This study provides an empirical analysis of patent litigation and innovation within high-tech firms. There is a significant drop in R&D over the course of the eleven year period of interest. However, the results do not show litigation causing a significant effect on R&D investments as either a percentage of revenue or a percentage change from year to year. Secondly, there was found to be a slight drop in percentage change of patents earned per year over time, but this was not found to be significantly caused by litigation. However there is strong evidence to support that increased litigation does cause the percentage of patents classified as utility patents to fall. Since this ratio of utility patents per total patents can be viewed as an indicator of innovative quality, this trend suggests that litigation does cause overall innovative quality of a firm’s efforts to diminish.

<div>This dissertation studies how patents are monetized via legal actions without practicing the technology and the implications to firms. In recent years, scholars in other fields have extensively studied patent monetization and litigation regime, given the importance of technological innovation and commercialization to the strategy field, strategy scholars have been underrepresented on the topic of patent litigation and monetization. In this dissertation, I develop a theory on how heterogeneity in firms' business models monetizing resources determine firms' heterogeneity in valuation and acquisition of resources. Using a context of patents, we study two primary business models monetizing patents, namely, the practicing monetization and litigating monetization, which differ fundamentally in their value appropriation mechanisms. On the one hand, the value appropriation mechanism for practicing monetization relies on the value created by the firm's deployment of the patented technology in the product market, and from the restraint of rivalry via excluding competitors from accessing the patented technology. On the other hand, litigating monetization depends on the strength of legal actions and the ability to collect payments from target firms to the patent-owning firm, in forms such as settlement fees and damages awarded by the court. The theorization reclarifies the two types of patent heterogeneity: innovativeness and exclusivity, and theorize that differences in patents' innovativeness and exclusivity lead to differences in the expected profit from practicing and litigating monetization, thus leading to a difference in optimal monetization strategy and firms' different preferences for resource acquisition.</div><div><br></div><div>In Essay 1, we develop the aforementioned theory of patent monetization using formal models to understand the relationships among firms' business models, patent characteristics, and the optimal monetization strategy. We show the situations where litigating monetization can prevail and be the method that maximizes patents' value. We further predict that compared to patents that are practiced to produce products or services, patents monetized in a litigating manner are ones that are relatively less technologically innovative. Then, in Essay 2, I use the patent monetization context to investigate how firms' business models affect their resource acquisition behavior in the factor market, i.e., the market of patents. Exploiting recent institutional changes such as the enactment of the American Invents Act (AIA) that asymmetrically influenced different business models, I show that firms specialize in litigating monetization disproportionately acquire highly cited but old patents and patents that were litigated before. Then Essay 3, rooted in the literature that patents are essential signals from entrepreneurial firms to investors, I examine how disputes in patents in the form of litigations affect entrepreneurial firms' obtaining of external financing. </div><div><br></div>

The current patent system is by many scholars considered flawed regarding the intended positiveeffects on innovation, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). However, aneffective patent system requires possibilities for firms to enforce their patent rights to fulfil thebasic premise of inspiring innovation. The purpose of this study is to examine the challenges thatSMEs face in patent litigation and how it affects them and their innovation. 14 semi-structuredinterviews were conducted with Chief executive officers or research and development managersof Swedish SMEs to gain insights into the process of patent litigation and its effects on theinterviewed firms. Results showed that R&amp;D investments decreased after patent infringement inmany cases and that firms had a tendency to change the way new patents are written to createstronger patents. The main finding is that patent litigation had a negative effect on SMEs, due tothe high direct and indirect costs resulting from a patent case. This adds to previous researchwhich highlights the disproportionate effects of patent litigation on small firms compared tolarger firms.

