En la guerra de Malvinas lucharon alrededor de 14 mil combatientes en las trincheras, el aire y el mar. También en la posguerra, los sobrevivientes pelearon otras batallas desde otras trincheras. En el continente, se convirtieron en combatientes de las guerras contra el silencio, la incomprensión, los sentidos del conflicto y las propias marcas de una experiencia a veces difícil de significar. Para esas batallas, en ocasiones, buscaron a sus compañeros de las islas, aquellos con quienes habían compartido los momentos más límites de cotidianeidad con la muerte en el archipiélago malvinense. En la posguerra, muchos ex-combatientes de Malvinas se reencontraron, contuvieron, conformaron espacios para recordar la guerra y luchar por sus derechos, a la vez que continuaron y/o resignificaron los lazos afectivos construidos al calor de la batalla. Esta tesis aborda la posguerra de un grupo de ex-combatientes en particular: los integrantes del Apostadero Naval Malvinas. Luego de compartir el trabajo de estiba de los buques, la vida bajo bombardeo y las guardias nocturnas en los muelles de Puerto Argentino, los civiles y militares de la Armada que formaron esa unidad logística, volvieron a reunirse una vez que los cañones callaron, y continúan encontrándose aun hoy en las reuniones de camaradería anuales que realizan cada 20 de junio. ¿Por qué se reencontraron luego de la rendición? ¿Qué marcas de la guerra y posguerra pueden explicar la pervivencia de los vínculos construidos en las islas? A lo largo de la tesis, reconstruyo las experiencias de posguerra de los conscriptos, suboficiales y oficiales del Apostadero Naval Malvinas desde el regreso al continente hasta el presente (1982-2013), con el objeto de comprender la persistencia de los lazos afectivos configurados en esa experiencia extrema. Se trata de explorar la reconfiguración y resignificación de la identidad social fundada en las islas a lo largo de la posguerra, y la construcción de cierto sentido compartido sobre el conflicto en cada contexto histórico y según los “otros” con los que se vincularon, dialogaron u opusieron. En los procesos de (re)configuración de esa identidad social y memoria grupal, los silencios que los ex-combatientes del Apostadero tuvieron que combatir, aceptar a regañadientes y/o asumir a lo largo de los 30 años de la posguerra fueron puntos de referencias esenciales e ineludibles.

El estado actual de la controversia de soberanía sobre el territorio de las islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur, Sándwich del Sur y sus espacios marítimos circundantes, es de congelamiento. Desde 1982 a la fecha, el reclamo del Estado argentino a su par británico para que éste negocie la transferencia de la posesión de las islas sudatlánticas, no ha tenido éxito. Gran Bretaña sostiene que es la legítima poseedora del territorio y que la defensa de la libre determinación de la población de las islas prima sobre cualquier otra consideración. Por su parte, la Argentina argumenta que, conforme al derecho internacional público, es la única titular de la soberanía, que los isleños e isleñas no tienen la facultad de dirimir la controversia, que es exclusiva entre dos Estados, y que el Reino Unido está obligado a negociar la transferencia territorial, conforme lo establecido por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Esta investigación parte de la hipótesis de que la estrategia de resolución del conflicto que ha privilegiado la Argentina en este período –la negociación y la argumentación con base en el derecho internacional-, no es adecuada para recuperar la soberanía, conforme a la actitud de su contraparte y las condiciones estructurales de la negociación como método de resolución. En esa línea, el objetivo de esta tesis es describir la política exterior que ha adoptado la República Argentina en las últimas cuatro décadas respecto de la cuestión Malvinas, y las respuestas que ha obtenido de la otra parte de la controversia, el Reino Unido. Por último, siguiendo lo sucedido en un caso análogo al de Malvinas, el del archipiélago de Chagos, se propondrá una estrategia diferente para modificar el statu quo del conflicto: recurrir a la Corte Internacional de Justicia. / The current state of the sovereignty dispute over the territory of the Malvinas, South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime spaces is frozen. From 1982 to date, the claim of the Argentine State to its British counterpart so that it negotiates the transfer of possession of the South Atlantic islands, has not been successful. Great Britain maintains that it is the legitimate owner of the territory and that the defense of the self-determination of the population of the islands takes precedence over any other consideration. For its part, Argentina argues that, in 6 accordance with public international law, it is the sole holder of sovereignty, that the islanders do not have the power to settle the dispute, that it is exclusive between two States, and that the United Kingdom is obliged to negotiate the territorial transfer, as established by the General Assembly of the United Nations. This research is based on the hypothesis that the conflict resolution strategy that Argentina has favored in this period -negotiation and argumentation based on international law- is not adequate to recover sovereignty, according to the attitude of its counterparty and the structural conditions of the negotiation as a method of resolution. In this line, the objective of this thesis is to describe the foreign policy that the Argentine Republic has adopted in the last four decades regarding the Malvinas issue, and the responses that it has obtained from the other party to the controversy, the United Kingdom. Finally, following what happened in a case similar to that of Malvinas, that of the Chagos archipelago, a different strategy will be proposed to modify the status quo of the conflict: resort to the International Court of Justice.

