Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 2006. / Bibliogr.: f. 192-200. Publié aussi en version électronique dans la Collection Mémoires et thèses électroniques.

The content of the diploma thesis entails proving of compatibility between liberal variant of multiculturalism and liberalism. Critique by Brian Barry this compatibility denies and understands liberal multiculturalism, which it personifies in Will Kymlicka, as illiberal. This critical view is related to the liberal-communitarian debate, through which are interpreted Brian Barrys critique as well as new conceptual elements in Will Kymlickas liberal multiculturalism that make it an update of modern liberalism. The thesis legitimizes this update, as well as firm attachment between liberal multiculturalism and liberalism through interpretation of Kymlickas postulates that is based on Rawls theory of justice and through establishing connection between those postulates and the wider postulates of liberalism.

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Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-05-11T15:32:26Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Odair Camati_.pdf: 1067364 bytes, checksum: 5f0ed114a31bc5d5fcfe07a390e1b15c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-11T15:32:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Odair Camati_.pdf: 1067364 bytes, checksum: 5f0ed114a31bc5d5fcfe07a390e1b15c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-21 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Neste trabalho sustentamos a tese de que o encontro entre as teorias de Charles Taylor e Will Kymlicka oferece boas perspectivas para o estabelecimento de um projeto multicultural em sociedades liberais e democráticas, mas possui limites quando da tentativa de universalização desse mesmo projeto. As dificuldades quanto à universalização se apresentam de formas distintas nos autores referidos. Para o liberal Kymlicka, os valores tradicionais do liberalismo são suficientes para o reconhecimento de todas as diferentes manifestações culturais. Com isso a universalidade estaria pré-concebida, o que, segundo nosso entendimento, impediria um diálogo construtivo com aqueles que não comungam os mesmos valores. Taylor, por sua vez, propõe um modelo de razão prática com raízes hermenêuticas que ofereceria elementos para o estabelecimento de juízos de valor com validade para todas as comunidades humanas que se colocassem em processo de compreensão mútua. As limitações residem na dificuldade para estabelecer condições mínimas para que esse processo se desenvolva sem distorções. Para chegar a esse momento, faremos antes uma retomada dos principais elementos envoltos nas discussões multiculturais no sentido de provar a necessidade de debater tal temática. Na sequência, apresentaremos criticamente os fundamentos conceituais desenvolvidos pelos filósofos canadenses em suas teorias do multiculturalismo. Basicamente, a autonomia é o conceito central em Kymlicka e o reconhecimento ocupa o mesmo espaço em Taylor. Por fim, a partir de um liberalismo brando, da não possibilidade de total neutralidade estatal e da valorização do contexto de escolha, propomos que existem elementos suficientes para desenvolver um projeto multicultural em sociedades liberais e democráticas. O que não significa, necessariamente, que temos elementos para um projeto multicultural com validade universal / In this work, I support the thesis that even though the encounter between Charles Taylor’s and Will Kymlicka’s theories offers good prospects for the establishment of a multicultural project in liberal and democratic societies, it has some limits when we try to universalize it. The difficulties regarding universalization are presented in different ways by the aforementioned authors. On the one hand, Kymlicka’s liberalism holds that the traditional values of liberalism are sufficient for the recognition of all different cultural manifestations. On this view, the universality would be preconceived, which, according to our understanding, would preclude a constructive dialogue with those who do not share the same values. On the other hand, Taylor proposes a model of practical reason with hermeneutical roots that would provide elements for the establishment of value judgments valid for all human communities that put themselves in a process of mutual understanding. The limitations of this model lie in the difficulty of establishing minimum conditions for this process to be developed without distortions. To get this point, we shall first take up the main elements involved in multicultural discussions in order to prove the need to discuss such issues. After that, we shall critically expose the conceptual foundations developed by both Canadian philosophers in their theories of multiculturalism. Basically, while autonomy is Kymlicka’s core concept, recognition is Taylor’s one. Finally, from a soft liberalism, which claims the lack of state neutrality and the valorization of the context of choice, we propose that the encounter between the two theories has enough elements to develop a multicultural project in societies that are both liberal and democratic. Yet this does not necessarily mean that we have elements for a multicultural project with universal validity.

