Ce mémoire veut rechercher la signification de la liberté, savoir en quel sens on peut la dire vraie et réelle. Après avoir montré que dans l'histoire des idées les doctrines de la liberté présupposent toutes nécessairement une certaine idée du temps, nous reconnaitrons alors que cette dernière doit précéder la recherche du sens de la liberté. C'est alors qu'une philosophie nous apparaitra l'avoir découverte : nous voulons parler de celle de Bergson. Dans notre première section, nous partirons alors de bon pied sur les traces de notre philosophe à sa recherche. Nous découvrirons alors que l'idée de temps ne se laisse pas penser en dehors du réel, où elle trouve à s'incarner. C'est conséquemment alors que nous chercherons dans notre deuxième section à retrouver le réel et à en faire la science. De la conscience à la vie, en passant par le corps, nous trouverons à terme que notre seconde section achève la première. C'est que nous nous verrons avoir retrouvé, à différents niveaux de l'être, le sens qu'on doit donner au temps incarné. Qu'est-ce à dire de la liberté ? Nous aurons pu la rencontrer au passage comme son corrélat. Elle se reconnaitra alors vraie dans notre première section, réelle dans la seconde. Nous aurons ainsi découvert le sens que prend la liberté chez Bergson. Nous ouvrirons finalement sur le dépassement possible de ce sens chez le dernier Bergson. Au final, en ne brodant avec notre philosophe que sur le tissu serré des faits, et en faisant attention à ce que le raisonnement ne les dépasse jamais, nous espérons, avec Bergson, construire un concept rigoureux de liberté.

Titre de l'écran-titre (visionné le 28 février 2024) / La liberté absolue de la conscience que Sartre défend dans *L'être et le néant* semble être une théorie dépassée, son invalidité ayant été établie selon la phénoménologie postérieure à l'œuvre de Sartre. Pourtant, les critiques de la conception sartrienne ne font généralement pas preuve d'une bonne compréhension de la liberté absolue. Contrairement à ce qu'en disent les critiques, la liberté absolue n'est pas celle d'une conscience capricieuse pouvant modeler le monde et soi-même selon ses volontés et à partir de rien. Or, que veut dire Sartre par « liberté absolue »? C'est à cette question que ce mémoire entend répondre dans une tentative d'offrir une compréhension plus juste de la liberté absolue. La liberté absolue est une liberté de choix compris en termes de possibilités. Par suite, ce choix est absolu, car il est effectué dans une autonomie radicale. Cette radicalité d'autonomie de choix ne signifie pas que le sujet est conçu en dehors de sa situation dans le monde. De ce fait, l'objectif est de concevoir la façon dont la liberté absolue se maintient à travers deux dimensions principales : la dimension subjective (les raisons d'agir, le passé et l'aspect psychologique) et la dimension sociale (l'intersubjectivité et les faits sociaux). Ces deux dimensions seront l'occasion de répondre à des objections, principalement celles que Merleau-Ponty adresse à Sartre et que les critiques postérieures de la phénoménologie critique reprennent, concernant les divers rapports du sujet dans le monde avec des êtres et des sens qu'il n'a pas lui-même constitués et une situation avec laquelle il doit composer et que Sartre ne semble pas avoir, selon eux, considérée au sein de sa conception. Les éléments précédents permettront de dénoncer les interprétations naïves de la liberté absolue qui ne distingue pas la liberté radicale de la liberté totale et de contester la motivation de Merleau-Ponty, conception reprise par la phénoménologie critique, en lui opposant une motivation en intériorité qui conserve la liberté absolue et évite le déterminisme dans lequel la conception merleau-pontienne menace de sombrer. La pertinence d'un tel projet réside dans le fait qu'il implique toute une éthique de la responsabilité individuelle.