El conflicto que enfrentó a Argentina con el Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña en abril de 1982, ha sido estudiado desde una serie de puntos de vista. Desde la vereda de enfrente, se ha querido ver como un hecho justo, necesario y sobretodo impostergable para recuperar la soberanía argentina sobre las islas. Por ello encontramos visiones vinculadas con posiciones políticas a favor o en contra del régimen que tomó la decisión de la invasión; intereses académicos, ofreciendo en este caso los más variados análisis de la guerra, tales como estudios sociológicos de la población, de los conscriptos, de la guerra misma, análisis militares del conflicto, historias políticas, análisis de las relaciones internacionales, narraciones históricas, descripciones periodísticas, y un sin fin de etcéteras. También se ha querido ver al conflicto como una “cortina de humo” destinada a perdurar la supervivencia del régimen dictatorial argentino denominado “el proceso de reorganización nacional”. El presente trabajo persigue dos objetivos: el primero es dar a conocer la real dimensión de la participación peruana en la denominada guerra de las Malvinas y establecer los diferentes niveles de apoyo que brindó el Perú a la República Argentina. El segundo, y el más relevante, es dar una interpretación de los motivos que llevaron al Perú a tomar una posición de respaldo a la posición argentina.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:28:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2013Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T18:32:35Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 simon_r_me_mar.pdf: 806869 bytes, checksum: e0912808e84c1f56353edadb4812c175 (MD5) / Esta dissertação debate as influências da transição democrática sobre a política internacional do Brasil, durante o governo de João Figueiredo (1979-1985). Com base em uma análise histórica, argumenta-se que as aberturas interna e externa, com a inédita aproximação entre o Brasil e seu entorno sul-americano, não foram apenas concomitantes, mas essencialmente complementares. Mais ainda, o regime militar buscou usar a diplomacia como um de seus instrumentos para controlar a abertura “lenta, gradual e segura”, enquanto outros atores nacionais, como partidos de oposição e sindicatos, também recorreram à arena externa tentando fortalecer suas posições no embate doméstico para definir o novo regime / This dissertation debates the influence of Brazil’s democratic transition upon its foreign relations during the government of Joao Figueiredo (1979-1985). Based on a historical analysis, we argue that the opening of the regime and Brazil’s unprecedented rapprochement with its South-American neighbours were not only simultaneous, but essentially complementary. Moreover, the military regime tried to use diplomacy as one of its tools to control the so-called “slow, gradual and secure” transition, while other national actors, such as opposition parties and unions, also reached for external support to strengthen their position in the domestic dispute to shape the new regime

Orientador: Clodoaldo Bueno / Banca: Monica Hirst / Banca: Antônio Carlos Lessa / O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas" / Resumo: Esta dissertação debate as influências da transição democrática sobre a política internacional do Brasil, durante o governo de João Figueiredo (1979-1985). Com base em uma análise histórica, argumenta-se que as aberturas interna e externa, com a inédita aproximação entre o Brasil e seu entorno sul-americano, não foram apenas concomitantes, mas essencialmente complementares. Mais ainda, o regime militar