In examining the role of the �legal rule� in Indonesian law, and in particular environmental law related to water quality management, this thesis questions the often expressed view that laws in Indonesia are sound, they merely fail to be implemented. It proposes that this appraisal of the situation does not take a sufficiently deep assessment and that a cause for non-implementation lies within the drafting of the laws themselves. It is argued that the ineffective system for environmental protection in Indonesia can be related to a failure to recognise the role of the �legal rule� in environmental law. A proposition presented in this thesis is that the arrangements for environmental law making in Indonesia lacks a strong rule foundation and, for this reason, it is not capable of producing shared understandings by lawmakers about producing and reproducing environmental law as legal sub-system. Another central proposition is that Indonesian environmental law has a form and style, which negates the role of the legal rule in environmental management and control. Despite the changes brought by reformasi, the central position of the legal rule in environmental law and, indeed, the necessary rule foundation to the development of the legal system, has yet to achieve full recognition. If this situation is related to the system of water quality management and pollution control in Indonesia, it can be seen that environmental improvement will not be achieved until underlying issues concerning the structure, form and style of environmental law making are addressed.

In examining the role of the �legal rule� in Indonesian law, and in particular environmental law related to water quality management, this thesis questions the often expressed view that laws in Indonesia are sound, they merely fail to be implemented. It proposes that this appraisal of the situation does not take a sufficiently deep assessment and that a cause for non-implementation lies within the drafting of the laws themselves. It is argued that the ineffective system for environmental protection in Indonesia can be related to a failure to recognise the role of the �legal rule� in environmental law. A proposition presented in this thesis is that the arrangements for environmental law making in Indonesia lacks a strong rule foundation and, for this reason, it is not capable of producing shared understandings by lawmakers about producing and reproducing environmental law as legal sub-system. Another central proposition is that Indonesian environmental law has a form and style, which negates the role of the legal rule in environmental management and control. Despite the changes brought by reformasi, the central position of the legal rule in environmental law and, indeed, the necessary rule foundation to the development of the legal system, has yet to achieve full recognition. If this situation is related to the system of water quality management and pollution control in Indonesia, it can be seen that environmental improvement will not be achieved until underlying issues concerning the structure, form and style of environmental law making are addressed.

This thesis; apart from an introduction of the concept of legal principles, their importance and settlement of their conflicts; deals with an analysis of legal provisions relating to the legal principles and policies in the first, general section, Chapter I of the Civil Code, as these are the primary provisions with relevance to the entire private law. It further evaluates state of the current legislation and its positive and negative aspects. It focuses in detail on the principle of fairness, as it is a principle aiming for an important improvement of legal relations. It also deals with the key interrelated principles of the civil law - the principle of the freedom of choice, and the principle of equality and protection of the weaker party; their importance is also followed in chapters devoted to the selected special legal regulations of the private law (family law, labour law, and commercial law). Chapter 4 of this thesis deals with analysis of importance and role of good morals in the civil law. An independent section focuses on the term of public order in the civil law providing explanation of their common function. It also provides detailed analysis of legal construction of definition of nature of legal rules, seen not just as a theoretical legal problem, but also a practical one, as it is the...

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-07-11T12:29:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Gabriel Vinícius Zulli.pdf: 1094324 bytes, checksum: e5586e6ee5da875bcdcc45a8bc1796d7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-11T12:29:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gabriel Vinícius Zulli.pdf: 1094324 bytes, checksum: e5586e6ee5da875bcdcc45a8bc1796d7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-08 / The objective of this dissertation is to develop the theory of Karl Olivecrona's legal rule in relation to its epistemological assumptions. Karl Olivecrona was a disciple of Axel Hägerström, founder of the Uppsala School, 1911. His works "Law as a Fact", 1939, and "Law as fact. (1971) exemplifies the empirical critique employed by Uppsala's theses, critical objectivism. By the thesis of critical objectivism, Olivecrona develops his theory of norm through conceptual analysis and psychological analysis. The legal rule, therefore, is developed as independent imperatives, that is, as orders without determined issuer. The objective of this academic research, in advancing the problem of legal theory without a duty, is to develop the two empirical functions of the legal norm: to make a practical suggestion and to constitute, transfer, and extinguish a state of affairs / O objetivo desta dissertação é desenvolver a Teoria da Norma Jurídica de Karl Olivecrona em relação aos seus pressupostos epistemológicos. Karl Olivecrona foi discípulo de Axel Hägerström, fundador da Escola de Uppsala, de 1911. As obras “O Direito como Fato”, de 1939, e “O Direito como fato” (segunda edição), de 1971, exemplificam a crítica empírica empregada pelas teses de Uppsala, o objetivismo crítico. Pela tese do objetivismo crítico, Olivecrona desenvolve a sua teoria da norma mediante a análise conceitual e a análise psicológica. A norma jurídica, por isso, é desenvolvida como imperativos independentes, isto é, como ordens sem emissor determinado. O objetivo desta pesquisa acadêmica, ao avançar com o problema da teoria da norma jurídica sem um dever ser, é desenvolver as duas funções empíricas da norma jurídica: causar uma sugestão prática e constituir, transferir, extinguir um estado de coisas

