In interference-limited wireless networks, interference management techniques are important in order to improve the performance of the systems. Given that spectrum and energy are scarce resources in these networks, techniques that exploit the resources efficiently are desired. We consider a set of base stations operating concurrently in the same spectral band. Each base station is equipped with multiple antennas and transmits data to a single-antenna mobile user. This setting corresponds to the multiple-input single-output (MISO) interference channel (IFC). The receivers are assumed to treat interference signals as noise. Moreover, each transmitter is assumed to know the channels between itself and all receivers perfectly. We study the conflict between the transmitter-receiver pairs (links) using models from game theory and microeconomic theory. These models provide solutions to resource allocation problems which in our case correspond to the joint beamforming design at the transmitters. Our interest lies in solutions that are Pareto optimal. Pareto optimality ensures that it is not further possible to improve the performance of any link without reducing the performance of another link. Strategic games in game theory determine the noncooperative choice of strategies of the players. The outcome of a strategic game is a Nash equilibrium. While the Nash equilibrium in the MISO IFC is generally not efficient, we characterize the necessary null-shaping constraints on the strategy space of each transmitter such that the Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal. An arbitrator is involved in this setting which dictates the constraints at each transmitter. In contrast to strategic games, coalitional games provide cooperative solutions between the players. We study cooperation between the links via coalitional games without transferable utility. Cooperative beamforming schemes considered are either zero forcing transmission or Wiener filter precoding. We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the core of the coalitional game with zero forcing transmission is not empty. The core solution concept specifies the strategies with which all players have the incentive to cooperate jointly in a grand coalition. While the core only considers the formation of the grand coalition, coalition formation games study coalition dynamics. We utilize a coalition formation algorithm, called merge-and-split, to determine stable link grouping. Numerical results show that while in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime noncooperation between the links is efficient, at high SNR all links benefit in forming a grand coalition. Coalition formation shows its significance in the mid SNR regime where subset link cooperation provides joint performance gains. We use the models of exchange and competitive market from microeconomic theory to determine Pareto optimal equilibria in the two-user MISO IFC. In the exchange model, the links are represented as consumers that can trade goods within themselves. The goods in our setting correspond to the parameters of the beamforming vectors necessary to achieve all Pareto optimal points in the utility region. We utilize the conflict representation of the consumers in the Edgeworth box, a graphical tool that depicts the allocation of the goods for the two consumers, to provide closed-form solution to all Pareto optimal outcomes. The exchange equilibria are a subset of the points on the Pareto boundary at which both consumers achieve larger utility then at the Nash equilibrium. We propose a decentralized bargaining process between the consumers which starts at the Nash equilibrium and ends at an outcome arbitrarily close to an exchange equilibrium. The design of the bargaining process relies on a systematic study of the allocations in the Edgeworth box. In comparison to the exchange model, a competitive market additionally defines prices for the goods. The equilibrium in this economy is called Walrasian and corresponds to the prices that equate the demand to the supply of goods. We calculate the unique Walrasian equilibrium and propose a coordination process that is realized by the arbitrator which distributes the Walrasian prices to the consumers. The consumers then calculate in a decentralized manner their optimal demand corresponding to beamforming vectors that achieve the Walrasian equilibrium. This outcome is Pareto optimal and lies in the set of exchange equilibria. In this thesis, based on the game theoretic and microeconomic models, efficient beamforming strategies are proposed that jointly improve the performance of the systems. The gained results are applicable in interference-limited wireless networks requiring either coordination from the arbitrator or direct cooperation between the transmitters.

