abstract: After surveying the literature on the normativity of logic, the paper answers that logic is normative for reasoning and rationality. The paper then goes on to discuss whether this constitutes a new problem in issues in normativity, and the paper affirms that it does. Finally, the paper concludes by explaining that the logic as model view can address this new problem. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Philosophy 2017

Partant d'une interprétation de la conception hégélienne de l'action et de la normativité par sa confrontation avec des développements de la pensée contemporaine de l'action, du droit et des institutions qui lui semblent - à bien des égards - opposés, cette étude porte sur le jugement politique en tant qu'il met en jeu, de manière problématique, le rapport entre rationalité et normativité. Il s'agit de déterminer les conditions d'un véritable jugement politique, d'une évaluation qui peut se prévaloir légitimement du qualificatif de politique - par distinction, tout à la fois du jugement moral et du jugement technique. Après une analyse de la conception hégélienne de l'action et de ses évaluations qui permet de déceler une acception non exclusivement morale du devoir-être (I), il s'agit d'expliciter la normativité à l'œuvre dans la théorie hégélienne de l'esprit objectif à partir de l'analyse des rapports du droit à l'histoire et à la rationalité et de la mise au jour d'une conception hégélienne du sens pratique (Il), La constitution du sujet pratique dans son rapport aux institutions conduit à concevoir le social et le politique comme des modalités distinctes du pratique, conception à partir de laquelle peut être dégagée, au sein du pratique, une normativité spécifiquement politique (III), Enfin, après avoir explicité la manière dont peuvent être dégagées, chez Hegel, tant une rationalité pratique qu'une normativité philosophique, la dernière partie, conclusive, s'efforce de tirer le bilan des thèses ainsi mises au jour, et de dégager ce que sont la fécondité et les limites de la position hégélienne pour l'élaboration d'une théorie du jugement politique (IV), / Based on an interpretative work on hegelian concepts of action and normativity and their confrontation with contemporary conceptions of action, law and institutions, this study deals with political judgment insofar as it involves a problematic relationship between rationality and normativity, Thus the aim of this research is to determine the conditions of genuine political judgment, that is to say of an evaluation which could be legitimately called political, being neither a moral nor a technical one. After considering the hegelian concept of action and its evaluations - a work that enables to highlight a notion of "Sollen" which is not only a moral one -- (1), this study examines the proper normativity of the objective spirit by analysing the link between law, history and reason and the « practical sense” theory hegelian philosophy entails (Il) The constitution of practical subjectivity in its relationship to institutions allows ta understand social and political spheres as Specifie modalities of the practical field. This idea leads our work to single out, among the practical and objective world, the distinctive normativity of politics (III), Lastly, after an account of the notions of practical rationality and rational normativity which can be found in Hegel's thought, the final part attempts to draw conclusions and critical balance and assessment of the hegelian claims in order to elaborate a relevant theory of political judgment (IV).