Ce travail propose une approche globale et diachronique de l'infamie, sur quatre siècles, afin de décloisonner son étude et de la replacer dans son contexte socioculturel. L'infamie désigne la dégradation résultant de l'actualisation par un représentant de la cité d'un mépris jusqu'alors latent. Pour comprendre les fonctions et les modalités de cette formalisation, nous sommes partis d'un catalogue prosopographique duquel découlent les trois parties de notre recherche. Lors de cérémonies de dégradation, l'infamie était actualisée au cas par cas par une instance civique qui appréciait la dignité du citoyen. Ces spectacles du déshonneur favorisaient la diffusion des valeurs de l'aristocratie et la légitimait en rappelant son excellence. À partir du II" siècle av. J.-C., l'infamie connut un phénomène de juridicisation: elle découlait désormais de l'application d'une règle juridique sanctionnant certaines catégories de citoyens. Enfin, l'infamie concernait tous les citoyens, n'était pas contagieuse, et plaçait dans une situation de paria dont il était rare de sortir. La stigmatisation renforçait la cohésion du groupe et redéfinissait son système normatif Sans être un concept juridique unifié, l'infamie avait une unité conceptuelle. Elle affectait le citoyen qui ne se conformait pas au fonctionnement de la société et qui suscitait la défiance parce qu'il avait brisé l'intégrité de sa personne. Elle lui redonnait une place dans la hiérarchie civique en institutionnalisant une sorte d'anti-auctoritas. Rome étant une société d'ordres, l'infamie s'inscrivit toujours dans une perspective de classement des citoyens afin d'organiser leurs rapports entre eux et avec l'État. / This work intends to propose a global and diachronic approach to infamy, from 312 BC to 96 AD, in order to decompartmentalize its study, and put it back in its sociocultural context. Infamy refers to the degradation which results from the fulfilment of some latent contempt by a representative of the city. To understand the functions and the forms of this formalization, we started from a prosopographic catalogue from which the three parts of our research are taken. During the degradation ceremonies, infamy was actualized case by case by a civic authority which gauges the citizen's value. These dishonour shows favoured the spread of the values of aristocracy and, by reminding its excellence, made it legitimate. From the 2nd century BC, infamy experienced a phenomenon of juridicisation : it stemmed now from the application of a legal rule affecting some groups of citizen. Finally, infamy affected all the citizens, was not contagious, and made its target a social outcast. It was rare to get through this. The stigmatisation reinforced the cohesion of the rest of the group and contributed to redefine his normative system. Infamy was not a unified legal concept, but it had a ideational unity. It affected the citizen who did not conform to the society functioning and who aroused distrust because he had broken his personal integrity. It replaced him in the civic hierarchy by institutionalizing a kind of anti-auctoritas. Rome was an order society, infamy always fell within a perspective of ordering citizens so as to organise their relationships between them and with the State.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:19:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cassiano Inserra Bernini.pdf: 720433 bytes, checksum: d298dd79462719292c50326ec106424b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-10-26 / This work constructs the source rule for the Tax on Property of Automotive Vehicles (IPVA) levy. The competence to establish and collect this tax was given to the States and the Federal District by article 155, item III, of the 1988 Federal Constitution of Brazil. The methodology conceived by the Logical and Semantic Constructivism was used to study the theme. According to said methodology, the Law is taken as a cultural object expressed in language and based on the categories of the Philosophy of Language. Initially, the object is submitted to an analytical analysis and following it is reconstructed with emphasis on the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects of the terms. The work starts with some brief considerations on the legal rule and the source rule for the tax levy. Following, the work focuses on the historical aspects involving the IPVA and the possible requirement for the prior enactment of a nationwide supplementary law providing for the elements of the source rule for this tax levy enabling the competent political entities to establish it. This work also addresses the constitutional principles applicable to the IPVA. Finally, the source rule for the IPVA levy is constructed through a detailed analysis of all its constituent criteria / O trabalho constrói a regra matriz de incidência do Imposto sobre a Propriedade de Veículos Automotores IPVA , cuja competência para instituição e cobrança foi outorgada aos Estados e ao Distrito Federal pelo artigo 155, inciso III, da Constituição Federal do Brasil de 1988. Para o estudo do tema foi utilizada a metodologia idealizada pelo Construtivismo Lógico-Semântico, que toma o Direito positivo como objeto cultural expresso em linguagem e que parte de categorias da Filosofia da Linguagem para, inicialmente, realizar uma análise analítica do objeto, para em seguida reconstruí-lo, dando-se ênfase aos aspectos sintático, semântico e pragmático dos termos. O trabalho inicia-se com breves considerações a respeito da norma jurídica e da regra matriz de incidência tributária. Em seguida, foram examinados os aspectos históricos envolvendo o IPVA e a eventual necessidade da prévia edição de lei complementar nacional dispondo sobre elementos da regra matriz de incidência deste imposto para que as pessoas políticas competentes possam instituí-lo. Foram estudados, também, os princípios constitucionais aplicáveis ao IPVA. Por fim, é construída a regra matriz de incidência do IPVA, com o desenvolvimento de todos os seus critérios constitutivos

