Efficiency, Leverage and Exit: The Role of Information Asymmetry in Concentrated Industries This paper develops a real options model of imperfect competition with asymmetric information that analyzes firms' exit decisions. Optimal exit decision is linked to firm characteristics such as financial leverage and efficiency. The model shows that informational asymmetries can lead more efficient and less leveraged firms to leave the product market prematurely. It also demonstrates how firm efficiency can increase debt capacity relative to rival firms. The model also has implications for firm risk and asset returns. Specifically, the paper shows that, when there is information asymmetry among rivals, rival actions can have a "news effect" that change a firm's dynamic risk structure. Human Capital Investment and the Completion of Risky R&D Projects We consider a firm that employs human capital to make a technological breakthrough. Since the probability of success of the breakthrough depends on the current stock of human capital the firm has an incentive to expand its human capital stock. The present value of the patent is stochastic but can be observed during the R\&D phase of the project. The exogenous value of the patent determines the firm's decisions to invest in human capital, to abandon the project if necessary, and to invest in marketing the new product. We study the corresponding optimal stopping times, determine their value and risk consequences, and derive optimal investment in the stock of human capital. While optimal investment in human capital is very sensitive to its productivity do increase the probability of a breakthrough it is insensitive to changes in the volatility of the present value of the patent. The value of the firm is driven by fixed labor costs that occur until the breakthrough is made, the call option to invest in human capital and market the product, and the put option to abandon the project. These options together with labor costs' based operating leverage determine the risk dynamics. Risk varies non-monotonically with the stochastic value of the patent and is U-shaped. Migration Options for Skilled Labor and Optimal Investment in Human Capital This paper develops a model of optimal education choice of an agent who has an option to emigrate. Using a real options framework, we analyze the time evolution of human capital in the country of origin and investigate the role of migration possibilities in the accumulation of different types of human capital. The analysis shows that the accumulation of human capital depends crucially on the level of uncertainty and the transferability of human capital across countries. Government subsidies are an important determinant of the composition of different types of human capital and can be crucial in alleviating the brain drain problem. (author's abstract)

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T13:53:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RamiroJA_DISSERT.pdf: 1260580 bytes, checksum: 7ff1ddcb5602ec00dddfee73478d1bf6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-04-16 / The state of Rio Grande do Norte counts with a relevant potential in the shrimp farming supply chain. In the larviculture step the state responds for more than half of the national production. In the farming step it is the second largest producer. In the industrial step, its industries have almost 40% of the shrimp processing capacity of the northeast of Brazil. However, this country has the highest tax rate comparing with the main shrimp producer countries. Considering the influence of taxes in the competition among companies, the main goal of this research is to analyze the impact of indirect taxes in the above steps of the supply chain. To achieve it, it will be used the data of the 2011 Census of the Shrimp Farming and it will be applied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to identify the market form of those steps. In order to contribute with the characterization of the supply chain, CEO?s of farms and industries will be interviewed. The price-elasticity of the shrimp larvae, the in natura shrimp and the processed shrimp will be analyzed in order to verify the possibility that each one of those three steps has to pass-through the onus of the end of benefit over the ICMS. The data analysis shows that the larviculture step functions as a duopoly and, facing the end of that benefit, it will be able to pass-through most its onus to the farming step. On the other hand, this step functions similar to a perfect competing market, which diminishes its capacity to pass-through that onus to the processing step. This step operates as oligopoly with a lower concentration than the larviculture step but, due to the fact that it faces an oligopsony, it will end up assuming most of that onus, which will cause a decrease in the amount of processed shrimp. It is concluded that the end of that benefit would impact negatively, in this state, the supply chain at all, but mainly the farming and the industrial steps / O Rio Grande do Norte apresenta um relevante potencial na cadeia produtiva da cria??o de camar?es em viveiros. Na etapa de larvicultura responde por mais da metade da produ??o nacional de p?s-larvas. Por sua vez, na etapa