Cette thèse part du constat que le cadre théorique dont les sciences sociales disposent pour décrire l’expérience de mixité conjugale n’est pas adapté à la mouvance de la situation contemporaine. La plupart des théories qui ont été élaborées pour parler de cette expérience de rencontre se conjuguent sous l’emprise de notions vieillies. En s’intéressant aux trajectoires de mixité conjugale dans le contexte du Maroc, cette thèse contribuera à développer un cadre conceptuel qui reflète la mouvance de la réalité contemporaine et ce, en posant les bases d’un habitus discursif valorisant, ce qui constitue l’originalité principale de ce projet de recherche. À partir d’un terrain ethnographique qui a placé l’anthropologie de l’expérience partagée et les récits d’expérience au cœur de la méthodologie de recherche, cette thèse dresse également un portrait ethnographique de la mixité conjugale au Maroc, ce qui a permis de documenter un sujet encore très peu exploré par les sciences sociales. Dans le cadre de cette thèse, la mixité conjugale a été appréhendée sous l’angle de la métaphore du voyage prolongé de Fernandez (2002), ce qui a contribué à dynamiser le cadre théorique entourant la mixité conjugale. En arrière-fond de cette thèse, une réflexion autour du concept de « home » (le chez-soi) suggère que le projet de construction de soi des individus contemporains qui négocient leur quotidien au croisement de références culturelles différentes (dont font partie les participants de cette recherche) n’est pas nécessairement synonyme de déracinement et de fragmentation, mais qu’il porte l’idée d’attachement et de cohérence. / This thesis is based on the premise that the theoretical framework used by social sciences to describe mixed couples experiences is no longer adapted to contemporary situations of mobility. Most theories that have been developed to describe this experience use concepts that are not adapted to the present. By focusing on the paths taken by mixed couples in the context of Morocco, this thesis will contribute to the development of a conceptual framework reflecting the phenomenon as it exists today. Furthermore, the originality of this project lies mainly in the fact that it offers a habitus discursif valorisant for mixed unions. Based on ethnographic field work that puts narratives of experience at the heart of its research methodology, this thesis also offers an ethnographic portrait of mixed couples in Morocco, a subject that has received little attention from social sciences. Mixed couples have been studied in the framework of this thesis from the angle of Fernandez’s (2002) prolonged travel metaphor, which has contributed to revitalizing the theoretical framework for looking at mixed couples. In the background of this thesis there is a reflection around the concept of « home » whereby the self-creation of contemporary individuals negotiating their daily lives at the crossroads of different cultural references (as is the case for the participants of this research) is not necessarily synonymous with uprooting and fragmentation but rather incorporates ideas of attachment and personal continuity.

The essay represents the projector principle, on which, as the essay’s author believes, the narration of The Summer Lightning and Other Stories by Olive Senior is based. The projector principle illustrates the idea that little details and images in the text serve big purposes, for example, reflect the emotional state of the characters or how the characters construct their identity. The literary analysis of the present essay aims at exploring a complicated identity construction in the context of Jamaica with its half-lost indigenous and half-remained colonial legacies through the identity construction of adolescent Jamaican protagonists of the short stories.

This study is about the nature of persons and personal identity. It belongs to a tradition that maintains that in order to understand what it is to be a person we must clarify what personal identity consists in. In this pursuit, I differentiate between the problems (i) How do persons persist? and (ii) What facts, if any, does personal identity consist in? Concerning the first question, I argue that persons persist three-dimensionally (the endurance view), and not four-dimensionally (the perdurarne view), on the ground that objects must always fall under some substance sortal concept S (the sortal dependency of individuation), and that the concept person entails that objects falling under it are three-dimensional. Concerning the second question, I differentiate between Criterianists, who maintain that it is possible to specify a non-circular and informative criterion for personal identity, and Non-Criterianists, who deny that such a specification is possible. I argue against Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they are either (i) circular, (ii) violate the intrinsicality of identity or (iii) do not adequately represent what we are essentially. I further criticise three Psychological Non-Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they wrongly assume that 'person' refers to mental entities. Instead I formulate the Revised Animal Attribute View where person is understood as a basic sortal concept which picks out a biological sort of enduring animals. In this, I claim that the real essence of a person is determined by the real essence of the kind of animal he is, without thereby denying that persons have a real essence as persons. / digitalisering@umu

This thesis is an exploration of the general public's use and reflections on electronic identification (e-ID) tokens, in Sweden. Based on the researcher’s own experiences, the aim was to understand how the current e-ID scheme was enabling or obstructing the interaction with public agencies, etcetera. The thesis has a qualitative research design and is situated within the interpretivist paradigm. The data was collected through semi-structured interviews and the analysis of three documents, published by three different public agencies in Sweden. The data was analyzed through the vehicle of thematic analysis, which engendered four themes. These were 1. e-ID definitions, 2. the personal identity number as enabler and obstruction, 3. banks as the major e-ID issuer in Sweden and 4. security, skepticism and trust. The findings indicated that the e-ID was associated with convenience and security risks, which were brought up by the interviewees as well as the analyzed public reports. Furthermore, one of the public reports argued that the e-ID should be separated from the notion of having authority, through re- baptizing the Swedish term for e-ID, in Swedish 'e-legitimation' to electronic identity document ('elektronisk identitetshandling' in Swedish).