Ce travail contribue à la définition des mesures de l'efficacité et de la productivité dans la théorie microéconomique. Il présente des apports théoriques et empiriques. En premier lieu, cette thèse élabore une critique sur certaines mesures classiques de l’efficacité et de la productivité. Il est montré que la mesure directionnelle, sous l'hypothèse de rendements d'échelle constants, pose un certain nombre de problèmes quant à l’évaluation des variations de la productivité. De plus, il est établi que la « slacks-based » et la directionnelle « slack-based » mesures (ou mesures de Färe-Lovell) ne permettent pas de caractériser la technologie de production. Il résulte que ce type de mesure ne permet pas d’évaluer l'efficacité et les variations de productivité. Une approche alternative est proposée qui permet de contourner cette difficulté. Ensuite, cette thèse introduit deux nouveaux indicateurs: un indicateur social de Luenberger-Hicks-Moorsteen et un indicateur de productivité généralisé. Le premier permet d'évaluer l'effet des politiques sur les capabilités au sens d'A. Sen. Il consiste en une transposition des indicateurs de Hicks-Moorsteen en considérant le rôle spécifique d’un sous-vecteur prenant en compte les facteurs sociaux. Le second indicateur généralise les indicateurs standards de productivité. Il permet de retrouver à la fois les indicateurs de Luenberger et le Luenberger Hicks-Moortsteen comme cas spéciaux de cet indicateur généralisé. En considérant la version multiplicative de l’indicateur généralisé, on retrouve comme cas particuliers, les indicateurs de Malmquist et le Hicks-Moorsteen. Enfin, cette thèse présente des applications empiriques qui illustrent la méthodologie. Ces études évaluent et comparent la performance des régions touristiques et plus précisément celle du Languedoc-Roussillon, qui mobilise un cadre d'analyse transfrontalier. / This phd contributes to the definition of efficiency measures and productivity indicator, in the microeconomic theory. It presents theoretical and empirical contributions. Firstly, this phd develops a review on standard measures of efficiency and productivity. It is shown that the directional measure, under the assumption of constant returns to scale, raises some problems in the assessment of productivity changes. Moreover, it is established that the "slacks-based" and directional "slack-based" measures (or Färe-Lovell measures) do not allow to characterize technology. It follows that such measures do not allow to evaluate efficiency and productivity changes. An alternative approach is proposed which overcomes this difficulty. Then, this phd introduces two new indicators: a social Luenberger-Hicks-Moorsteen indicator and a generalized indicator of productivity. The first mesure the impact of publics policies in the line of the capability theory introduce by A. Sen. This indicator consists on a transposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen indicator by considering a sub-vector of social factors. The second indicator generalizes standards productivity indicators. It allows to find the Luenberger and the Luenberger Hicks-Moortsteen as special cases of this general indicator. Considering the multiplicative version of the generalized indicator, on can find the Malmquist and Hicks-Moorsteen indicators, as special cases. Finally, this phd presents some empirical applications to illustrate the methodology. These studies evaluate and compare the performance of the tourist destination, and specifically for the Languedoc-Roussillon, which involves a cross-border analysis framework

In interference-limited wireless networks, interference management techniques are important in order to improve the performance of the systems. Given that spectrum and energy are scarce resources in these networks, techniques that exploit the resources efficiently are desired. We consider a set of base stations operating concurrently in the same spectral band. Each base station is equipped with multiple antennas and transmits data to a single-antenna mobile user. This setting corresponds to the multiple-input single-output (MISO) interference channel (IFC). The receivers are assumed to treat interference signals as noise. Moreover, each transmitter is assumed to know the channels between itself and all receivers perfectly. We study the conflict between the transmitter-receiver pairs (links) using models from game theory and microeconomic theory. These models provide solutions to resource allocation problems which in our case correspond to the joint beamforming design at the transmitters. Our interest lies in solutions that are Pareto optimal. Pareto optimality ensures that it is not further possible to improve the performance of any link without reducing the performance of another link. Strategic games in game theory determine the noncooperative choice of strategies of the players. The outcome of a strategic game is a Nash equilibrium. While the Nash equilibrium in the MISO IFC is generally not efficient, we characterize the necessary null-shaping constraints on the strategy space of each transmitter such that the Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal. An