buscou usar a diplomacia como um de seus instrumentos para controlar a abertura "lenta, gradual e segura", enquanto outros atores nacionais, como partidos de oposição e sindicatos, também recorreram à arena externa tentando fortalecer suas posições no embate doméstico para definir o novo regime / Abstract: This dissertation debates the influence of Brazil's democratic transition upon its foreign relations during the government of Joao Figueiredo (1979-1985). Based on a historical analysis, we argue that the opening of the regime and Brazil's unprecedented rapprochement with its South-American neighbours were not only simultaneous, but essentially complementary. Moreover, the military regime tried to use diplomacy as one of its tools to control the so-called "slow, gradual and secure" transition, while other national actors, such as opposition parties and unions, also reached for external support to strengthen their position in the domestic dispute to shape the new regime / Mestre

1982年4月2日，阿根廷入侵福克蘭/馬爾維納斯群島，震驚英國朝野。時任首相的柴契爾夫人在4月7日成立戰爭內閣，並決定出兵奪島，不到三個月的時間，英軍於6月14日克復福克蘭/馬爾維納斯群島，阿根廷戰敗，聯合軍政府總統加爾鐵里下台。 柴契爾夫人的領導風格揉合法理型及卡理斯瑪式的支配型權威，以及轉換型的領導方式，在處理這場危機時掌握快速反應及賦予危機定義的要領，指出阿根廷入侵已危害英國的基本利益，一面派遣特遣隊開赴戰場，同時以外交談判方式拖延掩護特遣隊行蹤。阿根廷駐軍雖是以逸待勞，但軍隊指揮調度的反覆埋下戰敗的禍根，軍政府想要移轉國內焦點的動機並未如願，反而加速本身的崩解，開啟民選政府的扉頁，阿方辛成為戰後首位民選總統。 英國在戰爭之後有意與阿根廷恢復正常的外交關係，與90年代阿根廷梅南上台後以發展經濟為主的外交政策不謀而合，在主權保護傘的前提下共同開發與勘探油氣。但到了2001年德拉魯阿上台後一改外交政策，強調阿根廷擁有福克蘭/馬爾維納斯群島的主權，歷經多位總統至今仍維持一貫的基調。而英國自2010年國家安全戰略報告發表後，確立保障該群島島民安全與自決的權利，促成2013年島民決定政治地位的公投，結果是壓倒性的贊成票決定仍由英國管轄，英阿爭議依舊紛擾。 / On 2 April 1982, UK was stunned with the news that Argentina had invaded the Falkland/Malvinas islands. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher set up the war cabinet rapidly at 7 April and decided to dispatch the military to take the island back. In three months, the British military recovered the Falkland/Malvinas islands on 14 June, Argentina was defeated, President Leopoldo Galtieri stepped down. The leadership of Thatcher was composed of legal-rational authority and charismatic authority, as well as transformational leadership. When she faced the crisis she realized the essentiality of the fast-reaction and make-a-definition-to-the-crisis, so she accused the invasion had undermined the Britain's interest and dispatched the armed forces to the battlefield, at the same time used diplomatic negotiations to cover up the military actions. On the other hand, Argentina's military had the advantage of having the island under their control, but the advantage was undermined with the change in command, which eventually lost the war. The Junta not only failed to shift the focus of the society, but also dug its own grave. After the collapse of the Junta, Raúl Alfosin the elected president, and started a new era of Argentina. After the war, the UK intended to normalize the relationship with Argentina. That coincided with the diplomatic policy of President Carlos Menan in the 90s, whose main focus was developing the economy. Under the sovereign umbrella, UK and Argentina cooperated and exploited natural gas and oil in the sea surrounding the Falkland/Malvinas islands. Until 2001 Fernando de la Rua was elected and changed the diplomatic policy to emphasize Argentine’s sovereignty over the Falkland/Malvinas islands. That policy was consistently upheld by several presidencies afterwards. Nevertheless, with the promulgation of the "National Security Strategy", UK assured to safeguard the islanders' safety and the right of self-determination. A referendum was facilitated in 2013 on the Falkland Islands. An overwhelming 90% of voters chose to remain as UK territory. The dispute is still unsettled.

