O presente trabalho examina a interpretação das imunidades tributárias previstas no art. 150, VI, da Constituição Federal brasileira de 1988. Em primeiro lugar, são examinadas as teorias sobre a interpretação jurídica e conclui-se que a interpretação deve ser entendida como a construção do sentido do texto. No entanto, tal interpretação está limitada ao sentido literal possível do texto e, ademais, deve ser devidamente fundamentada, através do discurso argumentativo, de modo que a decisão possa ser intersubjetivamente controlada. Conclui-se que, no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, têm primazia os argumentos de natureza linguística e sistemática, visto que se referem diretamente à ordem jurídica vigente. E, dentre os argumentos sistemáticos, deve-se prestigiar aquele sentido que seja mais consentâneo com o princípio constitucional subjacente ao dispositivo a ser interpretado. As mesmas conclusões aplicam-se às normas de Direito Tributário, já que estão sujeitas aos mesmos métodos de interpretação aplicáveis às demais normas jurídicas. Contudo, deve ser ressaltado que as normas que estabelecem a incidência dos tributos, bem como os preceitos que fixam a competência, incluindo as imunidades, têm sua interpretação limitada ao sentido literal possível, sendo vedado o recurso à analogia. Diante disso, afirma-se que, na aplicação desses preceitos, devem ser considerados principalmente os argumentos linguísticos, que limitam a interpretação ao sentido possível do texto, e os argumentos sistemáticos, que estudam a relação das imunidades com as outras normas inseridas no ordenamento pátrio, especialmente os princípios constitucionais. Nesse estudo, deve ser examinada a função exercida pelas imunidades, que não apenas bloqueiam a instituição de tributos, como podem resguardar certas condutas e promover um estado de coisas desejado pelo Estado. Estabelecidas tais premissas, são examinadas as imunidades do art. 150, VI, da Constituição, tendo em vista as principais questões hoje debatidas pela doutrina e pela jurisprudência acerca desses preceitos. / This thesis examines the interpretation of the tax immunities provided for in article 150, VI, of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. Firstly, we will examine the main theories concerning juridical interpretation and we conclude that interpretation must be understood as the construction of the meaning of the text. However, the interpretation is limited to the possible literal meaning of the text and must also be fully justified, through an argumentative discourse, so that decisions can be controlled intersubjectivly. We conclude that, in light of Brazilian legal system, the linguistic and systematic arguments have precedence, since those arguments refer directly to the legal system now in force. Considering these systematic arguments, the interpreter should give precedence to the meaning that is more compatible with the principle underlying the provision subject to interpretation. The same conclusions apply to tax provisions, since they are subject to the same methods of interpretation applicable to other legal provisions. However, it should be stressed that the interpretation of provisions that regulate the incidence of taxes, as well as those that regulate taxation powers, including tax immunities, is limited to the possible literal meaning of the text, being forbidden the use of analogies. Therefore, in the interpretation of those provisions, we should consider mainly the linguistic arguments, which limit the interpretation to the possible meaning, and the systematic arguments, which study the relationship between tax immunities and other provisions of our legal system, especially the constitutional principles. In this study, it should be examined the functions performed by tax immunities, that not only prohibit taxation, but also can protect some types of conducts and promote a state of affairs desired by the State. Having established those premises, we examine the tax immunities provided for in article 150, VI, of Brazilian Constitution, in light of the main topics now debated by the literature and the case law concerning those provisions.

O presente trabalho examina a interpretação das imunidades tributárias previstas no art. 150, VI, da Constituição Federal brasileira de 1988. Em primeiro lugar, são examinadas as teorias sobre a interpretação jurídica e conclui-se que a interpretação deve ser entendida como a construção do sentido do texto. No entanto, tal interpretação está limitada ao sentido literal possível do texto e, ademais, deve ser devidamente fundamentada, através do discurso argumentativo, de modo que a decisão possa ser intersubjetivamente controlada. Conclui-se que, no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, têm primazia os argumentos de natureza linguística e sistemática, visto que se referem diretamente à ordem jurídica vigente. E, dentre os argumentos sistemáticos, deve-se prestigiar aquele sentido que seja mais consentâneo com o princípio constitucional subjacente ao dispositivo a ser interpretado. As mesmas conclusões aplicam-se às normas de Direito Tributário, já que estão sujeitas aos mesmos métodos de interpretação aplicáveis às demais normas jurídicas. Contudo, deve ser ressaltado que as normas que estabelecem a incidência dos tributos, bem como os preceitos que fixam a competência, incluindo as imunidades, têm sua interpretação limitada ao sentido literal possível, sendo vedado o recurso à analogia. Diante disso, afirma-se que, na aplicação desses preceitos, devem ser considerados principalmente os argumentos linguísticos, que limitam a interpretação ao sentido possível do texto, e os argumentos sistemáticos, que estudam a relação das imunidades com as outras normas inseridas no ordenamento pátrio, especialmente os princípios constitucionais. Nesse estudo, deve ser examinada a função exercida pelas imunidades, que não apenas bloqueiam a instituição de tributos, como podem resguardar certas condutas e promover um estado de coisas desejado pelo Estado. Estabelecidas tais premissas, são examinadas as imunidades do art. 150, VI, da Constituição, tendo em