A pesquisa tem dois objetivos centrais: reconstruir o desenvolvimento da justiça de transição no Brasil até os dias atuais e identificar algumas das principais razões dos limites de sua implementação no país. Conforme as principais hipóteses, os limites da experiência da justiça transicional no Brasil estão associados a um discurso sobre a redemocratização no país, discurso este que tem a conciliação nacional como sua principal categoria. A primeira hipótese da pesquisa é a de que o discurso da conciliação nacional, veiculado pelo menos desde a elaboração do projeto de anistia pelo governo Figueiredo, continuaria a ser um dos principais limites ao desenvolvimento da justiça de transição no Brasil. Mas a segunda hipótese sustenta que, dos últimos trabalhos mais aprofundados sobre o tema para cá, este discurso teria sua hegemonia contestada de forma significativa, sendo obrigado a ceder a algumas das demandas de entidades da sociedade civil que até pouco tempo atrás não eram consideradas como negociáveis. Os objetivos e hipóteses centrais da tese serão mobilizados na seguinte estrutura. Capítulo 1: teoria e crítica dos parâmetros normativos da justiça de transição. Capítulo 2: reconstituição histórica e discursiva sobre a anistia e sobre o programa brasileiro de reparações. Capítulo 3: reconstituição discursiva e crítica sobre o julgamento do STF acerca da constitucionalidade da bilateralidade da anistia e sobre o estágio das ações penais movidas pelo Ministério Público Federal. Capítulo 4: reconstituição crítica dos trabalhos da Comissão Nacional da Verdade. / The research has two main objectives: to reconstruct the development of transitional justice in Brazil until today and to identify some of the main reasons underlying the limits of its implementation in the country. According to our main hypotheses, the limits of transitional justice in Brazil are associated with a discourse on the countrys democratization, which holds \"national reconciliation\" as its crucial category. The hypothesis 1 of the research asserts that the discourse of \"national reconciliation\", elaborated at least since the project of amnesty by the Figueiredo government, remains one of the main limitations to the development of transitional justice in Brazil. But the hypothesis 2 maintains that from the last major works on the subject to today, the hegemony of this discourse has been significantly challenged, giving some room to historical claims of civil society that until recently were not considered negotiable. The objectives and main hypotheses will be developed in the following structure. Chapter 1: theory and critique of the normative parameters of transitional justice. Chapter 2: historical and discursive reconstitution of the amnesty and of the Brazilian program of reparation. Chapter 3: discursive reconstitution and critique of the decision of the Brazilian Supreme Court on the amnestys constitutionality and the stage of criminal cases filed by federal prosecutors. Chapter 4: critical reconstitution of the work of the National Truth Commission.

Magister Legum - LLM

Magister Administrationis - MAdmin / In this dissertation, I problematize 'victim's justice' in post-genocide Rwanda. I argue that the kind of justice that was meted out in post-genocide Rwanda, namely victors' justice and complementary to it – victims’ justice, does not allow for the political reform required to break the cycle of violence in Rwanda. In the aftermath of the 1994-Rwandan Genocide, both state and society were faced with a moral and political dilemma, because the popular agency or mass participation of perpetrators derived from the Hutu majority, who targeted the Tutsi minority, with intent to annihilate them. There were massacres of both Hutus and Tutsis, but Hutus were targeted as individuals, whereas Tutsis were targeted as a group. It is the specific ‘intent to annihilate’ Tutsis as group, that makes this a Genocide against Tutsis. I draw and develop arguments made by Mahmood Mamdani, elaborating on the specific question of ‘victims justice’ for political reform in Rwanda. Both kinds of justice were outcomes of the logic of the Nuremburg Trials. Since its inception, the legacy of the Nuremburg Trial is demonstrated in how it was idealized at the end of the Cold-War by international law and human rights regime. In essence, the historical and political context of the Nuremburg trial has been removed, as it has been produced into a template- the 'Nuremburg-styled criminal trial'. 