<p>Den 26 maj 1982 påbörjas anfallet mot samhällena Darwin och Goose Green. Anfallande styrka är brittiska, 2 Paras, på plats och försvarsgrupperade är Taskforce Mercedes. Britterna vinner slutligen över en numerärt överlägsen och försvarsgrupperad argentinsk styrka. Hur kommer det sig att detta kan ske? Jag kommer, för att kunna besvara mina frågeställningar, i det här självständiga arbetet att med utgång i de grundläggande förmågorna, ledning, verkan, skydd, rörlighet, uthållighet och und/info, analysera slaget. Dessa frågeställningar är:</p><p> -          Vilken av de grundläggande förmågorna var avgörande för 2 Paras seger?</p><p>-          Vilken av de grundläggande förmågorna var avgörande för Taskforce Mercedes förlust?</p><p>Jag har kommit fram till följande; britterna kunde tack vare en kombination av förmågorna ledning och verkan avgöra striden till deras fördel. För argentinarna var det förmågan ledning som bäddade för deras förlust. Vill du veta hur jag kommit fram till detta och varför uppmanar jag dig att läsa detta arbete.</p> / <p>My name is Nicklas Nilsson. I’m a cadet studying at the Swedish Land warfare Centre. As a part of becoming a commissioned officer I’m obligated to write an essay at fundamental level. I have written about the Battle for Darwin – Goose Green. A battle between 2 Para and Taskforce Mercedes. I have used (de grundläggande förmågorna) six fundamental abilities as an analysis instrument. The questions I am going to answer with this essay are:</p><p> -What ability was decisive for 2 Para’s victory?</p><p>-What ability was decisive for Taskforce Mercedes defeat?</p><p> Initially I will conduct a literature study, followed by a comparative case study.</p><p>I have come to the following conclusions:</p><p>The Argentines lost due to their lack of a good leadership and</p><p>The British won due to the abilities, better trained, better motivated and with more experience. They also, contrary to the Argentines, had leaders that was present and tried to resolve the situations they’ve gotten in to. If you want to read more about this and how I’ve come to these conclusions, please read this essay.</p>

Den 26 maj 1982 påbörjas anfallet mot samhällena Darwin och Goose Green. Anfallande styrka är brittiska, 2 Paras, på plats och försvarsgrupperade är Taskforce Mercedes. Britterna vinner slutligen över en numerärt överlägsen och försvarsgrupperad argentinsk styrka. Hur kommer det sig att detta kan ske? Jag kommer, för att kunna besvara mina frågeställningar, i det här självständiga arbetet att med utgång i de grundläggande förmågorna, ledning, verkan, skydd, rörlighet, uthållighet och und/info, analysera slaget. Dessa frågeställningar är:  -          Vilken av de grundläggande förmågorna var avgörande för 2 Paras seger? -          Vilken av de grundläggande förmågorna var avgörande för Taskforce Mercedes förlust? Jag har kommit fram till följande; britterna kunde tack vare en kombination av förmågorna ledning och verkan avgöra striden till deras fördel. För argentinarna var det förmågan ledning som bäddade för deras förlust. Vill du veta hur jag kommit fram till detta och varför uppmanar jag dig att läsa detta arbete. / My name is Nicklas Nilsson. I’m a cadet studying at the Swedish Land warfare Centre. As a part of becoming a commissioned officer I’m obligated to write an essay at fundamental level. I have written about the Battle for Darwin – Goose Green. A battle between 2 Para and Taskforce Mercedes. I have used (de grundläggande förmågorna) six fundamental abilities as an analysis instrument. The questions I am going to answer with this essay are:  -What ability was decisive for 2 Para’s victory? -What ability was decisive for Taskforce Mercedes defeat?  Initially I will conduct a literature study, followed by a comparative case study. I have come to the following conclusions: The Argentines lost due to their lack of a good leadership and The British won due to the abilities, better trained, better motivated and with more experience. They also, contrary to the Argentines, had leaders that was present and tried to resolve the situations they’ve gotten in to. If you want to read more about this and how I’ve come to these conclusions, please read this essay.

