Current Legal Issues of Bank Regulation - Resume This thesis paper deals with issues that can be found in relation with bank regulation. At present, globalized world, banks as important financial intermediaries play a major role. Banks are present in our daily lives and whether or not we want to, they facilitate our everyday operations with the money, investment of free monetary resources, and also borrowing of money. We got accustomed to the convenience that the use of various banking services provides. Equally important are the services of banks for businesses enterprises, various investment companies and funds, and also the countries themselves (the governments). Failure of this system, now that so many subjects are dependent on it, could have far-reaching negative consequences. The bank regulation and its instruments serve as a protection against the rise of adverse consequences. With the growing importance of banks in our society, the importance of their regulation grows as well. But even this may not represent perfect protection and bank regulation may conceal other unforeseen problems. This thesis on "Current legal issues of bank regulation" reflects the legal status of May 31 2012 and is trying to highlight the problems that occur in specific instruments of banking regulation. The aim of this work...

La thèse étudie les liens qui existent entre les recommandations issues de la littérature sur l'assurance chômage optimale et la qualité des emplois repris par les chômeurs. Nous nous intéressons en particulier à une dimension de la qualité de l'emploi qu'est la stabilité des emplois dans un contexte où les contrats de courte voire de très courte durée sont en pleine expansion en France. En utilisant les modèles théoriques de recherche d'emploi et d'appariement, nous analysons la manière dont les caractéristiques de l'assurance chômage affectent la stabilité des emplois repris. La particularité de notre analyse consiste à intégrer la manière dont les employés sont influencés par les paramètres de l'assurance chômage. En effet, si l'on souhaite analyser de manière globale l'impact des paramètres du système d'indemnisation sur l'évolution du taux de chômage, il convient de déterminer comment ces derniers influencent le taux de sortie du chômage (analyse du comportement des demandeurs d'emploi) mais aussi comment ils affectent le taux d'entrée au chômage (analyse du comportement des employés). Pour étudier le comportement des employés nous considérons que ces derniers influencent leur probabilité de conserver leur emploi en fournissant des efforts de rétention d'emploi. Nous montrons notamment que les chômeurs qui quittent rapidement le chômage retrouvent fréquemment des emplois peu stables. Une fois en emploi, ils exercent relativement peu d'efforts pour conserver leur emploi augmentant par là même leur probabilité de retourner rapidement au chômage. L'impact final d'une réduction du montant de l'indemnisation sur l'évolution du chômage est donc indéterminé dès lors que l'on intègre les employés dans l'analyse. / The thesis studies the relationships between the Optimal Unemployment Insurance (UI) literature recommendations and post unemployment job stability. We focus on one particular job quality dimension that is job stability within a context of a huge increase of very short duration job contracts in France since the 2000’s. Using job search and matching frameworks, we analyse how the features of the UI system affect job stability. The particularity of our approach is that we account for employees’ behaviors while the majority of the literature on optimal UI focuses only on jobless workers behaviors. We show notably that job-seekers who leave quickly unemployment tend to find unstable jobs. Once employed they have a greater probability to return to unemployment because the job-retention efforts they exert are not sufficient.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2017-08-01T16:51:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tiago Henrique Lenhard_.pdf: 599231 bytes, checksum: 3887a7a17e0d823268ecff3b91709a7b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-01T16:51:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tiago Henrique Lenhard_.pdf: 599231 bytes, checksum: 3887a7a17e0d823268ecff3b91709a7b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-15 / Nenhuma / O objetivo deste trabalho é verificar o efeito da aplicação de taxa de coparticipação como mecanismo de regulação da demanda por serviços de saúde, mais especificamente na frequência e nos custos de consultas médicas, em consultas de plantão hospitalar, em exames laboratoriais e de diagnóstico por imagem. Os dados utilizados para este