Ce mémoire examine le rôle de la diversité dans une conception de la justice. Je débute en considérant l’abstraction de la différence impliquée dans le raisonnement utilisé pour arriver à une conception de la justice. Par la suite j’évalue le rôle des différences des groupes sociaux dans l’application des principes de justice, en considérant si la justice exige des droits individuels ou si les groupes peuvent revendiquer des droits différenciés. Ce mémoire utilise la position originale de John Rawls pour évaluer la première question, et sa conception de la personne et des groupes sociaux pour examiner la deuxième. Je soutiens que nous pouvons et devrions utiliser l’abstraction de la position originale, tant que nous sommes conscients de ses limites. Bien que sa conception politique de la personne soit également utile pour la défense des droits individuels, sa conception du groupe social n’est pas appropriée pour les groupes culturels ou historiquement opprimés, car il repose trop lourdement sur la notion d’association volontaire. J’analyse l’argument de Will Kymlicka concernant les droits minoritaires et j’enrichis la théorie de Rawls en ajoutant l’inégalité entre groupes. Je termine en examinant les problèmes concernant les minorités à l’intérieur des groupes minoritaires et conclue que les droits minoritaires ne sont justifiées que lorsqu’ils sont compatibles avec les droits individuels, et non pas quand ils renforcent une autre inégalité. Par conséquent, même si l’abstraction au niveau théorique est justifiée, les droits des groupes minoritaires exigeront qu’on porte une attention aux différences entres groupes, ainsi qu’à l’intérieur de ceux-ci. / This thesis examines the role of diversity in a conception of justice. I begin by considering the abstraction from difference involved in the reasoning used to arrive at a conception of justice. I then evaluate the role of social group difference in the application of principles of justice, considering whether justice demands principles that are the same for all in the form of individual rights or whether groups can claim differentiated rights. This thesis uses John Rawls’s original position to evaluate the first question, and his account of the self and social group to discuss the second. I argue that we can and should use the abstraction of the original position, so long as we are aware of its limits. While Rawls’s political conception of the self is also useful for defending individual rights, his account of the social group is inappropriate for cultural or historically oppressed groups, as it relies too heavily on the notion of voluntary association. I follow Will Kymlicka’s argument for minority rights and extend Rawls's theory to consider inequality between groups. I close by considering concerns regarding minorities within minorities, and conclude that minority rights are only justified when they are consistent with individual rights, not when they reinforce a different inequality. Therefore, even though the abstraction at the theoretical level is justified, minority rights for groups will require attention to the differences between groups, as well as within them.

Ce mémoire examine le rôle de la diversité dans une conception de la justice. Je débute en considérant l’abstraction de la différence impliquée dans le raisonnement utilisé pour arriver à une conception de la justice. Par la suite j’évalue le rôle des différences des groupes sociaux dans l’application des principes de justice, en considérant si la justice exige des droits individuels ou si les groupes peuvent revendiquer des droits différenciés. Ce mémoire utilise la position originale de John Rawls pour évaluer la première question, et sa conception de la personne et des groupes sociaux pour examiner la deuxième. Je soutiens que nous pouvons et devrions utiliser l’abstraction de la position originale, tant que nous sommes conscients de ses limites. Bien que sa conception politique de la personne soit également utile pour la défense des droits individuels, sa conception du groupe social n’est pas appropriée pour les groupes culturels ou historiquement opprimés, car il repose trop lourdement sur la notion d’association volontaire. J’analyse l’argument de Will Kymlicka concernant les droits minoritaires et j’enrichis la théorie de Rawls en ajoutant l’inégalité entre groupes. Je termine en examinant les problèmes concernant les minorités à l’intérieur des groupes minoritaires et conclue que les droits minoritaires ne sont justifiées que lorsqu’ils sont compatibles avec les droits individuels, et non pas quand ils renforcent une autre inégalité. Par conséquent, même si l’abstraction au niveau théorique est justifiée, les droits des groupes minoritaires exigeront qu’on porte une attention aux différences entres groupes, ainsi qu’à l’intérieur de ceux-ci. / This thesis examines the role of diversity in a conception of justice. I begin by considering the abstraction from difference involved in the reasoning used to arrive at a conception of justice. I then evaluate the role of social group difference in the application of principles of justice, considering whether justice demands principles that are the same for all in the form of individual rights or whether groups can claim differentiated rights. This thesis uses John Rawls’s original position to evaluate the first question, and his account of the self and social group to discuss the second. I argue that we can and should use the abstraction of the original position, so long as we are aware of its limits. While Rawls’s political conception of the self is also useful for defending individual rights, his account of the social group is inappropriate for cultural or historically oppressed groups, as it relies too heavily on the notion of voluntary association. I follow Will Kymlicka’s argument for minority rights and extend Rawls's theory to consider inequality between groups. I close by considering concerns regarding minorities within minorities, and conclude that minority rights are only justified when they are consistent with individual rights, not when they reinforce a different inequality. Therefore, even though the abstraction at the theoretical level is justified, minority rights for groups will require attention to the differences between groups, as well as within them.

