Cette thèse traite de l'état de la pensée juridique française pendant la période de la Première Guerre mondiale. Il s'agit d'abord d'expliquer quelles sont les formes d'engagement, aussi bien militaires qu'idéologiques, des enseignants juristes pendant le conflit. Il s'agit ensuite de rendre compte des enjeux juridiques que posent le conflit. Enfin, il s'agit de montrer l'influence de ce contexte particulier sur les débats doctrinaux qui ont lieu pendant et après le conflit. Ces recherches ont ainsi pour but de déterminer quelles sont les conséquences de la Grande Guerre sur la pensée juridique française. / This research focuses on the state of French legal thought during the First World War. The first step is to explain the forms of engagement, both military and ideological, of the legal doctrine during the conflict. The next step is to account for the legal challenges posed by the conflict. Finally, it is necessary to show the influence of this particular context on the doctrinal debates that take place during and after the conflict. The purpose of this research is to determine the consequences of the Great War on French legal thought.

This master's thesis focuses on the deposition of the king Wenceslas (1361-1419) from the throne of the Holy Roman Empire. The dethronement act was realised in August 1400 by four Rhenish electors (Count Palatine and archbishops of Mainz, Cologne and Trier) after years- long preparations. The first chapter briefly questions the possibility of king's deposition in medieval political thought. The second chapter describes long political fights in the Holy Roman Empire before 1400 and highlights the most important events which finally led to the king's deposition, such as the fight for the controll over the archbishopric of Mainz. The third chapter analyses the legal dimension of the dethronement act and puts forward possible interpretation of its role in the constitutional history of the Holy Roman Empire. The elector's activity can be understood as a part of long-term growth of political power of the electoral college, as it was codified in the Golden Bull of Charles IV.

A presente dissertação trata das relações entre os momentos críticos da economia e os usos e adaptações do direito econômico no contexto de crise. Como recorte específico, estudou-se a influência da crise econômica brasileira da década de 1980 sobre a cultura jurídica, em especial sobre o pensamento jurídico que se ocupou do direito econômico. No primeiro capítulo, o direito econômico é apresentado em sua dimensão histórica, ressaltando como fases de crise contribuíram para sua formação doutrinária e legislativa. Adiante, são mostradas manifestações do direito econômico no Brasil entre as décadas de 1930 e 1960, antes da consolidação científica da área, de forma a evidenciar as respostas dos juristas às transformações e adversidades da economia nacional em um período marcado pelo crescimento da atuação do Estado no domínio econômico. Já no capítulo derradeiro, em conjunto com uma análise panorâmica da economia brasileira durante as décadas de 1970 e 1990, são apresentadas manifestações de juristas acerca de temas vinculados à crise econômica nacional, utilizando-se como divisões do texto as formas institucionais sugeridas pela escola regulacionista. / This dissertation links the critical moments of the economy and the uses and adaptations of the economic law in the context of crisis. As specific focus, we studied the influence of the Brazilian economic crisis of the 1980s on the legal culture, particularly on the legal thinking concerning the economic law. In the first chapter, the economic law is presented in its historical dimension, emphasizing how periods of crisis contributed to its doctrinal and legislative development. Following this line, we demonstrate manifestations of economic law in Brazil between the 1930s and 1960s, before the scientific consolidation of the area, in order to show the answers of lawyers and legal scholars to the changes and adversitys of the national economy in a period marked by the growth of state action in the economic domain. In the last chapter, together with an overview of the Brazilian economy during the 1970s and 1990s, we present legal topics related to the national economic crisis, using as text divisions the institutional forms suggested by the regulation school.