'Criminal justice' has come to define how we think of justice after mass violence, as the most morally acceptable form of justice for the victims, and the most politically viable response for constituting a 'new political order' after mass violence. This dissertation addresses the argument made, that victors' justice and victims' justice in Rwanda, has constituted two categories, which collectivise Tutsis as victims and Hutus as perpetrators. In the context of a genocide, where the perpetrators are derived from the Hutu majority and the victims from the Tutsi minority, this present both a moral and political dilemma for Rwanda’s state-building and national reconciliation project. Criminal justice also frames mass violence as being criminal, rather than addressing it as political violence. This has troubling consequences for intervening into the cycle of violence in Rwanda. The 'cycle of violence' in Rwanda, refers to the continuation of political violence, in which 'every round of perpetrators has justified the use of violence as the only effective guarantee against being victimised yet again. Thus, intervention into the cycle of violence would mean thinking out of the logic of victimhood and pursuing an alternative kind of justice. To think of the genocide as political violence, redirects the attention to the issues that made the genocide possible. I establish the importance and necessity of critically interrogating 'victims justice' in Rwanda, by placing the 1994-Genocide in its historical and political context, with a particular focus on the legacy of colonialism. The post-colonial regimes in Rwanda, inherited the colonial institutions of rule; and the politicisation of Hutu and Tutsi into racial categories, which have shaped particular meanings for power, justice and citizenship. I demonstrate in this dissertation that critical issues found in post-genocide Rwanda today, are symptomatic of the inherited colonial legacy. I address the prevailing political crisis through an analysis on post-genocide governance; national reconciliation; the 'land question'; and the Great Lakes refugee crisis. Furthermore, I found that it was critically important for my research question, to also adopt a regional perspective, because Rwanda lies at the epicentre of the Great Lakes regional crisis. This dissertation concludes with returning to the question of political reform, and breaking the 'cycle of violence'. My suggestion is that we need to think of Mamdani's concept of survivor's justice, rather than victims' justice or victors' justice, which assist in confronting the needs of political reform that address colonial legacies.

A pesquisa tem dois objetivos centrais: reconstruir o desenvolvimento da justiça de transição no Brasil até os dias atuais e identificar algumas das principais razões dos limites de sua implementação no país. Conforme as principais hipóteses, os limites da experiência da justiça transicional no Brasil estão associados a um discurso sobre a redemocratização no país, discurso este que tem a conciliação nacional como sua principal categoria. A primeira hipótese da pesquisa é a de que o discurso da conciliação nacional, veiculado pelo menos desde a elaboração do projeto de anistia pelo governo Figueiredo, continuaria a ser um dos principais limites ao desenvolvimento da justiça de transição no Brasil. Mas a segunda hipótese sustenta que, dos últimos trabalhos mais aprofundados sobre o tema para cá, este discurso teria sua hegemonia contestada de forma significativa, sendo obrigado a ceder a algumas das demandas de entidades da sociedade civil que até pouco tempo atrás não eram consideradas como negociáveis. Os objetivos e hipóteses centrais da tese serão mobilizados na seguinte estrutura. Capítulo 1: teoria e crítica dos parâmetros normativos da justiça de transição. Capítulo 2: reconstituição histórica e discursiva sobre a anistia e sobre o programa brasileiro de reparações. Capítulo 3: reconstituição discursiva e crítica sobre o julgamento do STF acerca da constitucionalidade da bilateralidade da anistia e sobre o estágio das ações penais movidas pelo Ministério Público Federal. Capítulo 4: reconstituição crítica dos trabalhos da Comissão Nacional da Verdade. / The research has two main objectives: to reconstruct the development of transitional justice in Brazil until today and to identify some of the main reasons underlying the limits of its implementation in the country. According to our main hypotheses, the limits of transitional justice in Brazil are associated with a discourse on the countrys democratization, which holds \"national reconciliation\" as its crucial category. The hypothesis 1 of the research asserts that the discourse of \"national reconciliation\", elaborated at least since the project of amnesty by the Figueiredo government, remains one of the main limitations to the development of transitional justice in Brazil. But the hypothesis 2 maintains that from the last major works on the subject to today, the hegemony of this discourse has been significantly challenged, giving some room to historical claims of civil society that until recently were not considered negotiable. The objectives and main hypotheses will be developed in the following structure. Chapter 1: theory and critique of the normative parameters of transitional justice. Chapter 2: historical and discursive reconstitution of the amnesty and of the Brazilian program of reparation. Chapter 3: discursive reconstitution and critique of the decision of the Brazilian Supreme Court on the amnestys constitutionality and the stage of criminal cases filed by federal prosecutors. Chapter 4: critical reconstitution of the work of the National Truth Commission.

