<p>Syftet med denna studie är att skapa en definition av begreppet praktisk kunskap. För att uppnå detta har en litteraturstudie genomförts, i vilken elva relevanta filosofer och deras teorier har belysts. I analysen utkristalliserades åtta olika komponenter i praktisk kunskap. Det råder konsensus dessa filosofer emellan om att denna är kopplad till handling och/eller är grundad på erfarenhet. Den praktiska kunskapen är kontextualiserad och i vissa avseenden råder det ett dialektiskt förhållande mellan teori och praktik. Reflektionen är av betydelse och kunskapen har en etisk dimension. Praktisk kunskap är personlig och sitter i kroppen.</p>

This thesis examines the rhetoric of Louis D. Brandeis in light of pragmatism-specifically, the philosophical pragmatism of William James and John Dewey. While a number of scholars claim that pragmatism has nothing to offer politics, rhetoric, or decision-making, this thesis argues that Brandeis's method of acting politically, speaking publicly, and solving problems exemplifies the pragmatic political style-a style of political operation that is characteristically pragmatic, a direct extension of James and Dewey's philosophy. This thesis illustrates Brandeis's pragmatic political style through an analysis of his rhetoric prior to taking his seat on the United States Supreme Court, his rhetoric while on the Supreme Court, and his rhetoric as one of America's most prominent Zionists. This thesis shows that pragmatism (at least William James and John Dewey's classical American pragmatism-the pragmatism Brandeis exemplifies rhetorically) can be a fruitful part of political operation.

Syftet med denna studie är att skapa en definition av begreppet praktisk kunskap. För att uppnå detta har en litteraturstudie genomförts, i vilken elva relevanta filosofer och deras teorier har belysts. I analysen utkristalliserades åtta olika komponenter i praktisk kunskap. Det råder konsensus dessa filosofer emellan om att denna är kopplad till handling och/eller är grundad på erfarenhet. Den praktiska kunskapen är kontextualiserad och i vissa avseenden råder det ett dialektiskt förhållande mellan teori och praktik. Reflektionen är av betydelse och kunskapen har en etisk dimension. Praktisk kunskap är personlig och sitter i kroppen.

John Dewey föddes år 1859, samma år som Charles Darwin bröt ny mark för människan genom sin Theory of Species. Genom Darwin skulle grunden för det kollektiva mänskliga tänkandet och förståelsen av oss själva aldrig förbli detsamma. För Dewey precis som för Darwin är det förståelsen av människan och hennes värld som är det intressanta. Denna uppsats är en närläsning av Deweys verk Demokrati och utbildning som publicerades för första gången 1916. Verket som är skrivet på tidigt 1900-tal har haft ett stort inflytande på pedagogiskt tänkande generellt, men är också ett av de verkligt intressanta arbetena rörande människan och utbildningens roll för det demokratiska samhället. Verket är av idémässigt fundamental betydelse för den filosofiska tanketradition som kallas pragmatism då Dewey fångar upp den bärande idén om människan i samhället som en del av världen och som beroende av en bra utbildning. Uppsatsen har för avsikt att förmedla och tolka de tankegångar som Dewey låter framträda i Demokrati och utbildning. Arbetet har resulterat i de sex tematiska delarna som är ordnade under rubrikerna; Utbildningens demokratifunktion, Individens kunskap om världen, Att tänka, Kunskapsteori, Moral samt Deweys filosofibegrepp. Olika teorier om sanning presenteras och pragmatismens sanningsteori behandlas. Avslutningsvis konstateras att det som vi idag ser som filosofi en gång startade genom utbildning och att den pragmatiska filosofin i första hand påverkar samhället genom utbildningen. / John Dewey was born in 1859. That same year Charles Darwin published his Theory of Species. After Darwin, the understanding of human and human thinking of itself never again would be the same. For Charles Darwin and John Dewey the understanding of human and humans role in the world is the most interesting and important part of knowledge. This essay is a reading of Deweys Demokracy and Education witch first was published in in the year of 1916. The main part of this work is in the six parts; The education and its democracy principle, The individualls knowledge of the world, to think, theory of knowledge, moral and Dewey´s philosophy. The essay will also explain that the work of Dewey (Democracy and Education) has a huge impact on philosophy in the arena of education. It is also very important for the American philosophy called Pragmatism formed and grunded by Dewey, William James and Charles Sanders Peirce. The work was written in the early 20th century and catch the idea of human need and hunger for education and also the importance of good education for the society in witch humans as individualls in groups are living. A number of theories of truth is represented and the philosophy called Pragmatism is represented as having it´s own theory of truth.