Cette thèse porte sur l’histoire de l’arbitrage commercial international, mode de règlement des différends par lequel les parties soustraient l’examen de leur litige aux juridictions étatiques et en confient la solution à une ou plusieurs personnes privées. Cette histoire peut être divisée en trois grandes périodes. Pendant « l’âge des aspirations » (des années 1800 à 1920 environ), l’arbitrage fut utilisé dans de nombreux contextes, tant sur le plan national (arbitrage corporatif) qu’international (arbitrage interétatique), ce qui a conféré certains traits caractéristiques à la pratique moderne de l’arbitrage commercial international. Pendant l’« âge de l'institutionnalisation » (des années 1920 à 1950 environ), des institutions clés, telles que la Chambre de commerce internationale et sa Cour d’arbitrage, furent créées, et on assista également à la mise en place de systèmes d’arbitrage institutionnels cohérents et efficaces. Enfin, l’« âge de l’autonomie » (depuis les années 1950) fut marqué par une spécialisation accrue et par les tentatives d’auto-instituer un corps de droit séparé et de justifier les fondements théoriques du système d’arbitrage dans son ensemble. Cette recherche démontre que l’histoire de l’arbitrage commercial international oscille entre des phases de « renouveau » et des phases d’« anxiété ». Pendant les périodes de renouveau, de nouveaux instruments, dispositifs et institutions furent conçus pour étendre la portée de l’arbitrage commercial international. De telles mesures furent contrebalancées pendant les périodes d’anxiété ou de remise en question, pendant lesquelles on chercha à limiter la place de l’arbitrage (afin, par exemple, de ne pas empiéter sur la souveraineté des États). Cette tension ou mouvement de balancier entre renouveau et anxiété est un trait caractéristique de l’histoire de l’arbitrage commercial international et permet d’expliquer les forces structurantes qui sous-tendent son évolution. / This thesis is an exploration of the history of international commercial arbitration—the mechanism by which the mutual rights and liabilities of the parties are determined with binding effect by a third person, the arbitrator, instead of by a court of law. It seeks to divide the history of international commercial arbitration into three broad waves or periods. In the Age of Aspirations (ca.1800–1920), arbitration was used in a range of contexts, both domestic (in local trade associations) and international (between states), as a result of which some of the defining features of modern international commercial arbitration practice were established. The Age of Institutionalization (1920s–1950s) witnessed the creation of key institutions, such as the International Chamber of Commerce and its Court of Arbitration, and the establishment of coherent and effective institutional arbitration systems. The Age of Autonomy (1950s–present) was marked by increased specialization and the attempt to create a separate body of law and justify the theoretical foundations of the arbitration system as a whole. The thesis argues that this history oscillates between moments of renewal and moments of anxiety. During periods of renewal, new instruments, devices, and institutions were created to carry international commercial arbitration forward. These initiatives were then counterbalanced during periods of anxiety, in which it seemed that international commercial arbitration should not go too far (lest it encroach on state sovereignty, for example). This tension or pendulum-like movement—from renewal to anxiety and from anxiety to renewal—is a key feature of the history of international commercial arbitration and helps explain the course of its development.

A presente dissertação trata das relações entre os momentos críticos da economia e os usos e adaptações do direito econômico no contexto de crise. Como recorte específico, estudou-se a influência da crise econômica brasileira da década de 1980 sobre a cultura jurídica, em especial sobre o pensamento jurídico que se ocupou do direito econômico. No primeiro capítulo, o direito econômico é apresentado em sua dimensão histórica, ressaltando como fases de crise contribuíram para sua formação doutrinária e legislativa. Adiante, são mostradas manifestações do direito econômico no Brasil entre as décadas de 1930 e 1960, antes da consolidação científica da área, de forma a evidenciar as respostas dos juristas às transformações e adversidades da economia nacional em um período marcado pelo crescimento da atuação do Estado no domínio econômico. Já no capítulo derradeiro, em conjunto com uma análise panorâmica da economia brasileira durante as décadas de 1970 e 1990, são apresentadas manifestações de juristas acerca de temas vinculados à crise econômica nacional, utilizando-se como divisões do texto as formas institucionais sugeridas pela escola regulacionista. / This dissertation links the critical moments of the economy and the uses and adaptations of the economic law in the context of crisis. As specific focus, we studied the influence of the Brazilian economic crisis of the 1980s on the legal culture, particularly on the legal thinking concerning the economic law. In the first chapter, the economic law is presented in its historical dimension, emphasizing how periods of crisis contributed to its doctrinal and legislative development. Following this line, we demonstrate manifestations of economic law in Brazil between the 1930s and 1960s, before the scientific consolidation of the area, in order to show the answers of lawyers and legal scholars to the changes and adversitys of the national economy in a period marked by the growth of state action in the economic domain. In the last chapter, together with an overview of the Brazilian economy during the 1970s and 1990s, we present legal topics related to the national economic crisis, using as text divisions the institutional forms suggested by the regulation school.

