This dissertation investigates the relationship between religion and the state in Enlightenment Europe as articulated by John Locke, Benedict de Spinoza and Jean Jacques Rousseau. I conduct the study focusing mainly on the primary texts of the above-mentioned theorists. Locke and Spinoza conceived of toleration to be the best way in which religion and the secular state could peacefully co-exist, even though they differed considerably in their respective understanding of the concept. Locke conceived of toleration using a moderate theological framework, predominantly paying attention to freedom of worship and the separate spheres of influence for religion and the state. On the other hand, Spinoza was radically secular in his interpretation focusing mainly on the freedom of thought, speech and even the press. Rousseau provided the main alternative to Locke and Spinoza's ideas on toleration. His understanding of the most effective relationship between religion and the state revolved around the implementation of a civil religion. This would be a religion based on civil principles. Rousseau argued that good citizenship, a good lawgiver, patriotism, the doctrine of separation of powers and an elective aristocracy were important for his ideas on civil religion to function effectively. Given the context of Enlightenment Europe, this dissertation concludes that toleration, or more exactly Locke's version of it, now forms the foundation of most Western secular states. This is because it did not digress from the most important aspects of contemporary religious doctrine. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2009.

The general distinction between uses of the term "idea" which we draw is between occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them as opposed to concepts. Locke uses "idea" in the first way, Malebranche uses it in the second. Leibniz allows that the mind is infinite and that dispositions in the body correspond to dispositions in the mind; thus he is able to maintain that idea are both concepts and dispositions in the mind. We explain concepts in terms of conventional rules, for the most part linguistic and especially mathematical. We call a system of conventional rules an objective structure and, as those who took ideas to be concepts held that they are concepts of divine science, we treat God as the unique objective structure. The question in seventeenth century theories of ideas is how that body of knowledge comprising ideas and their relations is applicable to thing. In the first four chapters, we consider concepts and the Cartesian programme to reduce the description of everything but that which applies concepts to mathematical descriptions. Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz held that the lack of simplicity and exactness in human knowledge arises from the correspondence between microscopic activities in the body and mental occurrences. With occurrences in the body explained mechanically, it was held, the world can be described with maximum simplicity and exactness. Extended things are law-obeying configurations to which concepts are applied; thinking things are rule-following things by virtue of applying these concepts. But the parts played by convention and behaviour are left out of their accounts and, omitting these, the world cannot be shown to be anything more than a diagram, perhaps portrayed only in the mind of the investigator. In the antepenultimate chapter, we discuss two related views which led the rationalists to maintain that all rational beings naturally follow a unique objective structure: their position on the correspondence between the activity of the body and occurrences in the mind (illustrated in their theories of vision) and the view that divine science is the standard for all scientific formulations. In the penultimate chapter, we present evidence that rationalist accounts of cognition were in fact modelled on rule-governed activity, Plato's theory of knowledge and Ideas is compared with rationalist accounts and is found to have less relevance to rule-governed activity, Kant, we admit, saw the relevance of rules, but no more than the rationalists. In the ninth chapter, we discuss Malebranche's vision in God (which most clearly presents ideas as concepts), its relation to Descartes' and Leibniz's positions and its dependent on occasionalism. In the fifth chapter, we argue against Chomsky's innatist position and, more generally, claims in the behavioural and social sciences to explain human knowledge in terms of internalized components and covert activities. It is also maintained that Chomsky's innatism bears little resemblance to that of seventeenth century rationalism. We discuss in the sixth through the eighth chapters the Scholastic back-ground to the use of the term "idea" and theories of ideas. In the sixth chapter, the pervasive influence of Suarez is established, as is the prevalence of nominalism in the seventeenth century and its connection with Gaszendism and eventually Locke. Suarez combined aspects of Thomism and nominalism, Thomism was concerned with so-called spiritual objects of knowledge, which roughly act as standards and are the contribution of the knower to what is known; rationalism's account of knowledge maintained these aspects of Thomism, nominalism, on the other hand, presented what we shall call a causal or genetic account of knowledge (according to which our knowledge arises from causal relations and operations of the intellect) and was concerned with so-called material objects got from sensation (while allowing for spiritual operations). The distinction between spiritual and material objects and faculties is introduced in the sixth chapter. In the seventh chapter, we discuss the bridge between these facilities, the intellectus agens, which served as an objective structure in Thomist accounts. In the eight chapter, we discuss uses of “spiritual”, “idea” and “mind”, beginning with Scholastic uses, but concentrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi. Locke's causal account is discussed in the final chapter. We emphasise his divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his reliance on mental dispositions. Locke's position suffers from the omission of concepts.