Protocole d'entente entre l'Université Laval et l'Université de Sherbrooke / Cette thèse s’applique à vérifier s’il est possible d’éduquer un enfant de façon à lui ouvrir la voie vers la liberté. Une liberté qui soit l’expression de son ultime humanité sans pour autant le mettre en situation de conflit avec l’univers social. Bien qu’un important détour du côté des fondements théoriques soit incontournable pour préciser ce que nous entendons par liberté et ce sur quoi elle repose, c’est d’un point de vue pratique, comme une éthique appliquée de l’éducation que nous abordons cette question. Il s’agit donc non seulement de voir si la liberté est possible, mais aussi comment on peut passer de la théorie à la réalité dans un cadre éducatif. Plus précisément, c’est à Rudolf Steiner que nous posons la question. C’est dans son cadre conceptuel et dans les fondements et principes directeurs de la pédagogie Waldorf, qu’il a développée, que nous avons cherché les conditions de possibilité d’une éducation vers la liberté. Parce que Rudolf Steiner a fait de la liberté humaine une question fondamentale de toute son œuvre, y compris de son approche éducative. Il s’agit donc de voir comment s’articule le tout, si la philosophie de la liberté trouve son pendant dans la pratique pédagogique telle qu’il la propose. Toutefois pour ne pas demeurer enfermée dans l’univers steinerien et pour nourrir notre réflexion, nous avons soumis les propositions de Steiner aux questions soulevées par Jean-Bernard Paturet dans ce qu’il présente comme « l’aporétique de la raison éducative ». En effet, le contexte éducatif étant particulier en lui-même, il s’y rattache certaines difficultés que Paturet présente sous la forme de six apories – le domestique et l’affranchi, l’insociable sociabilité de l’homme, l’identité et l’ipséité, la personne et la catégorie, la rupture et la continuité, la nature et la culture – qui témoignent de la complexité de la relation entre l’éducation et la liberté. Ces apories soulèvent des questions directement liées aux conditions d’une éducation vers la liberté. C’est pourquoi, tout au long de notre enquête, nous avons tâché de voir si la proposition de Steiner permet de les résoudre. Les conditions de possibilité, nous les avons cherchées dans ce que nous avons identifié comme les trois piliers d’une éducation vers la liberté, à savoir : la société, les éducateurs responsables de la relation éducative et la méthode liée à la connaissance de l’être humain. Le cas du Québec a servi de témoin, accompagnant, dans ses ancrages théoriques et rhétoriques, le processus d’enquête sur les conditions de possibilité de la liberté. Cette recherche se déploie en deux grandes sections : la première consacrée aux fondements et la seconde portant sur l’application. Le premier chapitre de la section I traite des concepts fondamentaux de l’approche steinerienne, inscrits dans le contexte actuel afin de mieux préciser ce qui les distingue et de faire valoir leur pertinence. Le deuxième chapitre présente la méthode goethéenne de connaissance et son déploiement, par Steiner, en une science de l’esprit. La section II de la thèse, consacrée à l’enquête proprement dite se divise en quatre chapitres : le chapitre trois explore le premier pilier, celui de la société, dans lequel les conditions de possibilités de la liberté sont envisagées du point de vue des grandes orientations, des finalités et du rapport entre l’intérêt individuel et l’intérêt de la société. Le quatrième chapitre s’intéresse au second pilier, celui constitué par l’enseignant et la relation éducative. Le cinquième chapitre s’attaque à la méthode pédagogique qui doit nécessairement reposer sur une connaissance de l’être humain. C’est pourquoi y est intégré l’exposé sur l’anthropologie steinerienne, afin de pouvoir établir des liens directs entre la méthode et le développement de l’enfant. Ce chapitre est divisé en trois grandes sections correspondant aux trois phases de l’enfance, au cours desquelles la méthode éducative évolue et se transforme. Le chapitre suivant porte sur les difficultés soulevées par certains critiques de la pédagogie Waldorf. Avant de conclure, nous présentons le bilan des conditions de possibilité d’une éducation vers la liberté et du dépassement des apories. Il ressort de cette étude que ni la liberté humaine ni l’éducation y conduisant ne peuvent être envisagées sans réviser la conception actuelle de l’être humain et l’engagement éthique et responsable des éducateurs. / This thesis sets out to verify the possibility of educating a child in a way that leads him towards freedom; a freedom that represents the child’s ultimate humanity, without creating conflict between him and his social environment. Though a significant detour on the theoretical basis is crucial in order to specify what we mean by freedom, and what freedom is based on, it is from a practical viewpoint, like an applied ethics of education, that we will discuss this issue. Thus, not only will we discuss if freedom is possible, but also, within an educational framework, if one can go from a conceptual idea of freedom to the actual experience of freedom. This question will be posed more specifically to Rudolf Steiner. It is through his conceptual framework, and through the foundations and principles of Waldorf pedagogy, that he developed, that we sought to find the conditions of the possibility of an education leading to freedom. For Rudolf Steiner has made of human freedom a fundamental question throughout his works, as well as his educational approach. We need then to see how it all inter-relates, and whether the philosophy of freedom has its analogy in the pedagogical practice that he is suggesting. However, in order to avoid remaning locked in the Steinerian universe and to nourish our thinking, we have applied Steiner’s proposal to the issues that were raised by Jean-Bernard Paturet in his consideration of “the aporetics of the educational reason”. In fact, the educational context being special in itself, certain difficulties are here raised and presented by Paturet through six aporias: the domestic and the free man, the human unsocial sociability, the identity and the selfhood, the person and the category, the rupture and the continuity, and nature and culture – which reflect the complexity of the relationship between education and freedom. These aporias raise issues directly related to the conditions of an education towards freedom. Consequently, throughout this study, we have tried to determine whether Steiner’s proposal can solve these issues. We sought the conditions of the possibility of freedom through education in what we have identified as the three pillars, namely: the society, the educators responsible for the educational relationship, and the method pertaining to the knowledge of the human being. Québec’s case served as witness, accompanying, in its theoretical and rhetorical anchors, the process of investigating the conditions of the possibility of freedom through education. This study presents itself in two large sections: the first devoted to the foundations and the second to the application. The first chapter of section I discusses the basic concepts of Steiner’s approach, enrolled in the current context to better clarify what distinguishes them and what asserts their relevance. The second chapter presents Goethe's method of knowledge and its deployment, by Steiner, in a spiritual science. Section II of the thesis, dedicated to the investigation itself, is divided into four chapters: chapter three explores the first pillar, that of society, in which the conditions of the possibility of freedom are considered from the perspective of the broad guidelines, the purposes and the relationship between individual interests and society's interest. The fourth chapter focuses on the second pillar, the one constituted by the teacher and the educational relationship. The fifth chapter addresses the educational method that must necessarily be based on knowledge of the human being, hence the integrated presentation on Steinerian anthropology, in order to establish direct links between the method and the development of the child. This chapter is divided into three sections corresponding to the three phases of childhood, during which the educational method evolves and changes. The next chapter discusses the difficulties raised by some critics of Waldorf education and anthroposophy. Before concluding, we present the results of the possibility of education conditions for freedom and the overcoming of the aporias. It appears from this study that neither human freedom nor an education leading up to it can be considered without revising the current notion of the human being and that of the ethical and responsible commitment of the educators.