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo Cesar de Oliveira Marinho.pdf: 2034105 bytes, checksum: c5f56cb3c9fc76d86114ccc6a95d19e7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-02-27 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work is a study regarding the limitation of the effects and particularly of the prospective effects of decisions issued by appellate courts that result in a change to a previous holding and, consequently, recognize a new or more burdensome legal tax relationship. It begins with the distinction between a legal rule and the text of the law (prescriptive statement), with the legal rule being considered to be the result of an interpretive process conducted by all those who have the necessary cognitive ability. For them, the judicial branch is the authentic interpreter the one with the last word regarding what the law is, regardless of and overriding other interpretive results. When the interpretive results are coincident (the same legal rule) or when the judicial branch states the meaning of the legal rule, there is an idealization of a stable nucleus of legal rules. That nucleus represents certainty in regard to the meaning that should be attributed to a given normative text, so as to produce foreseeability and stability, founded on a general state of legitimate expectations and acting as guidelines for taxpayers conduct. Working from these premises, on the basis of legal certainty, which is a fundamental element of a democratic state that intends to be subject to the rule of law, set upon the pillars of the principals of private property, liberty and equality and grounded on the application of the rules of non-retroactive enforcement and legality to legal rules (and not merely to legal texts), this work seeks to justify the necessary prospective limitation of the effects of a decision that establishes a new legal holding, which consequently eliminates a previously settled holding, in relation to which taxpayers acted based on the legitimate expectation that they were acting in accordance with that which the authentic interpreter of the law held to be correct / Este trabalho tem por objeto o estudo sobre a modulação dos efeitos especialmente a aplicação de efeitos prospectivos das decisões proferidas pelos tribunais superiores que impliquem alteração de entendimento anteriormente manifestado e, consequentemente, reconheçam uma nova ou mais onerosa relação jurídica tributária. Partiu-se da distinção entre norma jurídica e texto de lei (enunciado prescritivo), considerando ser a norma jurídica resultante de um processo interpretativo realizado por todos aqueles que disponham do mínimo de senso cognitivo. Estes têm no intérprete autêntico, no Poder Judiciário, a figura daquele que possui a última palavra sobre o que é o direito, independentemente dos demais resultados interpretativos e a estes se sobrepondo. Existindo coincidência nos resultados interpretativos (mesma norma jurídica), ou dizendo, o Poder Judiciário, qual o sentido da norma jurídica, há a idealização de um núcleo estável de normas jurídicas. Tal núcleo representa a certeza em relação ao sentido que deve ser atribuído a determinado texto normativo, de modo a gerar previsibilidade e estabilidade, fundadas num estado geral de confiança legítima e orientadoras das condutas dos contribuintes. A partir dessas premissas, com base na segurança jurídica, enquanto elemento fundamental do Estado Democrático que se pretenda ser de Direito, elevada sobre os pilares dos princípios da propriedade, da liberdade e da igualdade e com fundamento na aplicação das regras da irretroatividade e da legalidade às normas jurídicas (e não apenas aos textos legais), este trabalho intenta justificar a necessária modulação prospectiva dos efeitos da decisão que estabelece um novo entendimento jurisprudencial, afastando, consequentemente, entendimento anteriormente pacificado, em relação ao qual os contribuintes atuaram baseados na confiança legítima de que estavam agindo segundo aquilo que o intérprete autêntico entendia ser o correto

