The thesis is a study of how Chinese illegal tiger parts trading networks are organized. In particular, this thesis tests in a qualitative manner the causal relationship between three independent variables and the network organizations of these markets. The three independent variables are “ethnicity”, “level of enforcement” and “proximity to the source country”. The thesis also discusses the dynamics of the illegal transactions of tiger parts products. Legitimate meditators or dispute resolutions mechanisms are lacking in the underworld so the risks, which the parties undertake during trading, are far higher. This thesis explores how illegal transactions are enforced, carried out and honored in this trade. In order to map the organization of the tiger trade, I conducted fieldwork in three trading hubs across China: Lhasa. Kunming and Xining. I discovered five tiger parts trading networks, three of which specialized in the trading of tiger skins and two in tiger bones. Within these networks, the level of perceived but not the actual level of risk influences the decisions of the actors in the network. Entry into the network is easy when the perceived level of enforcement is low. In these settings, there is no ethnic restriction for entering the network; the supplier is willing to trade with anyone with a trustworthy reputation. On the other hand, accessibility to the network is strictly controlled when actors perceive a high level of enforcement in their operating environment. Under this setting, the organization of the network becomes more exclusive and ethnically homogenous, as shown in the Tibetan tiger skin-trading network in Lhasa and the tiger bone-trading network in Kunming. The proximity of the tiger source country to the re-distribution sites (fieldwork cities) also influences the organization of the networks. When the level of enforcement is low and the tiger source country is far away from the re-distribution sites, a monetary deposit is required in order to show that the buyer is serious about his/her request, as shown by the tiger skin-trading network in Kunming.

Based upon two years of ethnographic fieldwork in London, England, which incorporated nearly 200 interviews with gang members, gang associates, and police officers, among others, this thesis addresses three questions presently unresolved in the street gangs literature: What is the business of gangs? How are gangs organised? And how do gangs recruit? With regard the business of gangs, this thesis illustrates how recreation, crime, enterprise, and extra-legal governance represent sequential stages in the evolutionary cycle of London’s street gangs. Gang member testimony emphasises how gangs typically begin life as neighbourhood-based peer groups, but also how, in response to external threats and financial commitments, gangs grow to incorporate street-level drugs distribution businesses that very much resemble the multi-level marketing structure of direct-sales companies. People join gangs to make money, achieve status, and obtain protection. Gangs engage in turf wars, acquire violent resources, and develop hierarchical structures in order to maintain provision of these desirable goods and services. Gang organisation, in turn, becomes a function of gang business. To better understand the nature and extent of gang organisation, this thesis moves on to discuss the presence of subgroups, hierarchy and leadership, pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives, rules, responsibilities, and restrictions, and consequences for absconding within gangs. It further presents how, in order to convey reputation and achieve intimidation, gangs seek association with elements of popular culture that help promote their image. Finally, through the novel application of signalling theory to the gang recruitment process, this thesis demonstrates how gangs face a primary trust dilemma in their uncertainty over the quality of recruits. Given that none of the trust-warranting properties for gang membership can be readily discovered from observation, gangs look for observable signs correlated with these properties. Gangs face a secondary trust dilemma in their uncertainty over the reliability of signs because certain agents (e.g., police informants, rival gang members, and adventure-seekers) have incentives to mimic them. To overcome their informational asymmetry gangs thus screen for signs that are too costly for mimics to fake but affordable for the genuine article. The thesis concludes with a discussion of gang desistance and intervention in the context of escalating youth violence in London.

'Thieves-in-law' (vory-v-zakone in Russian or kanonieri qurdebi in Georgian) are career criminals belonging to a criminal fraternity that has existed at least since the 1930s in the Soviet Gulag. These actors still exist in one form or another in post-Soviet countries and have integrated into transnational organised criminal networks. For reasons yet to be explicated, thieves-in-law became exceptionally prevalent in the Soviet republic of Georgia. Here, by the 1990s, they formed a mafia network where this means criminal associations that attempt to monopolize protection in legal and illegal sectors of the economy. In 2005, Mikhail Saakashvili, the current president of Georgia claimed that 'in the past 15 years ... Georgia was not ruled by [former President] Shevardnadze, but by thieves-in-law.' Directly transferring anti-organised crime policy from Italy and America, Saakashvili's government made reform of the criminal justice system generally and an attack on the thieves-in-law specifically a cornerstone of the Rose Revolution. New legislation criminalises the possession of the status of ‘thief-in-law’ and of membership of criminal associations that constitute what is known as the ‘thieves’ world’ (qurduli samkaro). Along with a sweeping reform of the police and prisons and a ‘culture of lawfulness’ campaign, Georgian criminal justice reforms since 2003 may be seen as the first sustained anti-mafia policy to be implemented in a post-Soviet country. It also appears to have been very successful. The longevity and sudden decline of the thieves-in-law in Georgia provides the main questions that the following study addresses: How do we account for changes in the levels of resilience to state attack of actors carrying the elite criminal status of ‘thief-in-law’? How has this resilience been so effectively compromised since 2005? Utilising unique access to primary sources of data such as police files, court cases, archives and expert interviews this thesis studies the dynamics of changing mafia activities, recruitment practices, and structural forms of a criminal group as it relates to changes in the environment and, in particular, the recent anti-organised crime policy.

