In this thesis, I apply teleofunctionalism to a current debate concerning the normativity of practical rationality. Assuming teleofunctionalism is the correct theory of mental phenomena, I argue that it can provide a promising account of the normativity of practical rationality. This claim is motivated by the idea that a capacity to represent internal states, external states, and relations between these states as reasons for action has a teleofunction, and is thus a source of normativity. This teleofunction is marked by a distinctive causal role that reason-representation plays in action. Although I argue that this capacity developed out of processes of biological natural selection, the content of representations of reasons for action produced by the mechanisms underlying this capacity need not be determined solely by biological selection. In an effort to naturalize normativity in this way, I discuss the relation between biological-functional normativity and the normativity of rationality itself.

Following is a study of fathers 'experiences of balance between work and home life. The method the researchers used was based on qualitative interviews aimed at describing father’s own experiences and values, which affects them. The researchers chose to specifically study situations where the fathers were faced with situations where their children needed to be cared for in the home because of a cold or similar illness since this is a situation that directly affects the time that was meant for work, but now risk being moved to areas of life that the researchers define as home life. This is to see whether the respondents felt that this situation affected the balance between work- and home life. The result shows that there are many values of masculinity and fatherhood that influence the respondents when they create their identities. It is those values that come into conflict, as different roles floats into other areas of life, which results in an imbalance between work- and home life. This means that fathers experience distress as they try to compensate by working from home or at other times. It also creates a conflict in ideal gender-equal relationships in which men and women in theory, try to act on values of gender-equality but in practice, solve these situation based on traditional gender patterns.

The project of the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment consists in providing a ground for judgments of taste so that we are justified in claiming that everybody else can agree with our judgment (subjective universality) and that all others ought to agree with us (subjective necessity, normativity). This justification is supposed to be accomplished in the Deduction of judgments of taste. The section that carries this title (38) is surprisingly short and for this and various other reasons (some of them textual) commentators have often wondered about the precise location where Kant provides the deduction, whether it is really contained in that short paragraph or whether the argument might actually extend beyond 38. In my thesis, I want to reinvigorate the discussion about the location of the deduction and its interpretation by arguing that it takes place between 30-42.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 102-106). / vi, 106 leaves, bound 29 cm

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2007. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (p. 89-90). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 92-96) Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2004. Graduate Programme in Communication and Culture. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 197-203). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ99232

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Ohio University, June, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 225-238)

110f. / Submitted by Suelen Reis (suziy.ellen@gmail.com) on 2013-04-16T16:21:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Ilca Menezesseg.pdf: 651126 bytes, checksum: 7317e68c70bdedb293ee0c1dd982092d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles(rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-05-11T15:20:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Ilca Menezesseg.pdf: 651126 bytes, checksum: 7317e68c70bdedb293ee0c1dd982092d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-11T15:20:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Ilca Menezesseg.pdf: 651126 bytes, checksum: 7317e68c70bdedb293ee0c1dd982092d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / A esfera pública é um tema polêmico. Desde sua origem na sociedade burguesa, o ideal de espaço discursivo e deliberativo, em que todos podem participar, fazendo uso de uma razão esclarecida, exercendo influência sobre o sistema político, é fundamental para a democracia. Mas há grupos excluídos, e a mídia de massa, que exerce influência sobre a opinião pública, com freqüência atende a interesses privados, provenientes de grupos, partidos políticos, e pessoas com poder econômico e de influência. Na sociedade contemporânea, essas questões críticas permanecem e a democracia precisa de seus fundamentos básicos. Em vista disso, Habermas pretende reabilitar o conceito de esfera pública, na complexa sociedade. Ele nunca abandona a questão do caráter normativo da comunicação pública esclarecida em relação à integração social e ao controle das ações políticas. As teorias da ação comunicativa e da ética do discurso, em Habermas, valorizam a racionalidade comunicativa, inerente à esfera pública. Essa racionalidade tem potencial normativo para a auto-regulação dos sujeitos e também para a manutenção da ordem social, porque as leis são fundamentadas através do discurso argumentativo. Habermas teoriza sobre a relação entre a normatividade da comunicação intersubjetiva e o sistema de direitos, do Estado democrático, que exerce controle sobre a sociedade civil e o Estado. A política democrática deliberativa surge dessa relação, e configura, na sociedade contemporânea, o ideal de esfera pública. / Salvador