本研究從DNA定序產業之美國專利侵權訴訟，了解該產業中廠商的訴訟行為與系爭專利之特性。本研究由商用資料庫取得DNA定序產業之美國專利侵權訴訟共100件及其系爭專利共168件，分析訴訟資訊、訴訟主體資訊(原告及被告)和訴訟客體資訊(系爭專利和被控侵權產品)。本研究也由次級資料中歸類各廠商在DNA定序產業鏈中之位置和其各世代產品技術之發展。由訴訟主體資訊可得知在DNA定序產業中，主要發起美國專利侵權訴訟之廠商為中游的儀器平台廠商，被控專利侵權的廠商也多為具有相同商業模式在同樣產業鏈位置上的競爭者。而由訴訟客體資訊中，除了以產品技術結構定位系爭專利之保護標的和技術特徵外，也從專利的被引證數、專利家族大小、所有權移轉次數、國際分類號分佈等指標比較系爭專利和一組同樣專利權人在相同時間間隔內申請的同技術領域之對照組專利，可發現系爭專利和對照組專利相比屬於較有價值的專利。 / The present research analyzes the U.S. patent infringement cases of the DNA sequencing industry to understand the features of patent-in-suit and litigation behaviors in said industry. The present research obtains 100 U.S. patent infringement cases and 168 patent-in-suit from commercial databases. The litigation history, parties in the litigation (plaintiff and defendant), subject matter of the litigation (the patent-in-suit and the infringing products) are analyzed. The present research identifies the position of different corporate entities in the DNA sequencing industry chain and the development of each generations of DNA sequencing technology. By analyzing the parties in the litigation, the present research identifies that most of the plaintiffs are corporate entities developing sequencing instrument, and most of the defendants are competitiors having the same business model with the plaintiffs. By analyzing subject matter of the litigation, the present research identifies the technical features and subject matter of the patent-in-suit. The present research compares the citation, patent family size, number of ownership transfer and IPC distribution between the patent-in-suit and a control group patents of the same technical field within the same time frame. The patent-in-suit is more valuable than the control group patents.

近十年高科技產業的發展，自iPod、iPhone至iPad等行動裝置的創新、問世，無疑是由Apple公司獨領風騷、引領潮流，而這些行動裝置的硬體型態或許不同，軟體、作業系統也不盡相同，但唯一的共通點就是大量採用「觸控」技術。在台灣企業中，義隆電子及禾瑞亞兩間公司均是相當專注於發展觸控偵測技術之公司，而此二間企業，面臨商場上白熱化的競爭，尤其是作為原告的義隆電子將如何以訴訟發動攻擊，而身為訴訟經驗淺薄的被告禾瑞亞公司又將如何應戰，均係本研究擬探討的問題。 透過蒐集文獻的方式，本研究對觸控面板產業的發展、各國際大廠在觸控專利的佈局做了基本的鋪墊。有鑑於義隆電子本身在專利侵權訴訟中有十多年豐富的經驗，故本文以義隆電子的訴訟經驗為藍本，歸納出若干訴訟發動及應訴策略，並將義隆電子與禾瑞亞訴訟中發生之具體問題納入各該策略章節一併討論，例如義隆電子起訴動機、訴訟標的價額之認定、定暫時狀態處分、以及企業普遍以發布重大訊息之方式公告起訴他企業，是否變相地違反公平交易委員會關於警告函之規定等。 本研究發現義隆電子因為歷經眾多國內外專利訴訟的洗禮，因此就訴訟各個階段的掌握及訊息處理較為嫻熟，主要亦由其掌握訴訟的節奏。然而，身為被告的企業應在訴訟中多採取積極的攻擊態勢，而非僅消極防守，包括接收到警告函時，應以適切的意見書及信函回應；若確遭起訴，應先為程序抗辯，尤其在起訴成本低廉的我國，盡可能的提高原告應付的裁判費實係被告方首先應嘗試爭取的戰場。此外，於訴訟中針對系爭專利提起舉發案、或是向公平交易委員會提出違反公平交易法之檢舉皆是被告最好的反制措施。然而，預防勝於治療，企業內部若能建立日常的專利監控機制，時時關注競爭對手動態，方為治標又治本的方法。

專利權人在權利保護期間享有法律保障之排他性，而智慧財產權之制度設置，必須兼顧個人權利與社會公益，藉由保護權利人進而促進社會公益，但專利權制度中，專利權濫用之現象，對於專利發展中國家而言，尤其是外國專利強權企業利用專利奪取私益已達浮濫程度，造成私益與公益之間的矛盾與衝突，因此專利公益訴訟是平衡兩者之利益的一個手段。而因專利要件審查難以完善，造成許多具有無效事由的專利被授予專利權，這些專利權的存在侵害公眾利益甚鉅，中國大陸的對策為：提起專利公益訴訟使瑕疵專利無效，鼓勵任意第三人對專利之有效性提出挑戰，請求專利管理機關重新進行專利有效性的審查，維護公眾的合法利益；本文比較我國目前具有瑕疵之專利權，仍由民間企業基於非公共利益之商業利益考量而提出專利舉發，分析兩岸的制度及案例，檢視我國專利公益訴訟提出之可能，期使舉發專利無效之制度得以更臻健全。 / The purpose of the study was to analyze the public interest with regards to patent litigation cases in China. Public interest litigation is litigation for the protection of the public interest. Patentees have the exclusive right to prevent others from exploiting the invention without the patentees' consent during the legal protection. However, intellectual property rights are set up to protect not only rights of patentee but also that of social welfare. To reconcile the contradictions between private interest and public welfare, the study focuses on the phenomenon of abuse of patents discussed in the patent systems and the merits of public interest in patent litigation. Furthermore, the study examines China public interest patent litigation to invalidate defected patent system and encourage any third party to challenge the validity of the patent. Under the comparative legal study approach, the study can provide different perspective for our legal system to improve more beneficially our Patent law system.

The dissertation examines current European patent court system and the possibilities of its improvement. First of all it identifies main problems of the existing fragmented patent litigation and in response to those findings, examines possible solutions to the situation. First, it deals with the possibility of adopting certain measures to improve the current situation, while maintaining the current system, in which national courts remain competent in patent disputes. The second option is linked to the issue of creating new specialized European patent jurisdiction. Thus the dissertation chronologically analyses individual legislative proposals and documents on the creation of a specialized European patent court system at supranational (EU) and international level. Namely Community Patent Convention (1975), Protocol on Litigation to the Agreement relating to Community Patents (1989), draft EPLA (European Patent Litigation Agreement 2003), proposals on decisions establishing Community Patent Court (2003) and draft Agreement on the European and Community Patents Court (2009). Separate section is devoted to the most recent Agreement on Unified Patent Court opened only to EU Member States, which was signed early in 2013 by most of them. The main objective of the research is to answer the question whether...

人類經濟活動重心之變革推動著產業競爭的樣貌，於二十一世紀的今日，知識已成為經濟活動中最主要之價值驅力，與之相應的，產業中智慧財產層面的競爭也逐漸受到重視，發展至今，智慧財產已深入產業鏈且細化為各種以智慧財產運用為中心以創造獲利之企業。 半導體產業於台灣經濟發展之推進中佔有關鍵性之地位，隨著台灣廠商在全球產業鏈中扮演的角色重要性與日俱增，難以避免必須因應半導體產業中由智慧財產所造就的新興商業模式，其中，智慧財產研發公司拋棄舊有以生產製造為主之商業模式，開創以知識為本的競爭場域，並挾其智慧財產進行全球化的授權以及訴訟，扮演著遊戲規則的創造者，尤其記憶體產業之兩大智慧財產研發公司Rambus Inc.以及Tessera Technology Inc.，自2000年起不斷於全球提起專利訴訟，對整體產業乃至於台灣廠商帶來無法忽視之影響。 本研究試圖建立分析智慧財產研發公司之架構，亦即由該等公司之策略演進出發，宏觀的了解其於變動的競爭環境中如何發揮企業優勢；其次，以公司策略定位為基礎，進一步推動資源投入之分配，並形塑商業模式的產生；最後，本研究萃取智慧財產研發公司商業模式中較具特色且影響廣泛之訴訟階段，藉由記憶體產業中之個案分析比較之方式進行深入之實證研究，以管窺該等公司之專利運用模式，期能透過提升對於智慧財產研發公司策略定位、商業模式以及訴訟模式之了解，活化企業智慧財產之管理，並提供台灣廠商面對專利授權與訴訟時因應之基礎。 / The revolution of economic activities of human beings has been the force behind the changing format of competition among industries. In the contemporary 21st century, knowledge has become one of the most valuable forces in economic activities; correspondently, the competition strategy of intellectual property also seized much attention. As of today, intellectual property has already been integrated in each and every industry chains and developed into various enterprises which earn profits by operating it. Semi-conductor industry played an important role in the process of Taiwan’s economic development. As Taiwanese companies claim more crucial roles in the global industry chain, they are inevitably forced to deal with the