Depuis les années 1990, le droit d’établissement des sociétés a connu une évolution sans précédent au sein du marché intérieur. En tant qu’opérateurs économiques, les sociétés devaient être les premières bénéficiaires de ce marché. Force est de constater qu’il n’existe toujours pas de véritable droit européen des sociétés. Cette carence normative a été comblée par l’action normative de la Cour de justice afin d’offrir aux sociétés les instruments juridiques nécessaires à leur mobilité. C’est ce qui ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne qui est allée bien au-delà d’une simple coordination des droits nationaux. En effet, il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice qu’elle a profondément influencé la condition juridique des sociétés puisque la Cour a bouleversé la notion même d’établissement. Partant, le droit d’établissement, le droit européen d’établissement des sociétés apparaît alors comme un droit subjectif à la mobilité. Si le rattachement des sociétés au territoire d’un Etat constitue une condition inhérente à leur existence, l’exercice du droit d’établissement permet de faciliter la mobilité de celles-ci sans pour autant remettre en cause les compétences des États qui restent les seuls à déterminer les conditions de création et de fonctionnement des sociétés. Dès lors, le droit d’établissement apparaît comme un droit subjectif procédural. / The right of establishment of companies had an unprecedented evolution within the domestic market since 1990. As economic operators, companies should be the first beneficiaries of this market. Unfortunately there is still no true European Company Law. This weakness was filled by normative action of the Court of Justice in order to give Companies the legal instruments necessary for their mobility. When we look closer to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, we can note that she did way more than a simple coordination of national laws. Indeed this jurisprudence has deeply changed companies’ legal conditions because the Court has disrupted the notion of establishment itself. Company European right of establishment then becomes a subjective right to mobility. The connection of companies to the law of a country is necessary to their legal existence. However the exercise of the right of establishment made companies mobility easier without questioning States abilities. Indeed only States can decide on the legal condition of creation and functioning of companies. Based on that, the right of establishment appears as a procedural subjective right.

This paper explores some of the main contributions developed bylegal theory in favour of social rights enforcement. The first part is devotedto the concept of subjective right and particularly to the conceptions due toRobert Alexy and Luigi Ferrajoli. The second part includes the analysis ofthe relationship between social rights and the principle of equality. Specialattention will be given to Luis Prieto’s theory. Finally, both post-positivisticand neo-constitutionalistic theories of Law will be evaluated in terms of theirdegree of recognition and defence of social rights. / En este trabajo se exponen algunas de las principales contribuciones de la teoría del Derecho a la exigibilidad de los derechos sociales. La primera parte está dedicada al concepto de derecho subjetivo y especialmente a las propuestas de Robert Alexy y Luigi Ferrajoli. En la segunda parte, se analiza la relación de los derechos sociales con el principio de igualdad y, más concretamente, la propuesta de Luis Prieto. Finalmente, se exploran las posibilidades que tanto la teoría pospositivista del Derecho como la neoconstitucionalista ofrecen para un mayor grado de reconocimiento y eficacia de los derechos sociales.

Dans l’entreprise, la responsabilité de l’employeur découle classiquement de la reconnaissance de pouvoirs. Un tel constat peut-il être établi au sujet des représentants des salariés ? Répondre à cette question suppose que soit identifiée la nature des prérogatives qui sont confiées par le code du travail aux titulaires de mandat électifs, ou syndicaux, au sein de l’entreprise. Cette étude a donc pour objectif de proposer une qualification des attributions des représentants du personnel puis d’en tirer conséquence sur le plan de la responsabilité.L’analyse des caractéristiques de ces attributions conduit à rattacher celles-ci, pour l’essentiel,à la catégorie des droits-fonctions et à exclure souvent la qualification de pouvoir. Ce choix n’a cependant pas pour effet d’écarter toute responsabilité du titulaire du mandat, comme on aurait pu le supposer. La qualification de droit-fonction appelle un régime de responsabilité original et particulièrement adapté à la mission des représentants des salariés au sein de l’entreprise. Elle permet, notamment, de sanctionner le manquement au devoir d’agir.L’absence de pouvoir des représentants du personnel ne s’accompagne donc pas d’une totale immunité. / In the business world, the liability of the employer or its representatives is related to their powers. Is it the same concerning the staff representatives ? Answering this question need to determine the nature of the powers available to the mandate holders. Thus, the aim of thisstudy is to propose a classification of the functions of staff representatives, as presented in theLabour regulations. Analyzing their nature leads to put them essentially in the category offunction-rights and often not in the category of the powers. The consequence is not, as expected, the rejection of any responsibility. The label of function-rights leads to an original system of liability, which is able to punish the default of duty to act. The lack of power ofstaff representatives does not mean immunity.