Cette thèse porte sur la pensée juridique des comparatistes euro-américains. Elle analyse les travaux d’un nombre important de comparatistes, qui ont eu une place significative au sein de la discipline en Europe et aux Etats-Unis entre les années 1860 et le début des années 2000. En examinant les représentations du monde non-occidental, elle met en avant les tensions entre l’inclusion et l’exclusion des spécificités non-occidentales, tout en insistant sur la nécessité de développer une pratique critique de résistance. En s’inspirant des théories postcoloniales, ce travail aborde les questions suivantes: comment le savoir sur les sociétés non-occidentales est-il construit dans la pensée juridique des comparatistes euro-américains ? Quelles sont les préconceptions qui facilitent la production de ce savoir ? Quel est le fondement théorique qui anime ces constructions et quelles sont leurs implications politiques ? Dans quelle mesure la pensée juridique comparative alimente-t-elle les attitudes de domination ou bien les remet-elle en question ? De quelle manière les réponses à ces questions sont-elles reproduites ou modifiées d’une époque à l’autre, d’un auteur à l’autre ? / This dissertation focuses on Euro-American comparative legal thought. It analyses the works of an important number of comparatists operating in Europe and in the United States, roughly from the 1860s to the early 2000s. Examining their representations of non-Western societies, it puts emphasis on the tensions between inclusion and exclusion of particularism and it argues in favor of a critical praxis of particularism. Inspired from postcolonial theories, it addresses the following questions: how are non-Western societies constructed in Euro-American comparative legal thought? What are the preconceptions that make the production of such knowledge possible? What is the theoretical framework that animates these constructions and what are their political implications? What elements internal to comparative legal knowledge fuel attitudes of domination or/and challenge them? How do they change and how are they reproduced from one epoch to another, from one author to another?

Alliés et amis de longue date, la France et les États-Unis n'ont cessé d'entretenir des relations depuis la Déclaration d'Indépendance de 1776. Néanmoins, ces échanges ont toujours été réputés extérieurs au domaine juridique, considéré comme inévitablement borné au champ national. Toutefois, l'examen approfondi des revues juridiques universitaires, entre la période 1870 et 1940, démontre la présence indéniable des juristes français dans la pensée juridique américaine, au travers des notes de bas de page, de comptes rendus d'ouvrages ou de la parution d'articles originaux. Grâce à la constitution d'une base de données et à des outils relevant de la bibliométrie, de l'analyse de réseau ou encore de l'iconographie, il a été mis en avant des usages fort différenciés de la référence française. Ces derniers remettent en question la question monolithique de l"influence" pour laisser transparaître une "circulation des idées" soumise à des processus de sélection et à l'emploi de voies de communication balisées. / France and the United States, long-standing allies and friends, have maintained constant relations since the 1776 Declaration of Independence. Nevertheless, these exchanges have always been considered external to the legal field, considered inevitably limited to the national field. However, an in-depth examination of law reviews between 1870 and 1940 shows the undeniable presence of French lawyers in American legal thought, through footnotes, book reviews or the publication of original articles. Thanks to the creation of a database and tools related to bibliometrics, network analysis and iconography, it has been possible to highlight the very different uses of the French reference. The latter question the monolithic question of "influence" to reveal a "flow of ideas" subject to selection processes and the use of marked communication channels.