vista as principais questões hoje debatidas pela doutrina e pela jurisprudência acerca desses preceitos. / This thesis examines the interpretation of the tax immunities provided for in article 150, VI, of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. Firstly, we will examine the main theories concerning juridical interpretation and we conclude that interpretation must be understood as the construction of the meaning of the text. However, the interpretation is limited to the possible literal meaning of the text and must also be fully justified, through an argumentative discourse, so that decisions can be controlled intersubjectivly. We conclude that, in light of Brazilian legal system, the linguistic and systematic arguments have precedence, since those arguments refer directly to the legal system now in force. Considering these systematic arguments, the interpreter should give precedence to the meaning that is more compatible with the principle underlying the provision subject to interpretation. The same conclusions apply to tax provisions, since they are subject to the same methods of interpretation applicable to other legal provisions. However, it should be stressed that the interpretation of provisions that regulate the incidence of taxes, as well as those that regulate taxation powers, including tax immunities, is limited to the possible literal meaning of the text, being forbidden the use of analogies. Therefore, in the interpretation of those provisions, we should consider mainly the linguistic arguments, which limit the interpretation to the possible meaning, and the systematic arguments, which study the relationship between tax immunities and other provisions of our legal system, especially the constitutional principles. In this study, it should be examined the functions performed by tax immunities, that not only prohibit taxation, but also can protect some types of conducts and promote a state of affairs desired by the State. Having established those premises, we examine the tax immunities provided for in article 150, VI, of Brazilian Constitution, in light of the main topics now debated by the literature and the case law concerning those provisions.

Les rapports entre créanciers et débiteurs de sûretés sont sensibles. L’importance de l’opération garantie ajoutée au déséquilibre inhérent à la sûreté explique le contentieux foisonnant que la discipline connait. Ces rapports se retrouvent parfois perturbés par la commission d’une faute : c’est à l’étude de ce type de faute que la thèse est consacrée.Les définitions usuelles de la faute et de la sûreté ont pour trait commun l’obligation : la première est un manquement à une obligation, la seconde est une garantie de l’obligation. L’obligation se présente alors comme un instrument propice à l’analyse des comportements fautifs commis par les acteurs d’une sûreté. Plus encore, l’obligation se révèle être au fondement de la sûreté : toute garantie du crédit ne peut s’expliquer qu’en référence à cet élément.En effet, l’obligation peut se décomposer en deux rapports. Le rapport obligatoire concerne la prestation et le pouvoir de contrainte du créancier ; le rapport d’obligation marque l’assujettissement de la personne, les exigences comportementales qui l’astreignent. Seul ce second rapport est systématiquement issu d’une sûreté : les parties à une sûreté doivent, pour l’essentiel, conformer leur attitude au but de l’opération. Le rapport obligatoire constitue la perspective finale : la prestation en garantie de laquelle une sûreté a été constituée.La faute ne se manifeste toutefois pas de manière unitaire lorsqu’elle entrave une sûreté. Commise par le débiteur, elle est une altération de la chance supplémentaire de paiement reconnue au créancier. Commise par le créancier, elle consiste en une altération des chances de remboursement du débiteur de la sûreté personnelle ou en une atteinte au patrimoine du constituant d’une sûreté réelle.C’est enfin au sujet de la notion de sûreté que l’analyse de la faute révèle ses intérêts. Elle est l’occasion de suggérer une définition de la sûreté, de proposer des éléments de rationalisation du droit des sûretés mais aussi de limiter les occurrences de fautes et leurs conséquences parfois délétères. / The relations between guarantee creditors and debtors are sensitive ones. The importance of the secured transaction, added to the unbalance of the guarantee explains the abundant litigation in this field. These relations are sometimes disturbed by the commission of a fault: the purpose of this thesis is to study this type of fault.The definitions of fault and guarantee have obligation as a common feature. A fault is an obligation breach, a guarantee protects the performance of an obligation. Thus, obligation appears to be a useful tool to analyze guilty behaviours in secured credit law. Moreover, obligation turns out to be the basis of guarantee: every credit guarantee is to be explained in reference to this element.As a matter of fact, the obligation can be broken down in two links. The obligatory link is about the benefit and the creditor’s enforcement power; the obligation link corresponds to the person subjugation, the behavioural requirements that he musts respect. Only this second link is systematically generated by a guarantee: the parties must essentially comply with the aim of the transaction. The obligatory link is the final prospect: the benefit, which a guarantee was established to protect.Nevertheless, the fault doesn’t manifest itself unitarily when it hinders a guarantee. The fault of the debtor is an alteration of the creditor’s additional opportunity to be paid. The fault of the creditor can be an alteration of debtor’s ability to refund or a violation of his estate, whether it is a personal safety or a property right securing payment.Eventually, it is regarding the guarantee concept that the analysis of fault reveals its interests. This analysis is an opportunity to suggest a definition of guarantee, to propose some elements in order to rationalise secured credit law but also to reduce fault occurrences and some of their deleterious effects.STAR