Le recours aux soins est chose quotidienne pour l'ensemble des individus. Ces derniers sont effectivement soumis dans leur quotidien à la contrainte médicale émanant du "droit-créance" à la protection de la santé prévu à l'alinéa 11 du Préambule de la Constitution de 1946. Néanmoins, parallèlement à ce développement de l'accès aux soins, s'est dégagé le droit subjectif à la santé qui interdit toute atteinte à la santé de l'individu. Ces deux acceptions du droit à la santé interagissent au point que la première devienne une véritable contrainte pour la seconde. Il est donc indispensable de trouver des solutions afin qu'un équilibre puisse s'établir entre ces deux conceptions. Le consentement aux soins du patient constitue valablement une conséquence de la conception subjective du droit à la santé. Consacré par la loi du 04 mars 2002, relative aux droits des patients, le droit au consentement ne dispose d'aucun rattachement à une norme fondamentale opératoire, pour l'heure. Il se trouve en réalité souvent atteint par le recours imposé aux soins. Cette étude s'attache donc à démontrer que le droit au consentement aux soins présente une effectivité relative et qu'il est alors indispensable de le rattacher à des droits fondamentaux préexistant / The appeal(recourse) to the care is daily thing for all the individuals. The latter are actually subjected(submitted) in their everyday life(daily paper) to the medical emanating constraint of "right-claim"("right-debt","law-claim") in the protection of the health planned in the paragraph 11 of the Introduction of the Constitution of 1946. Nevertheless, in a parallel to(at the same time as) this development of the access to healthcare, got free the subjective right(law) for the health which forbids any infringement(achievement) on the health of the individual. These two meanings of a word of the right(law) for the health interact to the point that the first one(night) becomes a real constraint for second. It is thus essential to find solutions so that a balance can become established between these two conceptions(designs). The consent in the care of the patient establishes(constitutes) validly a consequence of the subjective conception(design) of the right(law) for the health. Dedicated by the law of March 04th, 2002, relative to the rights of the patients, the right(law) for the consent arranges no fastening with an operating fundamental standard, for the moment. He(it) is in reality often reached(affected) by the appeal(recourse) compulsory for the care. This study thus attempts to demonstrate that the right(law) for the consent in the care presents a relative effectiveness and that it is then essential to connect him(it) with pre-existent fundamental right

A bolsa de estudo para o ensino fundamental privado, financiada com recursos da educação pública, está prevista na CF/88 e na LDB/96 em caráter excepcional para atender ao direito público subjetivo de acesso ao ensino fundamental. Trata-se de uma excepcionalidade, pois a Lei permite o uso deste instituto sob três condições: quando não houver vaga na escola pública próxima à residência da criança, quando a criança não possuir recursos para financiar o próprio estudo em escola privada, e como conseqüência, o poder público obrigado a investir prioritariamente na solução da falta de vagas na local de moradia do aluno bolsista. Em resumo a bolsa deve ser transitória. A pesquisa tomou o caso de Nova Iguaçu/RJ, centrandose nos anos de 1997 a 2008, no entanto, mostrou que esse Município tem concedido bolsas de estudo de forma recorrente desde, no mínimo 1990, e no mesmo lugar e a crianças não necessariamente carentes, pois a maior parte delas já estava na escola quando receberam bolsa. O que caracteriza a sua ilegalidade, a sua inconstitucionalidade. A pesquisa objetivou entender a natureza da política de concessão de bolsas no âmbito deste Município. A hipótese de que a concessão de bolsas, mais do que uma resposta ao direito público subjetivo, seria uma forma de desviar recursos públicos à escola privada, pautada pelo clientelismo e pela troca de favores foi corroborada pela pesquisa. Para tanto, recorreu-se a uma combinação de métodos de pesquisa, ao paradigma indiciário e ao materialismo