The education of the emotions is a valuable tool not always taken into account in the development of the democratic, egalitarian background essential to empower citizens. Perhaps the difficulty lies in the fact that, firstly, it is necessary to probe the possibilities of educability of emotions. Martha Nussbaum is one of the contemporary philosophers who have devoted much of their work to the study of emotions, and from her theory, conclusions can be drawn about the question of their educability. Her theory of emotions can be situated within a set of theories that understand emotions as cognitive, which turns literature into a useful tool for their education. However, the author does not put forward an explicit methodology for such development from narrative. To this end, in this interview Nussbaum is asked about the concept of self-conscious reflection as a feasible proposal to enable the education of emotions, as well as about whether a list of democratic emotions” can be built from her theory. Also, in this context, Nussbaum responds and elaborates on these themes. / La educación de las emociones es un valioso instrumento no siempre tomado en cuenta para el desarrollo de un trasfondo valorativo igualitario y  democrático  indispensable  para  la  autonomía  de  los  ciudadanos.  Tal  vez  la dificultad radique en que, en primer lugar, es necesario sondear las posibilidades de la educabilidad de las emociones. Martha Nussbaum es una de las filósofas contemporáneas que han dedicado gran parte de su obra al estudio de las emociones, y de su teoría pueden derivarse conclusiones acerca de la pregunta de su educabilidad. Su teoría de las emociones se circunscribe dentro de un conjunto de teorías que consideran a las emociones como cognitivas, y eso convierte a la literatura en una útil herramienta para su educación. Sin embargo, la autora no explicita una metodología que permita dicho desarrollo desde las narraciones. A  estos  efectos,  en  esta  entrevista  se  le  propone  el  concepto  de  autorreflexión como posibilitador de ello, a la vez que se busca reconstruir a partir de su teoría un listado de emociones democráticas”. Asimismo, en este contexto, Nussbaum responde y profundiza acerca de estas temáticas.

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Aristotle’s articulation of a correct state is inherently socially hierarchical. This has led many scholars to view the functionalist approach as being at odds with the inherent equality of persons that is taken for granted in contemporary political theory. My thesis therefore aims to offer a defence of functionalist theory, demonstrating that it can be formulated to respect the functioning of every individual. In Chapter 1, I examine the key Aristotelian concept of natural justice. In order to draw out the subtleties of natural justice, I compare it with Cicero’s articulation of natural law. In Chapter 2, I compare and contrast Martha Nussbaum’s and Aristotle’s articulations of political philosophy. In Chapter 3, I examine the Aristotelian notion of friendship by considering the work of Cooper and Bentley. I argue against most contemporary theorists that Aristotle’s basic understanding of human relationships is altruistic. / Graduate / 0422

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

The ‘’capability approach’’, developed by the Indian economist Amartya Sen, has been widely used in the field of development and has contributed a perception of development that is different from the traditional understanding of it. Despite this, the theory has received a great amount of feminist critique and it has been concluded that the field lacks empirical data on how women in developing countries can be fully understood from the approach of Sen. This field study aims at filling this gap of empirical data as well as to examine how well Sen’s approach can contribute to the understanding of women in a developing context. Responses such as the one of Martha Nussbaum and other feminist critique of Sen is examined using a field study on poor women conducted in the state of Karnataka, India. The collection of data has been conducted through interviews with urban poor women as well as with women working with women empowerment at a local organization. Participant observation in the field has been complementary to the interviews. This study reveals that Sen’s capability approach is incomplete to some extent in order to understand the situation of women in a developing context. This lack of understanding is further completed with Nussbaum’s work. Finally, the modern feminist critique against both Sen and Nussbaum shows a lack of analysis in them both in terms of intersectionality and power.

In Martha Nussbaum’s book Frontiers of Global Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, she presents the capabilities approach, a new theoretical framework that in her view better responds to the urgent problems of social inequality than existing theories of social justice. This thesis evaluates her descriptive claim by applying the capabilities approach to the French burqa ban and assessing whether the ban is unjust, and if so, what forms of intervention are most appropriate. In doing this, I will argue that Nussbaum’s theory is unsatisfactory unless she extends it to include the obligation to criticize in cases where we are certain that an injustice is being committed.

<p>The thesis <em>„Martha Nussbaum’s philosophy with regard to its feministic orientation” </em>represents Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the good life, demonstrates it as a feminist philosophy and locates it in the context of feminist theory. It is shown that Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach in connection with her reflections about the political liberalism and communitarianism is an important contribution for a feministic ethic of equality. Martha Nussbaum combines questions of justice with a theory of the good life. In her demand for the ethicing of the political, lies the relevance of her philosophy for feminism.</p><p> </p>

This thesis is an examination of the concept of human development and does a comparative study of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Sen rectifies the emphasis on income by welfare economics, and argues for the ‘equality of capability’; a goal that he says can be achieved by means of the intrinsic and instrumental role of democracy. However, the author notes that Sen’s development paradigm is inadequate as an account for what constitutes the kind of well-being that is fully human and asserts that Sen’s framework should be concretized politically. In view of this, the author argues that Nussbaum’s articulation of a ‘threshold of capabilities’, anchored on her reading Aristotle’s concept of human flourishing and Marx’s insight on human dignity, is a politically realistic human development framework. Nussbaum thinks that the essential human capabilities are entitlements that must be constitutionally guaranteed to ensure a decent and dignified human life for all. As a response to the reality of pluralism, Nussbaum says that the universality of these entitlements can be secured by means of an overlapping consensus. Furthermore, the extreme poverty in many nations which exposes women and children to much vulnerability has provoked the author to inquire about the applicability of Nussbaum’s framework to the global arena. As such, the thesis argues for the radical expansion of the Human Development Index used by the United Nations Development Program in measuring the quality of human life, notably the inclusion of political liberties and gender equality. In addition to this, the study puts forward the argument that global human development is best achieved through democracy, and asserts that global institutions have a moral duty to protect and promote the central human capabilities.

The thesis „Martha Nussbaum’s philosophy with regard to its feministic orientation” represents Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the good life, demonstrates it as a feminist philosophy and locates it in the context of feminist theory. It is shown that Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach in connection with her reflections about the political liberalism and communitarianism is an important contribution for a feministic ethic of equality. Martha Nussbaum combines questions of justice with a theory of the good life. In her demand for the ethicing of the political, lies the relevance of her philosophy for feminism.

Sen and Nussbaum generate very different degrees of obligation for the affluent under their theories of justice, despite each of them deriving their theory of justice from capability as a metric for quality of life. On one hand, Sen’s account of obligation seems very weak, while Nussbaum’s seems overwhelmingly robust. I argue that the sufficient/decisivereasons framework as put forth by philosopher Derek Parfit captures the nuances of their extremely different accounts of obligation. Further, I argue that this framework convincingly demonstrates that the accounts of obligation that Sen and Nussbaum offer in each of their versions of the capability approach are unsatisfying, as each approach occupies such extremes that they are unreasonable. In spite of this, supplementing the capability approach with a different and perhaps more centrist account of obligation can make the capability approach a more consistent and appealing theory of justice. To this end, I appropriate Thomas Pogge’s account of obligation.