Will Kymlicka’s seminal work on Multicultural Citizenship has done much to advance the case for minority rights worldwide. Agreeing with communitarians that culture is important, yet unwilling to relinquish liberal equality and fairness, Kymlicka builds on John Rawls’s monumental Theory of Justice to show group rights are not only accord with liberalism, but are its true fulfilment. Yet, while Kymlicka’s theory has received accolades for elegantly tying liberalism and culturalism together theoretically, it has been met with equal scepticism over the tenability of its praxis. In this book, I argue that much of the criticism wielded against Kymlicka’s theory results from his crucial reliance on the definition of societal cultures and the contradictions embedded therein. This is further compounded by the tendency of Kymlicka to neglect his commitment to dynamic culture and liberalism in favour of a monolithic treatment of culture, leading us down the path to illiberal conclusions. I suggest that for Kymlicka’s theory of “Multicultural Citizenship” to embrace a truly vibrant multiculturalism, the theory must overcome its internal contradictions and reaffirm its commitment to a multi-layered and recursive approach to group rights. I shall review the strengths and weaknesses of Kymlicka’s theory set against contemporary debates on the topics of nationalism and minority rights and will suggest how the theory can reduce its inner tensions to embolden its critical support for multiculturalism in Canada and worldwide.

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<p>Over the last few decades, the Swedish society has become more and more multicultural, which has resulted in the fact that the differences between different ethnic groups have become more and more noticed and debated. Studies have shown that persons belonging to minority groups are often wronged by majority decisions, which leaves the minorities in a disadvantageous position in relation to the majority. The scientific problem is how a state should compensate different minority groups for their disadvantaged position in order to be able to guarantee justice and equality for all individuals of the state.</p><p>The aim of this thesis is to examine the Swedish government’s attitude towards minority rights, and to analyse whether this coincides with Will Kymlicka’s normative minority rights theory. The research questions are:</p><p>• How should the majority society treat minorities according to Kymlicka?</p><p>• Which is Swedish minority policy’s stance on minority rights?</p><p>The methods used in this thesis include a qualitative text analysis and a field investigation among Finnish-speaking people living in Borlänge.</p><p>The conclusion of this essay is that the Swedish government in all likelihood has a positive attitude towards minority rights, since it has assigned group differentiated rights to the national minorities in Sweden. Furthermore, the Swedish government’s view on minority rights coincides to a great extent with Will Kymlicka’s normative theory.</p>

This thesis argues that to take into account only liberal interpretations of multicultural dilemmas would be insufficient and unrealistic in assessing the claims of justice for ethnocultural diversity. The current liberal approach as offered by Will Kymlicka is a good beginning for ethnic conflict management. However, his theory is marked by a number of limitations due to the fact that he operates only with the principles and norms of liberal institutions. In modern multiculturally constituted democracies, the presence and constant increase of cultural diversity challenges the self-understanding of liberal democracy. Kymlicka's liberal theory of multiculturalism has been challenged by several political theorists, who emphasize the insufficiency of his approach due its reliance on liberal readings of ethnic conflicts. [from Introduction, p. [1]]