trabalho são provenientes de uma operadora de planos de saúde (OPS) da modalidade de Cooperativa Médica A metodologia utilizada para avaliar os resultados da aplicação de taxa de coparticipação dos planos é o Propensity Score Matching (PSM) a partir de estimadores One to one Matching (OM), Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM), Radius Matching (RM) e Kernel Matching (KM). Os resultados indicam a existência de risco moral em indivíduos que possuem plano sem taxa de coparticipação na demanda por consultas médicas e em plantão hospitalar. Para os custos gerados para a OPS por esses serviços o resultado é semelhante. Para os exames laboratoriais o risco moral não foi evidenciado pela ausência de coparticipação nos planos. Já para os exames de diagnóstico por imagem o risco moral foi evidenciado. Os custos para a OPS nesses exames apresentaram um aumento significativo para os indivíduos sem taxa nos dois grupos de exames. Os resultados obtidos por este trabalho indicam que o efeito causado pela taxa de coparticipação é positivo para a OPS, pois a aplicação desse mecanismo reduz significativamente a demanda e os custos para os serviços considerados nesta análise, evidenciando a ocorrência do risco moral em planos sem taxa de coparticipação. / The goal of our study is to investigate the role of copayment as a regulatory mechanism in health services demand. Specifically, we want to understand the effect of copayment on the number and costs related to appointments, emergency appointments, and laboratory and imaging tests. Our dataset was obtained from a health insurance cooperative company (HIC). To evaluate the effects of copayment application in the health care utilization we apply a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method, using the following estimators: One to one Matching (OM), Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM), Radius Matching (RM) and Kernel Matching (KM). The results indicate the evidence of moral hazard effects in appointments and emergency appointments demand for those individuals with health insurance without copayment. Similar results are obtained when we consider the costs incurred by the HIC when providing these services. As for laboratory tests, there was no evidence on moral hazard effects. However, when we consider imaging tests, moral hazard effects were evidenced. HIC provision costs of laboratory and imaging tests showed a significant increase for those individuals with health care plan without copayment. Our results indicate that charging a copayment reduces demand and costs of those health care services considered in out study, highlighting the incentives due to the moral hazard existence in the health care insurance market.

A presente dissertação analisa como a ausência de incentivos adequados no seguro saúde ocasiona o surgimento do fenômeno conhecido como risco moral e suas conseqüências na determinação da demanda de serviços médicos. O trabalho envolve a revisão da literatura e a estimação de um modelo econométrico que avalia a efetividade dos mecanismos de regulação no controle do risco moral por parte do paciente. A principal conclusão é que o risco moral por parte do paciente é importante para os serviços ambulatoriais, mas não ocorre nos serviços hospitalares. / This dissertation analyses how the lack of appropriate incentives motivates the emergence of moral hazard in health insurance and its consequences in the determination of medical services demand. The involves the literature review and the estimation of a econometric model, which evaluates the effectiveness of rationing mechanisms in the control of moral hazard motivated by the patient. The main conclusion is that moral hazard motivated by the patient is significant for ambulatory care, but it does not occur for inpatient care.

全民健保已於民國83年3月1日起正式開辦，其為社會保險的一種，和以往公、勞保等的社會保險，最大的不同處有二：一是將全民皆納入保險的體系中。以往的社會保險只針對特定群體承保，如公務員的公保、勞工的勞保。二是採行部分負擔制度。以往的社會保險除了掛號費外，被保險人幾乎不用再繳交其他的費用。因此，本篇論文即針對這兩個主要的不同處，做一番理論性的探討與實證上的研究。 　　在理論探討方面，是說明政府為何要介入全民健保，其與道德危險的關係如何。所採用的模型為Rothchild與Stiglitz在1976年所提出之競爭性市場下保險配置的模型，並由代表性個人擴充到兩類高低風險不同的被保險人。在實證研究方面，所利用的數據，主要是來自公、勞保的醫療費用支出的數據，再輔以必要的資料，如人口總數，各年齡層的人口分佈及醫療費用的比例，而資料為最近十年間的數據。其方法為先利用公、勞保醫療費用支出的金額，計算出平均一個人可能的醫療費用支出，再透過各年齡層對醫療資源需求不同的程度與人口數，估算出可能的總醫療費用支出，然後再利用先前估算出的數字，求出政府方面所可能節省的醫療費用支出，以及社會福利損失所可能減少的金額。 　　本論文的結論認為，全民健保中的部分負擔制度，確實能發揮抑制道德危險的效果，不論是在政府的醫療費用支出方面，或是整個社會支出的變動方面，都可以看得出有不錯的改善情形。但在長期趨勢預估方面，值得注意的是，醫療費用支出的成長會大於保費收入的增加，若不提早因應與改善規劃，全民健保也有可能會出現入不敷出的情形。因此，全民健保仍有努力與改善的必要。