A presente tese investigou quais foram, como foram produzidas e quais os motivos para a produção das doutrinas jurídicas utilizadas pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal para decidir os habeas corpi relativos a casos políticos dos estados e distrito federal entre 1906, a partir da tensão surgida durante o governo Afonso Pena entre os correligionários de Pinheiro Machado e a base de sustentação do presidente no Congresso, e 1915, ano do assassinato do senador. Foi empregada a obra de Michael Stolleis como referencial teórico, que busca articular história, história do direito e história da ciência do direito, utilizando o termo “história” não apenas com o significado de mudanças fáticas e normativas, mas também com o de expressão, preparação e compreensão intelecto-linguística dessas mudanças, tratando-se sempre da interação entre a transformação histórica e um pensar que conceitua, podendo o pensamento preceder os acontecimentos ou segui-los, comentando-os e interpretando-os. A presente tese foi dividida em dois capítulos. No primeiro, trata-se do surgimento da primeira república, suas características básicas, instituições relevantes para a presente tese e a cultura jurídica do período, com análise das faculdades, livros, perfil dos juristas etc. Esse capítulo é importante para balizar os limites das discussões político-jurídicas, por exemplo, e para ver que a forma como os juristas decidiram os processos no STF no período investigado não constituiu uma “exceção”. No segundo capítulo, sendo realizada a divisão das seções de acordo com os governos do presidentes no período pesquisado, é analisada a relação do STF com a política no período pesquisado, mediante a análise dos processos de habeas corpus relativos a casos políticos dos estados e distrito federal. O auge da tensão foi durante o governo Hermes da Fonseca, durante a política das salvações e a posterior reação pinheirista, quando vários casos políticos foram judicializados e parte dos ministros do tribunal era identificada com o hermismo, outra parte identificada com o pinheirismo (ambos os grupos normalmente aliados), assim como parte era identificada com a oposição. Foi um claro momento de divisão do STF na primeira república. No contexto de uma formação superior distante da excelência, marcada pelo autodidatismo, muitos dos ministros eram bons juristas de acordo com aqueles padrões, tendo conhecimento das doutrinas e autores, nacionais e estrangeiros, relevantes naquele tempo e espaço, e eram capazes de elaborar doutrinas jurídicas de aparência sofisticada, convincentes, sem contradições lógicas grosseiras, a partir de um amplo e desconexo quadro de referências nacionais e estrangeiras, com o objetivo de defender suas posições. Eram os “jurisconsultos adaptáveis” (Seelaender) em ação. Para identificar a estratégia doutrinária adotada pelos ministros, entendeu-se que a análise isolada de doutrinas do habeas corpus, desconsiderando o contexto político da época e discussões jurídicas paralelas sobre teorias de intervenção federal, estado de sítio, controle de constitucionalidade e separação de poderes, seria muito despistadora. É fundamental compreender a interação entre essas teorias no pensamento jurídico dos atores pesquisados. Foi necessário compreender como essas teorias funcionavam de forma combinada nos votos proferidos pelos juízes em casos políticos para compreender a atuação dos ministros. Por exemplo, por um lado, pode-se ver que o hermista Enéas Galvão concomitantemente costumava atribuir ao habeas corpus um escopo mais amplo de proteção e de decidir que o Poder Judiciário não poderia controlar a constitucionalidade da intervenção federal e do decreto de estado de sítio emitido pelo Presidente da República. Por outro lado, pode-se ver que o perrepista Pedro Lessa concomitantemente atribuía ao habeas corpus um âmbito mais restrito de proteção, funcionando de forma semelhante a uma ação possessória, na forma como formulava o habeas corpus como meio apto para proteger “a liberdade-condição, a liberdade-meio, a fim de que se possa exercer a liberdade-fim”, e decidia que o Poder Judiciário poderia controlar a constitucionalidade da intervenção federal e do estado de sítio emitido pelo Presidente da República, e estabelecer limites, dando aos estados governados por oligarcas em oposição ao governo federal - com quem ele e sua facção estavam intimamente ligados - mais espaço para, ao mesmo tempo, evitar uma intervenção federal e lidar com oposicionistas locais nos estados. Claro, ao lado de juristas mais sofisticados, como Enéas Galvão e Pedro Lessa, havia outros menos sofisticados, que, além de adotar uma visão mais delimitadora do habeas corpus e do controle de constitucionalidade, e uma visão mais amplificadora da intervenção federal e do estado de sítio, tentavam resolver os casos de forma mais simples, com base exclusiva em questões processuais. Esse era o caso, e. g., do pinheirista Pedro