histórico. Procedeu-se a consultas a documentos do Município e a entrevistas com gestores da educação pública, da escola privada, políticos, lideranças sindicato dos trabalhadores da educação do Município, conselheiros na área da educação e aos próprios bolsistas. Constatou-se, sobretudo até o final de 2004, devido à forma sub-reptícia e à falta de transparência pública na sua concessão, que, até a sua extinção em 2008 pelo Governo Municipal, a sociedade civil enfrentou imensas dificuldades para exercer o papel de cidadão no controle social sobre esta política pública. / State-funded grants for private schools operating in the compulsory education sector (comprising 8 years) are provided for in the Federal Constitution of 1988 and the General Law of Education of 1996 as an exception to fulfill the public subjective right of access to the 8 years of compulsory education. This is an exception, for the law allows said grants under three conditions: when there is no place available in the State school near the child home, when the child has not funds to pay his own fees in a private school and, as a result, the State should prioritarily invest to solve the lack of places in the place of residence of the pupil with a grant. In short, the grant should be provisional. This research examined the case of the municipality of Nova Iguaçu, in the State of Rio de Janeiro, between 1997 and 2008. It found that the local government has consistently given grants since at least 1990, always in the same place and with the same schools for children not necessarily deprived, for most of them were already at school when they were given a grant, which indicates the illegal and nonconstitutional nature of the grants. The research sought to understand the nature of the grant awarding policy in this local government and confirmed the hypothesis that, the awarding of grants, far from being an answer to the subjective public right of access to education, would be a way of channelling public funds to private schools, based on clientelism and exchange of favours. To do this, the research employed a combination of research methods, the criticalhistorical approach and the index paradigm. Local government documents were examined and interviews were carried out with State education and private school administrators, politicians, leaders of the local government education workers\' union, education councillors and those legally responsible for the children who were given the grants. It was found, up to its extinction, in 2008, particularly until the end of 2004, owing to the subreptitious form and the lack of public transparency in the grant awarding, that civil society faced immense difficulties to perform the citizen role of social control over this public policy.

The work is developed through a study about historic origin of the principle of segregation of the powers until its modern functional concept, aiming at demonstrating that it is not incompatible with the popular control of the effectiveness of the fundamental social rights through judicial function. Following, it was tried to give evidence to which must be the juridical of the state financial limitations as a main factor to the fundamental social rights, and the way they have to be faced in the process ambient. Finally, the work was submitted to the norms of the fundamental social rights with the approval of the juridical concept of the subjective right in order to give them the attribute of subjective pretension. / O trabalho se desenvolve a partir do estudo da origem histórica do princípio da separação dos poderes estatais até a sua moderna concepção funcional, com o propósito de demonstrar que o mesmo não se incompatibiliza com o controle popular da efetividade dos direitos fundamentais sociais por meio da função judicial. Na seqüência, buscou-se evidenciar qual deve ser o conteúdo jurídico das limitações financeiras estatais como fator condicionante da efetividade dos direitos fundamentais sociais e a forma como devem ser enfrentadas no ambiente do processo. Por fim, o trabalho submeteu as normas de direitos fundamentais sociais ao crivo do conceito jurídico de direito subjetivo com o fim de conferir-lhes o atributo da pretensão judicial.