new business model established by the creation of intellectual properties. Among them, intellectual property development companies have withdrawn from old business model of production and manufacturing and create a new competition field on the basis of intellectually properties. Intellectual property development companies engage in global wide license and litigation, acting as the rule-maker within the new frame of competition. Rambus Inc. and Tessera Technology Inc. are the two leading intellectual property development companies which brought lawsuits internationally since 2000, creating serious impacts on both the entire industry and Taiwanese companies. This research aims to establish an analytical framework to observe intellectually property development companies, starting from the progress of strategy, try to understand how to exercise their advantages in the ever-changing competitive business world; furthermore, based on business strategies, this research look further into the distribution of resources and the creation of business models; lastly, this research closely examines the litigation phase of the business model of intellectual property development companies by comparative case studies, in order to conclude the operation pattern of patents of such companies. With further exploration on the strategic positioning, business model and litigation pattern of intellectual property development companies, this research provides not only a deeper understanding on the management of IPRs but also a framework for Taiwanese companies to cope with patent licenses and litigations.

隨著知識經濟的發展，專利成為企業的重要資產，專利訴訟更成為企業經營管理必修顯學。專利之高度技術內容及其商業化本質，使得專利訴訟成為技巧最複雜、成本最高昂、耗費時間也最冗長的救濟程序，終而引發各界對於專利訴訟制度之反思，開始強調應循公平、合理、迅速、經濟、專業之糾紛解決程序來排解專利糾紛。美國於1982年制訂專利法第294條開放專利有效性及專利侵權爭議得由當事人自願提付仲裁，聯合國國際貿易委員會於1985年制訂國際商務仲裁模範法（UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration），作為各會員國仲裁法制之參考藍本，世界智慧財產權組織（World Intellectual Property Organization，WIPO）亦於1994年成立「仲裁與調解中心」為智慧財產案件提供專業性及跨國性之糾紛解決服務。上開仲裁立法及機構設置均顯示專利仲裁制度之發展與成長。 專利是一種權利保護期間短暫、權利範圍不明確、保護客體高度技術化，且集結科技、法律、管理三大專業於一身之權利，其糾紛解決對於迅速性、專業性、經濟性、秘密性、靈活性、和諧性、跨國性及風險控制性之需求，正係仲裁程序所能提供之優點。惟專利權與仲裁程序仍有本質上之互斥，包括：專利權之獨佔性及其背後蘊含之龐大商機，吸引專利權人寧願循訴訟途徑奮戰到底；專利糾紛當事人之實力差距，使得雙方難以達成仲裁協議；專利糾紛對於調查證據之強烈需求，與仲裁程序強調之迅速、經濟致生衝突；專利判決的不確定性，以致專利案件約有50％的上訴成功率，此亦促使當事人欲循訴訟程序爭取由上訴審法官重新審視案件，而不願意循仲裁程序「一戰定江山」。 經本文就我國企業專利糾紛循仲裁程序解決進行分析，發現有下列幾點之限制：一、我國企業客觀實力不足，主觀心態復趨於保守，導致企業之糾紛程序選擇權受到一定的限制。二、仲裁程序以當事人合意為前提，雙方就現在之爭議欲達成仲裁協議，本即有一定之難度。三、我國仲裁法未開放專利有效性糾紛之仲裁容許性，權利有效性問題仍待行政法院認定，致生程序切割及審理時程延宕之不利益。四、我國仲裁制度因仲裁人之公正、獨立性有待加強、證據法則規範不夠完整且未能落實，導致程序正義不彰，當事人對仲裁制度信賴感普遍不足。五、我國仲裁法未明文賦予仲裁人核准保全程序之權限，當事人仍須向法院聲請假扣押、假處分裁定，不但緩不濟急，法官對於應否進行保全程序及核准為何種保全措施，其掌握度亦不如仲裁人。六、我國非紐約公約簽約國，以致於我國仲裁判斷面臨難以於外國獲得承認及執行之困境。上述幾點，都是我國企業專利糾紛欲循仲裁程序解決所面臨之限制因素。 有鑑於專利仲裁於我國企業之主要活躍領域，即美國與中國，已逐步成熟發展，本文謹建議我國企業面臨專利糾紛程序選擇時，應考量糾紛之目的及類型，以決定是否適用仲裁程序。若適用之，則需作好仲裁策略規劃，對於仲裁協議、仲裁地、仲裁機構、仲裁人、仲裁程序均應為適當之安排，以爭取最有利之仲裁判斷。 本文最末則自短程及長程觀點，對我國專利仲裁之發展提出建議。短程而言，我國企業就單純的法律解釋爭議、訟爭性不高或彼此間存有持續性合作關係之專利契約，宜約定仲裁條款；就專利侵權糾紛則得透過互相退讓之方式，約定就專利有效性爭議不為爭執，或同意被告之損害賠償上限，以換取適用仲裁之空間。長程而言，於仲裁立法面，我國應於仲裁法或專利法明文開放專利糾紛之仲裁容許性、增訂仲裁程序之調查證據規範、明文立法賦予仲裁庭核准保全程序之權限；於仲裁制度面，應提升仲裁人之公正性、獨立性及自律性、加強仲裁人之專業及制訂專業之專利仲裁規則；於企業策略面，建議企業應依專利糾紛之目的及類型為適當之程序選擇，如適用仲裁程序，則應妥善配置仲裁要素，規劃出最有利之仲裁程序。 / As the knowledge-based economy rapidly grows today, patent rights has become one of the most valuable assets of corporation. Patent litigation becomes the most important commercial method to generate massive revenue in nowadays. Patents usually involve complicated technology and commercial elements and patent litigation procedure is usually complicated, time consuming and mostly very expensive. Hence, new solutions, which are more fair, reasonable, rapid, economic and professional, are proposed to replace litigations. In the U.S., the Congress approved 35 U.S.C. 294 in 1982 to regulate rules allowing dispute parties may voluntary initiate binding arbitration procedure in regard with patent validity and infringement issues. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration enacted in 1985 offered as prototype of arbitration legislation for UN members. In 1994, the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center was established to offer professional and cross-broader Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) options for the resolution of intellectual property disputes between private parties. All these reforms show the development and growth of patent arbitration. Patent are characterized with limitations on period of protection, scope of claim and advanced technology. It involves with the knowledge of law, technology and commerce. Thus it will be required to deal with patent dispute with efficiency, profession, confidentiality, economic, flexibility, multi-nation and risk control when one decides which dispute resolution method to adopt, and arbitration is exactly the ADR method that satisfies all the requirements. Nevertheless, the exclusivity and the great commercial interests inherent behind patent litigation attract patentees to enforce their patent rights through courts regime. The difference in financial strength and interest leads to a difficulty for different parties to achieve an agreement. Extensive discovery procedure is almost compulsory in patent infringement litigation so that information between parties can be fully disclosed through the process. On the other hand, information disclosure is limited in arbitration proceedings. Also the parties may appeal a patent case in court, and it has an approximately 50% win rate in such attempt. All these factors decrease the parties’ intention to settle their case by arbitration. Through the case study and analysis of the Taiwan companies on patent litigation and arbitration history, it is not difficult to discover the deficiency of Taiwan’s current arbitration regime. The shortage in resource and unwillingness to take arbitral procedure restricts Taiwan companies to exercise they right to select dispute resolution procedure. Mutual consensus is the key priority for arbitration, but this could be extremely difficult to achieve on given patent dispute. Patent validity cannot be determined through the arbitration under current Taiwan Arbitration Law and needs to be determined by court, which prolongs the arbitral proceedings. Moreover, the professional ability of Taiwan’s arbitration remains in doubt, in terms of lack of fairness, independence and evidence rules, led the untrustworthiness of our arbitration regime. The arbitral tribunal has no authority to order interim measures, such as provisional