de engorda esse Estado ? o segundo maior produtor de camar?o do pa?s. Na etapa de beneficiamento, as plantas instaladas no Estado possuem quase 40% da capacidade de beneficiamento de camar?o do Nordeste. Ocorre que o Brasil apresenta a carga tribut?ria mais alta entre os principais pa?ses produtores de camar?o. Diante da influ?ncia que os tributos exercem na concorr?ncia entre as empresas, o presente trabalho se prop?e a analisar o impacto dos tributos indiretos nas etapas supracitadas da cadeia produtiva do camar?o de viveiro no Rio Grande do Norte. Para tanto, ser?o utilizados os dados do Censo da Carcinicultura de 2011 e ser? aplicado o Herfindahl-Hirschman Index para identificar em quais formas de mercado opera cada etapa da referida cadeia. De modo a contribuir na caracteriza??o da cadeia ser?o realizadas entrevistas com diretores de fazendas de engorda e plantas de beneficiamento. Ser? analisada a elasticidade-pre?o da p?s-larva, do camar?o in natura e do camar?o beneficiado para verificar a possibilidade que as etapas supracitadas possuem de repassar o ?nus do fim do benef?cio estadual de cr?dito presumido de ICMS para o seguinte elo da cadeia. A an?lise dos dados mostrou que o setor de larvicultura funciona como um duop?lio e que, diante da extin??o desse benef?cio, a maior parte do ?nus do mesmo seria transferido para o setor de engorda. J? este setor funciona em uma estrutura de mercado mais semelhante ? concorr?ncia perfeita, o que diminui sua possibilidade de transferir esse ?nus para o setor de beneficiamento. Esta situa??o provocaria uma redu??o na quantidade produzida. O setor de beneficiamento tamb?m funcionaria como um oligop?lio com concentra??o pouco inferior ao de larvicultura, mas, por se defrontar com um oligops?nio, acabaria por arcar com a maior parte do ?nus, ocasionando uma queda na quantidade de camar?o beneficiado. Conclui-se que o fim desse benef?cio impactaria negativamente, no Estado do Rio Grande do Norte, a cadeia como um todo, mas principalmente as etapas de engorda e beneficiamento

An analysis of the market conditions in the press and media monitoring field in Croatia and Slovenia. Industry analysis, business strategy and competition analysis. Oligopoly models of and a hypothesis of the future development in the field. Labour market conditions, threats and opportunities for a new firm. Assessment of chances for entry.

Высокие риски возникновения ценовых войн обуславливают неблагоприятную конъюнктуру на российском рынке труб большого диаметра, что подтверждает актуальность тематики исследования. Целью магистерской диссертации является разработка формулы расчета цены на трубу большого диаметра для российского рынка, которая поспособствует стабилизации ситуации. Цена, рассчитываемая по формуле, может учитывать всевозможные индикаторы рынка. Если она максимально приближена к текущим рыночным тенденциям, а также позволяет снизить риски неоправданного изменения цены, то такой механизм является наилучшим способом регулирования на рынке труб большого диаметра. В качестве источников информации использовалась учебно-методическая и научно-исследовательская литература, статистические данные Федеральной службы государственной статистики, данные бухгалтерской и управленческой отчетности предприятий. / High risks of price wars cause unfavorable conditions on the Russian market of large diameter pipes, which confirms the relevance of the research topic. The purpose of the master's thesis is to develop a formula for calculating the price of a large diameter pipe for the Russian market, which will contribute to the stabilization of the situation. The price calculated using the formula can take into account various market indicators. If it is as close as possible to current market trends, and also reduces the risks of unjustified price changes, then this mechanism is the best way to regulate the market for large diameter pipes. Educational and research literature, statistical data of the Federal state statistics service, and data on accounting and management reports of enterprises were used as sources of information.

The following thesis acts as a critical cultural progression report surrounding the current technological disruption in the entertainment industry and its impact on consumers. This begins with a study of the history starting in 1910 and covers the urbanization of America during the Industrial Revolution, the developing fan experience, a history of consumer demands in relation to oligopolistic principles and the blockbuster method, the invention and influence of the television, and the current effect of technological advancement in the entertainment industry. Following this historical overview, four chapters will study different methods of analysis covering the intricacies of the current technological disruption using four theories: population ecology, media systems dependency, the mainstream cult, and convergence and participatory culture. The culmination of this work will consist of drawing together the history, the theories, and the contemporary examples into a conclusion about the fate of the media oligopoly in which this researcher points to the importance of seamless integration between the media industry and the consumer by way of three possible outcomes.