A bolsa de estudo para o ensino fundamental privado, financiada com recursos da educação pública, está prevista na CF/88 e na LDB/96 em caráter excepcional para atender ao direito público subjetivo de acesso ao ensino fundamental. Trata-se de uma excepcionalidade, pois a Lei permite o uso deste instituto sob três condições: quando não houver vaga na escola pública próxima à residência da criança, quando a criança não possuir recursos para financiar o próprio estudo em escola privada, e como conseqüência, o poder público obrigado a investir prioritariamente na solução da falta de vagas na local de moradia do aluno bolsista. Em resumo a bolsa deve ser transitória. A pesquisa tomou o caso de Nova Iguaçu/RJ, centrandose nos anos de 1997 a 2008, no entanto, mostrou que esse Município tem concedido bolsas de estudo de forma recorrente desde, no mínimo 1990, e no mesmo lugar e a crianças não necessariamente carentes, pois a maior parte delas já estava na escola quando receberam bolsa. O que caracteriza a sua ilegalidade, a sua inconstitucionalidade. A pesquisa objetivou entender a natureza da política de concessão de bolsas no âmbito deste Município. A hipótese de que a concessão de bolsas, mais do que uma resposta ao direito público subjetivo, seria uma forma de desviar recursos públicos à escola privada, pautada pelo clientelismo e pela troca de favores foi corroborada pela pesquisa. Para tanto, recorreu-se a uma combinação de métodos de pesquisa, ao paradigma indiciário e ao materialismo histórico. Procedeu-se a consultas a documentos do Município e a entrevistas com gestores da educação pública, da escola privada, políticos, lideranças sindicato dos trabalhadores da educação do Município, conselheiros na área da educação e aos próprios bolsistas. Constatou-se, sobretudo até o final de 2004, devido à forma sub-reptícia e à falta de transparência pública na sua concessão, que, até a sua extinção em 2008 pelo Governo Municipal, a sociedade civil enfrentou imensas dificuldades para exercer o papel de cidadão no controle social sobre esta política pública. / State-funded grants for private schools operating in the compulsory education sector (comprising 8 years) are provided for in the Federal Constitution of 1988 and the General Law of Education of 1996 as an exception to fulfill the public subjective right of access to the 8 years of compulsory education. This is an exception, for the law allows said grants under three conditions: when there is no place available in the State school near the child home, when the child has not funds to pay his own fees in a private school and, as a result, the State should prioritarily invest to solve the lack of places in the place of residence of the pupil with a grant. In short, the grant should be provisional. This research examined the case of the municipality of Nova Iguaçu, in the State of Rio de Janeiro, between 1997 and 2008. It found that the local government has consistently given grants since at least 1990, always in the same place and with the same schools for children not necessarily deprived, for most of them were already at school when they were given a grant, which indicates the illegal and nonconstitutional nature of the grants. The research sought to understand the nature of the grant awarding policy in this local government and confirmed the hypothesis that, the awarding of grants, far from being an answer to the subjective public right of access to education, would be a way of channelling public funds to private schools, based on clientelism and exchange of favours. To do this, the research employed a combination of research methods, the criticalhistorical approach and the index paradigm. Local government documents were examined and interviews were carried out with State education and private school administrators, politicians, leaders of the local government education workers\' union, education councillors and those legally responsible for the children who were given the grants. It was found, up to its extinction, in 2008, particularly until the end of 2004, owing to the subreptitious form and the lack of public transparency in the grant awarding, that civil society faced immense difficulties to perform the citizen role of social control over this public policy.