coordenadoria de aperfeiÃoamento de pessoal de ensino superior / A pergunta que dà tÃtulo a este trabalho à muito atual e tambÃm muito antiga, de maneira que diversas tradiÃÃes, perpassando numerosas Ãreas do conhecimento, estÃo disponÃveis para aquele que se propÃe a abordÃ-la. Opta-se, aqui, pelo debate filosÃfico que tem Ludwig Wittgenstein como principal referÃncia. No primeiro capÃtulo, sÃo indicados quais aspectos da concepÃÃo de filosofia de Wittgenstein sÃo, no restante da exposiÃÃo, mantidos e quais sÃo descartados ou apenas parcialmente aceitos. No segundo capÃtulo, defende-se que regras devem funcionar como razÃes e que apenas seres dotados de alguma forma de saber e capazes de comportamento intencional podem segui-las. Sem apelar à capacidade de adotar posturas normativas sapientes, nÃo à possÃvel realizar a distinÃÃo fundamental entre seguir e meramente conformar-se a uma regra. Os capÃtulos III e IV lidam diretamente com problemas canonicamente formulados no seminal Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, de Saul Kripke. A concepÃÃo comunitarista defendida por esse autor à criticada, sobretudo atravÃs de consideraÃÃes sobre a distinÃÃo entre pÃblico e privado. Conclui-se, a partir delas, que pertencer a uma comunidade nÃo à condiÃÃo necessÃria para ser um seguidor de regras, apesar de ser uma propriedade muito relevante de todos os seguidores de regras conhecidos. Apontase, como soluÃÃo mais apropriada ao desafio cÃtico de Kripke, a caracterizaÃÃo do seguimento de regra como uma capacidade especÃfica de ver aspectos da prÃpria aÃÃo. Essa capacidade à constitutiva da linguagem simbÃlica e, portanto, logicamente anterior a ela, de maneira que para seguir regra nÃo à necessÃrio dominar uma linguagem em sentido estrito. Por fim, à luz dessas reflexÃes, argumentos metafilosÃficos discutidos no primeiro capÃtulo sÃo retomados e expandidos com o objetivo de fundamentar a rejeiÃÃo da concepÃÃo quietista defendida por Wittgenstein.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-23T14:41:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ana Cristina Scopel.pdf: 652096 bytes, checksum: 1be2f97f2d9070efefc9c7e995abd65b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-06-21 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / De acordo com o Relatório Semestral (dez/2010) do Departamento Penitenciário Nacional (DEPEN), o Estado do Espírito Santo possui uma população carcerária de 10.803 internos. Não são poucas as vidas enclausuradas, isoladas do convívio em sociedade e ameaçadas cotidianamente com a invisibilidade social que legitima torturas físicas e psicológicas; são muitas as sobrevidas marcadas por precárias condições de higiene e salubridade, como se pode constatar em material divulgado pelo Conselho Estadual de Direitos Humanos do ES. Assim, firmou-se como objetivos desse trabalho conhecer a realidade prisional a que estão submetidos os internos do sistema carcerário capixaba, analisar as formas como estes vivenciam o cumprimento de suas penas, conhecer os mecanismos, os dispositivos e as estratégias produzidas por esses internos, as quais os permitem viver, bem como os favorecem no processo de criação, produção e afirmação da vida. Esse trabalho tornou-se possível a partir do acompanhamento cartográfico da Penitenciária de Segurança Máxima I localizada no Município de Viana (ES) e da vida de dois internos que, gentilmente, colocaram-se como parceiros na concretização desse pesquisar. Realizamos, assim, entrevistas continuadas por um período de cinco meses com dois internos da PSMA I, além de transitarmos por tal estabelecimento e de participarmos de algumas atividades por ele propiciadas. Nossas análises apontam para o combate, que se faz necessário nesses espaços de aprisionamento, aos estados de dominação reinantes não só nas prisões, mas circulantes por entre toda a sociedade estados de dominação que sufocam a criação da vida e que devem ser combatidos a partir das práticas de liberdade, práticas questionadoras sempre prontas à reinvenção dos códigos, das normas e das identidades forjadas por um discurso que produz o empobrecimento e massificação dos modos de ser e estar no mundo. Enfatizamos a prisão como um dispositivo marcadamente produtor de adoecimentos, um espaço que não cessa de subtrair a autonomia dos sujeitos, destituindo-os das rédeas de suas próprias vidas. Entretanto, acreditamos que nos movimentos cotidianos da vida, algo sempre escapa às normas, algo esbarra e ultrapassa as regras, produzindo pequenos desvios, recortes e delicados fragmentos que alimentam outra lógica, outras vidas / According to the semestral report (dec/2010) from the National Penitentiary Department (DEPEN), the Espirito Santo State has a population of 10,803 prisoners. It is not little the number of enclosed