Defendo, nesta dissertação, uma interpretação materialista da filosofia humeana. Essa interpretação se apóia em alguns dos temas presentes no Livro 1 do Tratado da Natureza Humana. Divido a tarefa em três partes: no primeiro capítulo, examino dois dos princípios que fundamentam a teoria das idéias apresentada na Parte 1, o princípio da cópia e o da separabilidade. Juntos, eles implicam a impotência da razão a priori no domínio dos fatos. É a imaginação, uma faculdade corpórea, que assume o papel principal na epistemologia humeana; no segundo capítulo, examino a seção “Da imaterialidade da alma” (Parte 4, Seção 5), na qual a alma substancial desaparece e dá lugar a percepções causalmente relacionadas a um corpo. Aqui se evidencia a concepção fisicalista de Hume sobre o fenômeno cognitivo. Procuro esclarecer tal concepção por meio de uma comparação entre ela e a concepção de Reid, segundo a qual o fenômeno cognitivo é intrinsecamente imaterial e, portanto, sem qualquer relação causal com a matéria; o objeto do terceiro capítulo é a seção “Da identidade pessoal” (Parte 4, Seção 6), na qual Hume afirma que a crença nessa identidade decorre de associações de idéias. No Apêndice Hume reconhece a insuficiência de sua explicação inicial. Exponho alguns dos problemas que podem ter gerado as dúvidas do Apêndice e defendo que elas não configuram um possível abandono do materialismo, ou seja, da concepção ontológica que levou à tese de que a mente é um mero feixe de percepções relacionadas causalmente. / I defend, in this dissertation, a materialist interpretation of humean philosophy. This interpretation is based on some of the themes presented in Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature. The task is divided in three parts: in the first chapter, I examine two of the principles which ground the theory of ideas presented in Part 1, the principles of copy and of separability. Together, they imply the impotence of a priori reason in the factual domain. It is the imagination, a corporeal faculty, that assumes the leading role in humean epistemology; in the second chapter, I examine the section Of the immateriality of the soul (Part 4, Section 5), in which the substantial soul disappears and gives place to perceptions causally related to a body. Here, Hume’s phisicalist conception about the cognitive phenomena is evidenced. I try to explain this conception by comparing it to Reid’s conception, according to which cognitive phenomena is intrinsically imaterial and, therefore, without any causal relation to matter; the subject of the third chapter is the section “Of personal identity” (Part 4, Section 6), in which Hume states that the belief in this identity derives from associations of ideas. In the Appendix Hume recognizes the insufficiency of his early explanation. I expose some of the problems that may have engendered the doubts of the Appendix and defend that they don’t amount to a possible abandonment of materialism, that is, of the ontological conception which has led to the thesis of the mind as a simple bundle of perceptions causally related.

O estudo procuratraçar os contornos gerais do direito ao esquecimento no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro. O direito ao esquecimento consiste em um instrumento eficaz para impedir que a divulgação de fatos passados, destituídos de relevância informativa, venham a impedir o livre desenvolvimento da pessoa humana, na realização autônoma de seu projeto de vida. Apesar de poder ser exercido por qualquer indivíduo, independentemente de sua notoriedade, o direito ao esquecimento não é absoluto edeve ser ponderado com os direitos potencialmente conflitantes, como a liberdade de expressão e direito à informação.Para melhor compreensão dessa difícil ponderação são apresentados os critérios utilizados pela jurisprudência nacional e estrangeira na solução do árduo conflito entre a divulgação das informações e o direito ao esquecimento, em cujo contexto a atualidade da informação emerge como critério preponderante, embora não absoluto, já que fatos de relevância histórica também merecem proteção jurídica. A questão é igualmente examinada no ambiente virtual, a fim de que sejam identificadas as diversas formas de esquecimento na internet, as quais encontram outros meios de efetivação não se restringindo à possibilidade de apagar informações. / The study attempts to trace the general contours of the right to be forgotten in the Brazilian legal system. The right to oblivion consists of an effective instrument to prevent the disclosure of past events, devoid of newsworthiness, will prevent the free developmet of the human person, in the autonomous realization of his life project. Although it can be exercised by any individual, regardless of its reputation, the right to oblivion is not absolute and must be balanced against the potencially conflicting rights such as freedom of expression and right to information. To understand this difficult balancing presents the criteria used by national and international law in solving the hard conflict between the disclosure and the right to be forgotten, in which context the relevance of information emerges as a major criteriorn, although not absolute, since historical relevance of facts also deserve legal protection. This issue is examined in the virtual environment in order to identify various forms of oblivion on the Internet, which are other effective means not limited to the possibility of deleting information.