Diese Dissertation besteht aus zwei Teilen, die durch eine Einleitung zu Auktions- und Oligopolmärkten und durch eine kurze Diskussion über die erzielten Resultate am Ende der Arbeit miteinander verbunden sind. Der erste Teil diskutiert die Literatur zu Auktionen und analysiert das Verhalten von Bietern in Österreichischen Rinderauktionen. Das Ziel der Untersuchung ist es zu bestimmen, ob es Unterschiede im Verhalten der Bieter gibt und ob diese die Möglichkeit eines späteren Kaufes in Betracht ziehen. Der zweite Teil beschäftigt sich mit den Strategien von Firmen in der Halbleiterindustrie. Im besonderen werden die strategischen Effekte von "learning-by-doing" und "spillovers" betrachtet. Des weiteren werden die Konsequenzen der Aggregation von firmenspezifischen Preisverhalten zu einer industriespezifischen Presigleichung empirisch untersucht. In beiden Teilen wird schwerpunktmäßig auf der Frage eingegangen, ob das Vernachlässigen von Asymmetrien unter den Marktteilnehmern und/oder das Vernachlässigen dynamischer Effekte die geschätzen Parameter beeinflußt. / This thesis consists of two parts, which are connected by an introduction on auction and oligopoly markets and a short discussion about the obtained results at the end. The first part provides a literature review on auctions and analyzes bidders' behavior in Austrian cattle auctions. The aim is to investigate whether there are differences among bidders and whether bidders take the possibility of buying later into account when bidding for objects. The second part analyzes firms' strategies in the semiconductor industry. In particular, the strategic effects of learning-by-doing and spillovers are considered. Further, the consequences of aggregating firms' pricing behavior to an industry level pricing equation are empirically investigated. In both parts emphasis is put on the question, whether neglecting asymmetries across market participants and/or neglecting dynamic effects influences the estimated parameters.

Les Gaz à Effet de Serre (GES) jouent un rôle crucial dans la régulation du climat. Le changement climatique, conséquence de l'accumulation de GES dans l'atmosphère, a de nombreux impacts tels que les phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes (tempêtes, ouragans, cyclones, inondations, canicules, sécheresses), la disparition d'espèces animales et végétales, la prévalence croissante des maladies liées à la pollution atmosphérique (santé respiratoire par exemple). La pollution industrielle contribue au changement climatique. Par ailleurs, les firmes produisant un même bien sont en perpétuelle concurrence et leurs niveaux d'émission diffèrent selon leur technologie et leur pouvoir de marché. Compte tenu de ces effets néfastes croissants des agents économiques sur l'environnement, il est nécessaire que des politiques publiques soient mises en place pour réduire les émissions de GES.L'objectif de la thèse est triple. D'une part, elle vise à analyser la pollution dans des structures de marchés où tous les agents se comportent de manière stratégique (concurrence oligopolistique). D'autre part, elle vise à effectuer des exercices de statique comparative afin de mesurer les effets des variations de paramètres sur les équilibres stratégiques. Enfin, elle étudie différentes politiques publiques pour réguler les émissions liées à cette pollution. Notons ici que la thèse porte plus sur l'atténuation que sur l'adaptation au changement climatique.Le domaine exploré se situe au croisement de l'économie de l'environnement, et des jeux stratégiques de marché. / Greenhouse gases (GHG) play a crucial role in climate regulation. Climate change, due to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, has many consequences such as extremes weather events (storms, hurricanes, cyclones, floods, heat waves, droughts), extinction of animal and plant species, the increasing prevalence in diseases related to air pollution (e.g.,health respiratory). Industrial pollution contributes to climate change. Moreover, firms which produce the same good are in constant competition and their emission levels differ according to their technology and market power. Facing these deteriorating effects of the behaviour of economic agents on the environment, it is necessary to implement public policies to alleviate GHG emissions.The objective of this thesis is threefold. On the one hand, it aims to analyze pollution in market structures where all agents behave strategically (oligopolistic competition). On the other hand, it aims to carry out comparative static exercises in order to capture the effects of parameter variations on strategic equilibria. Finally, it studies different public policies to regulate emissions related to this pollution. It should be noted here that the thesis focuses more on mitigation than adaptation to climate change.The explored domain is at the junction of environmental economics, and strategic market games.