lives, isolated from the social living and daily threatened with the social invisibility that legitimates physical and psychological tortures; it is too many under lives marked by precarious hygiene and salubrity conditions as we can see in a material divulged by the Espirito Santo State Council on Human Rights. Therefore, it was established as goals of this study to get to know the carceral reality under which the Espirito Santo carceral system s prisoners are submitted, to analyze the ways how they experience the fulfilling of their sentences, to get to know the mechanisms, the devices and the strategies produced by those prisoners, which allow them to live, as well as support the process of creation, production and assertion of life. This study became possible because of the cartographic attendance of the Maximum Security Prison I (PSMA I), located in Viana, ES, and because of the lives of two prisoners who kindly place themselves as partners for the concretization of this research. We thereby made many interviews during five months with those two prisoners from the PSMA I, besides the walks along the institute and participations in eventual activities promoted by it. Our analyses indicate the fighting, necessary in such spaces of enclosure, against the domination states ruling not only in the prisons, but also among the whole society; such domination states stifle the creation of life, and must be wrestled by liberty experiences, questioning experiences always ready for intervention of codes, rules and identities forged by a discourse that produces impoverishment and massification of the ways of being in the world. We emphasize prison as a device markedly producer of illnesses, a space where subject s autonomy do not stop being subtract, putting them away from the control of their lives. However, we believe that in the daily movements of life, something always escapes from the norms, something stumbles and overpasses the rules, producing small deviations, cuttings and slight fragments that feed another logic, other lives

A posição filosófica chamada de externismo semântico caracteriza-se pela tese segundo a qual a individuação do conteúdo de estados mentais deve recorrer a fatores que não podem ser localizados na região geralmente circunscrita pela noção mesma de mente. Tal tese implica, em todo caso, que a suposta interioridade da vida psicológica não se basta para tornar inteligível as condições de possibilidade que o pensamento conceitual requer. Assim, se fatores externos aos indivíduos são vistos como desempenhando uma contribuição decisiva na própria determinação de seu conteúdo mental, isto é algo que torna necessário compreender em que sentido mente e mundo podem ser tomados como intrinsecamente relacionados. A aposta teórica do presente trabalho é a de que apenas uma concepção da individuação liberada dos grilhões substancialistas permite fornecer um solo ontológico fértil para uma teoria externista do conceito. Daí que a noção de triangulação, que Donald Davidson forjou para dar conta de alguns fatores cruciais na gênese da conceitualidade, seja lida a partir de filosofias que ressaltam o caráter decisivo da vida como referencialidade fundamental do conceito. Logo, é na ordem vital que se busca dissolver os impasses ligados à origem da normatividade e à dualidade entre interno e externo, oposição a partir da qual a subjetividade desde muito tempo tem sido pensada. / The philosophical position called semantic externalism is characterized by the thesis according to which the individuation of the content of mental states must make reference to traits that cannot be placed inside the sphere usually circumscribed by the very notion of mind. Such a thesis implies, anyway, that the supposed interiority of the psychological life is not enough to make intelligible the conditions that conceptual thought requires. If factors external to individuals are seen as entertaining a decisive contribution in the very determination of their mental content, that is makes it necessary to understand in what sense mind and world can be taken as intrinsically related. The theoretical bet of the present thesis is that only a conception of individuation free from the substantialist commitments can provide a fertile ontological ground to an externalist theory of the concept. In this sense, the notion of triangulation, that Donald Davidson has forged to explain some crucial elements in the genesis of conceptuality, is read from the standpoint of philosophies that highlight the decisive character of life as fundamental referentiality of the concept itself. So, it is in the vital order that some deadlocks concerning the origins of normativity and the inner outer duality structural opposition under which from a long time subjectivity is thought upon, are dissolved.