No description available.

Por meio de tradicionais e novos conceitos da Geopolítica, são analisadas as especiais circunstâncias que cercaram as relações entre a Argentina e os principais países do mundo desenvolvido, os EUA e parte da Europa, durante a Guerra das Malvinas, para, a partir desse mesmo ferramental conceitual, verificar como esse episódio teve seu impacto nas relações de Brasil e Argentina na América do Sul. Os principais acontecimentos políticos, táticos e logísticos desse conflito são descritos para auxiliar nessa análise feita. A partir desse ponto de inflexão na história sul-americana, utiliza-se o conceito de Medidas de Confiança Mútua (MCM) para se verificar como as Marinhas de Brasil e Argentina intensificaram suas relações dentro do novo marco geopolítico acordado entre os dois países. São descritos os sucessos dessa política de aproximação em cinco fases históricas distintas, didaticamente elaboradas: duas anteriores à própria Guerra das Malvinas, e três posteriores. Destacam-se, neste estudo, justamente, as três últimas fases. Ou seja, a terceira fase, após a Guerra das Malvinas, onde são descritos, dentre outros aspectos, os encontros estratégicos organizados pelo EMFA (Brasil) e pelo EMCFA (Argentina) no final da década de 80 do século passado; a quarta fase, ao longo da década de 90, por ter sido o período em que as principais MCM de sucesso ocorreram; e a quinta fase, já na virada do milênio, onde são discutidos os limites atuais das MCM que vêm sendo adotadas e as possíveis perspectivas futuras. A primeira e a segunda fases situam-se ainda nos períodos iniciais e intermediários da Guerra Fria, mas, por já existirem ali algumas MCM embrionárias entre as Marinhas de Brasil e Argentina, importantes para desdobramentos futuros, estas fases têm também discutidas as suas importâncias históricas. Enfatiza-se que, na primeira fase, os principais episódios ocorreram sob grande influência dos EUA, enquanto, na segunda fase, já se constatava uma ligeira autonomia regional nas medidas adotadas. / There are analyzede, by means of traditional and new concepts of geopolitics, the special circumstances that surrounded the relations between Argentina and the main developed countries, the United States and part of Europe, during the Malvinas War, in order to, based on such conceptual tool, exam, how such episode impacted the Brazil-Argentina relations on South America. The main political, tactic and logistic events are described to help with the analysis. As of this turning point in the South-American history, it is used the concept of Mutual Confidence Measures (MCM) to verify how the Brazilian and Argentinean Navies intensified their relations in the new giopolitics milestone agreed upon between both countries. There are described the successful events in such approaching policy and politics in five different phases, didactically worked out: two prior to the Malvinas War and three afterwards. This study high lights precisely the three last phases, i.e., the phases after the Malvinas War. In the third phase, there are described, among other aspects, the strategic meetings organized by the EMFA (Brazil) and the EMCFA (Argentina) at the end of the 1980s; in the forth phase, are highly emphasized the 1990s since this is the period during which most of the MCM succeeded; and, in the fifth phase, already at the turning of the millennium, the current limits of the MCM, that are being adopted, are discussed, as well as the possible perspectives for the future. The first and second phases are the ones still during the beginning and intermediate periods of the Cold War. These phases are also discussed because they already presented some embryonic MCM policies between the Brazilian and Argentinean Navies, important for the way the events unfolded later on. In the first phase, there are stressed the main episodes that took place under the influence of the US, while, in the second, one can already notice a slight regional autonomy in the measures adopted.