O objetivo principal deste trabalho écalcular o valor da perda de bem-estar do setor siderúrgico brasileiro, considerando os diferentes mercados relevantes, como o de aço bruto, laminados, vergalhões e ferro-gusa. Para alcançar este propósito foram estimadas diferentes equações de demanda para os referidos mercados relevantes para, então, encontrar as elasticidades-preço da demanda. O modelo teórico utilizado referente ao peso morto para mercados oligopolizados foi o de Daskin (1991). Tratandose do cálculo das elasticidades-preço, utilizaram-se modelos de equações simultâneas com o uso de variáveis instrumentais. O mercado siderúrgico é oligopolizado no mundo inteiro, incluindo o Brasil. As inúmeras fusões e aquisições ocorridas, principalmente após a desestatização do setor, contribuíram para a concentração do mercado. O mercado siderúrgico brasileiro apresentou um alto índice de concentração, principalmente no mercado de vergalhões onde apenas três grupos empresariais (Gerdau, Arcelor Mittal e Votorantim) controlam todo o mercado deste produto. Em um mercado altamente concentrado as firmas podem exercer poder de mercado e desta forma há perdas econômicas para a sociedade como um todo. As elasticidades-preço encontradas no trabalho refletem bem a estrutura do setor siderúrgico brasileiro, em que, todos os mercados relevantes analisados apresentaram baixos valores de elasticidade-preço, ou sejam, inelásticos às variações de preço. O mercado de vergalhões foi o mais inelástico se comparado aos demais mercados, além disso, os seus valores de peso morto em relação ao faturamento também foram os maiores, evidenciando uma forte perda de bem-estar. Apesar dos outros mercados relevantes terem apresentado valores de peso morto em relação ao faturamento do setor inferiores, os mesmos não foram desprezíveis. O mercado de aço bruto que neste estudo representa o mercado siderúrgico brasileiro como um todo (exceto o seguimento de ferro-gusa), por incorporar os demais mercados relevantes, é dominado pelos grupos empresariais Arcelor Mittal; Gerdau, Usiminas Cosipa e Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional - CSN, e também apresentou resultados indicativos de forte perda de bemestar, com alto valor de peso morto. Já o mercado de laminados, controlado pelos grupos Arcelor Mittal, Usiminas Cosipa, CSN e Gerdau, apresentou resultados muito próximos aos do aço bruto. O mercado de ferro-gusa, menos concentrado em comparação as demais, foi o que apresentou os menores valores de peso morto, o que era esperado, pois este mercado, apesar de ser dominado por quatro grandes grupos siderúrgicos (Arcelor Mittal, Usiminas Cosipa, CSN e Gerdau), é um mercado onde há a participação de inúmeros produtores de pequeno porte denominados guseiros. As conclusões deste trabalho mostram que o mercado siderúrgico brasileiro é muito concentrado e há o exercício do poder de mercado por parte das firmas participantes, ocasionando perda de bem-estar para sociedade brasileira. Espera-se que este estudo, ao apresentar os valores de perda de bem-estar, possacontribuir para a análise ou para elaboração de políticas públicas relacionadas ao setor em questão. / The main objective of this study was to calculate the value of the welfare loss for the Brazilian steel sector. Different relevant markets were analyzed, such as: crude steel, rolled steel, rebar and pig iron. Price-elasticities of demand were obtained by estimating different demand equations for each related market. The theoretical model proposed by Daskin (1991) was used to calculate the dead weight loss in oligopolistic markets. Elasticities were obtained by formulating the simultaneous equations model and using instrumental variables. Worldwide, steel market can be considered an oligolopy, as well as in Brazil. In the Brazilian market, mergers and acquisitions that happened after the privatization of the sector, contributed for the market concentration. The Brazilian steel market showed a high concentration ratio, especially in the rebar market where only three groups (Gerdau, Arcelor Mittal and Votorantim) control the entire Brazilian market for this product. In a highly concentrated market firms tend to exercise market power. Consequently, there are economic losses to the society. The price elasticities of demand that were found in this research highlight the structure of the Brazilian steel market. For all the relevant markets that were analyzed, there were found low values for elasticities. It shows that all the products are price-inelastic. The rebar market was found to be the more inelastic when compared to other markets. In addition, for this same market, the calculated values of dead weight loss related to sales were also higher. High welfare losses can