資訊不對稱為經濟普遍存在之現象，舉凡勞動市場、保險市場與借貸信用市場皆會發生類似主問題。而本文將就資訊不對稱下之借貸信用市場討論效率問題。 　　眾所皆知，當借貸市場存在資訊不對稱時會發生二大問題：道德危險、逆選擇問題，又因此三大問題會導致貸款者對特定契約之供給減少使借貸市場發生超額需求產生信用分配之現象。故可知，市場均衡因資訊不對稱現象之存在可能無法滿足柏拉圖最適。因此本文將借用四個理論模型說明：借貸信用市場之效率問題。 　　理論模型一：逆選擇下之借貸市場效率一最適放款利率與擔保品之決定 　　理論模型二：逆選擇下之借貸市場效率一最適投資水準之決定 　　理論模型三：逆選擇與道德危險下之信用分配效率 　　理論模型四：償還機率訊息不對稱下之資金配置與金融崩潰 　　透過此四個理論模型之分析可歸納出以下之結論： 　　1.借貸市場存在穩定均衡且均衡滿足市場效率時，政府無須干預借貸市場。 　　2.借貸市場存在穩定均衡且無信用分配現象但均衡未滿足市場效率時，政府就應採行自由放任之態度，透過金融中介機構之借貸行為達成社會效率。 　　3.借貸市場存在穩定均衡且存在信用分配現象但均衡未滿足市場效率時，政府就應採行交叉補貼政策干預市場，但並非所有的干預政策皆能使借貸市場之效率提升，其中尤以“補貼低品質借貸契約”之政策為最佳方案，但因為此政策須政府能夠完全區分借款者之品質型態才可採行，因此，若政府無法加以區分借款者之品質型態時，僅好退而求其次採行次佳方案“信用保証政策”。 　　4.借貸市場若不存在均衡，發生金融性崩潰時，政府應擔任最後貸款者之角色，干預借貸市場以降低私人部間之風險。

Financial intermediaries are recognized to promote the efficiency of resource allocation by mitigating problems of incentives, asymmetric information and contract incompleteness. The role played by financial intermediaries is perceived so crucial that these institutions have received all over the world the greatest attention of regulators. Differences in regulatory regimes as well as in the real economies have produced a large variety in the characteristics of financial sectors and of individual intermediaries. In particular, in different places and times it is possible to observe banking sectors more or less competitive, populated by credit intermediaries of different sizes and with different levels of specialization. This variety of institutions raises interesting questions about the features of a well functioning financial intermediation sector. These questions have inspired an important body of economic literature which, however, is still inconclusive in many aspects. This dissertation includes three studies all intending to contribute in this direction. Chapter 2 Recent empirical works have found evidence consistent with larger banks having lower incentives to collect soft information and, in particular, to lend to small firms which are typically regarded as relatively opaque borrowers. Another market segment affected by relatively high levels of opaqueness is that of long-term loans and the reason is that, as emphasized in the corporate finance literature, short-term maturities are useful for the purpose of screening and monitoring investment projects. It is therefore interesting to assess whether large and small banks differ in their propensity to issue long-term loans, a type of investigation which has not been conducted yet. The reason why small and large banks might be expected to have a different propensity to issue long-term loans has to do with two notions. First, the effectiveness of a short-term maturity as a screening and monitoring device is preserved only if parties anticipate that, when payments are due, the lender will not be willing to extend the maturity, otherwise the initial short-term loan is de facto a long-term one. The problem may rise if the liquidation of insolvent firms produces lower payoffs than their refinancing: under these circumstances, as suggested by theories on renegotiation, liquidation is not implemented no matter what is written on the contract (parties can easily avoid the inefficiency that would result from liquidation, for example by simply granting a new loan). Second, at a more specific level theories on renegotiation suggest that the ability to commit to not extend thematurity decreases with bank size.1 Small banks are therefore predicted to issue shorter-term loans and to make a better selection of projects. The results are consistent with this prediction. Controlling for other characteristics of both the demand- and the supply-side as well as for the type of guarantee supplied, small banks have lower proportions of long-term loans to total loans and lower proportions of non performing loans to total loans. It should be pointed out that this does not imply that small banks are necessarily more efficient since short-term maturities also have costs; in particular, short-term maturities can interfere with the incentives of good types by inducing short-termism (the inflation of shortterm results at the expenses of total profitability). Moreover, beyond the ability to commit other supply-side features are shown to be relevant in the determination of the maturity, at least with specific classes borrowers. In particular, the findings are also consistent with the presence of economies of scale in lending at long maturities to firms in more technical and innovative industries. Since providing the right incentives to high quality entrepreneurs and to firms in innovative sectors is more likely to be a priority in more advanced countries, a policy implication is that these economies need more the presence of large credit institutions and the more so if venture capital and stock market are of limited size. Chapter 3 As already emphasized, theories on renegotiation suggest that the ability of banks to commit to a given course of