Dans la perspective psychologique, l'esprit réel en général (humain en particulier) n'est inconditionnellement ni transcendant ni efficace ni révélateur. D'abord, il est matériellement immanent (il ne peut s'affranchir de la matière), bien qu'il soit formellement transcendantal. Ensuite, il est pragmatiquement et historiquement inefficace (il ne crée pas même l'humanité), bien qu'il soit conditionnellement causal. Enfin, il est théorétiquement schématique et algorithmique (il ne comprend pas l'essence intégrale du monde), bien qu'il soit réaliste sous caution. Somme toute, l'organisme vivant en général (humain en particulier) ne s'aperçoit luimême, à travers la mentalité transcendantale, la réflexion pragmatique et la connaissance théorétique, ni pendant ni après ni avant l'action (et l'omission) complète, l'émotion de liberté et la sensation de réalité. L'immanence, la liberté et la réalité bien comprises sont conjointement une condition nécessaire bien qu'insuffisante de la responsabilité axiologique comme mode d'être, laquelle se caractérise ultimement par la bonté, ou la malice, des conduites, des émois et des constats, non par les mauvaises et bonnes, ou les empiriques et intellectuelles, raisons, consciences et intentions qui les accompagnent, suivent et précèdent. / Généralement et régulièrement admis en philosophie de l'esprit, l'immatérialité transcendantale, le pouvoir spirituel et la vérité intellectuelle (comme leurs équivalents scientifiques respectifs: la computation fonctionnelle, la causalité psychologique et le réalisme psychologique) génèrent les rapports antinomiques de la liberté, de l'indétermination et de la détermination. L'antinomie de la liberté et de la détermination résume les difficultés auxquelles se heurte la triple affirmation de l'immatérialité transcendantale, du pouvoir spirituel et de la vérité intellectuelle. En effet, dans la mesure où le pouvoir spirituel des réflexions pragmatiques est censée être le truchement de la liberté, il fait de la détermination un problème. Et, dans la mesure où la vérité intellectuelle des connaissances théorétiques est censé être le truchement de la détermination, elle fait de la liberté un problème. La recherche d'une solution à ces antinomies est devenue une possibilité thématique pour la philosophie en opposant l'immatérialité transcendantale à l'immanence psychologique (comme pour la science en opposant la computation fonctionnelle à la mentalité consciente), ou encore en sauvant le pouvoir spirituel par une limitation du réalisme psychologique, ou en faisant l'inverse (sauver la vérité intellectuelle par une limitation de la causalité psychologique). Or, dans la perspective psychologique, l'esprit en général (y compris l'idée, ou le concept) est matériellement immanent (l'esprit ne peut s'affranchir de la matière, bien qu'il soit formellement transcendantal), pragmatiquement et historiquement inefficace (l'esprit ne crée pas l'humanité, bien qu'il soit conditionnellement causal) et théorétiquement schématique ou algorithmique (l'esprit ne comprend pas l'essence intégrale du monde, bien qu'il soit réaliste sous caution). Aussi bien, l'exercice réel, libre et complet de la motricité vivante, de son émotivité et de sa sensitivité ne s'aperçoit, à travers la mentalité transcendantale, la réflexion pragmatique et la connaissance théorétique, ni pendant ni après ni avant l'action (et l'omission), l'émotion et la sensation. L'immanence, la liberté et la réalité bien comprises sont des «propriétés» de la motricité vivante et de la sensibilité, non celles de l'esprit (ou mentalité). Elles sont conjointement une condition nécessaire bien qu'insuffisante de la responsabilité axiologique. La valeur axiologique comme mode d'être se caractérise ultimement par la bonté, ou la malice, des conduites, des émois et des constats, non par les mauvaises et bonnes, ou les empiriques et intellectuelles, raisons, consciences et intentions qui les accompagnent, suivent et précèdent.