Visionen om hållbar utveckling är komplex, men trots detta ska slöjdundervisningen enligt Skolverket bidra till att eleverna utvecklar kunskaper som främjar en hållbar utveckling. Uppsatsens syfte är att belysa förutsättningar för meningsskapandet ifråga om hållbar utveckling i slöjdämnet. Den första delen är klargörande: diskurser identifieras i Skolverkets kompletterande material till kursplanen i slöjdämnet. Därefter diskuteras potentiella konsekvenser i form av möjligheter och begränsningar med fokus på undervisningen och hållbar utveckling. Uppsatsens problemformuleringar är: 1. Hur konstitueras slöjdämnet i Skolverkets kompletterande material till kursplanen i slöjdämnet? 2. Vilka begränsningar och möjligheter för undervisning och hållbar utveckling möjliggörs utifrån hur slöjdämnet konstitueras i Skolverkets kompletterande material? Uppsatsen har en läroplanteoretisk och en pragmatisk grund. Specifikt fokuseras ett institutionellt meningsskapande och detta görs med hjälp av diskursanalys. I Skolverkets kompletterande material konstitueras fyra olika diskurser: görandets diskurs, synliggörandets diskurs, en kreativitets diskurs och en personlig diskurs. Utifrån detta börjar undervisningen i görandet och är erfarenhetsbaserat. Målet med undervisningen är att slöjdkunskaperna ska synliggöras, vilket genomsyrar de andra diskurserna. Hur det praktiska kunnandet ska synliggöras råder en viss tveksamhet kring. Läraren måste vara öppen för det ”tysta”, men hur denna ”tysta kunskap” visar sig, vari den består eller hur den skall bedömas framkommer inte. Med avstamp i konstituerandet av Skolverkets kompletterande material och tre olika ESD perspektiv: perspektivet i demokrati, ett medmänskligt samhällsperspektiv och närhet och erfarenhetsperspektiv diskuteras elevers möjligheter till meningsskapande ifråga om hållbar utveckling i slöjdämnet. Det framkommer att om innehållet konstitueras med en personlig diskurs som mål, möjliggör det ett meningsskapande inom ESD. Det kan innebära att eleven deltar i handling i en demokratisk process, har ett personligt engagemang i samhället, att eleven förenas med människor bakåt i historien och slöjden får en berättelse och ett sammanhang. Slöjdämnet kan därmed möjliggöra att elever får erfara hållbar utveckling.

1. Intuitions are often treated in philosophy as a basic evidential source to confirm/discredit a proposed definition or theory; e.g. intuitions about Gettier cases are taken to deny a justified-true-belief analysis of ‘knowledge’. Recently, Weinberg, Nichols & Stitch (WN&S) provided evidence that epistemic intuitions vary across persons and cultures. In-so-far as philosophy of this type (Standard Philosophical Methodology – SPM) is committed to provide conceptual analyses, the use of intuition is suspect – it does not exhibit the requisite normativity. I provide an analysis of intuition, with an emphasis on its neural – or connectionist – cognitive backbone; the analysis provides insight into its epistemic status and proper role within SPM. Intuition is initially characterized as the recognition of a pattern. 2. The metaphysics of ‘pattern’ is analyzed for the purpose of denying that traditional symbolic computation is capable of differentiating the patterns of interest. 3. The epistemology of ‘recognition’ is analyzed, again, to deny that traditional computation is capable of capturing human acts of recognition. 4. Fodor’s informational semantics, his Language of Thought and his Representational Theory of Mind are analyzed and his arguments denied. Again, the purpose is to deny traditional computational theories of mind. 5. Both intuition and a theory of concepts – pragmatic conceptualism - are developed within the connectionist computational paradigm. Intuition is a particular sort of occurrent signal, and a concept is a counterfactually defined set of signals. Standard connectionist theory is significantly extended to develop my position, and consciousness plays a key functional role. This extension – taking connectionism seriously – is argued to be justified on the basis of the failure of the traditional computing paradigm to account for human cognition. 6. Repercussions for the use of intuition in SPM are developed. Variance in intuition is characterized – and expected - as a kind of bias in the network, either inherent or externally-provoked. The WN&S data is explained in the context of this bias. If SPM remains committed to the use of intuition, then intuition must be taken as a part of a larger body of evidence, and it is from experts – not the folk – that intuitions should be solicited.