This essay examines and juxtaposes Mario Jori’s and Frederick Schauer’s ideas on legal formalism. Although developed independently of each other, these ideas show remarkable similarities: both focus on the notion of norm or rule as a tool for clarifying the notion of legal formalism; both defend legal formalism from the criticisms routinely moved against it. The author maintains that Jori’s and Schauer’s theories may contribute to shed light on (and criticize) the controversial notion of defeasibility of legal rules; they may also contribute to scale down, from a legal-theoretical point of view, the novelties of contemporary constitutional orders; finally, it may help to better understand their working machinery. / In questo saggio vengono esaminate e messe a confronto le idee di Mario Jori e di Frederick Schauer in tema di formalismo giuridico. Pur essendo state elaborate l’una indipendentemente dall’altra, presentano notevoli somiglianze, perché entrambe usano la nozione di norma o regola come punto focale per chiarire la nozione di formalismo giuridico, e perché entrambe difendono quest’ultimo dalle critiche usualmente rivolte ad esso. L’autrice ritiene che l’esame delle idee dei due autori possa contribuire a chiarire (e criticare) la controversa nozione di defeasibility delle norme giuridiche e possa altresì, in via generale, contribuire a ridimensionare, dal punto di vista teorico-giuridico, le novità del diritto degli odierni Stati costituzionali, oltre che a comprenderne meglio i meccanismi di funzionamento. / En este trabajo se examina y compara las ideas de Mario Jori y de Frederick Schauer en relación con el formalismo jurídico. A pesar de haber sido desarrolladas de forma independiente unas de las otras, dichas ideas presentan notables semejanzas ya que ambos autores utilizan el concepto de una norma o regla como punto focal para aclarar la noción de formalismo jurídico, y porque ambos lo defienden de las críticas que usualmente se le dirigen. La autora considera que el examen de las ideas de los dos autores puede contribuir a aclarar (y criticar) la controvertida noción de defeasibility (derrotabilidad) de las normas jurídicas y, de modo general, también a redimensionar, desde el punto de vista teórico-jurídico, las novedades que presentan los derechos de los modernos Estados constitucionales, y comprender mejor los mecanismos de su funcionamiento.

Le présent travail intitulé « La procédure devant les tribunaux ecclésiastiques de l’Église de Grèce : une analyse nomocanonique de la loi étatique 5383/1932 », ambitionne d’être la première monographie consacrée à la Loi 5383/1932, loi concernant les tribunaux ecclésiastiques grecs, dite aussi, d’après la définition du Conseil d’État, loi du droit disciplinaire ecclésiastique. Elle concerne 82 métropoles et l’archevêché d’Athènes. La procédure disciplinaire est une procédure judiciaire ; elle consiste en un procès au cours duquel doivent être appliqués tous les principes d’un procès juste. Ces tribunaux aussi doivent offrir la garantie d’un jugement juste. Le critère consiste à savoir s’ils saisissent une différence selon les règles du droit, avec compétence pour cette différence dans le cadre d’une procédure préétablie. La Loi 5383/1932 est un texte juridique et, pour la traiter, nous avons appliqué les méthodes juridiques et canoniques, dites nomocanoniques, d’analyse et d’interprétation. / The present work bears the title, «The Procedure before the Ecclesiastical (Church) Courts of the Church of Greece: A nomocanonical analysis of the state law 5383/1932» which aspires to constitute the first monograph devoted to Law 5383/1932, a law that concerns the Greek Ecclesiastical courts, or better yet, the law regarding ecclesiastical disciplinary law according to the case law of the Council of State. This law concerns 82 metropolises (cathedrals) and the archdiocese of Athens. The disciplinary procedure is a judicial procedure that entails a hearing during which all of the principles of a fair trial must be applied. These courts owe a duty to offer the guarantees of a fair trial. The criterion is to know whether they are vindicating a difference with the rules of law having jurisdiction over this difference in the context of an existing procedure. Law 5383/1932 is a legal text and, in order to analyze it, we have used the legal and Canon law methods otherwise known as legal rule analysis and interpretation.