Mibielli. / This PhD dissertation investigated which were, how they were produced, and what were the motives for the production of legal doctrines used by the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court to decide the habeas corpora on political cases from the states and the federal district between 1906, from the arising tension during the Afonso Pena government between supporters of Pinheiro Machado and the president's support base in Congress, and 1915, the year of the senator's murder. It was employed as a theoretical framework the work of Michael Stolleis, which seeks to articulate history, legal history, and science of legal history, using the term “history” not only with the meaning of factual and normative changes, but also the meaning of expression, preparation, and intellectual and linguistic understanding of these changes, since it is always the interaction between historical change and conceptual thinking that conceptualizes, being the thought able to precede the events or follow them, commenting on them and interpreting them. This PhD dissertation has been divided into two chapters. In the first one, it is dealt with the emergence of the first republic, its basic characteristics, relevant institutions for this work, and the legal culture of the period, with the analysis of law schools, books, the lawyer’s profile, etc. This chapter is relevant to mark the boundaries of legal-political discussions, for instance, and to see that the way lawyers decided the cases in the Supreme Court in the researched period did not constitute an “exception.” In the second chapter, being held the division of sections according to the governments of presidents in the researched period, it is analyzed the STF's relationship with politics in the researched period by the analysis of habeas corpus procedures relating to political cases of states and district federal. The height of the tension was during Hermes da Fonseca’s government, during the politics of salvation and the subsequent pinheirista reaction when several political cases were judicialized and part of the judges of the court was identified with the hermismo, another part was identified with the pinheirismo (both usually allied groups) and part was identified with the opposition. It was a clear moment of STF’s division in the first republic. In the context of a higher education far from excellence, marked by self-education, many of the judges were good lawyers according to those standards, with knowledge of the doctrines and authors, national and foreigners, relevant at that time and space, and were able to create sophisticated legal doctrines, with a compelling appearance and without gross logical contradictions, from a broad and disjointed framework of national and international references, in order to defend their positions. They were the “adaptive lawyers” (Seelaender) in action. To identify the doctrinal strategy adopted by the judges, it was understood that the isolated analysis of the habeas corpus doctrines, disregarding the political context of the time and parallel legal discussions on theories of federal intervention, state of siege, constitutional review, and separation of powers, would be very misleading. It is essential to understand the interaction between these theories in the legal thinking of the researched actors. It was necessary to understand how these theories worked combined in the opinions cast by the judges in political cases to understand the actions of the judges. For example, on the one hand, one can see that the hermista Eneas Galvão concomitantly used to assign habeas corpus a broader scope of protection and decide that the judiciary could not review the constitutionality of federal intervention and state of siege decree issued by the President. On the other hand, one can see that the perrepista Pedro Lessa concurrently attributed to habeas corpus a narrower scope of protection, operating similarly to a possessory action, in the way he formulated the habeas corpus as a means able to protect “the freedom- condition, the freedom-means, so that it can be exercised the freedom-end,” and decided that the judiciary could review the constitutionality of federal intervention and the state of siege issued by the President, narrowing their scope, giving the states ruled by oligarchs in opposition to the federal government - with whom he and his faction were closely linked - more room to, at the same time, avoid federal intervention and deal with local opposition in the states. Of course, alongside more sophisticated lawyers, such as Eneas Galvão and Pedro Lessa, there were other less sophisticated, which, in addition to adopting a more bounding view of habeas corpus and judicial review, and a further amplifying vision of federal intervention and state of siege, tryed to solve the cases more simply, exclusively based on procedural matters. This was the case, e. g., of the pinheirista Pedro Mibielli.