No description available.

Orientador: Profª. Drª. Maria Isabel Limongi / Dissertaçao (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Paraná, Setor de Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Defesa: Curitiba, 27/03/2013 / Inclui referências : f. 64-65 / Área de concentração: Historia da Filosofia Moderna e Comtemporânea / Resumo: Pretendo, neste trabalho, analisar a formação de conceitos na construção do sistema moral de Hume atrás de um debate entre o autor escocês e três representantes de sistemas morais distintos. Respectivamente John Locke e sua moral demonstrativa, Francis Hutcheson e a moral sentimentalista e por fim Thomas Hobbes e a moral egoísta. Hume elaborou um sistema moral inédito, mas não podemos desconsiderar que suas críticas e elogios a outros filósofos morais são fundamentais na constituição de seu projeto sobre as ações morais. Propomos neste trabalho, elencar três concepções distintas às quais Hume recorre para justificar seu ataque à tradição moral racionalista, às relações de ideias encontradas no Ensaio sobre o entendimento humano de John Locke. Focaremos esse ponto da teoria moral lockeana, pois Hume pretende provar que a moral não é passível de demonstração aos moldes da matemática, conforme pretendia Locke. Em seguida apresentaremos o elogio de Hume conferido aos sentimentalistas morais. Tomamos como representante da presente corrente Francis Hutcheson. Hume adota o moral sense e o rearranja conforme sua concepção própria. Por fim, apresentamos a moralidade em Thomas Hobbes, que é egoísta. Notamos que com essa conversa entre Hume e nossos filósofos escolhidos os papéis da razão e das paixões são recolocados de modo original para a época. Depois de expormos as teorias desses três filósofos, e de posicionarmos Hume, estruturando dessa maneira a sua edificação sobre a moralidade, pretendemos demonstrar como para a Hume a moral é regulada e podemos alcançar, a partir da própria natureza humana, juízos morais estáveis. / Abstract: I intend in this work to analyze important concepts in the construction of Hume's moral system behind a debate between the Scottish author and three representatives of different moral systems. Respectively John Locke and his moral demonstrative, Francis Hutcheson and moral sentimentalist and finally Thomas Hobbes and his selfish moral. Hume developed a novel system of morality, but we can not ignore that his criticisms and compliments the other moral philosophers are fundamental in the constitution of his Project. We propose in this paper, listing three different conceptions of which Hume uses to justify his attack on the moral rationalist tradition, on the relation of ideas found in the Essay concerning human understanding by John Locke. We will focus this point of Lockean moral theory, since Hume intends to prove that morality is not susceptible to molds demonstration of mathematics, as intended Locke. Then, we present the praise given to Hume's moral sentimentalists. We take this as representative of the current Francis Hutcheson. Hume adopts the moral sense and rearrange as your own design. Finally, we present morality in Thomas Hobbes, that is selfish. We note that this conversation between Hume and our philosophers chosen the roles of reason and the passions are replaced so original for its time. After exposing the theories of these three philosophers, and position ourselves Hume, thus structuring your edification about morality, we intend to demonstrate how Hume morality is regulated and can achieve from the very human nature, stable moral judgments.

Orientador: Martha Rosa Pisani Destro / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-11T13:38:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Batista_GustavoAraujo_D.pdf: 1579436 bytes, checksum: cddc80f045bbe9d4440dbf238f7eff50 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo : Este trabalho é uma síntese feita a partir de uma pesquisa bibliográfica de filosofia comparada da educação, desenvolvida sobre dois tipos de pensamento pedagógico, elaborados, respectivamente, por John Locke (1632-1704) e por Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778); nessa pesquisa faz-se uma leitura de suas propostas pedagógicas à luz teórico-metodológica do materialismo histórico-dialético. Procurou-se contextualizar historicamente os dois autores abordados, com o intuito de demonstrar em que medida as rupturas e as permanências geradas pelas contradições nas infraestruturas econômicas das sociedades de suas respectivas épocas interferiram nas superestruturas políticas, filosóficas, intelectuais, religiosas e pedagógicas e, conseqüentemente, em suas trajetórias existenciais e em suas obras. Dividindo-se em três capítulos, no primeiro discorre-se sobre a contextualização histórica dos dois filósofos estudados, passando-se em revista os Séculos XVII e XVIII em seus vários aspectos, assim como nele se faz uma descrição acerca das biografias e das personalidades desses autores; no segundo incumbe-se de abordar os pensamentos lockeano e rousseauniano como um todo, ressaltando-se as principais categorias pelas quais seus autores estruturam e articulam as suas idéias acerca do conhecimento, da política, da religião e da tolerância; no terceiro aborda-se algumas categorias pedagógicas desses pensamentos, as quais, comparadas entre si, têm o intuito de aclarar as convergências entre os seus dois autores, ao mesmo tempo em que se procura ressaltar a influência que este recebe daquele em se tratando de constituir o seu pensamento pedagógico; também nesse capítulo são explicitadas as visões de mundo e de homem nas quais esses autores enquadrar-se-iam, assim como são tratadas outras categorias que permitem vincular os seus pensamentos não apenas entre si, mas sim às classes sociais para as quais suas obras constituem significado / Abstract : This work is a synthesis done from a bibliographical research of compared philosophy of education, developed about two kinds of pedagogical thinking, done, respectively, by John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778); in that research one does a reading of their pedagogical proposals by the theoretical-methodological light of the historical-dialectical materialism. One looked for doing historically a context about the two authors approached, with the aim of showing in what measure the ruptures and the permanencies produced by the contradictions in the economical infrastructure of the societies of their respective eras interfered into the political, philosophical, intellectual, religious and pedagogical superstructures and, consequently, into their existential trajectories and into their works. Being divided into three chapters, in the first one discusses about the historical context of the two philosophers studied, passing on review the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries in their several aspects, as well as in this it is done a description concerning the biographies and personalities of those authors; in the second one undertakes to approach the lockean and rousseaunian thoughts at all, standing out the main categories by which their authors structure and articulate their ideas concerning knowledge, politics, religion and toleration; in the third one approaches some pedagogical categories of those thoughts, that, compared to one another, have the aim of clearing the convergences between their two authors, at the same time on which one looks for standing out the influence that this receives from that in regarding of constructing his pedagogical thinking; also in this chapter are made explicit the visions of world and man into which those two authors would be fitted, as well as are treated others categories that permit to link their thoughts not only each other, but so to the social classes to which their works make meaning / Doutorado / Historia, Filosofia e Educação / Doutor em Educação

Nesta tese buscamos identificar uma resposta à questão sobre a formação dos conceitos empíricos à luz da lógica geral. Para responder essa questão, trabalhamos em dois caminhos. Em primeiro lugar, buscamos compreender qual é exatamente a questão que pode ser respondida no domínio da lógica geral. Para alcançar esse objetivo partimos de uma pista encontrada na Crítica da razão pura, onde Kant compara o projeto crítico com aquele desenvolvido por John Locke, e investigamos o modo como Locke explica a formação das representações gerais. Além disso, procedemos por analisar a própria noção de lógica geral em Kant, o que foi realizado, igualmente, em duas etapas: o registro histórico das influências recebidas através do Manual de Meier e a análise das Reflexões concernentes à natureza e limite da lógica geral. Realizado esse trabalho, foi possível circunscrever nossa questão inicial: à lógica geral cabe explicar a forma dos conceitos, isto é, sua universalidade. Assim, em segundo lugar, nos dedicamos à análise da distinção do que consiste propriamente a universalidade dos conceitos para Kant. Sugerimos que a universalidade dos conceitos, em oposição à singularidade das intuições, significa tomar uma representação parcial como fundamento de cognição. A hipótese desenvolvida foi, portanto, enfrentar o texto das Lições e das Reflexões sobre lógica, especificamente, no que diz respeito ao papel dos atos lógicos (comparação, reflexão e abstração), para buscar encontrar uma explicação de como surgem representações capazes de serem utilizadas pelo entendimento como fundamento de cognição. Após discutir e rejeitar uma possibilidade de interpretação encontrada na