Alors que le recours à la normalisation est croissant dans le domaine des activités économiques, il est pertinent de constater que l’appréhension théorique du phénomène s’est bien souvent limitée à son identification technique.Pourtant, la normalisation doit être tenue pour un phénomène normatif plus vaste, dont les implications tant juridiques que pratiques ne peuvent être ignorées. La thèse ici présentée propose une étude d’ensemble du phénomène. Celle-ci fait apparaître son extraordinaire variété et la complexité de son articulation avec le droit économique. La réflexion partira du constat que la normalisation se manifeste à l’ordre juridique par l’intermédiaire de formes normatives variées, qui ne se limitent pas au domaine de la normalisation technique. Dès lors, l’adoption d’une analyse conceptuelle prend tout son sens. D’une part, elle permet de dégager qu’elles sont les caractéristiques permettant d’identifier les manifestations normatives relevant, ou non, d’un processus de normalisation. D’autre part, elle précise dans quelle mesure les normes issues de la normalisation sont porteuses de normativité juridique. Une telle analyse est logiquement complétée par une approche fonctionnelle du phénomène. Celle-ci révèle la contribution de ce processus à la mise en oeuvre du droit économique et précise dans quelle mesure il peut participer à sa création. Néanmoins l’articulation de la normalisation avec le droit économique ne se limite pas à la contribution de la première au second. Ainsi, l’étude de la confrontation de la normalisation à la matière nous permettra de relever que, si la normalisation facilite les échanges et dans une certaine mesure la concurrence, elle peut également restreindre la compétition entre les entreprises sur le marché. / While the use of standards is increasing in the field of economic activities, it is pertinent to note that the theoretical understanding of the phenomenon was often limited to technical identification. However, standardization should be held to a broader normative phenomenon, both legal and practical implications can not be ignored. The thesis presented here provides a comprehensive study of the phenomenon. This shows the extraordinary variety and complexity of itsrelationship with the economic law. Reflection based on the premise that standardization occurs in the legal system through various forms of standards, which are not confined to the field of technical standardization. Therefore, the adoption of a conceptual analysis makes sense. On the one hand, it allows to identify the characteristics that are used to identify normative events coming or not a process of normalization. On the other hand, it specifies how standards from standardization are carriers of legal normativity. Such analysis is logically complemented by a functional approach to the phenomenon. It reveals the contribution of this process to the implementation of economic law and specifies howt hey can participate in its creation. Nevertheless, the articulation of economic normalization with the law is not limited to the contribution of the former to the latter. Thus, the study of the confrontation of standardization in this area will allow us to observe that, although standardization facilitates trade and to some extent competition, it may also restrict competition between firms in the market.

For many, epistemology is a normative discipline in much the same sense as ethics. According to the analogy, just as ethics is about what we should do and how we should live our lives, epistemology is about what we should believe and how we should go about forming our beliefs. What complicates the analogy, however, is that believing things is also a part of living life. Our beliefs aren’t only evaluable with respect to whether they are credible, true, or amount to knowledge, but also with respect to whether they are useful, beneficial, or contribute to our happiness and wellbeing. The analogy implies that epistemic considerations (like evidence, truth, or knowledge) settle questions about what we should believe just as ethical considerations (like duty, goodness, or virtue) settle questions about what we should do and how we should live. The present work is an attempt to challenge this general picture of the subject matter of epistemology. Specifically, I argue that the normative assessment of belief cannot be understood in isolation from the broader social practices and human activities in virtue of which what we believe is ethically and practically significant. Chapter I introduces the central issues and raises a challenge to views that distinguish between epistemic and ethical assessment in terms of reasons for belief and reasons for action, respectively. The conclusion of this chapter is that there must be some conceptual link between the norms of belief and the norms of action. Chapter II builds upon this challenge by spelling out that conceptual link: reasons for belief entail reasons for action, and vice versa. The main conclusion of chapters I and II is that epistemology cannot settle questions about what we should believe without also settling questions about what we should do, and ethics cannot settle questions about what we should do without also settling questions about what we should believe. Chapters III and IV provide novel answers to two significant challenges to abandoning the analogy: providing plausible accounts of the relationship between reasons and rational motivation and the normative comparison of epistemic considerations and practical reasons for belief.