"It is noted that special measures are always necessary in post-conflict situations to bring about the restoration of normalcy to societies. Truth commissions have been identified as a key to uniting, reconciling and helping the people to confidently deal with their past. Whilst these are noble notions, practically, truth commissions face serious challenges. The dissertation shall seek to highlight these problems and offer recommendations. ... The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the general introduction. It gives a brief political history of Ghana and South Africa and their impact on the enjoyment of human rights. The chapter shall also discuss the need for national reconciliation in both countries. Chapter two discusses truth commissions in contemporary societies. It briefly discusses the establishment of national reconciliaton commissions and their mandates. Chapter three focuses on the laws establishing the TRC and NRC of South Africa and Ghana respectively. These legislation shall be considered in detail in order to analyse their objectives to know whether or not thet are achievable within their stated mandates. Chapter four discusses the challenges truth commission poses to international law and its implications on rule of law. The chapter shall discuss the issue of amnesty to perpetrators of gross human rights and the perpetuation of the culture of impunity in the light of international law. Chapter five considers the way forward and suggest recommendations." -- Chapter 1. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa))--University of Pretoria, 2003. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

In 1990, Chile made a successful transition from the authoritarian dictatorship that had ruled the country since 1973 to a democratically elected government. The authoritarian regime was characterized by massive and systemic practices of human rights abuses, and it left an official toll of 5,000 deaths, about 2000 of which constitute “detained and disappeared people”, and an additional 27,000 people who have been officially recognized as victims of torture. These figures do not take into account the unknown numbers of Chilean exiles, or those who were internally displaced or who lost their jobs due to their suspected political affiliations. The human cost of the military regime has continued to be one of the most enduring issues confronting the post-authoritarian Chilean nation. This thesis builds on the work of critical researchers who locate the Chilean authoritarian regime in the transnational politics of the Cold War and their effect in implementing neo-liberalism in Chile. This literature demonstrates that terror was a constitutive, rather than an incidental, element of neo-liberal governmentality: governmentality that inscribed itself on Chilean bodies through terror practices and that remains unscathed through the transition to democracy. With that premise in mind I explore, through a historical analysis of major conjunctures in the history of human rights debates in Chile, how the post-authoritarian nation accounts for the human rights legacies of authoritarianism while obscuring the continuity of authoritarian governmentality. I propose that human rights constitute a biopolitical governmental regime that in a manner comparable to the authoritarian terror captures human life within the realm of state power. As a regime, human rights submit experiences of terror to specific power-knowledge technologies that render terror intelligible, manageable and governable. Rather than promoting essential values of truth and justice, the human rights regime produces specific discourses of truth and justice as well as specific discourses of subjectivity and nation. In concrete terms, this thesis explores how the post-authoritarian nation and it subjects use the human rights regime to discursively construct a national truth in order to promote and protect specific governmental arrangements.

In 1990, Chile made a successful transition from the authoritarian dictatorship that had ruled the country since 1973 to a democratically elected government. The authoritarian regime was characterized by massive and systemic practices of human rights abuses, and it left an official toll of 5,000 deaths, about 2000 of which constitute “detained and disappeared people”, and an additional 27,000 people who have been officially recognized as victims of torture. These figures do not take into account the unknown numbers of Chilean exiles, or those who were internally displaced or who lost their jobs due to their suspected political affiliations. The human cost of the military regime has continued to be one of the most enduring issues confronting the post-authoritarian Chilean nation. This thesis builds on the work of critical researchers who locate the Chilean authoritarian regime in the transnational politics of the Cold War and their effect in implementing neo-liberalism in Chile. This literature demonstrates that terror was a constitutive, rather than an incidental, element of neo-liberal governmentality: governmentality that inscribed itself on Chilean bodies through terror practices and that remains unscathed through the transition to democracy. With that premise in mind I explore, through a historical analysis of major conjunctures in the history of human rights debates in Chile, how the post-authoritarian nation accounts for the human rights legacies of authoritarianism while obscuring the continuity of authoritarian governmentality. I propose that human rights constitute a biopolitical governmental regime that in a manner comparable to the authoritarian terror captures human life within the realm of state power. As a regime, human rights submit experiences of terror to specific power-knowledge technologies that render terror intelligible, manageable and governable. Rather than promoting essential values of truth and justice, the human rights regime produces specific discourses of truth and justice as well as specific discourses of subjectivity and nation. In concrete terms, this thesis explores how the post-authoritarian nation and it subjects use the human rights regime to discursively construct a national truth in order to promote and protect specific governmental arrangements.