seizure and preliminary injunction and Taiwan is not a signature party of New York Convention are also the factors that weaken the value of arbitration procedure in Taiwan. In comparison with the system in Taiwan, China and the U.S. patent arbitration are more systematized and are still increasing in numbers in both China and the United States. This thesis shall point out the factors for parties to consider adopting arbitration as patent dispute resolution, and assist parties to plan arbitration strategies. Lastly, this thesis will give suggestions on Taiwan’s patent arbitration regime development in both short and long terms. In short term, the public should be more aware the benefits by adopting arbitration clause in contract, when argument and disagreement might exist merely on obvious legal definition or less argument presented or when collaboration still exist between parties. This will encourage parties to agree to solve their dispute through arbitration in advance. In long term, legislators should regulate more detailed rules on arbitration procedure, evidence rules, and judicial support. Arbitration institutions should increase the training, improve the quality of arbitrators and develop more conscientious procedure rules. Corporation should have the concepts to learn and understand more about arbitration, and takes arbitration into consideration as commerce strategy in advance.

智慧財產案件審理法第16條揭示當事人抗辯智慧財產權有應撤銷、廢止之原因者，法院應就其主張或抗辯有無理由自為判斷，不適用相關法律停止訴訟程序之規定。前項情形，法院認有撤銷之原因時，智慧財產權人於該民事訴訟中不得對於他造主張權利。上開規定之意旨在於使同一智慧財產權所生之紛爭得於同一訴訟程序中一次解決，以對智慧財產權作有效保護。 依據上開規定，專利有效性之議題即可能為專利侵權訴訟程序及舉發程序所審理。兩程序審理之情形下，專利有效性之認定即可能會因對同一證據事實有不同見解而使認定結果產生歧異（嚴格定義下之判決歧異）或因證據/請求權基礎之不同而產生歧異（假性之判決歧異）。 民事法院和行政機關/法院於發明、新型及新式樣專利對專利有效性具兩歧認定之比例分別為所有抗辯專利有效性案件之6.8%、16%及12%。具歧異認定之案件中約有8%係因對同一證據之處理方式不同。約66%之案件係起因於呈送之證據有別及主張之撤銷理由不同，而此歧異認定或可於後續程序化解。另約有8%歧異認定之案件係因智慧局之見解受到先前經濟部對該見解之拘束，此分歧認定之結果或需藉由救濟程序才得化解。又約有16%具歧異認定之案件係因民事法院非以舉發程序中構成「舉發成立」之要件審酌系爭專利是否具撤銷事由，此歧異認定之結果尚需仰賴救濟程序始得化解。 民事法院倘非以舉發成立要件審酌專利有效性，則其審酌範疇可能涵蓋：得據以舉發事由、未達得據以舉發標準之事由、專利法及施行細則中得據以使申請案不予專利或不受理之事由。而有違誠信原則之事由亦可能受到審查，使系爭專利有不可執行之虞。倘民事訴訟有效性抗辯得涵蓋上開事由，則可預見本質不良但被智慧局誤准之專利將有去除之途徑，公眾利益即得以維護；專利申請人於申請過程中較可能考慮遵循誠信原則；且專利糾紛得以完全於一訴訟程序一併解決。專利環境或可能朝優質化、誠信化及效率化發展。於此架構下，侵權訴訟專利有效性抗辯機制及舉發程序之雙軌制審理即各有實質存在意義。 專利權人於台灣侵權訴訟具專利有效性抗辯案件之勝訴比約10%；敗訴案件中，發明、新型及新式樣專利被認定具無效事由之比例約為48%、65%及40%。審理法施行以來，舉發申請案之案件量約僅減少6%至7%，或隱含專利侵權訴訟不僅未於一定程度取代舉發制度更可能因而使當事人必需同時面對侵權訴訟與舉發程序雙軌戰場之處境。 審理法第16條之施行加快民事訴訟審結速度，達到迅速實現訴訟當事人權利保護之立法目的。而專利權所生之紛爭於同一訴訟程序中一次解決之目的，依檢驗角度之不同而有截然不同之結果，因此或可說未全然達到紛爭一次解決之立法目的。 / Article 16 of Intellectual Property Case Adjunction Act in Taiwan reveals that when a party claims or defends that an intellectual property right shall be cancelled, the court shall decide based on the merit of the case and the relevant laws concerning the stay of an action shall not apply.　