MAGALHÃES, Tiago de Oliveira. O que é seguir uma regra? Reflexões filosóficas sobre normatividade. 2017. 127f. Tese (Doutorado) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Instituto de Cultura e Arte, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2017. / Submitted by sebastiao barroso (jrwizard2209@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-11T13:16:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2017_tese_tomagalhães.pdf: 899067 bytes, checksum: 9c077803fde4c382ebb5491cd4801e34 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-09-11T16:31:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2017_tese_tomagalhães.pdf: 899067 bytes, checksum: 9c077803fde4c382ebb5491cd4801e34 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-11T16:31:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2017_tese_tomagalhães.pdf: 899067 bytes, checksum: 9c077803fde4c382ebb5491cd4801e34 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017 / This thesis approach the question contained in its title, taking as starting point the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and other authors related to him. In the first chapter, different aspects of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy are evaluated. In the second chapter, it is argued that rules should be understood as reasons and that only beings endowed with some form of knowledge and capable of intentional behavior can follow them. Without appealing to the capacity to adopt sapient normative positions, it is not possible to make the fundamental distinction between following and merely conforming to a rule. Chapters III and IV deal directly with problems canonically formulated in Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. The communitarian conception defended by this author is criticized, mainly through considerations on the distinction between public and private. It follows from this that belonging to a community is not a necessary condition to be a rule-follower. As a more appropriate solution to Kripke's skeptic challenge, the characterization of rule-following as a specific ability to see aspects of action itself is pointed out. This capacity is constitutive of symbolic language and, therefore, logically prior to it, so that to follow a rule it is not necessary to master a language, understood in the strict sense. Finally, in the light of these reflections, metaphilosophical arguments discussed in the first chapter are taken up and expanded in order to substantiate the rejection of the quietist conception espoused by Wittgenstein. / A pergunta que dá título a este trabalho é muito atual e também muito antiga, de maneira que diversas tradições, perpassando numerosas áreas do conhecimento, estão disponíveis para aquele que se propõe a abordá-la. Opta-se, aqui, pelo debate filosófico que tem Ludwig Wittgenstein como principal referência. No primeiro capítulo, são indicados quais aspectos da concepção de filosofia de Wittgenstein são, no restante da exposição, mantidos e quais são descartados ou apenas parcialmente aceitos. No segundo capítulo, defende-se que regras devem funcionar como razões e que apenas seres dotados de alguma forma de saber e capazes de comportamento intencional podem segui-las. Sem apelar à capacidade de adotar posturas normativas sapientes, não é possível realizar a distinção fundamental entre seguir e meramente conformar-se a uma regra. Os capítulos III e IV lidam diretamente com problemas canonicamente formulados no seminal Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, de Saul Kripke. A concepção comunitarista defendida por esse autor é criticada, sobretudo através de considerações sobre a distinção entre público e privado. Conclui-se, a partir delas, que pertencer a uma comunidade não é condição necessária para ser um seguidor de regras, apesar de ser uma propriedade muito relevante de todos os seguidores de regras conhecidos. Apontase, como solução mais apropriada ao desafio cético de Kripke, a caracterização do seguimento de regra como uma capacidade específica de ver aspectos da própria ação. Essa capacidade é constitutiva da linguagem simbólica e, portanto, logicamente anterior a ela, de maneira que para seguir regra não é necessário dominar uma linguagem em sentido estrito. Por fim, à luz dessas reflexões, argumentos metafilosóficos discutidos no primeiro capítulo são retomados e expandidos com o objetivo de fundamentar a rejeição da concepção quietista defendida por Wittgenstein.