Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2007. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Oct. 22, 2007). Directed by Hephzibah Roskelly; submitted to the Dept. of English. Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-177).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 14, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 224-232) and index.

One of the most important but least discussed issues of our era is the problem of population--its size, density, and diversity, its explosive growth globally, its stability or shrinkage regionally, and the challenges it creates as we attempt to redefine who we are and what our place is in relation to the rest of the natural world. Utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, I trace the meaning of population in ancient, pre-Malthusian, and post-Malthusian political economy, note its contemporary treatment in politics, economics and science, and examine the reasons for its decline and relative absence in present-day environmental philosophy. While some of the helpful ways in which commentators of the past approached the topic have been largely forgotten, such as valuing the relation between the size of a community and its ability to function harmoniously, I argue that historical debates do not address the issue in relation to current conditions. I apply ethical orientations from the Continental and Classical American philosophical traditions, namely those of John Dewey and Max Scheler to problems associated with the revival of the subject. Both men viewed persons as irreducibly unique and unquantifiable beings with open and infinite creative possibilities. Among other insights, Dewey and Scheler emphasized quality over quantity, and they stressed the questions of value associated with population issues and ways of adjusting both ourselves and our valuing to a quality-centered world. I conclude by pointing to ways in which inquiry into the meaning of population intersects with contemporary social and environmental challenges.

Cette thèse s’intéresse à la question de la participation et du rôle du public dans la gouvernance des risques nucléaires. La question de recherche principale de la thèse est la suivante : comment un public potentiellement impacté par des activités à haut risque, parvient à se constituer en acteur social qui participe activement à leur gouvernance ? Grâce à une étude de cas, la thèse explore comment, à travers le temps, des acteurs de la société civile, progressivement institutionnalisés par le biais des Commissions Locales d’Information (CLI1), peuvent avoir des effets sur la gouvernance du risque nucléaire en France. La thèse se demande également si les différentes parties prenantes du nucléaire en France souhaitent réellement arriver à une compréhension partagée des situations et des enjeux. / This dissertation contributes to these debates by exploring the conditions in which people potentially impacted by nuclear activities can become active participants in the governance of such high-risk industries, and how they can organize themselves and build a common voice. Its chapters, each with their own focus, also shed light on changes in the roles of the nuclear stakeholders who have dealings with this public. Finally, this dissertation analyses the potential impacts for safety governance in such organizations.

The argument of this dissertation is that the full and continued importance of evolution to the foundations and practice of American philosophy has not been fully recognized. The years surrounding the first appearance of the theory of evolution on American shores were full of scientific uncertainty and philosophical excitement. William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and John Dewey responded to this uncertainty and excitement with a unique interpretation of evolution that recognized the deeply constructive and interactive nature of all living beings. This living idea of evolution fed back into many aspects of their mature philosophies. The early historians and commentators of this period, such as Herbert W. Schneider, and Phillip P. Wiener, whatever their view of evolution, did not fully understand the change that had just taken place in philosophy and biological science. They missed the radical change in the causal structure of science and philosophy implied by evolutionary philosophy. Later commentators on this period, with a few notable exceptions, have continued this trend. This has contributed to a disconnect of James, Peirce, and Dewey from the larger narrative of evolutionary philosophy. In this dissertation I reconnect James, Peirce, and Dewey to this larger historical narrative. I show how the narrative they began is still vitally important to our understanding of American philosophy and the philosophy of evolution.