La révolution de 1789 fit émerger, face à une société jusqu’alors conçue comme une entité, un nouvel individu désireux d’affirmer sa singularité. À la morale chrétienne qui se réfère à Dieu, les philosophes du XVIIIe siècle, et plus particulièrement Kant, ont voulu substituer une morale où l’homme serait, selon le mot de Protagoras, mesure de toutes choses. Cependant, l’individu devait encore se conformer à ce que Kant nomme l’impératif catégorique, et supporter une adhésion forcée à des valeurs communes. La morale a été progressivement ressentie comme autoritaire et illégitime ; certains ont voulu ne voir en elle que les valeurs d’une société bourgeoise. Les années 1960 donnèrent donc naissance à une morale individuelle, qui a pris le nom d’éthique. Ces bouleversements n’ont pas été sans répercussions profondes sur le droit des personnes et de la famille. Aussi les bonnes moeurs ont-elles disparu du droit de la famille pour laisser la place en droit des personnes à la dignité humaine : à la conception d’un droit-modèle succéda celle d’un droit-principe. La notion de dignité ne fut consacrée dans le Code civil français que fort tardivement, ce qui explique l’absence de consensus concernant sa définition. On peut regretter qu’une telle fragilité ait pu entraîner la dilution de ce principe, voire sa transformation en un droit subjectif ; elle n’oppose alors qu’une faible résistance à l’avènement de l’autonomie personnelle, construite en porte-à-faux par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur l’article 8 et le consentement de l’individu. Dans cette sphère européenne, l’individu a gagné le droit d’opérer des choix sur son corps, quelque dangereux qu’ils soient, et peut-être même la liberté de renoncer au bénéfice des droits énoncés dans la Convention. Il apparaît donc essentiel de redéfinir la dignité, rempart contre la réification de l’être humain, autour des concepts de liberté et d’égalité. Dès lors, d’une logique néfaste de concurrence entre la dignité et l’autonomie, pourra renaître un véritable rapport de complémentarité et de hiérarchie / After the French revolution, in front of a holist society hitherto, the willingness of a new individual to affirm his singularity did emerge. Whilst the Christian morality referred to God, the XVIIIth century philosophers, especially Kant, wanted to substitute a morality where, according to the words of Protagoras, man would be the measure of anythings. The individual, however, still had to conform to what Kant names the categorical imperative, and to support for shared values. The morality became gradually felt as authoritative and illegitimate, the middle-class values. The 60’s let rise an individual morality, which took the name of ethics. These upheavals were not without major effects on law of persons and family law. Boni mores disappeared therefore from family law to give way to human dignity in law of persons: to the conception of a model law that of a principle law did succeed. The concept of dignity was only tardily devoted in the Civil code: that could explain the absence of consensus concerning its definition. One can consider it regrettable that such a fragility could involve the dilution of this principle, and even its transformation into a subjective right; it does not oppose whereas a low resistance to the advent of personal autonomy, awkwardly built by the European Court of the human rights on the article 8 and the individual consent. The individual gained the right to operate choices on his body, however dangerous they are, and perhaps even freedom to give up the benefit of rights stated in the Convention. It thus appears essential to redefine dignity, a rampart against the reification of human being,around the concepts of freedom and equality. Consequently, from a harmful logic of competition between dignity and autonomy, a true relation of complementarity and hierarchy between these two concepts will be able to reappear.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 REGINA MARIA DE MARCHI GARCIA.pdf: 1391741 bytes, checksum: 6d8fa960a4d5cd6e5e8da27c1590f792 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-17 / In this work we will do an analysis of the rights of children and adolescents within 20 (twenty) years from the Statute, by centralizing our study on right to education professional. In Brazil, since the time of colonisation until today, we found violations of the rights of children and adolescents. In the course of history, there was a big change design and treatment of children and adolescents. This design change has slowly and gradually. Today, there is great difficulty to commit the rights envisaged in the text of the Constitution, even those minimum guarantees taken as to the development of the subject. In relation to the central theme of this work, the right to professional education of adolescents, that judge is disqualified from public subjective rights rol that constitute the minimum "existential", the situation is no different. Hence the importance of examining the prospects for its fulfillment. This work aims to demonstrate that the right to vocational education represents a mechanism