action is an important factor for efficiency and that such ability depends on observable characteristics, like bank size. An important aspect which has not been analyzed in the theoretical literature is the effect that competition among banks exert on their ability to commit. The theoretical model presented in chapter 3 tries to provide an answer to this question. More specifically, the model studies the effects of competition among banks when these are subject to dynamic commitment problems which may result in excess refinancing of insolvent borrowers (soft budget constraint) as well as in excess termination of profitable ones (ratchet effect and short-termism). The building assumption is that, because of priority schemes and relationship lending, competition is harsher for new lending than for lending to ongoing projects. The main conclusion is that there exists a trade-off between the benefits that competition brings by disciplining low quality borrowers and the costs implied by worsening the incentives of good ones. The model also allows to look at the effects of competition on stability. This is done in two ways by looking at the extent to which competition interferes with the procyclicality of the banking sector and by studying if competition may eliminate or add inefficient equilibria. The main policy implication is that the optimal level of competition of a banking system is positively related to the quality of the underlying economy. If taken together, the results of chapters 2 and 3 also provide a theory about local or regional banks which is not based on any aprioristic assumption about the technology of these type of intermediaries. As long as these institutions can be seen as banks with a relatively high market power and a relatively small size (they are often important players at a local level although of limited size), both chapters 2 and 3 suggest that these intermediaries can more easily commit to a tough stance at the refinancing stage, with positive effects on their ability to screen out bad projects but with negative effects on their ability to incentivize good types and to fund more technical and innovative firms. In other words, these institutions might promote growth at earlier stages of development, although they are not sufficient to address the incentive issues of more advanced economies. Interestingly, this interpretation of the role of local banks is totally distinct from the traditional one which is based on the aprioristic assumption that these banks are good in doing relationship lending. Chapter 4 Conflicts of interest of economic institutions carrying out a variety of functions are considered a widespread phenomenon severely limiting the efficiency that can be achieved. These worries are often taken as justification for regulations imposing transparency requirements or tougher measures like separation of functions. At the same time, contract theory suggests that the effects of opportunistic behavior can be limited by adopting appropriate incentive schemes. The third study, chapter 4, tries to understand from a theoretical point of view to what extent the use of incentive schemes can address the distortions posed by the presence of conflicts of interest. The universal bank is regarded as a (common) agent serving different clients with potentially conflicting interests: for example, it may buy assets on behalf of investors and sell assets on behalf of issuing firms. The clients offer incentive schemes to the bank and they behave non-cooperatively. The bank decides a level of effort and, when firewalls are absent, a level of collusion, modelled as a costly and unproductive redistribution of wealth among the clients (for example, the banks can at no cost sell the securities it is underwriting to the funds it manages and can do so at the price it likes). Firewalls are defined as all legal or economic devices imposing a real separation of functions and therefore preventing the bank from colluding as specified above. The main conclusion is that in the absence of firewalls the equilibrium incentive schemes are steeper. This means that the equilibrium level of effort is higher and may compensate the (ex post) inefficiency of collusion. In other words, not only appropriate incentive schemes can eliminate the distortions posed by conflicts of interest but, at least in principle, their presence may even be necessary for efficiency (this happens if effort is a public good for the two principals so that the allocation without firewalls is characterized by under-provision of effort). At the same time, the allocation without firewalls is shown to be the least efficient in the presence of one naive player who does not