Hoy en día, la problemática ambiental en el Perú es la contaminación del agua, debido al vertimiento de aguas residuales domesticas de las poblaciones que no tienen un sistema de tratamiento adecuado que presentan un tratamiento deficiente. Mediante la presente investigación se demuestra los procesos de depuración a través de la aireación en el flujo del conducto, esto debido a las pendientes pronunciadas en la red de alcantarillado y sistemas de conducción. Para esto se realizó el diseño de la PTAR convencional en base a la Norma OS-090 para luego realizar los cálculos de aireación basados en la teoría de Naudascher y proceder a realizar el diseño de la PTAR Optimizada. Los resultados obtenidos teóricamente fueron validados a través de pruebas de laboratorio realizado en campo. Al finalizar la investigación se concluye y recomienda lo siguiente: La Norma OS-090 no considera la remoción de contaminantes en la red de alcantarillado y sistemas de conducción. En el proceso de diseño generalmente no se considera condiciones geográficas particulares, como la fuerte pendiente que representa una gran ventaja en zonas rurales. Luego de realizar los cálculos de la aireación en la fuerte pendiente basados en los conocimientos de la Hidráulica y validarlos a través de un muestreo de campo, se logra comprobar la hipótesis inicial, las pendientes pronunciadas del terreno nos permiten optimizar la PTAR a través de la remoción del DBO y SST en las redes de alcantarillado y sistemas de conducción, por ende, se logra reducir costos en la etapa de construcción, operación, mantenimiento, aumentar la eficiencia del proceso y generar el menor impacto ambiental. Se recomienda poder realizar más pruebas de laboratorio para la obtención de mayor cantidad de datos que aumenten el rango de precisión de la remoción del DBO para cada pendiente. Para futuros diseños de PTAR en zonas rurales con pendiente pronunciada se recomienda considerar los cálculos de aireación en el proceso de diseño. / Today, the environmental problem in Peru is water contamination, due to the dumping of domestic wastewater from populations that do not have an adequate treatment system and that present poor treatment. This research demonstrates the purification processes through aeration in the flow, this due to steep slopes in the sewerage network and conduction systems. For this, the design of the conventional PTAR was carried out based on the OS-090 standard, then the aeration calculations based on Naudascher's theory were performed and the optimized PTAR was designed. The theoretical results were validated through laboratory tests conducted in the field. At the end of the research we conclude and recommend the following: The OS-090 standard does not consider the removal of pollutants from the sewer network or pipeline systems. The design process generally does not consider particular geographical conditions, such as the steep slope that represents a major advantage in rural areas. After performing the calculations of aeration on the steep slope based on the knowledge of hydraulics and validate them through a field sampling, it is possible to verify the initial hypothesis, the steep slopes of the ground allow us to optimize the PTAR through the removal of DBO and SST in the sewer networks and conduction systems, therefore, it is possible to reduce costs in the construction stage, operation, maintenance, Increase process efficiency and generate the least environmental impact. It is recommended that more laboratory tests can be performed to obtain more data that increases the range of accuracy of DBO removal for each slope. For future PTAR designs in steeper rural areas it is recommended to consider aeration calculations in the design process. / Tesis

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After countering claims that truth cannot be a norm of belief, this dissertation argues that truth’s normativity is grounded in personhood. It does so by attending to the fact that truth is a norm for the human person, and to the relationships between the human person and the objective goodness and value of truth. The dissertation develops this argument by critically appropriating writings of Thomas Aquinas and representatives of twentieth-century personalism on the relationship between truth and the human person. The dissertation’s initial chapters rebut objections (1) that the involuntariness of belief rules out any possibility of norms of belief, (2) that truth cannot be a norm of belief because truth is unable to provide guidance in determining what to believe, and (3) that it is incompatible with other norms of belief such as justification. It rebuts the first objection by challenging its general account of belief and outlining an alternative account. It responds to the second argument by criticizing its understanding of guidance as overly narrow and sketching an alternative notion of guidance-by-value. It counters the third objection by arguing for the primacy of the truth-norm. The dissertation then takes up the question of what grounds the truth-norm. Chapter Three surveys recent accounts, drawing from its survey a set of desiderata for any satisfactory account. Chapter Four begins the dissertation’s account of the normativity of truth. Working from Dietrich von Hildebrand’s conception of objective goods, it argues that truth is an objective good for the person by showing how deeply interwoven truth is with friendship. Given that friendship is an objective good for the person, and that truth stands in certain intimate relationships to friendship, it follows that truth is an objective good for the person. Chapter Five rounds out the argument. The objective goodness of truth entails that truth is a value. Values are normative for persons. Therefore, truth is normative for the human person. This chapter defends the claim that values are normative for persons by elucidating the dependency of the realization of personhood—in several of its various dimensions—on value-grasping and value-realizing acts.