S'il existe une différence fondamentale entre l’espèce humaine et les autres, elle réside sans doute dans la capacité de la première à « faire monde ». Cette capacité repose sur le fait que l'homme est un « animal symbolique ». La symbolisation lui confère une liberté, une aptitude à l’innovation et une inventivité sans commune mesure avec celles que manifestent les autres espèces. La construction d’un monde, qui mêle ainsi disposition à l’innovation technique et inventivité culturelle, est au fondement de l'historialité. L’histoire, en particulier au 20e siècle, a été marquée par le développement sans précédent de la technique et par le fait que l’innovation technique repose de plus en plus sur les savoirs scientifiques. Or si l’on en croit certains penseurs, dont Heidegger, Ellul, Mumford ou Anders, la mutation de la technique en technologie, son organisation en système et l’autonomisation rapide dudit système de toute régulation politique et éthique mettent en péril la liberté, individuelle et collective, créatrice de culture et d’histoire. Autrement dit, franchi un certain seuil du développement de la technique, la liberté donnée avec la disposition à l’innovation et l’invention se serait retournée contre elle-même. L’ordre technique, qui pour Heidegger est un « non-monde », serait ainsi devenu un lieu d’asservissement. Cette thèse commune aux penseurs critiques de la modernité technique, doit- elle être considérée comme définitive? L'homme est-il vraiment en train de perdre sa liberté au détriment de la machine devenue la mesure et le maître de toute chose? Voilà la question que tente de réfléchir cette étude.

General Introduction<p><p>The process of the institutionalisation of law that started at the end of the 18th century was followed by a general wave of codification throughout Europe. The French codification of 1804 was exemplary for all the others. The “law in books” was complete, certain, clear, and undisputable. From then on, the law in books had priority over the “law in action”. Law in books was a critique of law in action that preceded the French Revolution. Judicial activism was proscribed, and judges were called to apply the rules issued by the legislator.<p><p>This ideal of the French Revolution is still framing our pattern of legal thinking. It is dominant throughout the 19th century with the école de l’exégèse in France, Begriffjurisprudenz in Germany, and analytical jurisprudence in Anglo-American legal systems. Legal formalism or the deductive application of rules is the only form of judicial reasoning that is allowed. The science of law, as a consequence, was confined to a theoretical support and elaboration of this judge-centred approach to law.<p><p>This view on law and legal science persisted throughout the last century. It started being criticized in the late 1960s, a critique that paved the path for a more active role of the judge. New theories of interpretation were proposed so as to supplement the law in books with theoretically justified methodologies to determine its meaning.<p><p>The findings of legal theory are still, to a large extent, premised on the central role of the judge in the legal system. Although this evolution may be applauded for having contributed to a more dynamic attitude towards the law, the role of the legislator remains largely underexposed. Legal theory takes the law as “just there”, and limits its theoretical undertakings to law as it is. Law, so it is said, is the result of political decision-making. Once it comes into being however, it is separated from politics. Politics, that is, is thought of as impure, at least when compared to the methods of legal reasoning and decision-making. <p><p>This brings us to the theme of this book. Some of the questions I propose to explore are: Where does the law come from? What are the premises of a theory that considers law separated from politics? What does it mean for a legislator to be bound to the rules of a constitution throughout the process of legislation? Does the constitution consist of rules to be followed by the legislator or is its role merely confined to be a political programme?<p><p>These and other questions frame the main problem this book proposes to deal with. They are triggered by the fact of the exponential growth of today’s legal systems. Complaints about both the increasing volume of legislation and its decreasing quality in most European countries have raised the question as to whether collaboration between legislators and legal theory can help to articulate and to solve that problem.<p><p>As a matter of fact, although the complaints are made with an ever-stronger voice, solutions are by no means obvious. Legislation as a matter of politics is not rational. Politics is a power game, resulting in compromises that are framed into a legislative or statutory structure. This power game seems to have its own logic, the results of which most of the time outweigh any other form of logic.<p><p> Legal theory for its part is considered, from the perspective of politics at least, to be a “theoretical” approach to legal problems. It contributes to the description and systematisation of existing valid law. It shows up, like Minerva’s owl, after the sunset of legislative activity. From that perspective, there is not much hope that legal theory can usefully intervene in the process of legislation or regulation, i.e. before or during the creation of rules. Legal theory then is confined to “legal science” or “legal dogmatics”.<p><p>I propose to consider the problem of legislation from another angle. The premises of the problem are that, although legislation and regulation is the result of a political process, they can be the object of a theoretical study. Using an approach analogous to e.g. Hans Kelsen in legal theory ,the main idea is not to primarily focus on the content of rules and concepts, but rather on the structure and function of legal systems. <p><p>In the approach of this book, the focal point is on problems that are common to most legal systems and not on the characteristics, viz. the content of concepts that are specific for one or more legal systems. The creation of law, so is my claim, has become a problem. <p><p>Kelsen’s approach leaves legislation and regulation – apart from their formal validity aspects – outside the scope of study. The creation of rules relies on value judgments that are according to him not fit for theoretical study. In short, the creation of legal rules is a matter of politics and politics is not fit for scientific study.