The early twentieth century witnessed the emergence of "objective relativism," a distinctly American school of metaphysical realism inspired by the works of John Dewey and A.N. Whitehead. Largely forgotten, objective relativism provided a metaphysical framework, based upon an ontology of events and relations rather than substances and discrete properties, that has continued relevance for contemporary metaphysical discussions. In this thesis, I attempt to chart the boundaries and pathways of this ontology, outlining what Dewey calls the "ground-map of the province of criticism." In particular, the ground-map of objective relativism is invoked to situate and analyze the model of psycho-physical emergence outlined in Dewey's Experience and Nature. Because it is a relational ontology, objective relativism avoids problems with emergence common to substantival models. Additional analyses of its ontological premises, both in Dewey's writings and elsewhere, demonstrate how compelling accounts of causation, consciousness, and meaning may be formulated within this model.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:28:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2006-03-10Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:57:29Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 ribeiro_ea_me_mar.pdf: 719755 bytes, checksum: 88be5faf5ed41eb949239305ccd1c0ef (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Segundo alguns trabalhos matriciais da literatura sobre o assunto, o pragmatismo se destacou como uma das correntes filosóficas que mais influenciaram o pensamento educacional brasileiro entre 1930 e 1964, tendo como o seu principal representante no Brasil, Anísio Teixeira. Contudo, tais trabalhos não se aprofundaram sobre a recepção do pragmatismo de Dewey, nos anos subseqüentes ao Estado Novo, quando as interpretações e as apropriações dessa fonte teórica, desenvolvida por esse e por outros educadores brasileiros, tornaram-se mais diversificadas em razão do debate político educacional e pedagógico, ganhando as páginas dos periódicos educacionais, entre 1944 e 1964. Tentando contribuir para a compreensão acerca da recepção do pragmatismo no Brasil, esta pesquisa analisa e discute as matérias publicadas na Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pedagógicos e a revista Educação e Ciências Sociais no período de 1944 e 1964. Desses artigos, foram selecionados tantos para a análise, que resultou na identificação de duas interpretações correntes nos periódicos: uma pautada na obra filosófica e a outra na obra pedagógica do filósofo norte-americano. Dessa análise também se concluiu que o pragmatismo deweyano é apropriado pelos autores brasileiros para abordar os temas relativos ao humanismo, à democracia e à constituição dos saberes sobre a educação, emergentes da realidade educacional da época, demarcando uma posição que não é homogênea nem pode ser unificada. / According to some matrical works of literature on the subject, the pragmatism if detached as one of the philosophical chains that had more influenced the Brazilian Educational thought between 1930 and 1964, having as its main representative in Brazil, Anísio Teixeira. However, such works had not been gone deep on the reception of the pragmatism of Dewey, in the subsequent years to the New State, when the interpretations and the appropriations of this theoretical source, developed for this and for other Brazilian educators, they had become more diversified in reason of the debate educational and pedagogical politician, gaining the periodic pages of the educational ones, between 1944 and 1964. Trying to contribute for the understanding concerning the reception of the pragmatism in Brazil, this research analyzes and argues the substances published in the Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pedagógicos and the magazine Educação e Ciências Sociais in the period of 1944 and 1964. Of these articles, as much for the analysis had been selected, that resulted in the identification of two current interpretations in the periodic ones: orientated in the philosophical workmanship and to another one in the pedagogical workmanship of the North American philosopher. Of this analysis also if it concluded that the deweyan pragmatism is appropriate for the Brazilian authors to approach the relative subjects to the humanism, the democracy and the constitution of knowing them on the education, emergent of the educational reality of the time, demarcating a position that is not homogeneous nor can be unified.

John Dewey. A perspective of his Concept of Truth”. Rorty proposes his view as being an heir of pragmatism, such as J. Dewey’s, emphasizing that it stems, among other things, from the pragmatist notion of truth. Differing from many of Rorty’s ideas, I attempt to expound some notions I deem relevant in J. Dewey’s philosophy, and especially discuss some aspects of his conceptof truth. I plan to show that Dewey’s pragmatism takes up some traces of our everyday concept of truth, related to correspondence, but that this does not imply an engagement with a robust notion of truth. At the same time, I believe that the acceptance of such traces, although it does not suppose a definition or clear explanation regarding the content” of truth, suffices to distinguish between truth’s normative aspect and any justificationist view that may operate as knowledge’s epistemic support. / Rorty nos propone su visión como herencia del pragmatismo, entreellos el de J. Dewey, marcando con énfasis que su concepción se desprende, entre otras cosas, de la concepción pragmatista de la verdad. En contraposición a varias ideas de Rorty, pretendo exponer algunas ideas que creo centrales en la filosofía de J. Dewey; en particular, discutir, desde cierta perspectiva, algunaslíneas de su concepción de la verdad. Pretendo mostrar que el pragmatismo de Dewey asume algunos rasgos de nuestro concepto cotidiano de verdad, vinculados a la correspondencia, y que ello no implica un compromiso con una noción robusta de verdad. A la vez, creo que la aceptación de tales rasgos, aunque no supone una definición ni una clara explicación del contenido” de la verdad, es suficiente para permitirnos mantener la diferencia entre el aspecto normativo que implica la noción de verdad, respecto a cualquier concepción justificacionista que opere como respaldo epistémico del conocimiento.