O estudo procuratraçar os contornos gerais do direito ao esquecimento no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro. O direito ao esquecimento consiste em um instrumento eficaz para impedir que a divulgação de fatos passados, destituídos de relevância informativa, venham a impedir o livre desenvolvimento da pessoa humana, na realização autônoma de seu projeto de vida. Apesar de poder ser exercido por qualquer indivíduo, independentemente de sua notoriedade, o direito ao esquecimento não é absoluto edeve ser ponderado com os direitos potencialmente conflitantes, como a liberdade de expressão e direito à informação.Para melhor compreensão dessa difícil ponderação são apresentados os critérios utilizados pela jurisprudência nacional e estrangeira na solução do árduo conflito entre a divulgação das informações e o direito ao esquecimento, em cujo contexto a atualidade da informação emerge como critério preponderante, embora não absoluto, já que fatos de relevância histórica também merecem proteção jurídica. A questão é igualmente examinada no ambiente virtual, a fim de que sejam identificadas as diversas formas de esquecimento na internet, as quais encontram outros meios de efetivação não se restringindo à possibilidade de apagar informações. / The study attempts to trace the general contours of the right to be forgotten in the Brazilian legal system. The right to oblivion consists of an effective instrument to prevent the disclosure of past events, devoid of newsworthiness, will prevent the free developmet of the human person, in the autonomous realization of his life project. Although it can be exercised by any individual, regardless of its reputation, the right to oblivion is not absolute and must be balanced against the potencially conflicting rights such as freedom of expression and right to information. To understand this difficult balancing presents the criteria used by national and international law in solving the hard conflict between the disclosure and the right to be forgotten, in which context the relevance of information emerges as a major criteriorn, although not absolute, since historical relevance of facts also deserve legal protection. This issue is examined in the virtual environment in order to identify various forms of oblivion on the Internet, which are other effective means not limited to the possibility of deleting information.

Qualitative research based on a half standardized interview with seniors is aimed at identifying the seniors´ perception of the dignity concerning dignity of merit, moral strength and personal identity, and the related values of every human being, also known as Menschenwürde {--} human dignity. The results show the risk of loss or reduction of dignity in old age. The reasons are external and internal. External reasons include the approach of society and individuals to the elderly, (un) availability of social services for seniors and their families and also the social system. Internal reasons involve the change of the inner self, reduction of self-sufficiency, financial provision, degree of independence, evaluation of the past life, the age and gender. In the highest risk of loss of dignity are the very old, individuals dependent on the care of others and women. The research makes us think about creating decent living conditions for the elderly. The issues of supportive background creation and available home care services for the elderly and possibilities of a better support for families caring for dependent and dying elderly persons are also addressed. On an individual level it is necessary to instruct people, who come into contact with the elderly, with risk factors that may decrease dignity of the elderly and to gain skills for assistance to enhance seniors´ dignity by an appropriate and sensible approach. Perception of dignity changes with a social system. Dignity is an important component of the quality of life perception. Attention must be paid to this issue also in the future. With prolonged longevity of an individual and an active participation in community life up to the old age it should be reconsidered since what age an individual is regarded as old. For example, according to the WHO the early old age starts at 60 years of age. This is what young seniors perceive negatively. They do not consider themselves old even when they are 65 years old.

Defendo, nesta dissertação, uma interpretação materialista da filosofia humeana. Essa interpretação se apóia em alguns dos temas presentes no Livro 1 do Tratado da Natureza Humana. Divido a tarefa em três partes: no primeiro capítulo, examino dois dos princípios que fundamentam a teoria das idéias apresentada na Parte 1, o princípio da cópia e o da separabilidade. Juntos, eles implicam a impotência da razão a priori no domínio dos fatos. É a imaginação, uma faculdade corpórea, que assume o papel principal na epistemologia humeana; no segundo capítulo, examino a seção “Da imaterialidade da alma” (Parte 4, Seção 5), na qual a alma substancial desaparece e dá lugar a percepções causalmente relacionadas a um corpo. Aqui se evidencia a concepção fisicalista de Hume sobre o fenômeno cognitivo. Procuro esclarecer tal concepção por meio de uma comparação entre ela e a concepção de Reid, segundo a qual o fenômeno cognitivo é intrinsecamente imaterial e, portanto, sem qualquer relação causal com a matéria; o objeto do terceiro capítulo é a seção “Da identidade pessoal” (Parte 4, Seção 6), na qual Hume afirma que a crença nessa identidade decorre de associações de idéias. No Apêndice Hume reconhece a insuficiência de sua explicação inicial. Exponho alguns dos problemas que podem ter gerado as dúvidas do Apêndice e defendo que elas não configuram um possível abandono do materialismo, ou seja, da concepção ontológica que levou à tese de que a mente é um mero feixe de percepções relacionadas causalmente. / I defend, in this dissertation, a materialist interpretation of humean philosophy. This interpretation is based on some of the themes presented in Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature. The task is divided in three parts: in the first chapter, I examine two of the principles which ground the theory of ideas presented in Part 1, the principles of copy and of separability. Together, they imply the impotence of a priori reason in the factual domain. It is the imagination, a corporeal faculty, that assumes the leading role in humean epistemology; in the second chapter, I examine the section Of the immateriality of the soul (Part 4, Section 5), in which the substantial soul disappears and gives place to perceptions causally related to a body. Here, Hume’s phisicalist conception about the cognitive phenomena is evidenced. I try to explain this conception by comparing it to Reid’s conception, according to which cognitive phenomena is intrinsically imaterial and, therefore, without any causal relation to matter; the subject of the third chapter is the section “Of personal identity” (Part 4, Section 6), in which Hume states that the belief in this identity derives from associations of ideas. In the Appendix Hume recognizes the insufficiency of his early explanation. I expose some of the problems that may have engendered the doubts of the Appendix and defend that they don’t amount to a possible abandonment of materialism, that is, of the ontological conception which has led to the thesis of the mind as a simple bundle of perceptions causally related.

Defendo, nesta dissertação, uma interpretação materialista da filosofia humeana. Essa interpretação se apóia em alguns dos temas presentes no Livro 1 do Tratado da Natureza Humana. Divido a tarefa em três partes: no primeiro capítulo, examino dois dos princípios que fundamentam a teoria das idéias apresentada na Parte 1, o princípio da cópia e o da separabilidade. Juntos, eles implicam a impotência da razão a priori no domínio dos fatos. É a imaginação, uma faculdade corpórea, que assume o papel principal na epistemologia humeana; no segundo capítulo, examino a seção “Da imaterialidade da alma” (Parte 4, Seção 5), na qual a alma substancial desaparece e dá lugar a percepções causalmente relacionadas a um corpo. Aqui se evidencia a concepção fisicalista de Hume sobre o fenômeno cognitivo. Procuro esclarecer tal concepção por meio de uma comparação entre ela e a concepção de Reid, segundo a qual o fenômeno cognitivo é intrinsecamente imaterial e, portanto, sem qualquer relação causal com a matéria; o objeto do terceiro capítulo é a seção “Da identidade pessoal” (Parte 4, Seção 6), na qual Hume afirma que a crença nessa identidade decorre de associações de idéias. No Apêndice Hume reconhece a insuficiência de sua explicação inicial. Exponho alguns dos problemas que podem ter gerado as dúvidas do Apêndice e defendo que elas não configuram um possível abandono do materialismo, ou seja, da concepção ontológica que levou à tese de que a mente é um mero feixe de percepções relacionadas causalmente. / I defend, in this dissertation, a materialist interpretation of humean philosophy. This interpretation is based on some of the themes presented in Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature. The task is divided in three parts: in the first chapter, I examine two of the principles which ground the theory of ideas presented in Part 1, the principles of copy and of separability. Together, they imply the impotence of a priori reason in the factual domain. It is the imagination, a corporeal faculty, that assumes the leading role in humean epistemology; in the second chapter, I examine the section Of the immateriality of the soul (Part 4, Section 5), in which the substantial soul disappears and gives place to perceptions causally related to a body. Here, Hume’s phisicalist conception about the cognitive phenomena is evidenced. I try to explain this conception by comparing it to Reid’s conception, according to which cognitive phenomena is intrinsically imaterial and, therefore, without any causal relation to matter; the subject of the third chapter is the section “Of personal identity” (Part 4, Section 6), in which Hume states that the belief in this identity derives from associations of ideas. In the Appendix Hume recognizes the insufficiency of his early explanation. I expose some of the problems that may have engendered the doubts of the Appendix and defend that they don’t amount to a possible abandonment of materialism, that is, of the ontological conception which has led to the thesis of the mind as a simple bundle of perceptions causally related.