The Arctic area is in a state of rapid change. New fairways open up as the ice melts, which – in turn – presents both opportunities and threats to the neighboring states. As the Arctic is of both economical and strategic interest, these states include both great powers like the U.S. and Russia but also small powers like Norway and Denmark. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how these states use their armed forces in claim of the Arctic and – more specifically – how Maritime Diplomacy is used in this situation. The thesis furthers attempts to address the question whether there are differences between the large states on the one hand, and the smaller ones on the other when using Maritime Diplomacy. The theoretical framework used in the thesis comes from several well known scholars and military theorists including Cable and Corbett which focus on maritime strategy. The analyses suggest that there are indeed significant differences between the studied states in terms of their use of Maritime Diplomacy. The thesis concludes that the four nations uses it’s maritime diplomacy tools in a coherent way. But there is a difference between great powers and smaller states since the smaller tend to use influence as a tool in greater extent. The thesis also shows that Russia as the only state that uses a coercive tool.

Abstract: The old established description gunboat diplomacy has in modern time changed to a broader and more nuanced definition called maritime diplomacy. But what is maritime diplomacy and how is it described? This essay analyses the theories from the Englishman James Cable and the American Edward Luttwak. Both Cable and Luttwak represent nations which have a global security interests and deploy their maritime forces worldwide. The foundation for their theories is power politics. Is it possible to apply their theories in a small-state perspective?   Analyze of Cable and Luttwaks theories crystallizes three categories that can be defined in maritime diplomacy: naval presence, naval coercion and naval deterrence. By applying these three categories on a case study I want to scrutinize if the categories is applicable on a small state. The Swedish naval expedition to Aland in 1918 works as case study. The aim is to see if today’s theory of maritime diplomacy is applicable on how a small-state uses their maritime forces.   The conclusion is that naval presence is suitable for a small-state to use. Naval presence gives room for political maneuvers and god possibilities to have an influence on the situation. Naval presence also gives reasonable security to own forces due to the possibility to withdrawal if the situation deteriorates.   Naval coercion is also useful for a small-state, but the situation should be thoroughly analyzed in order to have control over the course of events. The political will together with proper guidance is important for succeeding in naval coercion.   Naval deterrence can be used but depends on the relation between forces. A small-state can only deter an opponent that has less ability of power projection.

Russia and the US are two great powers who have strategic interest in the Arctic. Research indicates increased military activities in the Arctic and a security dilemma is up to topic in the region. To understand whether military or territorial disputes can become future threats in the Arctic, states' strategic interest in the Arctic needs to be investigated from a war science perspective. To gain an understanding of the states' strategic use of military means in a marine environment, naval diplomacy will be used in the investigation to offer an understanding on how naval forces can utilize different Defence, Coercive, Symbolic or Supportive strategic value. By examining current Russian and US Arctic policy documents, and how the strategic values of naval diplomacy are described, can give an indication of how Russia’s and the US increased military in the Arctic can be understood. The conclusions of the examination involve Russia's marine strategy as for infrastructure for readiness, possibility for all year around presence of naval forces regardless of season and delimiting of other powers ability of interaction in specific areas. The US marine strategy can be understood from aspects of a periodic presence and surveillance purposes, both with collaborative partners and to coerce other powers.

The submarine has historically proven itself to be able to greatly contribute to the achievement of national strategic goals and ambitions. Multiple nations are therefore developing and procuring submarines to increase their own strategic effect on the global arena. What is absent in discussions regarding submarines are possible contributions as a diplomatic tool. This study aims to analyze the possibility of understanding the submarine as a diplomatic tool in a context of development. Thus the study is based on theories of naval diplomacy which through the use of four strategic values, formulated and defined by the theories, explains national use of naval forces for diplomatic purposes. By analysis of documents explaining the development of submarines in two nations, Sweden and the USA, with differing global and strategic ambitions a width regarding empirical data is ensured which in turn contributes to a wider understanding of the submarine. The outcome of the analysis shows that the submarine indeed can be understood and seen as a tool of diplomatic value. However the result is ambiguous since the strategic value of symbolism does not present itself as a factor in the depiction of the submarine in Swedish documents and thus prevents the total understanding of the submarine as a diplomatic tool.

Present naval disputes indicates that naval compellence has endured since imperial expansionism and is still an active part of nation’s maritime diplomacy and strategy. In this study, I argue that sea power is more than a symbol of the aggressor’s national power and have a substantial impact on the outcome of naval compellence. Due to the exclusiveness of specific types of warships, the strategic prioritisation creates strategic cost that can signal resolve and credibility as sunk cost. Submarines also creates the opportunity for private signalling, without public transparency. Combining data from multiple datasets that compares the outcome of naval compellence between 1918-2011 with the naval power of the aggressor, this study presents systematic evidence that battleships increase the probability of successful naval compellence while carriers, conventional and nuclear submarines can’t be proven to have a significant impact on the outcome.