<p><p>This position is an understandable one, though it is only partially acceptable. Rule creation is a matter of choice. The legitimation of this choice is found in the democratic character of the regulating process and not in some science of values. In other words, would one try to mould legislation into the frame of a science, we would face something like “scientific politics”, as Marxism propagated, and which is, for several reasons, unacceptable.<p><p>A different standpoint is to study legislative problems from the angle of legal theory. This approach I propose to call legisprudence. The object of study of legisprudence is the rational creation of legislation and regulation. As to its method, it makes use of the theoretical insights and tools of current legal theory. Whereas the latter has been dealing most of the time dealing with problems of the application of law by the judge, legisprudence explores the possibilities of the enlargement of the field of study as to include the creation of law by the legislator.<p><p>Within this new approach, a variety of new question and problems – e.g. the validity of norms, their meaning, the structure of the legal system, etc. - are raised. They are traditionally dealt with from the perspective of the judge or are taken for granted by classical legal theory. However, when shifting our attention from the judge to the legislator, the same questions arise: In what sense does the legislator have to take the systematicity of the legal order into account? What counts as a valid norm? What meanings can be created and how? to mention but a few.<p><p>Traditional legal science or legal dogmatics covers many of these questions with the cloak of sovereignty. Legislators are sovereign, they decide what will count as a valid norm, and its meaning. Whether and how a rule and its meaning fit with the legal system, is then a matter of interpretation – and this is the task of the judge and the legal scientist.<p><p>On this view, the process of legislation seems to be inappropriate for theoretical inquiry. After long decades of legalism in legal reasoning, it can be said that the dominant views in legal theory resulting from that, have precisely barred the way for inquiring into the position of the legislator. Everything happens behind the veil of sovereignty as far as legislation properly so called is concerned, and behind the veil of legality when it comes to the execution of legislative acts. These veils conceal a great part of ignorance related to the possibilities of an alternative theoretical reflection on rule making. Sovereignty itself, so one can say, creates silence about this alternative, so that it becomes “sovereignty in silence” .<p><p>Sovereignty of the ruler prevents his rules from being questioned in any other than binary terms. Validity is a good example of that. The only question that is worthwhile putting is: Is this propositional content a valid rule yes or no? As a consequence, questions on its efficacy, effectivity, efficiency, or acceptability are not in order.<p><p>The claim of legisprudence is that these questions, like others, are important ones, and that they can be analysed with the help of legal theory.<p><p>The book is divided into three parts.<p><p>In the first part, I propose to explore the three basic tenets of the Modern philosophical project as Descartes inaugurated it. These three tenets are: rationality, the individuality of the subject, and freedom. A brief sketch of what is meant by them is offered in the first chapter.<p>Rationality as it is dealt with in the Modern philosophical project means that what is rational is self-evident. Self-evidence is certainty and certainty is the mark of truth. The question for whom something is certain is however left out of view. The subject, that is, has himself immediate access to reason and truth upon the use of his rational capacities. The latter are presumed to be identical in and for all. The subject’s reflection on himself leads to the true insight that he is a res cogitans.<p><p>The subject thinks of himself as an ”I”, that is, as an individual. Others are not thought of as others, but rather as representations or ideas. The subject as an individual is a product of thought, that is, upon the Modern approach of rationality, a theoretical idea. <p><p>As a result of rationality as self-evidence and the subject as an individual, practical reason is confined to free will. Freedom as the third basic tenet of the Modern philosophical project is limited to following the commands of God and the rules of the country. These commands and rules are found “out there”, without questioning either their origin or their purpose.<p><p>The main critique of the Modern philosophical project as it is briefly set out in the first chapter is that it is based on the so-called "scholastic fallacy”. This fallacy involves that rationality is presupposed identical in everyone’s head. On the supposition that all subjects are ontologically rational as Descartes suggests, their use of their rational capacities would result in an identical outcome that is truth. The universality of reason is, however, a hidden premise of the Modern philosophical project. It unfolds from a “view from nowhere”. This view of rationality is challenged as an unreflected one, and the methodological device of this book is to avoid this type of fallacies.<p><p>Chapter 2 focuses on the idea of science as it comes up with the Modern philosophical project. The infinite universe is substituted for the Aristotelian closed world. Mathematics becomes the appropriate method of the scientia nova that Descartes and Galileï initiate. As Descartes’ method aims at being a mathesis universalis it is believed to include the aptitude to deal with any problem, theoretical as well as practical. <p><p>The subsequent epistemologization of philosophy tacitly presupposes that mathematics belongs to the very nature of reality. From there, it follows that philosophy is thought of as a theory of reality. On an alternative view, mainly advocated by, e.g. Heidegger, it is claimed that mathematics as a method of science is a matter of choice. If the method is a matter of choice, the scientia nova can be articulated as a liberation from the shackles of ecclesiastical authority, and hence as a matter of freedom. Another consequence is that the scientia nova can articulate true propositions about reality, without having direct access to it. The distinction between a theory of reality and a theory about reality is illustrated with the help of the conflict between Galileï and the Church.