Theories of Extended Mind have evolved in waves to reach the present state of disagreement with regard to whether or not external artefacts become part of the mind when used for memory purposes. A four-step approach has been used to address and resolve this disagreement. First, a new component for models of mind which provides a saliency function is provided. This saliency function corresponds to computational elements found necessary in large mainframe computer systems for handling rich data environments. Second, there is introduced a Computational Model of Memory containing the new component which models the operation of human memory. The Computational Model of Memory contains four interoperative elements including the new component, short-term memory, long-term memory, and a cross-reference associator. Third, the work of Marcin Milkowski is drawn upon to obtain a general method of assessing a computational model’s well-formedness, and the method is applied to prove the adequacy of the Computational Model of Memory. According to Milkowski’s schema, the model satisfies most criteria for a well-formed computational model, including in particular a separation between conceptual elements of the model, and constitutive elements of the model, which while explicitly related, are required to subsist at separate logical conceptual levels. Fourth, the Computational Model of Memory is applied to outstanding arguments in Extended Mind to clarify and resolve several of these arguments. The model serves to highlight where the nature of the disagreement depends upon a category error of reference, and further resolves a key disagreement by demonstrating that the mind may treat external artefacts as an alternative realizable constitutive element of short-term and long-term memory.

Le sujet du parcours est l'esprit, l'axe de recherche est le concept de causalité. Il s'agit d'abord de relever les déclinaisons de ce concept afin de souligner ces applications dans les travaux des philosophes de l'esprit. Après avoir vu des approches de la causalité (productif et pour dépendance), on parcourt la voie du fonctionnalisme et du physicalisme en philosophie de l'esprit, en voyant les notions de cause et leurs problèmes. On voit aussi d'un point de vue plus empirique la recherche du corrélat neuronal de la conscience. On souligne que la question de la " conscience phénoménale" peut être individuée en tant que problème philosophique et scientifique parce qu'elle s'impose comme inaccessible à une connaissance intersubjective et que le concept productif de cause ne peut pas être appliqué. Le problème principal, c'est la possibilité de détecter une corrélation mais pas un rapport asymétrique de relation causale. En cherchant un point de vue qui part de la conscience et un concept relationnel pour la corrélation psycho-physique (interrelation), on voit les thèses phénoméniste de Mach, de Carnap et de la pensée boudhiste (Ancienne/ Moyen-Age) avec leurs problèmes et leurs intuitions. On peut comprendre que la corrélation ne peut pas être dégagée d'un point de vue métaphysique mais qu'une conception épistémologique s'avère possible. C'est dans la méthode phénoménologique et la recherche neurophénoménologique qu'on peut trouver les moyens concrets d'exploration de la conscience. Cela permet d'appliquer un concept causal actionniste sur le plan épistémique et la notion d'interrelation pour décrire la corrélation psychophysique et son contexte d'individuation. / The debate is on the notions of cause impact on theory of mind and consciousness. First of all, I explore two notions of causality as defined by Ned Hall (2004) : production and dependence, and other related positions among which the actionist theory. After, I see the use of the notion of cause approaches to mind-body problem and to problem of consciousness (functionalism, physicalism and the NCC research) and two experimental examples (blindsight ans neurofeedback), I argue that neither production nor dependence are useful because there is a correlation and not an asymetrical causal relation, but that actionist theory of cause can be a good descriptive approache to our epistemic point of view. After I explore the phenomenalist point of view (Mach, Carnap and the Buddhist philosophy of Middle Age) on consciousness and psychophysical relation and the notions of cause and interrelation. It emerges that an epistemic description is useful and possible. I find in phenomenological and neurophenomenological methods the specific ways to detailing aspects of consciousness and mental phenomena, this allows to apply the actionist concept of cause for the epistemic point of view and to describe the psychophysical relation with the notion of interrelation.

Consumers are nowadays presented with many choices regarding products and services. In addition, there is a wide array of brands that one is forced to choose from. In this study you will get to know the brands that Swedish consumers think of first when given a specific category, thus the brands that are Top-of-mind. The purpose of this study is to investigate possible opportunities for a new entrant to become Top-of-mind and whether the importance of being Top-of-mind differs. The study examines four product categories: Toothpaste, Soft drink, Insurance company and Sportscar. The study’s empirical data is based on a survey of 200 respondents. The results of the study show that there are greater opportunities for a new market entrant to become Top-of-mind within the product category Insurance company and Sportscar, at the same time as it indicates that the possibilities within Toothpaste and Soda are smaller. Furthermore, the study's results conclude that it is more important to be Top-of-mind in the product categories Toothpaste, Soft drink and Insurance company.

I argue in this thesis that Aristotle’s hylomorphic metaphysics, supported by his theory of causality and his theory of the soul (De Anima), holds the key to solving the problem of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind. A core aspect of the contemporary mind-body problem is the problem of mental causation (how does the mind interact with the body to cause actions in humans). Without mental causation, in the realist sense of the word, it is difficult to see how humans are held responsible for their actions. There have been different approaches to solving the mind-body problem, but each has met with its own set of problems, except, I argue, Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Jaegwon Kim argues that Davidson’s anomalous monism cum supervenience renders mental causation epiphenomenal, and that a mental state is causally efficacious only when reduced to the physical properties. I argue that it is the phenomenal consciousness that accounts for our actions, and while neither Davidson’s nor Kim’s accounts of action can adequately deal with phenomenal consciousness, Aristotle’s metaphysics can. I argue that the ancient and neo-Aristotelian notion of self-knowledge is akin to our contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness and that Aristotle saves the notion of autonomous mental causation through his theory of hylomorphism that holds every substance is a composite of matter (body) and form (soul). My thesis is thus a novel invitation to rethink Aristotle’s psychology and philosophy of mind in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria 2020. / University of Pretoria(Postgraduate Bursary (2017-2018) / Philosophy / DPhil / Unrestricted

The aim of this research is to expand the framework of contemporary conflict resolution by constructing a complementary relationship between Western epistemologies and a Buddhist epistemology. Despite its evolution and development through self-reflexivity and self-critique, contemporary conflict resolution established upon Western epistemologies has confined the understanding of human mind to social/cultural orientations and left a comprehensive and qualitative analysis of the potential of individual human mind underdeveloped. Buddhist epistemology, the central theme of which is to address human suffering that is mainly psychological and subjective, makes a critical analysis of human subjectivity in terms of how it can be become a root cause of suffering including conflict and how it can be addressed by gaining an insight into the social/cultural construction of human subjectivity. The argument of the thesis is that when a socially/culturally-oriented view of human mind and a deeper and more profound view of human mind are combined together, we can engage in a qualitatively richer and deeper analysis of the psychological and subjective dynamics of conflict resolution.

Att dagdrömma är ett fenomen som ofta ansetts distraherande då det kan ses som orelaterat till en primär uppgift. Under senare år har dock dess fördelar och användningsområden börjat uppmärksammas mer. Syftet med denna studie var att undersöka konstnärligt kreativa människors upplevelser av dagdrömmande i relation till deras skapandeprocess. Intervjuer genomfördes med sex konstnärligt kreativa individer som uppfyllde särskilda krav för kreativitet. Intervjumaterialet analyserades sedan genom en form av tematisk analys. Analysen resulterade i fem teman: Hjärnan får paus, Dagdrömmandets hinder, Sammanflätade ämnen, Idéers ursprung och Metakognition. Resultaten visade att deltagarna upplevde att det fanns flera typer av idéer och att dessa uppstod på olika sätt. Dagdrömmar upplevdes främst som något positivt och användbart för idéuppkomst under skapandeprocessen. Även i de fall då dagdrömmar inte genererade idéer sågs de positiva då de ändå ansågs kunna fylla vissa syften för dem. / To daydream is a phenomenon that often has been considered as distracting as it can be seen as unrelated to a primary task. However, during recent years it’s advantages and areas of use have begun to receive more attention. The aim of this study was to examine artistically creative people’s experiences of daydreaming in relation to their process of creating. Interviews were conducted with six artistically creative individuals who met specific criteria for creativity. The interview material was then analyzed by a form of thematic analysis. The analysis resulted in five themes: A break for the mind, Obstacles for daydreaming, Intertwined subjects, Origins of ideas and Metacognition. In summary the results showed that the participants experienced that there were several types of ideas and that they emerged in different ways. Daydreaming was mainly experienced as something positive and useful for idea generation during the process of creating. Even in cases where daydreams did not generate ideas, they were viewed positively as they were still considered to be able to fulfill purposes for the participants.

This work examines the relationship between Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy and the nonlinear dynamical systems framework for studying cognition. I argue that the nonlinear dynamical systems approach to cognitive science presupposes many key elements of his process philosophy. The process philosophical interpretation of nature posits events and the dynamic relations between events as the fundamental substrate of reality, as opposed to static physical substances. I present a brief history of the development of substance thought before describing Whitehead’s characterization of nature as a process. In following, I will examine the both the computational and nonlinear dynamical systems frameworks for investigating cognition. I will show that the computational paradigm is subject to many of the same criticisms as substance. Conversely, I will show that nonlinear dynamical cognitive science avoids these criticisms and is congenial to Whitehead’s philosophy insofar as it is suitable for describing emergent processes. To conclude, I suggest that the nonlinear dynamical cognitive science confirms and validates Whitehead’s philosophy. Furthermore, I argue that process philosophy is an appropriate characterization of nature for guiding inquiry in cognitive science.

<p>One of the central questions in the philosophy of sounds and hearing is the question of space: what spaces or locations, if any, do sound perceptions make one aware of? When I hear a sound, do I perceive the direction of the sound? The direction (or distance) of the sound's source? The boundaries or dimensions of the space the sound is produced in, or of the source itself? And if sound perceptions do make one aware of space, then with what level of determinacy?</p> <p>In the first chapter of this essay, I describe my approach to sounds and hearing, and state what I take to be the fundamental challenges for any view of sound perception. For one, I take the everyday experience of sounds to be one of the most significant obstacles to an account of sound perception, and one that has scarcely been recognized as such. In everyday hearing, we are not the least bit concerned with sounds. We use sounds to gather information about the behaviour of their sources, which are typically the object of our attention whenever we perceive a sound. If I hear the sound of a car honking or a person speaking, I immediately pay attention to the car and how I can avoid it, or to the person and the meaning they intend to communicate. In everyday hearing, our awareness of sounds is similar to our awareness of windowpanes while watching the goings on outside. Consequently, the everyday experience of sounds is problematic as a model of sound perception.</p> <p>In the second and third chapters, I discuss the two most popular views of sound perception in the philosophical literature, the remote view and the non-spatial view. Since these views have received much attention in the literature, I spend more time raising objections to them in chapter III than describing them in chapter II. One of the principle aims of this essay is to make the case that both of these views are mistaken, despite the valuable insights contained in each.</p> <p>In the fourth and fifth chapters, I discuss the medial view. While the idea that sounds are sound waves located in a medium is the predominant view of sounds themselves in auditory science and the history of philosophy, the view that we hear sounds to be located in the medium has received little attention. Some objections to the medial view have been raised, which I address in chapter V, but very little has been said to defend or even describe the medial view. Part of the motivation for this essay is that I am struck by the fact that the medial view, which would seem to follow naturally from auditory science and the history of philosophy, has been so little discussed. Consequently, the bulk of this essay is dedicated to a description and defence of the medial view.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Sixty subjects divided equally among Anglo-Americans, Black Americans, and Hispanic Americans participated in the study. They were classified as chronic pain patients by medical diagnosis and duration of pain. They were drawing Workers' Compensation and were all blue-collar workers from the Dallas-Fort Worth area. Cognitive complexity is a measure of individuals' ability to construe their feelings, events of their lives, and their world in a meaningful manner. Cognitive complexity appeared to differ among the cultural groups as indicated by significantly different functionally independent construct scores. Anglo-Americans appeared to have a greater internal complexity than did Black Americans and Hispanic Americans.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1684.pdf: 1154750 bytes, checksum: 1633dff45db74e09b4b96af809718c99 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-11-07 / The cyborg theme, concerning the combination of organisms and machines, has been extensively explored recently. In this text, the theme is once again discussed, first, through a brief historical overview and, then, through a shift in the paradigm, proposed by the philosopher of mind Andy Clark, known as Extended Mind or Activ Externalism: it s not necessary for a man to have implants or chips in his body, to receive a transplant or to use wearable computers to gain the status of cyborg. The human being is naturally a cyborg, because it has always incorporated tools that extend the mind. Therefore, there is a redefinition of the notion of mind, which frees it from the limits of the skull and extends it to the limits of human action, involving body, brain and world. The brain carries the fate of controlling this material mind, upon which its existence depends / O tema do ciborgue, da mistura dos organismos com as máquinas, tem sido bastante explorado nos dias atuais. Neste texto, o tema volta a ser discutido, primeiramente, através de um breve panorama histórico e, em seguida, através de uma quebra de paradigma, proposta pelo filósofo da mente Andy Clark, conhecida como Mente Estendida ou Externalismo Ativo: não é necessário que o humano porte implantes, chips, submeta-se a transplantes ou use computadores vestíveis para que ganhe o estatuto de ciborgue. O ser humano é, naturalmente, ciborgue, pois incorpora, desde sempre, ferramentas que ampliam sua mente. Portanto, há uma redefinição do conceito de mente, que a liberta dos limites da caixa craniana e a estende até os limites da ação humana, abarcando corpo, cérebro e mundo. Ao cérebro é dado o papel de controlador dessa mente material, de cuja existência ela depende