recognize the existence of the conflict of interest. As long as transparency requirements can be considered tools to improve market participants’ sophistication, these results suggest why and how this type of regulation can work. Moreover, the model allows to draw conclusions about the desirability of tougher regulation prescribing a more or less neat separation of functions. With sophisticated economic agents, who can address the distortions posed by conflicts of interest by choosing appropriate incentive schemes, separation of functions is unnecessary or even detrimental for efficiency. On the other hand, more or less powerful firewalls are desirable if market participants are not considered sufficiently sophisticated to be able to react to the presence of conflicts of interest and if transparency requirements cannot increase their sophistication. In few words, the optimal regulation of conflicts of interest is softer in situations involving professionals who are more likely to realize and to react by choosing an appropriate incentive scheme or, more generally, for institutions operating in advanced economies where the average level of market participants sophistication is higher.

Research questions, results and Empirical Data This book studies the allocation of scarce resources among competing needs and wants. Chapter 1 – Luck, effort and Redistribution on procedural justice provides one possible explanation for the vast differences between US and Western European tax an redistribution levels. Chapter 2- Participation and Peers in Social Dilemmas on social norms investigates two potential reasons why solutions to social dilemmas in for instance insurance systems can persist without being destroyed by the negative forces of free-riding. Chapter 3 - Commitment and Impasses in Negotiation on conflict shifts focus to bilateral bargaining and the reasons for conflict and impasses. Whether they manifest as strikes, job resignations, or trade embargoes, failures of the negotiation process create tremendous loss of social welfare and are therefore important to further understand. Each chapter is based on observations of real human behavior in the lab. The empirical data consists of: 204 M.B.A. students and 96 M.Sc. students from Harvard university, the Stockholm School of Economics, the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm university and Karolinska Institutet; 5 experiments over 21 experimental sessions generated 2,520 observations.

We consider a risk averse entrepreneur who approaches a diversified venture capitalist (VC) for financing of a project with positive potential return. We develop several models that capture key features of the venture financing, including staged investment, VC oversight costs and agency conflicts. The contract between the VC and the EN includes risk-free and pay-performance sensitive compensation. Moral hazard arises because the EN must exert effort for the project to succeed. Our model is novel in that it also allows for asymmetric beliefs about project quality due to the EN's optimism even when the VC and EN face symmetric information. We first analyze the VC-EN relationship when the VC has bargaining power. We characterize the equilibrium levels for the pay-performance sensitivities, investment and effort over time and show they can be either increasing or decreasing or initially increasing and then decreasing. We find that asymmetric beliefs and risk aversion have opposite effects on the VC-EN relationship. When the EN is moderately more optimistic than the VC, he accepts more risk and exerts more effort and the VC responds with more investment. In contrast, risk aversion reduces effort and investment. Our model predicts a performance-sensitive investment policy where critical milestones must be achieved for investment to continue. These milestones increase with the risk aversion and decrease with the asymmetry in beliefs. Consequently, project duration increases with asymmetric beliefs and decreases with risk aversion. We calibrate this core model to empirical data and use numerical analysis to demonstrate that the technical and systematic risks have opposite effects. The VC's payoff and the project's value and duration increase with technical risk and decrease with systematic risk. We analyze the relationship when the EN has bargaining power, and find that the equilibrium and the corresponding implications for venture financing do change. In this setting, the negative effects due to risk aversion are more pronounced. We also find that if the EN's effort cannot be observed by the VC, then the pay-performance sensitivities, investment and effort all increase.

Univ., Diss--Bonn, 2007.