arbitrator is involved in this setting which dictates the constraints at each transmitter. In contrast to strategic games, coalitional games provide cooperative solutions between the players. We study cooperation between the links via coalitional games without transferable utility. Cooperative beamforming schemes considered are either zero forcing transmission or Wiener filter precoding. We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the core of the coalitional game with zero forcing transmission is not empty. The core solution concept specifies the strategies with which all players have the incentive to cooperate jointly in a grand coalition. While the core only considers the formation of the grand coalition, coalition formation games study coalition dynamics. We utilize a coalition formation algorithm, called merge-and-split, to determine stable link grouping. Numerical results show that while in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime noncooperation between the links is efficient, at high SNR all links benefit in forming a grand coalition. Coalition formation shows its significance in the mid SNR regime where subset link cooperation provides joint performance gains. We use the models of exchange and competitive market from microeconomic theory to determine Pareto optimal equilibria in the two-user MISO IFC. In the exchange model, the links are represented as consumers that can trade goods within themselves. The goods in our setting correspond to the parameters of the beamforming vectors necessary to achieve all Pareto optimal points in the utility region. We utilize the conflict representation of the consumers in the Edgeworth box, a graphical tool that depicts the allocation of the goods for the two consumers, to provide closed-form solution to all Pareto optimal outcomes. The exchange equilibria are a subset of the points on the Pareto boundary at which both consumers achieve larger utility then at the Nash equilibrium. We propose a decentralized bargaining process between the consumers which starts at the Nash equilibrium and ends at an outcome arbitrarily close to an exchange equilibrium. The design of the bargaining process relies on a systematic study of the allocations in the Edgeworth box. In comparison to the exchange model, a competitive market additionally defines prices for the goods. The equilibrium in this economy is called Walrasian and corresponds to the prices that equate the demand to the supply of goods. We calculate the unique Walrasian equilibrium and propose a coordination process that is realized by the arbitrator which distributes the Walrasian prices to the consumers. The consumers then calculate in a decentralized manner their optimal demand corresponding to beamforming vectors that achieve the Walrasian equilibrium. This outcome is Pareto optimal and lies in the set of exchange equilibria. In this thesis, based on the game theoretic and microeconomic models, efficient beamforming strategies are proposed that jointly improve the performance of the systems. The gained results are applicable in interference-limited wireless networks requiring either coordination from the arbitrator or direct cooperation between the transmitters.

<p>\textbf{Chapter 1}\\</p> <p>This paper explores the implications of the mismatch hypothesis in the context of the labor market using a survey on newly licensed US lawyers called the After the JD Study. Using a triple difference approach, I measure the impact of diversity quotas on marginal minority workers’ future salaries, promotion rates, and leaving rates for occupation and job. With middling statistical power, my findings are in line with the mismatch hypothesis in that beneficiaries of the diversity quota policy are made ex-ante worse off. My findings are also in line with recent literature on diminishing racial outcome gaps by skill.</p> <p><br></p> <p>\textbf{Chapter 2}\\</p> <p>In this paper, we provide theoretical framework for three models of Digital Media Firm behavior called \textit{Premium}, \textit{Free-to-Play}, and \textit{Play-to-Earn} as well as suggest an empirical measure of firm ponzi-likeness. First, we study a baseline model optimal price and quality of a digital product, the premium model. Second, we extend the baseline model where some customers, called minnows, receive the product for free and other customers, called whales, pay a price for a better version of the product, this is the free-to-play model. Finally, we explore a model where customers receive a security-like asset from the firm and this asset acts like a negative price while also subsidizing the firm's revenue. This final model provides an environment for much research. We show that, even when firms are ponzi-schemes in this final model, quality of the product need not be at a minimum. We also briefly discuss how one would measure the ponzi-likeness of a digital media firm in the third model setting. </p> <p><br></p> <p>\textbf{Chapter 3}\\</p> <p>In this paper, I explore unique measures of racial prejudice and their impact on black wages in the labor market using the General Social Survey, Current Population Survey and the NLSY79. I generate two variables