Depuis plus d’une décennie, la République Centrafricaine (ci-après le Centrafrique ou la RCA) et la République de Côte d’Ivoire (ci-après la RCI ou la Côte d’Ivoire) traversent des conflits militaro-politiques graves qui se sont accentués pour le premier en 2012 et pour le second en 2011. Ces crises qui, dans la plupart des cas tirent leurs racines dans la mal gouvernance et une absence de volonté politique ont un dénominateur commun : des dégâts matériels importants et en perte de vies humaines. Des crimes graves dans la hiérarchie de l’horreur ont été commis (crimes de guerre, crimes contre l’humanité et crimes de génocide). Compte tenu de la gravité de ces crimes qui transcendent profondément la conscience humaine, les deux pays ont engagé des processus de justice transitionnelle, à travers des mesures judiciaires et non judiciaires en vue de faire face à leur passé douloureux et réconcilier les populations et communautés divisées. Comment intégrer la Justice dans une stratégie plus globale du processus transitionnel pour la réconciliation nationale favorable à un nouvel avenir démocratique ?Certes, la répression de ces crimes par les tribunaux centrafricains et ivoiriens, la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI), la Cour Pénale Spéciale (CPS) en RCA ou au titre de la compétence universelle de juridiction est un objectif prioritaire poursuivi par les deux pays. Cependant, la justice classique s’est montrée incapable d’en juger tous les auteurs, tant leur nombre est important et tant les faits qui leurs sont reprochés sont graves. C’est pourquoi les autorités centrafricaines et ivoiriennes ont envisagé d’autres mécanismes complémentaires à la justice pénale destinés à rétablir un vivre ensemble entre les populations divisées, notamment la création des Commissions Vérité et Réconciliation. Elle est chargée d’établir une vérité historique sur les crimes du passé en vue de tourner définitivement la page. En dehors de cette institution classique de la réconciliation nationale, d’autres structures ont été créées, soit pour combler les lacunes des précédentes initiatives, soit pour connaître d’autres domaines nouveaux. La religion a aussi joué un rôle important; soit qu’elle promeut la tolérance religieuse, l’acceptation des différences ou la résolution pacifique des conflits, soit qu’elle apparaît comme cause de conflits, à travers la promotion ou la diffusion des messages de haine et de division.Mais dans la démarche de conciliation de ces deux objectifs, comment entreprendre le processus de réconciliation nationale sans pour autant avaliser les pratiques d’impunité ? C’est en ce sens que la répression des crimes graves apparaît comme un mécanisme nécessaire de la justice transitionnelle.Enfin, il est important de noter que les crises que connaissent les deux pays obéissent à des mobiles politiques, mais aussi institutionnels. C’est pourquoi des réformes institutionnelles ont été engagées dans plusieurs domaines, entre autres, la Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité (RSS) avec le désarmement, la démobilisation et la réinsertion des tous les combattants. Des réformes ont aussi été entreprises dans le domaine de la bonne gouvernance et de la justice constitutionnelle pour que désormais, les actions des gouvernants soient soumises au droit. / For more than a decade, the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (RCI or the Ivory Coast) are going through serious military-political conflicts which have been accentuated for the Central African Republic in 2012 and for RCI in 2011. These crises, which in most cases are rooted in poor governance and lack of political will have a common denominator: significant material damage and loss of life. Serious crimes in the hierarchy of horror have been committed (war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide). Given the seriousness of these crimes that profoundly transcend human consciousness, both countries have engaged in transitional justice processes, through judicial and non-judicial measures to deal with their painful past and reconcile divided populations and communities. How to integrate justice into a more global strategy of the transitional process for national reconciliation in favour of a new democratic future?It is true that the repression of these crimes by the Central African and Ivorian courts, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Special Criminal Court (SPC) in CAR or under universal jurisdiction is a priority objective pursued by both countries. However, classical justice has proved incapable of judging all the authors, as their number is important and the facts they are accused of are serious. This is why the Central African and Ivorian authorities have considered complimentary mechanisms to criminal justice aimed at restoring living together among the divided populations, materialized by the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR). It is responsible for establishing a historical truth about the crimes committed in order to definitively turn the page. Apart from this classical institution of national