<p><p>Chapter 3 concentrates on the subject and rationality. Both the subject and rationality are put in context, that is, a context of participation. With this approach, I propose to challenge the self-evidentiary character of rationality as well as the idea of the isolated and ontologically anchored Cartesian subject. Relying on George Herbert Mead’s theory of the subject, I argue that the subject is first and foremost an “intersubject”. <p><p>The subject, it is argued, is a social subject whose self emerges through interaction with others. The substitution of a subject of meaning for a subject of truth concretises the critique of the Cartesian subject in the first chapter. Both the subject and meaning, so it is argued, emerge from interaction in a context of participation. The subject’s self includes a social as well as an individual pole. These two poles and the interaction between them have been neglected throughout the Modern philosophical project. By articulating them, an attempt is made to take the subject qua subject seriously.<p><p>A similar contextualisation is operated with rationality. Rationality, even in its rationalistic appearance, is not self-revealing. The idealisation of rationality in the Modern philosophical project, that is, its decontextualisation, obscures the fact that it is historically situated. This situatedness refers to its emergence and operation in a specific context. This recontextualisation shows it as one conception of rationality among others. The Modern philosophical project held its conception of rationality to be a reflection of reality, upon its belief in the direct access to the latter.<p><p>The distinction between conceptions on the one hand and a concept on the other is the methodological device that serves to further articulate the concept of freedom. This is the theme of chapter 4. Freedom is related to the emergence of science in the 17th century. While the subject and rationality were connected to a context of participation in the foregoing chapters, attention will be drawn to the characteristics of the concept of freedom in this chapter. <p><p>The basic premise of the theory of freedom proposed in this chapter comes to saying that in the absence of any external limitation, subjects are free to act as they please. If they want to act, however, freedom unlimited as it is called must be determined. This means that from the infinite range of possibilities, a choice has to be made. Without a choice, everything remains possible though no action can occur. To make a choice implies that the concept of freedom is concretised. This concretisation is called a conception. Action is possible, so it is argued further, on two types of conceptions. One is a conception of freedom, the other a conception about freedom. A conception of freedom is a conception of the subject himself; a conception about freedom on the contrary is a conception of someone else.<p><p>On the basic premise of the theory of freedom advocated throughout the book, freedom is unlimited. This includes a priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom. Therefore, his acting on conceptions about freedom must be justified. This requirement of justification is connected to the idea of freedom as principium. A principium has a twofold meaning. The first is a starting point; the second is that a principle is also a leitmotiv. <p><p>Freedom unlimited is the starting point of political philosophy as it is found in Hobbes and Rousseau. They will be our main discussion partners throughout the book. Their theory of the social contract as the basis of the construction of political space is premised by the idea of freedom unlimited. They do neglect though the second aspect of freedom as principium, that is, freedom as the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. This aspect is briefly elaborated in chapter 4 where Hobbes’ theory is diagnosed as a theory about freedom, while it purports to be a theory of freedom.<p><p>Freedom as principium and the priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom that it involves is identified as the basic principle of legisprudence. It holds, summarizing, that law can only be legitimate if it is legitimated to operate as an alternative for failing social interaction. The idea of freedom as principium will be elaborated in chapter 8 where I proceed to the identification of the principles of legisprudence.<p><p>The second part of the book is dedicated to the problem of legalism and legitimation.<p><p>Chapter 5 explores the reason for the absence of a theory of legislation until now. The main reason is that law, from the very beginning of the Modern philosophical project, is unfolded as a reflection of reality. The obscuration of the embedment of law in the realm of politics is explained as a strategy of practical reason. This strategy is at the basis of what is identified as strong legalism. Strong legalism is the dominant pattern of thought in legal thinking. It holds that normativity is a matter of rule following, irrespective of where the rules come from. It easily fits the idea of the provisional morality Descartes has sketched, but that never came to a real end.<p><p>The main characteristics of strong legalism are pointed from a reading of Hobbes and Rousseau. The characteristics identified are: representationalism, universality or the neglect of the time dimension, concealed instrumentalism, and etatism. These characteristics of the legalistic thought pattern are supported and corroborated by a type of legal science that finds its roots in the Modern philosophical project.<p><p>Over against this form of legalism that is labelled “strong legalism” chapter 6 explores the contours of a different brand of legalism that I propose to mark as “weak legalism”. <p><p>Weak legalism or “legalism with a human face” comprises a critique of strong legalism in that the latter neglects the position of the subject qua subject. As it will be discussed in the first part of the book, the Modern philosophical project makes the subject the preponderant actor in reality. He is, however, an actor in a play written in advance by others and not an auctor or an agent.