to proxy for racial prejudice which are extracted from the GSS and the NLSY79. The first variable, drawn from the GSS, measures prejudice sentiment towards blacks and the second, drawn from the NLSY79, measures individual experience with racial discrimination. I use these measurements to proxy for racial prejudice and its impact on the black-white wage gap. I find that these variables are two distinctly different measures of racial discrimination in the labor market, providing a powerful instrument for measuring racial discrimination in the labor market. They also provide the insight that, while racial prejudice may be high in certain occupations and regions, this sentiment does not directly impact black outcomes. Specifically, wages are more sensitive to racial prejudice in WC jobs than in BC jobs. </p>

Projet de recherche réalisé en 2014-2015 avec l'appui du Fonds de recherche du Québec – Société et culture. / Ce mémoire vise à évaluer les effets de variations des attentes des firmes quant à la protection conférée par les droits de propriété intellectuelle (« PI ») pour les inventions et innovations dans un milieu industriel d’innovation ouverte. D’abord, les régimes de PI aux États-Unis et au Canada sont analysés à travers des cas jurisprudentiels et législatifs et des traités internationaux afin d’illustrer de quelle façon les normes juridiques changent et démontrer les répercussions sur les attentes des firmes. Puis, les attributs du modèle de l’innovation ouverte, où les firmes gèrent à dessein leurs relations d’affaires avec une attitude d’ouverture, sont décrits et sa pertinence est appuyée à l’aide d’un modèle simple. L’accent est mis sur son traitement distinctif des échanges de connaissances et d’intrants à l’intérieur même des firmes et entre elles. Une fois ces notions établies et s’y référant à titre d’hypothèses, un modèle microéconomique des échanges de connaissances entre firmes est élaboré, avec deux variables de choix, la PI et le secret, qui captent les mécanismes de gestion technologique des firmes. Par la tension entre ces variables, les processus de prise de décisions et les interactions entre les firmes sont évalués au moyen d’une analyse statique. Pour étudier plus en détails les choix des firmes, une version à deux joueurs du modèle est examinée au moyen de la théorie des jeux. Dans toutes ces formes du modèle, l’impact des fluctuations des attentes des firmes relativement au droit de la PI est jaugé. Tel que prévu, ces effets pour une firme changent en fonction des choix de gestion de chacune des firmes. Les effets varient également eu égard à la nature des relations à travers lesquelles les échanges de connaissance ont lieu. Dans la variante à deux joueurs, la statique comparative d’un équilibre de Nash en stratégie mixte montre que la relation avec l’autre joueur imprègne les incidences des variations du droit sur les stratégies de gestion technologique. Par exemple, une hausse des attentes de protection juridique de la PI couvrant la technologie d’une firme peut étonnamment mener cette firme à moins y recourir. / The purpose of this thesis is to assess the effects of changes in firms’ expectations of intellectual property (“IP”) law protection over inventions and innovations in an industrial environment characterized by open innovation practices. To begin, a legal analysis of IP regimes in Canada and the United States is achieved through different cases of court decisions, legal amendments and international treaties in order to show how legal standards vary and to demonstrate the repercussions of legal shifts over firms’ expectations. Then, the characteristics of the open innovation management model, in which firms adopt a purposively open mindset in their business relationships, are described, and its relevance is supported using a simple model. Emphasis is laid upon open innovation’s distinguishable treatment of intra- and inter-firm flows of knowledge and inputs. Building on these insights and using them as assumptions, a microeconomic model of firms’ knowledge flow interactions is constructed, with two choice variables that capture firms’ technology management mechanisms in an open innovation industrial environment: IP and secrecy. Through the tension between these two variables, inter-firm interactions and decision-making processes are assessed with a static analysis. To study firms’ choices in greater detail, a two-firm version of the model is then examined using game theory. Throughout, the impact of fluctuations in firms’ expectations of IP law is assessed. As expected, these effects, for a focal firm, vary depending on that firm’s technology management decisions as well as other firms’. Effects also differ with respect to the nature of knowledge flows relationships that each firm undertakes. In the two-firm game theoretic version of the model, comparative statics of a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium show that the relationship with the other firm qualifies the consequences of legal shifts on firms’ technology management strategies. Notably, increasing expectations of IP protection for a firm’s technology might actually result in this firm relying less on IP.