reconciliation, other structures have been created, either to fill the gaps of previous initiatives or to find other new areas. Religion has also played an important role; either it promotes religious tolerance, acceptance of differences or peaceful resolution of conflicts, or it appears as a cause of conflict, through messages of hatred and division.But in this process of reconciling these two objectives, how can we begin the process of national reconciliation without endorsing practices of impunity? It is in this sense that the repression of serious crimes appears as a necessary mechanism of transitional justice.Finally, it is important to note that the crises in both countries are politically motivated, but also institutional. This is why institutional reforms have been initiated in several areas, including Security Sector Reform (SSR) with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all combatants. Reforms have also been undertaken in the field of good governance and constitutional justice so that, henceforth, the actions of the rulers are subject to the law.

À la veille d'une journée de "deuil absolu" pour l'anniversaire des attentats tragiques de Madrid du 11 mars 2004, afin de lutter contre le terrorisme, l'ancien secrétaire général de l'ONU, Kofi Annan, a proposé une stratégie globale respectueuse des droits de l'homme et de la primauté du droit. Cependant, la stratégie prévue par l'ONU ne semble s'adresser qu’aux pays dans lesquels l'arsenal juridique contient déjà une protection des droits de l'homme, car toutes les résolutions adoptées appellent les États à ne pas restreindre les droits de l'homme au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Le problème en Irak est cependant beaucoup plus grave. En effet, la protection des droits fondamentaux y est encore lacunaire du fait de la genèse d’un système démocratique naissant et ajouté à cela, la dangerosité du terrorisme le plus brutal. L'importance croissante de la protection des droits de l'homme dans ce pays tient au fait que celle-ci représente un havre de paix pour calmer la brouille qui nourrit le terrorisme entre les diverses communautés de ce pays. Il s’agit essentiellement d’instaurer un climat favorable à une conciliation nationale. La lutte contre le terrorisme en Irak ne peut ainsi porter ses fruits sans l’adoption d’un État de droit et d’une loi qui affronte ce phénomène tout en conservant les droits fondamentaux. De même, depuis 2003, en dépit du fait que l’ONU et les nouveaux dirigeants s’efforcent d’ancrer les notions des droits de l’homme dans la société irakienne, leur tâche semble encore très difficile. En effet, l’échec continu de la communauté internationale dans ses diverses tentatives destinées à formuler une définition unanime du terrorisme s’est reflété négativement sur l’Irak. Le manque d’une définition juridique a permis à certaines puissances mondiales d’en donner une définition politique afin de servir leurs propres intérêts dans le cas irakien, ce qui a provoqué des violations des droits de l’homme au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme en Irak, en entravant les étapes vers une considération efficace des droits fondamentaux. / On the eve of a day of ‘absolute mourning’ for the anniversary of the tragic attacks in Madrid on March 11th, 2004, in order to fight against terrorism, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a comprehensive strategy respectful of human rights and the rule of law. However, the UN strategy seems to be addressed solely to countries in which the legal arsenal already contains a protection against human rights, as all the adopted resolutions call on states not to restrict human rights in the name of the fight against terrorism.The problem in Iraq is however much more serious. Indeed, the protection of fundamental rights in this country is still incomplete due to the genesis of a nascent democratic system, as well as to the dangerousness of the most brutal terrorism. The growing importance of the protection of human rights in this country is that the latter represents a haven of peace to calm the quarrel upon which terrorism thrives, between the different communities of this country. It is essentially a question of enabling a positive climate for a national conciliation.The fight against terrorism in Iraq cannot therefore bear fruit without a rule of law and a law which confront this phenomenon while maintaining fundamental rights. Similarly, since 2003, despite the fact that the UN and the new leaders have been striving to give a foothold to the concepts of human rights in the Iraqi society, the task still seems very difficult. Indeed, the continued failure of the international community in its various attempts to formulate a unanimous definition of terrorism was reflected negatively on Iraq. The lack of a legal definition allowed some world powers to establish a political definition in order to serve their own interests in the Iraqi case, which has caused violations of human rights in the name of the fight against terrorism in Iraq, by impeding the steps towards effective respect for fundamental rights.