1. Intuitions are often treated in philosophy as a basic evidential source to confirm/discredit a proposed definition or theory; e.g. intuitions about Gettier cases are taken to deny a justified-true-belief analysis of ‘knowledge’. Recently, Weinberg, Nichols & Stitch (WN&S) provided evidence that epistemic intuitions vary across persons and cultures. In-so-far as philosophy of this type (Standard Philosophical Methodology – SPM) is committed to provide conceptual analyses, the use of intuition is suspect – it does not exhibit the requisite normativity. I provide an analysis of intuition, with an emphasis on its neural – or connectionist – cognitive backbone; the analysis provides insight into its epistemic status and proper role within SPM. Intuition is initially characterized as the recognition of a pattern. 2. The metaphysics of ‘pattern’ is analyzed for the purpose of denying that traditional symbolic computation is capable of differentiating the patterns of interest. 3. The epistemology of ‘recognition’ is analyzed, again, to deny that traditional computation is capable of capturing human acts of recognition. 4. Fodor’s informational semantics, his Language of Thought and his Representational Theory of Mind are analyzed and his arguments denied. Again, the purpose is to deny traditional computational theories of mind. 5. Both intuition and a theory of concepts – pragmatic conceptualism - are developed within the connectionist computational paradigm. Intuition is a particular sort of occurrent signal, and a concept is a counterfactually defined set of signals. Standard connectionist theory is significantly extended to develop my position, and consciousness plays a key functional role. This extension – taking connectionism seriously – is argued to be justified on the basis of the failure of the traditional computing paradigm to account for human cognition. 6. Repercussions for the use of intuition in SPM are developed. Variance in intuition is characterized – and expected - as a kind of bias in the network, either inherent or externally-provoked. The WN&S data is explained in the context of this bias. If SPM remains committed to the use of intuition, then intuition must be taken as a part of a larger body of evidence, and it is from experts – not the folk – that intuitions should be solicited.

This thesis examines the rhetoric of Louis D. Brandeis in light of pragmatism-specifically, the philosophical pragmatism of William James and John Dewey. While a number of scholars claim that pragmatism has nothing to offer politics, rhetoric, or decision-making, this thesis argues that Brandeis's method of acting politically, speaking publicly, and solving problems exemplifies the pragmatic political style-a style of political operation that is characteristically pragmatic, a direct extension of James and Dewey's philosophy. This thesis illustrates Brandeis's pragmatic political style through an analysis of his rhetoric prior to taking his seat on the United States Supreme Court, his rhetoric while on the Supreme Court, and his rhetoric as one of America's most prominent Zionists. This thesis shows that pragmatism (at least William James and John Dewey's classical American pragmatism-the pragmatism Brandeis exemplifies rhetorically) can be a fruitful part of political operation.

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (doctoral)--Århus universitet, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references.

Higher education is at a crossroads. In the U.S. especially, the question of what role education should play in greater society continues to come up. Should education be about fundamentally developing the predispositions or skills of an individual so that he or she can be a more effective citizen later in life? Or should education merely function as a box to check off, a kind of rite of passage that, regardless of quality or content, is required of an individual on the way to becoming part of some “real world?” These issues are quickly moving to the forefront for students and scholars alike; no longer relegated behind closed doors at faculty meetings, these issues are coming to define the very institutions that question them. It is the goal of this thesis, then, to address these shifting goals for, and horizons of, education through a rhetorical lens. From this perspective, education functions as the text under consideration. Rhetoric as it is understood for the majority of this project can be seen in the social interactions that take place, typically between the individual student and his or her educational environment. The core theme that runs throughout this thesis is that learning is not something that solely takes place through formal education, nor is it about acquiring mere common sense; rather, it is a natural extension of human curiosity to wonder about and explore the world of which we are all a part. It is the responsibility of schools and universities alike to facilitate students in developing who they are as a part of this bigger picture. To this end, I introduce the term “inhabited learning.” Inhabited learning elaborates on why one’s learning experience in formal education is still so important: In an age of information we all need some way of making sense of the myriad facts and figures we encounter in our everyday lives, with the hope of being able to make better sense of ourselves in the process. / text