of personal development of adolescents and society itself. However, the State is being omitted in the execution of that right. So, we will teach the way to combat this omission in order to ensure the minimum requirements needed to ensure that the teen is properly trained at work and at school. That way, because it is fully effective standard and immediate applicability, leads to the doors of the judiciary. Therefore, the dismissal of jurisdiction is the legitimate and effective mechanism to facilitate the implementation of the right to professional education, already aimed at compliance with the Constitution / Neste estudo faremos uma análise dos direitos da criança e do adolescente, especificamente nos vinte anos do Estatuto, centralizando-o no direito à educação profissional. No Brasil, desde a época da Colonização até os dias de hoje, constatamos violações aos direitos da infância e adolescência. No decorrer da História, houve uma grande mudança de concepção e de tratamento das crianças e adolescentes. Essa mudança de concepção deu-se de forma lenta e gradativa. Hoje, há uma grande dificuldade de se efetivar os direitos preconizados no texto da Constituição, até mesmo aquelas garantias tidas como mínimas ao desenvolvimento do sujeito. Em relação ao tema central do presente trabalho, o direito à educação profissional dos adolescentes, que julgamos fazer parte do rol de direitos públicos subjetivos que constituem o mínimo existencial , a situação não é diferente. Daí a importância de analisarmos as perspectivas de sua efetivação. Este trabalho tem por finalidade demonstrar que o direito à educação profissional representa um mecanismo de desenvolvimento pessoal do adolescente e da própria sociedade; porém, o Estado está sendo omisso na efetivação desse direito. Assim, ensinaremos o caminho para o combate dessa omissão de modo a garantir os requisitos mínimos necessários, para que o adolescente seja adequadamente capacitado no trabalho e na escola. Caminho esse que, por se tratar de norma de eficácia plena e aplicabilidade imediata, leva às portas do Poder Judiciário. Pois, o provimento jurisdicional é o mecanismo legítimo e eficaz para viabilizar a efetivação do direito à educação profissional, já que tem por finalidade o cumprimento da Constituição

Pour une doctrine actuellement majoritaire, le contrat désigne l’acte juridique donnant exclusivement naissance à des obligations, soit une contrainte pesant sur la seule personne des parties. Cette approche subjectiviste du contrat fait obstacle à ce qu’il puisse être justifié que certains actes relatifs à une chose se doublent d’un effet réel, c'est-à-dire, d’une limite assignée au libre exercice des prérogatives juridiques relatives à la chose objet du contrat. En consentant à l’acte, le débiteur ne s’oblige pas seulement ; il s’engage à permettre la réalisation du contrat. Le sujet renonce à une part d’autonomie juridique, laquelle se traduit notamment par l’affectation du bien et donc par une perte du libre exercice de sa prérogative sur la chose. À l’effet personnel du contrat s’ajoute un effet réel. La prise en compte de l’effet réel du contrat permet de résoudre, par exemple, les difficultés liées à la détermination de la portée de l’engagement consenti par le propriétaire engagé à une promesse unilatérale, d’expliquer la situation du bailleur ou encore celle de l’apporteur d’un bien en propriété à une société. Inconnu du Code civil et des divers projets de réforme du droit des obligations, mais encore de la doctrine, l’effet réel du contrat ne peut être traduit à l’aide d’une notion existante. L’étude menée suppose donc de procéder à l’élaboration tant de la notion d’effet réel du contrat que d’un régime spécifique. Au terme de cette étude, il est conclu que la consécration de la notion d’effet réel du contrat permet d’appréhender l’ensemble des manifestations de l’engagement contractuel. / For the dominant legal doctrine, a contract is an act creating obligations between parties. This subjective approach, centered on the parties’ personal liability tends to preclude any justification of a potential effect in rem – i.e. a limit to the free exercise of legal powers on the subject matter of the contract. By agreeing to the contract, the contractor not only takes on an obligation, but also pledges to allow the completion of the contract, which implies his submission to a limitation of his rights, especially those relevant to the subject matter of the contract. In addition, as it may carry an assignment of property, a contract cannot be reduced to a simple creation of obligations. The admission of effets in rem makes it possible to establish the duties of an owner bound by a unilateral promise to sell and to explain the commitment of a lessor or of a shareholder bringing assets into the business. Ignored by law and by doctrine, the in rem effect of a contract cannot be fully understood through pre-existing notions. The subject of the study therefore consists in developing an entire theory of effect in rem of contract. In conclusion, it will appear that its recognition is a necessity to fully measure the scope of contractual liability.