Pionniers des études jurisprudentielles contemporaines, fondateurs des plus célèbres maisons d'éditionjuridique française, inventeurs de nouveaux genres littéraires et doctrinaux, les arrêtistes du XIXe siècledemeurent néanmoins encore largement méconnus. Au sein de leurs recueils de jurisprudence, Jean-BaptisteSirey, Désiré Dalloz et leurs nombreux collaborateurs, concurrents et successeurs, ont pourtant été des acteursà part entière d'une pensée juridique française trop souvent réduite aux seuls auteurs de la doctrine. Entrethéorie et pratique, l' « arrêtisme » contemporain a ainsi formé, de la Révolution jusqu'aux années 1870, unmouvement majeur de la littérature et de la pensée juridiques. Sur cette période, arrêtistes et commentateursde la doctrine se sont en effet âprement affrontés sur le terrain épistémique et éditorial, opposant travaux etdiscours sur la jurisprudence, et luttant pour le monopole des études jurisprudentielles. A partir des années 1880toutefois, l'arrivée massive des universitaires au sein des recueils de jurisprudence va marquer la fin del'arrêtisme des praticiens. A la Belle Epoque, les auteurs de l' « Ecole scientifique » qui entendent renouvelerl'étude et la science du droit s'emparent à leur tour activement de la jurisprudence ; présenté comme unrapprochement salvateur entre l'Ecole et le Palais, le « projet jurisprudentiel » des professeurs va toutefoiscontribuer à détacher les recueils d'arrêts de la culture praticienne dont ils étaient originellement issus. Il ressortde cette étude une relecture de l’histoire intellectuelle des recueils d’arrêts et des arrêtistes, dontl’historiographie classique en a dressé un portrait partiel, sinon partial. / Pioneers of contemporary case law studies, founders of the most famous French legal publishing companies,inventors of new literary and doctrinal genres, the arrêtistes of the nineteenth century still remain largelyunknown. In their casebooks, Jean-Baptiste Sirey, Désiré Dalloz and their many collaborators, competitors andsuccessors, were actors in their own right on the stage of French legal thinking, a stage too often reduced to theonly authors of the doctrine. Between theory and practice, the contemporary "arrêtisme" formed, from theRevolution to the 1870s, a major movement of literature and legal thought. Over this period, the arrêtistes andthe authors of legal doctrine clashed on epistemic and editorial grounds, opposing work and discourses on caselaw, and fighting for the monopoly of judicial analyses. However, from the 1880s onwards, the influx of universityprofessors in casebooks marked the end of the practitioners’ arrêtisme. During the Belle Epoque, the authors ofthe "Ecole scientifique", who intended to renew the study and science of law, took possession of case law;presented as a salutory reconciliation between the School and the Court, the professors’ "jurisprudential project"nevertheless contributed to separate case law reports from the culture of practitioners they were originallyderived from. What emerges from this study is a re-reading of the intellectual history of casebooks and arrêtistes,of which classical historiography gave a partial –if not biased -picture.