<p><p>To take the subject qua subject seriously, as weak legalism purports, entails placing him in a context with others. This part of chapter 6 joins the insights articulated in the first part of the book, more specifically in chapter 2. Others, and not just “otherness” as a representation of the subject, belong to the subject’s context. If it is in this context that the self and meaning emerge, this process is not necessarily conflict-free. Hobbes and Rousseau conclude from this fact that social interaction leads to war. It provides them with an argument to substitute interaction based on legal rules from social interaction based on conceptions of freedom. The former are issued by the sovereign and can be qualified as conceptions about freedom.<p><p>Hobbes and Rousseau hold that this substitution is ipso facto legitimate. On the theory of freedom that was sketched out in chapter 4, this substitution however needs to be legitimated.<p><p>Chapter 7 deals with the issue of legitimation. I distinguish to begin with between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories of legitimation. On the former, law is legitimated if it corresponds to at least one transcendent true norm. On the latter, no transcendent content is available. This is proper to a democratic theory of legitimation upon which the demos determines the ends of action as well as the means to realise them.<p><p>Apart from this difference between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation process they embrace is the same. This dynamic refers to the direction of the legitimation chain. In jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation chain runs from a transcendent norm to a rule of the sovereign. In non-jusnaturalistic theories exemplified by Hobbes and Rousseau the dynamics of the chain runs from an initial consent to the social contract to the set of rules issued by the sovereign.<p><p>The dynamic of the chain in both type of theories, so it is argued, is irreversible. The operationalisation of political space ensuing from the social contract is what legislation is about according to the Modern philosophical project. Taken as it stands, the initial consent of the subjects to the social contract or their proxy to the sovereign is an action on a conception of freedom. They do give, though, a proxy to the sovereign to issue subsequent limitations of their freedom that are yet unknown when subscribing the contract .From the “moment” of the contract, the sovereign is legitimated in substituting conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom. The initial proxy contained in the contract covers any of his limitations of freedom. As both Hobbes and Rousseau argue, the rules of the sovereign are always morally correct. As a consequence, they cannot be criticized for whatever reason. Would this be possible then the chain of legitimation initiated by the social contract would be reversed. <p><p>On strong legalism, however the chain is unidirectional. The sovereign transforms any propositional content into a true norm, which allows for the qualification of sovereignty as a black box.<p><p>Chapter 7 ends with the articulation of some possibilities of reversing the chain of legitimation in what is called the proxy model. On this idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain, a more general approach is initiated. This approach leads to the claim that a legislator’s limitations of freedom are to be justified. They are deemed legitimate and legitimated on a general proxy. The latter however affects he reflexive character of freedom of the subject. On the idea of a general proxy, any of his conceptions of freedom can a priori be replaced by conceptions about freedom. The general approach to the idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain comes to say that this substitution must be justified. Sovereigns, that is, should give reasons for their rules.<p><p>This is basically what legisprudence as a theory of rational legislation comes to. Its more concrete articulation is the topic of the third part of the book.<p><p>Chapter 8 starts with the exploration of an alternative for the proxy model of legitimation that was investigated in the previous chapters. The alternative is labelled the trade-off model. On this model, the subjects trade off conceptions of freedom for conceptions about freedom. This comes to saying that the substitution of conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom must be justified. No rule can be held legitimate if this justification or legitimation is lacking.<p><p>The trade off model is based on freedom as principium in its twofold meaning. Freedom unlimited as was argued in chapter 4 is both the starting point and the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. It follows from there that subjects are primarily to act on conceptions of freedom. A substitution of a conception about freedom for conceptions of freedom can only be legitimate if it is legitimated or justified as an alternative for failing social interaction. This is the first principle of legisprudence that is called the “principle of alternativity”. The second principle is the principle of necessity of the normative density. Rules should not automatically contain sanctions. If sanctions are included, this requires a specific justification. Rules with a sanction embrace a double reduction of freedom. First, the pattern of behaviour is imposed and second its realisation is enforced. Before realising a rule with the help of force alternative means of achievement of its goals are to be outweighed.<p><p>The third principle of legisprudence is the principle of temporality. The limitation of freedom on a conception about freedom must be justified as “on time”. Any justification is embedded in a context. This means that if it is successful it will only be temporarily so. The principle of temporality then requires a justification over time, and not only on the moment that a rule is issued.<p><p>The principle of coherence is the fourth principle of legisprudence. It requires that rules, both judicial and legislative make sense as a whole. The principle of coherence thus identified is elaborated in a theory that I propose to call the “level theory of coherence”, and that makes part of legisprudence.