L’étude proposée soutient que le droit constitutionnel offre un cadre privilégié pour observer les relations extérieures de l’État. L’approche envisage de les appréhender à la fois au prisme de l’État lui-même, qu’à travers l’action des organes compétents organisés dans l’État. Cette étude entend ainsi mettre en lumière les spécificités institutionnelles et normatives des relations extérieures de l’État. Lorsque celui-ci établit des rapports à l’extérieur de ses frontières au moyen de ses outils diplomatique et militaire, il assume un rôle singulier en comparaison des autres unités politiques non étatiques. En effet, il remplit une fonction-fin, au sens de Charles EISENMANN, propre à la matière des relations extérieures. Cette fonction politique est assurée par l’État afin de répondre à un besoin de la collectivité souveraine, à savoir nouer de «bons rapports» au-dehors de son territoire – sans préjuger si la relation en cause est conflictuelle ou coopérative.En raison de l’imbrication du droit et du politique, la fonction des relations extérieures de l’État, si elle ne préjuge pas de la répartition des compétences au sein de celui-ci, n’est pas sans influencer les choix du constituant et la pratique des organes habilités. Placée à l’interface entre le dedans et le dehors de l’État, l’analyse constitutionnelle permet alors de réinterroger plusieurs éléments souvent présentés comme relevant de l’évidence. L’étude conduit autant à les examiner, qu’à en observer les effets. Ainsi est-il possible, par exemple, de relativiser le monopole étatique des relations extérieures ou encore de tempérer, au regard de l’histoire, la concentration gouvernementale de la direction des affaires extérieures. / This study presents constitutional law as an ideal framework to analyze the foreign relations of the State. Through a double standpoint, it examines these relations from the State’s perspective and through the action of the empowered organs of the State. In this way, the study aims to highlight the institutional and normative specificities of State’s foreign relations. When the State establishes diplomatic and military relations at the outer-limits of its borders, it assumes a singular role compared to other political non-state unities. It performs a political function (fonction-fin), as defined by Charles EISENMANN, which belongs to the field of foreign relations. This political function is hold by the State in order to fulfill one basic need of the sovereign collectivity : to establish and to maintain “good relations” outside its boundaries – irrespective of the conflictual or cooperative nature of these relations. Because law and politics are intertwined, the function of foreign relations do not pre-define the distribution of powers within the State. Nevertheless, it exerts some influence on the constituent’s choices and on the practices of the empowered organs. At the interface between the State’s interior and exterior, constitutional analysis enables therefore to reexamine many elements usually taken as evident. This study assesses them and observe its effects. For example, it is possible to nuance the State’s monopoly on foreign relations and, through a historical perspective, to moderate the governmental concentration of the direction of foreign affairs.

Pour une doctrine actuellement majoritaire, le contrat désigne l’acte juridique donnant exclusivement naissance à des obligations, soit une contrainte pesant sur la seule personne des parties. Cette approche subjectiviste du contrat fait obstacle à ce qu’il puisse être justifié que certains actes relatifs à une chose se doublent d’un effet réel, c'est-à-dire, d’une limite assignée au libre exercice des prérogatives juridiques relatives à la chose objet du contrat. En consentant à l’acte, le débiteur ne s’oblige pas seulement ; il s’engage à permettre la réalisation du contrat. Le sujet renonce à une part d’autonomie juridique, laquelle se traduit notamment par l’affectation du bien et donc par une perte du libre exercice de sa prérogative sur la chose. À l’effet personnel du contrat s’ajoute un effet réel. La prise en compte de l’effet réel du contrat permet de résoudre, par exemple, les difficultés liées à la détermination de la portée de l’engagement consenti par le propriétaire engagé à une promesse unilatérale, d’expliquer la situation du bailleur ou encore celle de l’apporteur d’un bien en propriété à une société. Inconnu du Code civil et des divers projets de réforme du droit des obligations, mais encore de la doctrine, l’effet réel du contrat ne peut être traduit à l’aide d’une notion existante. L’étude menée suppose donc de procéder à l’élaboration tant de la notion d’effet réel du contrat que d’un régime spécifique. Au terme de cette étude, il est conclu que la consécration de la notion d’effet réel du contrat permet d’appréhender l’ensemble des manifestations de l’engagement contractuel. / For the dominant legal doctrine, a contract is an act creating obligations between parties. This subjective approach, centered on the parties’ personal liability tends to preclude any justification of a potential effect in rem – i.e. a limit to the free exercise of legal powers on the subject matter of the contract. By agreeing to the contract, the contractor not only takes on an obligation, but also pledges to allow the completion of the contract, which implies his submission to a limitation of his rights, especially those relevant to the subject matter of the contract. In addition, as it may carry an assignment of property, a contract cannot be reduced to a simple creation of obligations. The admission of effets in rem makes it possible to establish the duties of an owner bound by a unilateral promise to sell and to explain the commitment of a lessor or of a shareholder bringing assets into the business. Ignored by law and by doctrine, the in rem effect of a contract cannot be fully understood through pre-existing notions. The subject of the study therefore consists in developing an entire theory of effect in rem of contract. In conclusion, it will appear that its recognition is a necessity to fully measure the scope of contractual liability.