Does choice excuse inequality? Some contemporary egalitarians – often referred to as “Luck Egalitarians” – believe it does. However, many seemingly chosen inequalities obtain between men and women as a group. A recent surge of empirical literature has sought to demonstrate the role that individual choice plays in producing and maintaining a subset of existing gender inequalities (e.g. the gender wage gap). This thesis considers the status of such inequalities in the context of the Luck Egalitarian project. More precisely, it considers whether the claim that choice excuses inequality is appropriate to the phenomenon of gendered choice. In Chapter 1, I argue that Luck Egalitarianism, as it currently stands, does not adequately deal with the topic of gendered choice. I maintain that this is due largely to the fact that it is not sufficiently attentive to the social forces shaping gendered choices (e.g. socialization, hostile social climates). In Chapter 2, I discuss whether attending more fully to factors that facilitate autonomy gives Luck Egalitarianism a way to incorporate a more robust discussion of gender into its account of responsible choice. I argue that contextualizing the choice/circumstance principle is the key to ensuring that it tracks truly autonomous choice, and avoids treating choices shaped by gender norms as justifiably disadvantage-conferring. In Chapter 3, I begin the project of articulating a set of background conditions against which we can deem choices authentic. I draw on feminist approaches to the philosophy of autonomy to inform this project. I come to the conclusion that choice excuses inequality only if such choices are made against conditions which actively work against gender-specific constraints on choice. / Graduate / 0422 / emma.e.byrnes@gmail.com

In the last four decades, luck egalitarianism has emerged as a hotly debated theory of distributive justice. The tenet, in its most normative sense, calls for distribution or assistance when circumstances of disadvantage arise from bad luck that is independent of human influence. Disadvantages that can be traced back to individual choice and responsibility, on the other hand, are left for the sufferer to bear. In this paper, I argue that luck egalitarianism should be abandoned as a standard for determining whether a disadvantage should be addressed, because the assumption that there are instances of disadvantage completely attributable to individual choice is flawed. Brute luck, or luck that emerges from beyond human control, influences most human outcomes, making it difficult to confidently attribute outcomes to option luck, or luck that stems from human choice. Without option luck, luck egalitarianism becomes obsolete as the principle rests on the distinction between brute and option luck.

A recent movement within political philosophy called luck egalitarianism has attempted to synthesize the right’s regard for responsibility with the left’s concern for equality. The original motivation for subscribing to luck egalitarianism stems from the belief that one’s success in life ought to reflect one’s own choices and not brute luck. Luck egalitarian theorists differ in the decision procedures that they propose, but they share in common the general approach that we ought to equalize individuals with respect to brute luck so that differences in distribution are only a consequence of the responsible choices that individuals make. I intend to show that through the application of its own distributive procedures, the luck egalitarian approach actually undermines its original motivation by making the lives of individuals subject to brute luck.

This thesis shows that exploitation can arise from a just background, via just steps, when we exercise our moral rights. The theory rests on the idea that exploitation can arise via a special category of luck, which I call socially constructed luck. By taking into account what John Rawls calls background justice and what G.A. Cohen refers to as an accumulation problem, I argue that socially constructed luck is brought about through a cumulative process of people freely exercising their moral rights in the pursuit of their own conception of the good life. Unless the negative effects of this type of luck are offset, exploitative interactions can arise where people have no reasonable alternative but to enter a particular transaction. Socially constructed luck can play a direct role in privileging some individuals at the expense of others and allows for the extraction of surplus benefits. Importantly, by showing that luck egalitarianism should be understood within a conception of exploitation, the thesis not only provides a deeper understanding of how the luck egalitarian and relational egalitarian views align, but also justifies the introduction of a basic right to a reasonable alternative.

If morally arbitrary features (that is, blind brute luck) should have no impact on the distribution of wealth, then the vast inequality and the disparity in life prospects between countries is a moral catastrophe; birthplace is completely based on luck, and yet has an enormous impact on life prospects. I contend that those in affluent countries, who have benefited from the luck of birthplace, ought to work towards a more egalitarian world, in which luck plays as little a role in life prospects as possible.

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I argue that existing views in the political equality debate are inadequate. I propose an alternative approach to equality and argue its superiority to the competing approaches. I apply the approach to some issues in global justice relating to global poverty and to the inability of some countries to develop as they would like. In this connection I discuss institutions of international trade, sovereign debt and global reserves and I focus particularly on the WTO, IMF and World Bank.

[Truncated abstract] In this thesis, I seek to determine whether luck egalitarianism is a compelling interpretation of egalitarian justice. In answering this question, I challenge existing interpretations and criticisms of luck egalitarianism, and highlight its radical consequences. I propose a revised theory of luck egalitarianism, and conclude that it does represent a compelling interpretation of egalitarian justice. In the first chapter, I trace the evolution of luck egalitarianism, highlighting the variety of theories that have been grouped under this label. In chapter 2, I defend the approach against an influential critique by Elizabeth Anderson, who argues that luck egalitarianism is inherently disrespectful, trapped in the distributive paradigm, and harsh in its approach towards the victims of bad option luck. I argue against these criticisms, pointing out that the harsh treatment problem will rarely arise because few inequalities result entirely from option luck, and that luck egalitarianism is not disrespectful to those it seeks to assist, nor trapped in the distributive paradigm. In chapter 3, I analyse the distinction between option luck and brute luck, which is crucial to luck egalitarianism. I argue that the option-brute distinction is inconsistent with the underlying impulse of luck egalitarianism because it allows morally arbitrary inequalities to go uncorrected and because it is insufficiently sensitive to the impact of background inequalities on individual choice. I propose a revised theory of luck egalitarianism that focuses on the extent to which a person's level of advantage has been genuinely chosen, rejecting the option-brute distinction. In chapter 4, I give a broader justification of this theory, analysing recent critiques by Susan Hurley and Samuel Scheffler, who have both questioned the moral foundations of luck egalitarianism. In chapter 5, I outline a conception of egalitarian advantage to work alongside the revised theory of luck egalitarianism. I support Cohen's claim that egalitarians should adopt a heterogeneous account of advantage, which includes resources, welfare, and midfare. ... In chapter 7, I highlight the counter-intuitive social policy applications of luck egalitarianism, arguing that the universal approach to social provision associated with the social democratic welfare state comes closer to achieving luck-egalitarian objectives than the residual and conditional provision of benefits and services that is associated with the liberal welfare state. I conclude that luck egalitarianism, in the revised form I outline in chapter 3, is a compelling interpretation of egalitarian justice.