<p><p>At the end of the chapter, the principles of legisprudence are focused on from the position of the legislator before they are further explored in chapter 9. This chapter concretises the operationalisation of the principles of legisprudence. The principles of legisprudence, so it is argued, are to be read within the context of one another. Upon weighing and balancing their relative weight in the process of legislation, the ruling of the sovereign can be said to be legisprudentially optimal.<p><p>Legisprudential optimality on its turn is further concretised in chapter 10. The sovereign has to discharge of his duties throughout the legislative process while taking the circumstances of legislation into account. These circumstances are the fact that subjects interact with each other on the basis of conceptions of freedom. These circumstances result from the theory of freedom that was set out in chapter 4 and further elaborated in the subsequent chapters. <p><p>The duties of the sovereign throughout the process of legislation amount to a duty of fact finding, problem formulation, weighing and balancing of alternatives, prognosis, retrospection, taking future circumstances into account and finally a duty to correction.<p><p>Finally, a brief sketch is offered of the concept of validity according to legisprudence. Apart from the necessity of formal validity, both efficacy and axiological validity are briefly commented upon. From the diagnosis of some theories of validity that mainly focus on only one of the aspects of validity, the concept of validity according to legisprudence is called “network validity”.<p><p>Projects like this book would never begin, let alone come to an end, without the help of a large number of people. I will not enter into a detailed description of their contribution. Suffice to mention their names with the hope that they will recognize some of their thoughts, reflections, critiques and encouragements somewhere in the book.<p><p>The persons that come to my mind are Aulis Aarnio, Maurice Adams, Manuel Atienza, John Bell, Samantha Besson, Guido Calabresi, Tom Campbell, Carine Caunes, Emilios Christodoulidis, Wochiech and Aga Cyrul, Martine de Clerq, Pieter Dehon, Erwin Depue, Johan Desmet, David Dhooge, Guillaume Drago, Hugues Dumont, Philip Eijlander, Michiel Elst, René Foqué, Benoit Frydman, Tito Gallas, Philippe Gérard, René Gonzalez, Guy Haarscher, Mark Hunyadi, Sheldon Leader, Maria-Isabelle Köpke-Tinturé, Neil MacCormick, Francesco Laporte, Luzius Mader, Frank Michelman, Charles-Albert Morand, Dwight Newman, François Ost, Juliane Ottmann, Richard Parker, Trinie Parker, Aleksander Peczenik, Chaïm Perelman, Vlad Perju, Kauko Pietillä, Juha Pöhöynen, Daniel Priel, Pekka Riekinen, Thomas Roberts, Eric Rossiaux, Geoffrey Samuel, Jerzy Stelmach, Andreas Takis, Benoît Timmermans, Philippe Thion, Hannu Tolonen, Michel Troper, François Tulkens, Stamatios Tzitzis, François Vallançon, Koen Van Aeken, Wibren Van der Burg, Mark Van Hoecke, Michiel Vandekerckhove, Frederik Vandendriesche, Rob van Gestel, Scott Veatch, Roger Vergauwen, Amaryllis Verhoeven, Michel Villey, Jeremy Waldron, Kenneth Winston, Willem Witteveen, Wochiech Zadurski and Marek Zyrk-Zadurski.<p><p>Thomas Roberts helped me with the linguistic corrections of the text.<p><p>I have a special debt to Mark Van Bellingen and Lilly De Vooght for their views on the context of participation, the idea of a hermeneutical point of view and their critique on the “view from nowhere”.<p> <p><p> <p>1\ / Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette étude tente d'éclaircir la relation entre la liberté et l'État moderne dans la philosophie sociale hégélienne. Pour ce faire, une lecture herméneutique de la PDD permet de dégager toute l'importance de la pensée hégélienne afin de penser le problème contemporain de la relation entre l'individu et l'État moderne. Premièrement, Hegel affirme que l'État moderne produit les conditions nécessaires au développement des droits individuels. Cependant, cette liberté subjective demeure insuffisante et incapable de produire une stabilité et une durabilité de cette liberté. Il est ainsi nécessaire, deuxièmement, que l'État assume le rôle de l'universel qui assure cette stabilité. L'État moderne remplit ce rôle puisqu'il est organique et autosuffisant, en ce sens il représente la dimension objective de la liberté. Finalement, la liberté substantielle devient possible, pour les individus réflexifs, à l'intérieur de l'État moderne. Pour avoir accès à cette liberté finale, l'individu doit participer activement dans les institutions de l'État qui offre la possibilité de vivre une vie éthique, c'est-à-dire de vivre la réconciliation entre l'individu et l'État moderne.

Tableau d'honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdorales, 2015-2016 / Le présent mémoire a pour objet la métaphysique du mal sous-jacente au système de la liberté élaboré par Schelling en 1809 dans son dernier traité intitulé Recherches philosophiques sur l’essence de la liberté humaine et les sujets qui s’y rattachent. Il sera question, dans un premier temps, pour pouvoir aborder ces Recherches dans leur juste perspective, d’une reconstruction du problème de l’identité de l’identité et de la différence basées sur les principaux textes de la philosophie de l’Identité de Schelling, et ce dans la mesure où ce problème sous-tend les enjeux liés au système de la liberté. Dans un second temps, nous aborderons le système de la liberté en montrant que la différence finie est pensée en 1809 comme liberté humaine pour le bien et pour le mal. Cette détermination de la différence nous acheminera enfin, dans un troisième temps, vers la métaphysique du mal que Schelling conçoit alors comme une théodicée. L’enjeu sera dès lors de rapporter cette différence, la liberté humaine comme pouvoir du bien et du mal, à l’Identité, au système, à Dieu.

Progression d'un concept, le mal radical, dans trois textes :La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison (Kant), Le système de l'Ethique (Fichte), et Le Traité de 1809 (Schelling). Origine ultime du mal :libre arbitre ou détermination ?Responsabilité et liberté du mal. Mal moral et métaphysique du mal/ Advance of a concept: radical evil, in three readings: Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason (Kant), System of Ethics (Fichte), and Treatise of 1809 (Schelling).Ultimate origin of evil: free will or determination? Responsibility and freedom to evil. Moral evil and metaphysics of evil. / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished