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Le téléchargement dit de « pair à pair » est un procédé d’échange d’informations via Internet qui permet aux internautes de se procurer des œuvres protégées par la propriété littéraire et artistique et de procéder à leur diffusion sans l’autorisation des ayants droit sur les œuvres ainsi échangées. Cette pratique a donné naissance à un mode d’exploitation alternatif aux circuits légaux de diffusion des créations intellectuelles, empêchant l’exercice de l’exclusivité octroyée par le droit d’auteur qui est apparu démuni face ce phénomène. Particulièrement touché, le secteur musical qui a pourtant démontré par le passé une grande capacité d’adaptation aux nouvelles modalités d’exploitation des œuvres de l’esprit engendrées par le progrès technologique constitue un angle d’attaque privilégié pour étudier la difficulté du droit d’auteur à appréhender le « pair à pair ». Le choix du domaine musical qui ne bénéficie pas, à la différence du cinéma, d’une réglementation spécifique permet de plus l’approche la plus limpide possible des questions soulevées par ce procédé qui a remis en cause la légitimité du droit d’auteur dans l’esprit d’une partie du public. Au lendemain de l’adoption d’un régime légal spécialement conçu pour mettre un terme à l’impunité dont ont bénéficié de facto les échanges d’œuvres protégées sur Internet, cette étude se propose de livrer un panorama juridique des tentatives d’adaptation de la propriété littéraire et artistique au phénomène complexe du « pair à pair » afin donner les clés d’une lecture éclairée des solutions finalement dégagées par les pouvoirs publics et des conséquences que ces dernières pourront avoir sur l’avenir du droit d’auteur. / The so-called Peer to Peer is a downloading and uploading procedure of information exchange, through the Internet, allowing users to gain access to works normally protected by intellectual property rights, and to broadcast them without the agreement of the rights owners. This practice has given rise to an alternative means of exploitation for intellectual creations, which is removed from legal distribution circuits. It has therefore been forbidding the preservation of exclusivity granted by intellectual property rights. Law has appeared at a loss when confronted to this new phenomenon. The musical sector was particularly hit, even though it had shown in the past a great capacity in adapting to any new condition of exploitation generated by technological progress. This is why this sector represents a good field of study in order to approach the difficulties intellectual property rights encounter when confronted to the Peer to Peer occurrence. Unlike the movie sector, music is not specifically regulated and this particularity enhances the various and complex questions raised by the Peer to Peer which shakes the notion of legitimacy of intellectual property rights in the eyes of a part of the public. After the adoption of a specific legal system, expressly elaborated in order to put an end to the impunity of Peer to Peer exchanges, this study sets out to present a legal panorama of the attempts carried out to adapt intellectual property rights to this new phenomenon. We hope to have provided the keys to an understanding of the solutions finally adopted by the French State, and a clear view of the consequences these may bear on the future of intellectual property rights.

No / This paper adds to the limited economic literature on collecting behaviour by studying the price of musical works in the minidisc format. Over 1,000 MiniDisc prices are analysed using various estimating equations. The use of MiniDiscs allows the estimate of 'pure' collecting effects as there is no gain, in terms of listening content, from the purchase over other formats. What we observe in pricing can therefore be seen as premium for the fan of collecting a scarce item of product. Solo artists who had a tragic death commanded an estimated premium of around 86% using the power function with Greatest Hits having a premium of around 45% price. Both these were statistically significant at high levels.

This thesis provides an answer to the question, “what is a musical work?” I begin by canvasing four of the leading accounts in the literature, two Platonist theories and two Nominalist theories. Nominalism is, I suggest, well motivated, though neither of the two accounts given is satisfying. Next, I provide a detailed account of the main view in the literature, Julian Dodd’s type theory of musical works. According to Dodd, musical works are types and therefore are abstract entities. In Chapter 3 I criticize Dodd’s view by arguing that positing abstract type-entities provides no explanatory power so they should be rejected. Finally in Chapter 4 I show that a satisfying Nominalist account that does not identify any entity with musical works can be given. Thus, Dodd is correct to say that musical works are types but incorrect to suggest that this thereby commits us to an ontology including types.

The aim of this thesis is to increase our ontological understanding of musical works in two ways. We’ll increase our understanding of their categorial nature and we’ll increase our understanding of what the identity of each musical work consists in. In chapter 1, I introduce the basic question of the thesis: what are musical works? This question is broken down into four separate questions which guide the structure and argument of the thesis. One question asks if musical works exist, the other asks about the ontological category to which musical works belong. In the first half of the thesis, I argue that musical works exist and that the best explanation of their features is given by assigning them to the category of universals. I argue for this conclusion by elaborating and defending a view according to which musical works are properties. I then show that this conception is superior to the strongest rivals. One rival takes musical works to be historical individuals (Rohrbaugh 2003). The other takes them to be actions of composition (Davies 2004). In chapter 6, I turn to two questions about identity. One question asks about the identity criteria for musical works, the other question asks for an explanation of musical work identity. In the remainder of chapter 6, I argue by reference to contextualist intuitions that a superficially appealing view, sonicism is problematic. The critique of sonicism is used to draw out certain contextualist assumptions that our ontology of music ought to explain. In chapter 7, I examine a family of Levinsonian contextualist proposals. I argue that the original formulations (Levinson 1980) give incorrect results, and that attempts to modify them (Davies, S: 2001) slip into obscurity, or undermine the aims of the project (Levinson 1992). I end chapter 7 by presenting the performance theory in a more flattering light. I argue that as a theory of musical work identity, the performance theory is the best on the market because it overcomes the problems associated with the Levinsonian views and deepens our understanding of contextualist intuitions. In chapter 8, I present an account of the ontology of music which integrates the property theory of category with the performance theory of identity by construing musical works as impure relational properties. I then defend the integrated account against various objections. In this defence, I elaborate a view of compositional actions as belonging to the ontological category of processes.

Collective management and use of copyright on the Internet Abstract This thesis is dealing with two main areas. The first on is a concept of collective management, particularly the collective management of rights in musical works. At the beginning it is described as a general concept. More detailed aspects such as the inner organization of a collective society, its relations with another persons and entities and the exercise of collective management through setting tariffs, licensing and distribution of remuneration are explained thoroughly on the example of OSA. The difficulties for OSA in the field of extended collective licensing in connection with the royalty-free music are pointed out while describing the regimes of collective management. The second area is the use of musical works on the Internet with regards to collective management. At first, the terms Internet and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are described. Closely analysed is a liability of these providers for the content online and limitation of this liability with so-called safe harbours. It is argued that these harbours need to be revised as it is shown on the example of YouTube. Focus then turns on the possible ways of using musical works online - downloading, streaming, linking, webcasting and simulcasting. The greatest attention is paid...

À quel genre d’entités fait-on référence quand on parle d’«oeuvres musicales»? Le problème du statut ontologique de l’oeuvre musicale est très débattu aujourd’hui, surtout dans la philosophie analytique. Les nombreuses théories élaborées au cours des dernières décennies se concentrent principalement sur l’objet et ne prennent presque pas en compte le sujet. Nous croyons, au contraire, que l’apport de la conscience est essentiel pour la pleine existence d’une oeuvre musicale. C’était la conviction de Roman Ingarden, qui la considérait comme un objet purement intentionnel. À partir de sa réflexion et de la réactualisation critique qu’en fait la philosophe américaine Amie Thomasson, nous proposons notre réponse à la question «Qu’est-ce qu’une œuvre musicale?». / What kind of entities does one relate to by speaking of «musical works»? The problem of the ontological status of musical works is highly debated nowadays, especially in the field of analytical philosophy. The numerous theories developed over the last decades on this issue tend to treat the musical work mainly as an object, without almost contemplating the part played by the subject. We think, on the contrary, that the role of the consciousness is essential for the full-fledged existence of a musical work. This was the conviction of Roman Ingarden, who considered musical works as purely intentional objects. Starting from his thought and its critical update by the American philosopher Amie Thomasson, we do propose our answer to the question «What a musical work is?».

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Die Edition »Denkmäler der Tonkunst in Dresden« wird in loser Folge Werke – Messen, Oratorien, Kantaten, Lieder, Opern, Singspiele, Sinfonien, Konzerte, Kammermusik, Klavier- und Orgelmusik u. v. a. – aus der Fülle der musikalischen Überlieferung der Dresdner Musikkultur von der Spätrenaissance bis zur Frühromantik in neuen Werkausgaben der allgemeinen Musizierpraxis zugänglich machen. Vollständigkeit ist ebenso wenig beabsichtigt wie in Konkurrenz zu bereits begonnenen Werkausgaben wie z. B. von Johann Adolf Hasse oder Jan Dismas Zelenka zu treten. Vielmehr werden z. T. bereits in der musikalischen Praxis erprobte, aber noch nicht edierte Kompositionen veröffentlicht, des Weiteren Werke, die im Besonderen die typische Dresdner Hof- und Festkultur widerspiegeln. In der Edition finden außerdem Komponisten Berücksichtigung, die in Dresden wirkten, deren Werke jedoch außerhalb Dresdens überliefert sind. Außerdem werden Werke ausgewählt, die von Komponisten anderer Orte speziell für die Hofkapelle geschrieben wurden sowie Kompositionen aus dem Bestand der Notenbibliothek der ehemaligen Fürstenschule Grimma sowie anderer Provenienzen (Oels, Zittau, Herrnhut u. a.). Schließlich werden auch Aufführungsmaterialien der städtischen Musikpflege in Dresden herangezogen. Die Ausgaben können kostenlos vom Dokumentations- und Publikationsserver Qucosa der Sächsischen Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB Dresden) heruntergeladen werden. Korrekturen und Ergänzungen sind möglich, so dass Nutzer der Ausgaben gebeten werden, gegebenenfalls neue Erkenntnisse der Redaktion mitzuteilen.