literatura, sugerimos uma alternativa para compreender o papel dos atos lógicos na geração da forma de um conceito. Defendemos, assim, que a comparação e a reflexão respondem pelas atividades de: i) representar como parte, o que não é explicado pela recepção de um objeto intuído e; ii) tomar uma representação parcial como fundamento de cognição da coisa. Por sua vez, caberia à abstração, atividade de separar representações, um papel negativo: uma vez tomada uma representação como fundamento de cognição da coisa, segue-se uma subordinação da coisa à minha representação na medida em que a penso segundo o que ela tem em comum com outras. / The aim of this thesis is to identify an answer to the question about the formation of the empirical concepts through the general logic in Kant. In order to obtain this aim, we worked on two tracks. First, we try to understand what is exactly the question which can be answered by general logic. For this, we start with a clue found in the Critique of pure reason, where Kant compares his own project with the one developed in John Locke’s work and, then, investigate how Locke explains the formation of general representations. Besides that, we proceed to analyse the Kantian notion of general logic, which is also realized in two steps: an historical approach of the influences received by the Georg F. Meier’s Auszug and the analysis of the Kantian Notes over Meier’s text on the nature and limits of general logic. Therefore, we could circumscribe our initial question: the general logic can explain only the form of concepts, namely, their generality. Secondly, we scrutinize the distinction between intuitions and concepts through the following criteria: immediacy/mediacy and singularity/generality. We suggest understanding the generality of concepts in terms of the capacity of “taking a partial representation as a ground of cognition”. So, the developed hypothesis was to look to the Kantian Notes on logic, especially its sections dedicated to the logical acts (comparison, reflection, abstraction) in order to find an explanation of the generation of general representations capable of being used by the understanding as a ground of cognition. After discussing and rejecting a possibility found in the specialized literature, we suggest an alternative to understanding the logical acts in the generation of the form of concepts. We defend, by the end, that the comparison and reflection are activities of: i) representing as partial, which cannot be explained exclusively by the reception of an object e; ii) taking that partial representation as a ground of cognition. On the other hand, the logical act of abstraction is the activity of separating representations: once we have a representation taken as a ground of cognition, it follows an activity of subordination of the thing represented according to what it has in common with others.

Nesta tese buscamos identificar uma resposta à questão sobre a formação dos conceitos empíricos à luz da lógica geral. Para responder essa questão, trabalhamos em dois caminhos. Em primeiro lugar, buscamos compreender qual é exatamente a questão que pode ser respondida no domínio da lógica geral. Para alcançar esse objetivo partimos de uma pista encontrada na Crítica da razão pura, onde Kant compara o projeto crítico com aquele desenvolvido por John Locke, e investigamos o modo como Locke explica a formação das representações gerais. Além disso, procedemos por analisar a própria noção de lógica geral em Kant, o que foi realizado, igualmente, em duas etapas: o registro histórico das influências recebidas através do Manual de Meier e a análise das Reflexões concernentes à natureza e limite da lógica geral. Realizado esse trabalho, foi possível circunscrever nossa questão inicial: à lógica geral cabe explicar a forma dos conceitos, isto é, sua universalidade. Assim, em segundo lugar, nos dedicamos à análise da distinção do que consiste propriamente a universalidade dos conceitos para Kant. Sugerimos que a universalidade dos conceitos, em oposição à singularidade das intuições, significa tomar uma representação parcial como fundamento de cognição. A hipótese desenvolvida foi, portanto, enfrentar o texto das Lições e das Reflexões sobre lógica, especificamente, no que diz respeito ao papel dos atos lógicos (comparação, reflexão e abstração), para buscar encontrar uma explicação de como surgem representações capazes de serem utilizadas pelo entendimento como fundamento de cognição. Após discutir e rejeitar uma possibilidade de interpretação encontrada na literatura, sugerimos uma alternativa para compreender o papel dos atos lógicos na geração da forma de um conceito. Defendemos, assim, que a comparação e a reflexão respondem pelas atividades de: i) representar como parte, o que não é explicado pela recepção de um objeto intuído e; ii) tomar uma representação parcial como fundamento de cognição da coisa. Por sua vez, caberia à abstração, atividade de separar representações, um papel negativo: uma vez tomada uma representação como fundamento de cognição da coisa, segue-se uma subordinação da coisa à minha representação na medida em que a penso segundo o que ela tem em comum com outras. / The aim of this thesis is to identify an answer to the question about the formation of the empirical concepts through the general logic in Kant. In order to obtain this aim, we worked on two tracks. First, we try to understand what is exactly the question which can be answered by general logic. For this, we start with a clue found in the Critique of pure reason, where Kant compares his own project with the one developed in John Locke’s work and, then, investigate how Locke explains the formation of general representations. Besides that, we proceed to analyse the Kantian notion of general logic, which is also realized in two steps: an historical approach of the influences received by the Georg F. Meier’s Auszug and the analysis of the Kantian Notes over Meier’s text on the nature and limits of