L’entreprise. Pour un dirigeant-entrepreneur de PME, les choses vont bien au-delà d’une simple entité économique ; il s’agit d’avantage d’une idée, d’un projet, plus que de simples considérations économiques. En plus de la maîtrise du marché économique, le dirigeant de l’entreprise doit également s’intéresser à d’autres préoccupations pour assurer la pérennité de son organisation, et notamment son environnement juridique. Celui-ci est une source de risques pour l’entreprise et son dirigeant, notamment de risque juridique de contentieux économique. Alors comment éviter la banqueroute ? Les dernières réformes législatives, traduisant les profondes mutations en matière de procédure civile, apportent des instruments de gouvernance juridique de l’entreprise permettant à son dirigeant de lutter contre le risque de contentieux économique. Comment ? Tantôt par l’instauration d’une obligation de prévention des risques via la mise en œuvre d’un plan de vigilance aux fins d’éviter la survenance d’un risque juridique ; tantôt par une résolution dé-judiciarisée ou privatisée, via le développement des modes amiables et alternatifs de résolution des différends, dès lors qu’un risque survient, pour éviter d’être confronté au contentieux économique, entendu en tant que procès civil traditionnel. Un tour d’horizon des possibilités qui s’offrent aux dirigeants-entrepreneurs de PME, pour un développement économique sécurisé, et assurer la pérennité de l’organisation dans un environnement juridique et social en perpétuelle évolution, brisant ainsi les frontières traditionnelles de la justice / A company. For a small or medium business, things go far beyond than just a simple economic organization. It is more about an idea, a project, than simple economic problematics. Besides grasping the economic market within, the business manager also needs to stay aware of other concerns, such as its legal environment. The latter is usualy complex, underrated and at the origin of many risks for the company and its CEO, such as economic litigation. Consequently, how avoid bankruptcy? Accordingly to the last legislative amendments that express many important transformations of civil procedure, the creation of new legal governance tools can help the entrepreneur to fight against economic litigation risks. How? Considering the fact that the amendments tend towards accountability, by establishing an obligation of risks prevention, and towards the empowerment of in house counsels by directly participating in the resolution of disputes, corporations has to enforce a legal governance that participates to the prevention of economic litigation. The thesis proposes a guide to legal governance of companies by first introducing a vigilance plan to alleviate any legal risk, and by recommending a private resolution solution through the recent raise of alternative dispute resolutions to avoid any economic litigation as a traditional civil lawsuit. Therefore, the thesis is an overview of all the options that entrepeneurs and business managers of small and medium companies have for a safe economic developement to ensure the sustainability of the organisation, in a perpetually evolving legal and social environment, going beyond traditional justice

Borderlands are critical security zones but remain poorly understood. In regions plagued by drug violence and conflict, violent groups compete for territorial control, cooperate in illegal cross-border activities, and substitute for the functions of the state in these areas. Despite undermining physical security, fuelling fear, and challenging the state’s sovereignty, the exact modi operandi of these groups are little known. Against this backdrop, this thesis explores how different interactions among violent non-state actors (VNSAs) in the Colombian-Ecuadorian and Colombian-Venezuelan borderlands impact on citizen security. These border areas attract rebels, paramilitaries and criminal organisations alike: they constitute geo-strategic corridors for the global cocaine industry and are sites of supply and operation for the major actors involved in Colombia’s decades-long armed internal conflict. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this thesis consolidates the literature on conflict, security and organised crime, borders and borderlands, and anthropological approaches to fear and violence. It integrates theories of cooperation among social actors with original empirical research. It is based on a comparative, multi-sited case-study design, using ethnographic methods complemented by quantitative data. The research involved over twelve months of fieldwork with 433 interviews and participant observation on both sides of the crisis-affected Colombia-Ecuador and Colombia-Venezuela borders, and in Bogotá, Caracas and Quito. Developing a typology of VNSA interactions, I argue that these create not only physical violence but also less visible types of insecurity: when VNSAs fight each other, citizens are exposed to violence but follow the rules imposed by the opposing parties. Fragile alliances produce uncertainty among communities and erode the social fabric by fuelling interpersonal mistrust. Where VNSAs provide security and are socially recognised, "shadow citizen security" arises: security based on undemocratic means. I show that the geography of borderlands reinforces the distinct impacts of VNSA arrangements on citizen security yet renders them less visible.

Since the late 1980s, efforts made by the international community to deal with the complex and global problem of money laundering have stimulated the creation and definition of the so-called 'international crime of money laundering', which is included in various United Nations and Council of Europe international treaties, as well as European Union Directives. The Central purpose of this thesis is to investigate if the main goal of effectiveness in the adaptation of the international crime of money laundering at the domestic level, might undermine other values that international law is seeking to protect, namely the guarantee of due process and the adequate protection of human rights principles. Then, if the adoption of any element of the crime shows to be inconsistent with civil rights and guarantees, to propose how deficiencies could be remedied.