A presente tese investigou quais foram, como foram produzidas e quais os motivos para a produção das doutrinas jurídicas utilizadas pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal para decidir os habeas corpi relativos a casos políticos dos estados e distrito federal entre 1906, a partir da tensão surgida durante o governo Afonso Pena entre os correligionários de Pinheiro Machado e a base de sustentação do presidente no Congresso, e 1915, ano do assassinato do senador. Foi empregada a obra de Michael Stolleis como referencial teórico, que busca articular história, história do direito e história da ciência do direito, utilizando o termo “história” não apenas com o significado de mudanças fáticas e normativas, mas também com o de expressão, preparação e compreensão intelecto-linguística dessas mudanças, tratando-se sempre da interação entre a transformação histórica e um pensar que conceitua, podendo o pensamento preceder os acontecimentos ou segui-los, comentando-os e interpretando-os. A presente tese foi dividida em dois capítulos. No primeiro, trata-se do surgimento da primeira república, suas características básicas, instituições relevantes para a presente tese e a cultura jurídica do período, com análise das faculdades, livros, perfil dos juristas etc. Esse capítulo é importante para balizar os limites das discussões político-jurídicas, por exemplo, e para ver que a forma como os juristas decidiram os processos no STF no período investigado não constituiu uma “exceção”. No segundo capítulo, sendo realizada a divisão das seções de acordo com os governos do presidentes no período pesquisado, é analisada a relação do STF com a política no período pesquisado, mediante a análise dos processos de habeas corpus relativos a casos políticos dos estados e distrito federal. O auge da tensão foi durante o governo Hermes da Fonseca, durante a política das salvações e a posterior reação pinheirista, quando vários casos políticos foram judicializados e parte dos ministros do tribunal era identificada com o hermismo, outra parte identificada com o pinheirismo (ambos os grupos normalmente aliados), assim como parte era identificada com a oposição. Foi um claro momento de divisão do STF na primeira república. No contexto de uma formação superior distante da excelência, marcada pelo autodidatismo, muitos dos ministros eram bons juristas de acordo com aqueles padrões, tendo conhecimento das doutrinas e autores, nacionais e estrangeiros, relevantes naquele tempo e espaço, e eram capazes de elaborar doutrinas jurídicas de aparência sofisticada, convincentes, sem contradições lógicas grosseiras, a partir de um amplo e desconexo quadro de referências nacionais e estrangeiras, com o objetivo de defender suas posições. Eram os “jurisconsultos adaptáveis” (Seelaender) em ação. Para identificar a estratégia doutrinária adotada pelos ministros, entendeu-se que a análise isolada de doutrinas do habeas corpus, desconsiderando o contexto político da época e discussões jurídicas paralelas sobre teorias de intervenção federal, estado de sítio, controle de constitucionalidade e separação de poderes, seria muito despistadora. É fundamental compreender a interação entre essas teorias no pensamento jurídico dos atores pesquisados. Foi necessário compreender como essas teorias funcionavam de forma combinada nos votos proferidos pelos juízes em casos políticos para compreender a atuação dos ministros. Por exemplo, por um lado, pode-se ver que o hermista Enéas Galvão concomitantemente costumava atribuir ao habeas corpus um escopo mais amplo de proteção e de decidir que o Poder Judiciário não poderia controlar a constitucionalidade da intervenção federal e do decreto de estado de sítio emitido pelo Presidente da República. Por outro lado, pode-se ver que o perrepista Pedro Lessa concomitantemente atribuía ao habeas corpus um âmbito mais restrito de proteção, funcionando de forma semelhante a uma ação possessória, na forma como formulava o habeas corpus como meio apto para proteger “a liberdade-condição, a liberdade-meio, a fim de que se possa exercer a liberdade-fim”, e decidia que o Poder Judiciário poderia controlar a constitucionalidade da intervenção federal e do estado de sítio emitido pelo Presidente da República, e estabelecer limites, dando aos estados governados por oligarcas em oposição ao governo federal - com quem ele e sua facção estavam intimamente ligados - mais espaço para, ao mesmo tempo, evitar uma intervenção federal e lidar com oposicionistas locais nos estados. Claro, ao lado de juristas mais sofisticados, como Enéas Galvão e Pedro Lessa, havia outros menos sofisticados, que, além de adotar uma visão mais delimitadora do habeas corpus e do controle de constitucionalidade, e uma visão mais amplificadora da intervenção federal e do estado de sítio, tentavam resolver os casos de forma mais simples, com base exclusiva em questões processuais. Esse era o caso, e. g., do pinheirista Pedro