Thesis (MBA (Business Management))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study’s objective was to investigate what black economic empowerment (BEE) means to Namibians and what impact it has had on development in Namibia. The study also did research in South Africa for the purpose of benchmarking. Namibians in general understand and embrace BEE, but it is clear from the study that Namibians are highly skeptical about its impact in terms of empowering those who were previously disadvantaged. The purpose of BEE is to empower black people. The challenge, however, is that seventeen years after independence there is no policy yet on BEE in Namibia. Critics of affirmative action argue that it is not worthwhile empowering only certain groups of people and excluding the able-bodied, white male Namibians while the country has adopted the policy of national reconciliation, irrespective of what happened in the past. They argue that it would be fair to select people based on class, rather than race, gender or ethnicity. It is true that the picture painted so far on empowerment is skewed, but it is important to note that BEE is not about empowering the black elite or the middle class at the expense of those who really need to be economically empowered; it is about allowing every citizen of the country to participate fully in the economic development of his/her country. The research was conducted in Namibia and also partly in South Africa, as it used progress on BEE in South Africa as a yardstick. In Namibia, statements made by leaders in different sectors were studied and analysed, since there is no written policy on BEE. The study conducted surveys on businesses, including companies that have benefited from BEE, state owned enterprises, government institutions and small and medium enterprises. Individuals were also selected across the broad spectrum, of whom some were interviewed face-to-face and others through questionnaires. The study repeated the same process in South Africa, the only difference being that in South Africa it included study and analysis of policy documents. The aim of the study was to find out how far Namibia has gone in empowering its people and how this compares to neighbouring South Africa. The analysis was done in the following way: data from different sectors were compared and also assessed against targets set by different sectors or industries in their sectoral charters. Data from different industries in Namibia were also compared to similar industries in South Africa. In order to determine whether there has been any progress in terms of BEE since Namibia’s independence eighteen years ago, the results obtained during this study were compared to the figures that were available at the time of independence. The study has established that, although the Namibian government had set up a committee headed by the Office of the Prime Minister to come up with a legislative framework for the drafting and implementing of BEE policy in 2000, no such policy exists to date. All the companies included in this study indicated that they have submitted their affirmative action (AA) reports to the office of the Employment Equity Commissioner and that they adhere to this policy; yet the study has established that most of the companies do not adhere to the AA policy. There is a high degree of income disparity in Namibia, where the richest 10% of the population receives 65% of the total income. The study also found that Namibia does not have any shares in companies that were established after independence, especially in the mining industry, whereas mining is the backbone of Namibia’s economy. According to the findings of this study, with regard to the BEE agreements announced and signed so far, only those who already have wealth or are well-connected benefit from these deals. There is no controlling mechanism in place for BEE agreements and, as a result, companies choose who they want to do business with. In South Africa, the study has established, the majority of the companies have their own broad based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) policies and all the industries have either implemented or drafted their industry BBBEE charters. Although the government has laid down a good foundation for the rest of the institutions to build on, South Africa still has a long way to go, because the majority of its people are still living in abject poverty. The study established that people sitting on the committee to draft the BEE policy are permanently employed in other positions within the Government and