general logic. Therefore, we could circumscribe our initial question: the general logic can explain only the form of concepts, namely, their generality. Secondly, we scrutinize the distinction between intuitions and concepts through the following criteria: immediacy/mediacy and singularity/generality. We suggest understanding the generality of concepts in terms of the capacity of “taking a partial representation as a ground of cognition”. So, the developed hypothesis was to look to the Kantian Notes on logic, especially its sections dedicated to the logical acts (comparison, reflection, abstraction) in order to find an explanation of the generation of general representations capable of being used by the understanding as a ground of cognition. After discussing and rejecting a possibility found in the specialized literature, we suggest an alternative to understanding the logical acts in the generation of the form of concepts. We defend, by the end, that the comparison and reflection are activities of: i) representing as partial, which cannot be explained exclusively by the reception of an object e; ii) taking that partial representation as a ground of cognition. On the other hand, the logical act of abstraction is the activity of separating representations: once we have a representation taken as a ground of cognition, it follows an activity of subordination of the thing represented according to what it has in common with others.

Nesta tese buscamos identificar uma resposta à questão sobre a formação dos conceitos empíricos à luz da lógica geral. Para responder essa questão, trabalhamos em dois caminhos. Em primeiro lugar, buscamos compreender qual é exatamente a questão que pode ser respondida no domínio da lógica geral. Para alcançar esse objetivo partimos de uma pista encontrada na Crítica da razão pura, onde Kant compara o projeto crítico com aquele desenvolvido por John Locke, e investigamos o modo como Locke explica a formação das representações gerais. Além disso, procedemos por analisar a própria noção de lógica geral em Kant, o que foi realizado, igualmente, em duas etapas: o registro histórico das influências recebidas através do Manual de Meier e a análise das Reflexões concernentes à natureza e limite da lógica geral. Realizado esse trabalho, foi possível circunscrever nossa questão inicial: à lógica geral cabe explicar a forma dos conceitos, isto é, sua universalidade. Assim, em segundo lugar, nos dedicamos à análise da distinção do que consiste propriamente a universalidade dos conceitos para Kant. Sugerimos que a universalidade dos conceitos, em oposição à singularidade das intuições, significa tomar uma representação parcial como fundamento de cognição. A hipótese desenvolvida foi, portanto, enfrentar o texto das Lições e das Reflexões sobre lógica, especificamente, no que diz respeito ao papel dos atos lógicos (comparação, reflexão e abstração), para buscar encontrar uma explicação de como surgem representações capazes de serem utilizadas pelo entendimento como fundamento de cognição. Após discutir e rejeitar uma possibilidade de interpretação encontrada na literatura, sugerimos uma alternativa para compreender o papel dos atos lógicos na geração da forma de um conceito. Defendemos, assim, que a comparação e a reflexão respondem pelas atividades de: i) representar como parte, o que não é explicado pela recepção de um objeto intuído e; ii) tomar uma representação parcial como fundamento de cognição da coisa. Por sua vez, caberia à abstração, atividade de separar representações, um papel negativo: uma vez tomada uma representação como fundamento de cognição da coisa, segue-se uma subordinação da coisa à minha representação na medida em que a penso segundo o que ela tem em comum com outras. / The aim of this thesis is to identify an answer to the question about the formation of the empirical concepts through the general logic in Kant. In order to obtain this aim, we worked on two tracks. First, we try to understand what is exactly the question which can be answered by general logic. For this, we start with a clue found in the Critique of pure reason, where Kant compares his own project with the one developed in John Locke’s work and, then, investigate how Locke explains the formation of general representations. Besides that, we proceed to analyse the Kantian notion of general logic, which is also realized in two steps: an historical approach of the influences received by the Georg F. Meier’s Auszug and the analysis of the Kantian Notes over Meier’s text on the nature and limits of general logic. Therefore, we could circumscribe our initial question: the general logic can explain only the form of concepts, namely, their generality. Secondly, we scrutinize the distinction between intuitions and concepts through the following criteria: immediacy/mediacy and singularity/generality. We suggest understanding the generality of concepts in terms of the capacity of “taking a partial representation as a ground of cognition”. So, the developed hypothesis was to look to the Kantian Notes on logic, especially its sections dedicated to the logical acts (comparison, reflection, abstraction) in order to find an explanation of the generation of general representations capable of being used by the understanding as a ground of cognition. After discussing and rejecting a possibility found in the specialized literature, we suggest an alternative to understanding the logical acts in the generation of the form of concepts. We defend, by the end, that the comparison and reflection are activities of: i) representing as partial, which cannot be explained exclusively by the reception of an object e; ii) taking that partial representation as a ground of cognition. On the other hand, the logical act of abstraction is the activity of separating representations: once we have a representation taken as a ground of cognition, it follows an activity of subordination of the thing represented according to what it has in common with others.

Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida Marques / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-06T22:28:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Barnabe_GabrielRibeiro_M.pdf: 2707008 bytes, checksum: a7e84f9b9072afe3b22c10544cf5cf3e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: O realismo e o racionalismo são dois paradigmas que refletem os eixos que orientam as relações internacionais; a cooperação e o conflito. O pensamento de Hobbes, que se aproxima do realismo, entende o cenário internacional como predominante de conflito devido aos Estados buscarem a acumulação indefinida de poder e possuírem o direito natural sobre todas as coisas. Os pensamentos de Locke e Grotius se aproximam do paradigma do racionalismo, pois acreditam que os Estados podem ser racionalmente induzidos à cooperação. Para Locke, o cenário internacional é de paz enquanto a lei natural for cumprida. A violação da lei natural autoriza uma guerra justa. De acordo com Grotius, o homem possui naturalmente o desejo de viver em sociedade ordenada segundo sua reta razão. Grotius conjuga realistas e racionalistas ao argumentar pelo estabelecimento de regras mínimas para o mínimo de sociabilidade. A violação dessas regras mínimas autoriza uma guerra justa. Concluiremos que os pensamentos dos três filósofos são complementares para uma visão unificada dos fenômenos internacionais / Abstract: Realism and rationalism are two paradigms which reflect the main lines guiding international relations: cooperation and conflict. Hobbes' ideas, which approach realism, envision the international scene as predominantly conflictuous due to a quest of States to reach indefinite accumulation of power and to possess the natural right over all things. The thoughts of Locke and Grotius approach the paradigm of rationalism, for their belief in that the States can rationally be induced into cooperation. For Locke, the international scene is of peace as long as there is a fulfillment of natural law - the breaking of which would authorize a fair war. According to Grotius, man naturally possesses the desire of living in a society ordained according to his right reason. Grotius conjugates realists and rationalists when arguing for the establishment of a minimum of rules for a minimum of sociability. The breaking of these minimum rules authorizes a fair war. We shall conclude that the thoughts of the three philosophers are complementary for a unified vision of the international phenomena / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

It is now taken for granted that the globe is divided into mutually exclusive territories, each of which belong to a particular community. To be a political community, it is thought, means to have sole possession of a piece of the Earth’s surface and to have complete authority over that land. Yet the history of political thought has little to tell us about when and how this conception arose. I argue that the first complete statement of this doctrine of the territorial state emerged with Emer de Vattel’s The Law of Nations in 1758. Vattel’s doctrine synthesized three ideas which had been developing in the genres of natural law and the law of nations since the Peace of Westphalia: the state was supreme over its territory; it possessed independent moral personality; and it was tied to a permanent human community. This dissertation recovers the ideological resources of territorial state formation by tracing the philosophical roots of these ideas in Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, and Christian Wolff. I argue that although Vattel’s doctrine would appear as an ideal type, it was in fact provincially rooted in the narrow context of former dynastic fiefdoms in the Holy Roman Empire. I reach this conclusion through a spatial contextualist method of reading canonical texts in the natural law and law of nations traditions. I find that the shared linguistic practices that emerged to conceptualize and defend territorial states often relied upon assuming preexisting communities who laid claim to the land as their ‘native country.’