be related to the high market concentration for this product. Even though other relevant markets have presented positive values of dead weight loss related to sales of the lower sector, these values were not negligible. The market for crude steel that was analyzed in this study represents the Brazilian steel market as a whole because it incorporates other relevant markets. Large groups, such as, Arcelor Mittal, Gerdau, Usiminas Cosipa and CSN dominate the market. The results analyzed for the crude steel indicate a strong welfare loss, with a high value of dead weight loss. The results for the rolled products market, dominated by Arcelor Mittal, Usiminas Cosipa, CSN e Gerdau, are close to those found for the crude steel market. The market for pig iron, which is less concentrated when compared to other markets, presented lower values of dead weight loss. This result was expected because although this sector is dominated by four big groups there are many other small companies also producing in this sector. According to the results, it can be concluded that the Brazilian steel market is highly concentrated what enables firms to exercise their market power, causing a welfare loss for the Brazilian society. It is expected that, by presenting values for the welfare loss in the steel market, this research can help in the analysis and development of public policies for this sector.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo de Camargo Cavalcanti.pdf: 1618850 bytes, checksum: 482818a6012101867e57945461f2de6d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-12-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The main goal of the present work is to demonstrate that, in an economical structure imminently founded in oligopolies, as the Brazilian one is, it is difficult to ensure the dictates of social justice and to provide a dignified existence to all in face of the legal conduct of the economy, constitutionally implementing a State of Necessary Intervention. With the definition of Economic Rights and its inherent relation to human rights as a starting point, we will draw attention to the Competition Law and look closely to the article 170 of the Federal Constitution, as founding rule of the economic order and resulting antitrust defense model. Furthermore, we emphasise the capitalism as an economic system adopted by the Magna Carta, that establishes an economic order in which profit pursuit is legitimate. Thereafter, we will approach the institutional need of existence of the Administrative Council of Economic Defense (in Portuguese, CADE), contextualizing its inception in the Constitutions of the Brazilian Republic, in the scope of the antitrust defense, indicating some aspects of the Law 8.884/94, as well as the relevant differences to this work as put forth by the Law 12.529/11. To better clarify the question, we show our perspective of two cases of great relevance analysed by CADE, the Ambev and the Nestlé/Garoto cases. Subsequently, we will focus on the theory of concentration acts, identifying its definition according to the recente law of the Brazilian System of Competition Defense (in Protuguese, SBDC) and some of the guidelines given by CADE itself to analyse the acts. We will, then, indicate the negative effects of the concentration acts and and present a proposition to solve them: the harmonisation of the principle of prohibition of social regression with the theory by Ronald Coase of negative externalities, in light of Property Rights in the jurisprudence and German school of thought, which will allow us to bring forth the necessary adoption of new resolving criteria, eminently constitutional. Taking the oligopoly theory as basis, we enfasize the tacit collusion as exemplary unlawfulness of the problems stemmed from the support and consolidation of oligopolistic markets to, at last, discuss the Brazilian stance regarding the antitrust defense towards the international and globalized market. By way of conclusion, we propose some guidelines for SBDC and specifically for CADE, in order to stop oligopolies and follow the dictates of the Brazilian State of Necessary Intervention, as constitutionally provided, that is, an economic order for the dignified existence of all / O objetivo do presente trabalho é demonstrar que, em uma estrutura econômica eminentemente fundada em oligopólios, como a brasileira, é difícil garantir os ditames da justiça social e proporcionar uma existência digna para todos mediante a regência jurídica da economia, implantando constitucionalmente um Estado de Intervenção Necessária. Partindo da definição de Direito Econômico e de sua relação intrínseca com os Direitos Humanos, chamamos a atenção para o Direito Concorrencial e atentamos para o artigo 170 