Mibielli. / This PhD dissertation investigated which were, how they were produced, and what were the motives for the production of legal doctrines used by the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court to decide the habeas corpora on political cases from the states and the federal district between 1906, from the arising tension during the Afonso Pena government between supporters of Pinheiro Machado and the president's support base in Congress, and 1915, the year of the senator's murder. It was employed as a theoretical framework the work of Michael Stolleis, which seeks to articulate history, legal history, and science of legal history, using the term “history” not only with the meaning of factual and normative changes, but also the meaning of expression, preparation, and intellectual and linguistic understanding of these changes, since it is always the interaction between historical change and conceptual thinking that conceptualizes, being the thought able to precede the events or follow them, commenting on them and interpreting them. This PhD dissertation has been divided into two chapters. In the first one, it is dealt with the emergence of the first republic, its basic characteristics, relevant institutions for this work, and the legal culture of the period, with the analysis of law schools, books, the lawyer’s profile, etc. This chapter is relevant to mark the boundaries of legal-political discussions, for instance, and to see that the way lawyers decided the cases in the Supreme Court in the researched period did not constitute an “exception.” In the second chapter, being held the division of sections according to the governments of presidents in the researched period, it is analyzed the STF's relationship with politics in the researched period by the analysis of habeas corpus procedures relating to political cases of states and district federal. The height of the tension was during Hermes da Fonseca’s government, during the politics of salvation and the subsequent pinheirista reaction when several political cases were judicialized and part of the judges of the court was identified with the hermismo, another part was identified with the pinheirismo (both usually allied groups) and part was identified with the opposition. It was a clear moment of STF’s division in the first republic. In the context of a higher education far from excellence, marked by self-education, many of the judges were good lawyers according to those standards, with knowledge of the doctrines and authors, national and foreigners, relevant at that time and space, and were able to create sophisticated legal doctrines, with a compelling appearance and without gross logical contradictions, from a broad and disjointed framework of national and international references, in order to defend their positions. They were the “adaptive lawyers” (Seelaender) in action. To identify the doctrinal strategy adopted by the judges, it was understood that the isolated analysis of the habeas corpus doctrines, disregarding the political context of the time and parallel legal discussions on theories of federal intervention, state of siege, constitutional review, and separation of powers, would be very misleading. It is essential to understand the interaction between these theories in the legal thinking of the researched actors. It was necessary to understand how these theories worked combined in the opinions cast by the judges in political cases to understand the actions of the judges. For example, on the one hand, one can see that the hermista Eneas Galvão concomitantly used to assign habeas corpus a broader scope of protection and decide that the judiciary could not review the constitutionality of federal intervention and state of siege decree issued by the President. On the other hand, one can see that the perrepista Pedro Lessa concurrently attributed to habeas corpus a narrower scope of protection, operating similarly to a possessory action, in the way he formulated the habeas corpus as a means able to protect “the freedom- condition, the freedom-means, so that it can be exercised the freedom-end,” and decided that the judiciary could review the constitutionality of federal intervention and the state of siege issued by the President, narrowing their scope, giving the states ruled by oligarchs in opposition to the federal government - with whom he and his faction were closely linked - more room to, at the same time, avoid federal intervention and deal with local opposition in the states. Of course, alongside more sophisticated lawyers, such as Eneas Galvão and Pedro Lessa, there were other less sophisticated, which, in addition to adopting a more bounding view of habeas corpus and judicial review, and a further amplifying vision of federal intervention and state of siege, tryed to solve the cases more simply, exclusively based on procedural matters. This was the case, e. g., of the pinheirista Pedro Mibielli.