when it comes to prioritizing jobs, BEE is not regarded as one of the most important topics. It recommends that the government appoint people on the committee either permanently or on a fixed-term contract basis, so that these people can concentrate only on drafting and implementing the BEE policy. In line with the annual AA reports submitted, businesses should submit annual BEE reports to the government. This would ensure that some efforts are made to address BEE and, as is the case with AA, most of the companies, if not all, should be required to appoint BEE coordinators in their structures to drive the process. It is also recommended that there must be a graduating system whereby companies and individuals who have attained a certain level with regard to BEE should graduate out of the system in order to give others a chance to benefit. Businesses that have never benefited before should get preference when awarding tenders and quotas. Lastly, the study recommends that the Namibian government create a fund to which all registered companies would be required to contribute a certain percentage of their profits. These funds would be used for skills development, since skills development and transfer are the most important components of economic empowerment. The study has found that many firms have good governance, they practice diversity, they are doing very well financially and their company policies also state that they reward their employees in an unbiased way; but that can, nevertheless, not be taken as a guarantee to success in BEE. There is a fast-growing middle class of black people in Namibia, but the most important thing for Namibia, however, is to determine how this middle class can contribute to the creation of wealth for the majority of Namibians. Although there are clear indications in South Africa that there is a strong presence of BEE, at least for middle class black people, much remains to be done to address the issue of poverty. Finally, there are government policies and legislations that were created to advance black people, but the success of these policies and regulations depends on the management strategies that can create a conducive environment for black people. The corporate culture in private and public institutions needs to change so as to accept and accommodate black people in order for them to make a significant contribution to the economic development of Namibia. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie studie was om vas te stel wat swart ekonomiese bemagtiging (SEB) vir Namibiërs beteken en watter invloed dit op ontwikkeling in Namibië gehad het. Om ‘n maatstaf te stel het die studie ook navorsing in Suid-Afrika gedoen. Hoewel Namibiërs in die algemeen SEB verstaan en aanvaar, is dit uit die studie duidelik dat hulle hoogs skepties is oor die impak wat dit gehad het in die bemagtiging van voorheen benadeeldes. Die doel van SEB is om swartmense, vrouens en mense met gestremdhede te bemagtig. Die uitdaging is egter dat daar in Namibië sewentien jaar na onafhanklikheid steeds geen beleid ten opsigte van SEB is nie. Kritici van regstellende aksie redeneer dat dit nie verdienstelik is om sekere groepe te bevoordeel terwyl bekwame blanke Namibiese mans uitgesluit word nie.; dit terwyl die land ’n beleid van nasionale rekonsiliasie aanvaar het, in weerwil van gebeure in die verlede. Hulle reken dat dit regverdig sou wees om mense eerder op grond van klas as ras, geslag of etnisiteit te selekteer. Toegegee dat ’n skewe beeld van bemagtiging sover voorgehou is; tog is dit belangrik om te besef dat die doel van SEB is om elke burger van die land die geleentheid te gee om ten volle in ekonomiese ontwikkeling te deel en nie om die swart elite of middelklas te bevoordeel ten koste van dié wat werklik behoefte aan bemagtiging het nie. Navorsing is in Namibië gedoen en ook gedeeltelik in Suid-Afrika om vordering ten opsigte van SEB in dié land as maatstaf aan te wend. Die navorsing bestudeer en analiseer uitlatings deur leiers in verskillende sektore in Namibië, aangesien daar geen geskrewe SEB beleid is nie. Opnames is gedoen van besighede, insluitend maatskappye wat bevoordeel is uit SEB, ondernemings in staatsbesit, regeringsinstellings en klein en medium ondernemings. Daar is ook insette verkry van ’n breë spektrum van individue – deur persoonlike onderhoude of deur middel van vraelyste. Hierdie proses is in Suid-Afrika herhaal, waar ’n studie en analise van beleidsdokumente ingesluit is. Die doelwit met hierdie studie was om vas te stel hoe ver Namibië gevorder het in die bemagtiging van