da Constituição Federal, como regra matriz da ordem econômica e modelo de defesa da concorrência decorrente. Nessa seara, salientamos o capitalismo como sistema econômico adotado pela Carta Magna, que estabelece uma ordem econômica na qual a busca pelo lucro é legítima. Em seguida, abordamos a necessidade institucional de existência do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE), contextualizando seu surgimento nas Constituições da República brasileira, no âmbito da defesa da concorrência, e elencando alguns aspectos da Lei 8.884/94, bem como as diferenças relevantes para o trabalho trazidas pela Lei 12.529/11. Para melhor elucidar a questão, mostramos nossa perspectiva sobre dois casos de grande relevância analisados pelo CADE, o da Ambev e o da Nestlé/Garoto. A seguir, enfocamos a teoria dos atos de concentração, identificando sua definição consoante a recente lei do Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência (SBDC) e algumas das diretrizes fornecidas pelo próprio CADE para a análise dos atos. Expomos, então, os efeitos negativos dos atos de concentração e apresentamos uma proposta para solucioná-los: a compatibilização do princípio do não retrocesso social com a teoria de Ronald Coase sobre externalidades negativas, sob a leitura do Direito de Propriedade na jurisprudência e na doutrina alemãs, o que nos permitirá trazer à tona a necessária adoção de novos critérios resolutivos, eminentemente constitucionais. Tendo como base a teoria do oligopólio, enfatizamos a colusão tácita como ilicitude exemplar dos problemas advindos da manutenção e consolidação de mercados oligopolistas para, enfim, tratarmos da postura brasileira de defesa da concorrência em relação ao mercado internacional e globalizado. À guisa de conclusão, propomos algumas diretrizes para o SBDC e especificamente para o CADE, a fim de impedir os oligopólios e seguir os ditames do Estado brasileiro de Intervenção Necessária, conforme constitucionalmente previsto, ou seja, uma ordem econômica em prol da existência digna para todos.

Dans le cadre de cette thèse, je m'intéresse à la gestion des combustibles fossiles (pétrole, gaz naturel, charbon) en présence d'interactions stratégiques entre diffé­rents types d'agents. Dans un premier temps, j'étudie sous quelles conditions deux firmes asymétriques, exploitant une ressource non renouvelable, peuvent s'entendre autour d'un accord de coopération et ainsi former un cartel. J'analyse en parti­culier l'ensemble des accords possibles ainsi que la possibilité que ceux-ci soient acceptés par toutes les parties prenantes. Dans un second temps, je m'intéresse plus spécifiquement à l'incitation des pays membres du cartel de l'Opep à sures­timer ou sous-estimer leurs réserves de pétrole depuis l'instauration du système des quotas de production en 1982. Enfin, je caractérise la politique optimale d'un gouvernement en faveur du développement des technologies backstop au travers de subventions en R&D afin d'assurer la transition énergétique depuis des énergies fossiles polluantes à des énergies renouvelables non polluantes. Mais, je fais cette analyse dans le contexte où la production est contrôlée par une firme indépendante et lorsque le gouvernement ne peut pas implémenter une taxe sur les émissions. Un point commun de ces trois chapitres est la présence d'agents ayant des intérêts divergents. D'un point de vue méthodologique, j'utilise la théorie des jeux et, en particulier, les jeux différentiels dans les deux premiers chapitres. / This dissertation provides an analysis of the management of fossil fuels (oil, gas, coal) in the presence of strategic interactions between different types of agents. First, I study under which conditions two asymmetric firms, extracting a nonre­newable resource, may agree upon a cooperative agreement and, thus, merge into a cartel. I analyse, in particular, the set of feasible agreements and the possibility that every players accept one of them. Second, I focus more specifically on the incentives for the Opec members to over-report or under-report their oil reserves since the set of production quotas in 1982. Third, I characterize the optimal policy of a government in favor of the developing of backstop technologies through R&D subsidies in order to ensure the ecological transition from polluting fossil fuels to non-polluting renewable energies. However, I conduct this analysis in the context where the supply is controlled by an independent firm and when the government cannot implement a Pigovian tax on emissions. A common theme of these dif­ferent chapters is the presence of agents whose interests are contradictory. From a methodological point of view, I use game theory and, in particular, differential games in the two first chapters.