Under the circumstances in the preceding paragraph, the holder of the intellectual property right shall not claim any rights during the civil action against the opposing party where the court has recognized the grounds for cancellation of the intellectual property right. The main purpose of the article is to solve the disputes over Intellectual Property Right in one litigation proceeding so as to protect the intellectual property right effectively. According to said article, the validity issue of a patent may be dealt with under civil litigation and invalidation proceedings. Under the circumstances, the decisions on the validity issue of a patent may be diverged due to different perceptions on the same evidence/fact (defined in this article as “actual decision divergence”) or different submitted evidences or instituted grounds (defined in this article as “fake decision divergence”). With respect to invention, utility model, and design patents, about 6.8%, 16% and 12% of cases with invalidity defense respectively had decision divergence between civil court and administrative organization/court. Among patents with decision divergence, around 8% of the patents were due to different perceptions of the same evidence. About 66% of the patents were deemed differently due to different evidences and instituted grounds. This discrepancy may be resolved in subsequent proceedings. Around 8% of the patents having divergent decisions were resulted from that the opinion of Taiwan Intellectual Property Office (TIPO) is confined by that in a previous administrative action issued by its superior organization, the Board of Appeal. This discrepancy may need to be resolved through a remedial procedure. Approximately 16% of the patents were determined differently because the civil court adopted different standards for initiating an invalidation action. This type of discrepancy may only be resolved through a remedial procedure. When the civil court uses its own standards in determining the validity issue of the patent in question, the scope of judicial review might include: the grounds of invalidation proceedings, the grounds of invalidation proceedings with loosened standards, the grounds attributed to a patent being rejected or an application to be inacceptable to TIPO based on Patent Act or the Enforcement Rules of Patent Act. In addition, inequitable conduct might also be reviewed. Under the circumstances, defective patents have a chance to be removed, a duty of candor and good faith would be more likely to be followed during prosecution; patent disputes are able to be reviewed entirely in one proceeding. It is expected that the quality of the patent system would be improved. Moreover, either the invalidity defense mechanism in infringement litigation, or the invalidation proceeding serves its own purpose. For patent infringement cases with invalidity defense, plaintiffs won about 10% of the cases. Among the cases lost by plaintiffs, the patent at issue deemed by civil court as invalid accounted for about 48%, 65% and 40% for invention, utility model and design patents respectively. Since the IP Case Adjudication Act took effect, the number of invalidation cases has decreased about 6-7%, which might indicate that the invalidity defense mechanism in infringement litigation does not replace the invalidation proceeding. The regulation of Article 16 of IP Case Adjudication Act speeds up civil proceedings indicating that the legislative purpose of providing effective protection to parties in IP litigation may be realized. However, the legislative purpose of solving patent disputes in one proceeding may not be achieved fully as the test results vary on the basis of different evaluation criteria.