sy mense en hoe dit met die situasie in Suid-Afrika vergelyk. Die analise is soos volg gedoen: data van verskillende sektore is vergelyk en ook evalueer teen doelwitte wat in die handves van verskillende sektore of industrieë uiteengesit is. Data van industrieë in Namibië is ook vergelyk met soortgelyke industrieë in Suid-Afrika. Om vas te stel of enige vordering ten opsigte van SEB gemaak is sedert Namibië se onafhanklikheid agtien jaar gelede, is die navorsingsresultate van hierdie studie vergelyk met syfers wat op daardie tydstip beskikbaar was. Die studie het vasgestel dat die Namibiese regering in 2000 ’n komitee onder leiding van die Kantoor van die Eerste Minister aangestel het om ’n wetgewende raamwerk vir die opstel en implementering van ’n SEB beleid daar te stel. Tot op hede is daar egter nog nie so ’n beleid geformuleer nie. Al die maatskappye wat ingesluit is in hierdie studie het aangedui dat hulle regstellende aksie (RA) verslae aan die kantoor van die Diensbillikheid Kommissaris lewer en dat hulle hierdie beleid volg. Nogtans het die studie vasgestel dat die meeste van die maatskappye nie die RA voorskrifte nakom nie. Daar bestaan groot ongelykheid ten opsigte van inkomste in Namibië, waar die rykste 10% van die bevolking 65% van die inkomste verdien. Die studie het ook gevind dat Namibië geen aandele besit in maatskappye wat na onafhanklikheid tot stand gekom het nie, veral in mynbou, wat eintlik die ruggraat van die ekonomie vorm. Volgens die bevindinge van hierdie studie bevoordeel SEB ooreenkomste slegs diegene wat reeds rykdom besit of die regte verbintenisse het. Daar is geen beheermaatreëls in plek vir SEB ooreenkomste nie en gevolglik kies maatskappye met wie hulle besigheid wil doen. Tydens die studie is vasgestel dat die meerderheid maatskappye in Suid-Afrika hulle eie beleid het met betrekking tot breë-basis swart ekonomiese bemagtiging (BBSEB) en dat die industrieë hulle BBSEB industrie handves implementeer of opstel. Hoewel die regering ’n goeie grondslag gelê het vir ander instansies om op voort te bou, het Suid-Afrika nog ’n lang pad om te gaan, aangesien die meerderheid van die land se mense nog in groot armoede leef. Die studie het gevind dat die lede van die komitee wat die SEB beleid moet ontwerp voltydse posisies binne die regering beklee en dat SEB nie as ’n prioriteit gesien word nie. Daar word dus aanbeveel dat die regering mense permanent of op ‘n vaste termyn kontrak basis op die komitee aanstel, sodat hierdie persone op die opstel en implementering van die SEB beleid kan konsentreer. Indien vereis sou word dat besighede jaarliks RA verslae aan die regering inhandig, in lyn met die jaarlikse SEB verslae, sou dit verseker dat ’n poging aangewend word om SEB aan te spreek. Soos die geval is met RA, behoort van die meeste maatskappye, indien nie almal nie, verwag te word dat hulle SEB koördineerders in hulle strukture aanstel om die proses te dryf. Daar word ook aanbeveel dat ’n graduering sisteem ingestel word deur middel waarvan maatskappye en individue wat ’n sekere prestasievlak ten opsigte van SEB bereik het uit die sisteem gradueer om ander ’n kans te gee om voordeel te geniet. Besighede wat nog geen voordeel getrek het nie sou dan voorkeur geniet tydens die toeken van tenders en kwotas. Laastens beveel die studie aan dat die Namibiese regering ’n fonds skep waartoe alle geregistreerde maatskappye ’n seker persentasie van hulle wins moet bydra. Hierdie fonds sou aangewend word vir die ontwikkeling van vaardighede, aangesien die ontwikkeling en oordrag van vaardighede die belangrikste komponent van ekonomiese bemagtiging is. Hoewel die studie gevind het dat baie firmas goeie bestuur toepas, diversiteit beoefen, finasieel goed vaar en hulle beleid voorskryf dat werknemers sonder vooroordeel beloon word, verseker dit nie suksesvolle SEB nie. Daar is ’n vinnig-groeiende swart middelklas in Namibië en dit is belangrik om vas te stel hoe hierdie middelklas kan bydra om welstand te skep vir die meerderheid Namibiërs. Ten spyte van duidelike bewyse dat SEB in Suid-Afrika toegepas word, kan baie meer nog gedoen word om die probleem van armoede aan te spreek. Die sukses van die beleid en wetgewing wat deur die regering ingestel is om swart vooruitgang te ondersteun hang uiteindelik daarvan af dat ‘n omgewing geskep word wat bevorderlik is vir die benutting van geleenthede. Die korporatiewe kultuur in beide private en openbare instellings moet sodanig verander dat swartmense aanvaar en tegemoet gekom word, sodat hulle betekenisvol tot die ekonomiese ontwikkeling van Namibië kan bydra.