John Dewey é um dos fundadores da corrente filosófica denominada Pragmatismo, nome inspirado na palavra grega pragma que significa, entre outros, agir, praticar, ter habilidade em negociar de maneira inteligente; como por exemplo na resolução inteligente e eficiente de problemas. Ao lado de William James e C. S. Pierce, outros pioneiros na criação de tal corrente, o filósofo se detém sobre as mais importantes questões políticas e sociais de seu tempo, especialmente sobre a origem do conhecimento, questão tradicional nas ciências filosóficas ocidentais. O Pragmatismo está ligado à corrente empírica inglesa e à crítica ao tradicional dualismo filosófico que opõe razão e experiência, espírito-matéria, mente-corpo, indivíduo-sociedade, entre outros. Para Dewey o conhecimento origina-se da interação entre indivíduos e meio, necessária à sobrevivência dos primeiros, e da profunda capacidade de adaptação e modificação do ambiente efetivada pelos seres humanos através do pensamento reflexivo, do método inteligente. O método inteligente, capacidade exclusivamente humana de se adaptar e transformar a natureza, é entendido no Pragmatismo como instrumental, como advindo da prática e da sua reflexão. A união da prática e da reflexão situa-se na experiência. Nesse trabalho nos dedicamos a compreender o significado da concepção de experiência na obra de John Dewey através da pesquisa dos seus princípios constituidores e das suas características fundamentais. Nesse processo definimos semelhanças e diferenças entre experiências estéticas, educativas, reflexivas e democráticas, concluindo que a prática do pensamento reflexivo e da democracia das interações entre indivíduos e meio, que o desenvolvimento e a prática do método inteligente e a liberdade do compartilhamento das relações entre os seres humanos e o ambiente fundamentam todas as experiências efetivamente democráticas e reflexivas. Em Dewey, uma sociedade democrática se estabelece em experiências democráticas e inteligentes e, portanto, são essas últimas alguns dos objetivos e meios pelos quais a democracia deve se realizar na escola com vistas à construção de uma sociedade democrática, já que a instituição escolar foi criada para conservar e transformar o mundo natural e social do qual participa e constitui o ser humano. / John Dewey was one of the founders of the American school of thought known as Pragmatism, word derived from the Greek (pragma), and which has, among its meanings, to act, to practice, to have the ability to negotiate intelligently, e.g. as in the instrumental and efficient problem solving process. Seen as a pioneer (together with William James and CS Pierce), the philosopher reflects on the most pressing political and social issues of his time, especially in regards to the origin of knowledge, a topic which is recurrent in the Western philosophical sciences. The Pragmatism is connected to the English empirical philosophical system and to the rejection of the classic philosophical dualism that opposes reason to experience, spirit and matter, mind and body, individual and society, among others. According to Dewey, knowledge results from the interaction of the individuals with their environment, necessary to their survival, and from the deep human capacity to adapt and to modify the environment through thought, through the intelligent method. The intelligent method, the uniquely human capacity to adapt itself and to transform nature, is understood as instrumental, arising from practice and reflection. Practice and reflection forgather in experience. Through our work, we have sought to understand the meaning of the concept of experience in John Dewey, through the research of its fundamental principles and aspects. In this process, we have identified similarities and differences in aesthetic, education, reflective and democratic experiences, concluding that the practice of reflective thinking, the practice of the democracy of the interactions of individuals with their environment, that the development and practice of the intelligent method and the human capability to share relations are the ground for effective democratic and reflective experiences. A democratic society is based on democratic and intelligent experiences, and, therefore, these are some of the objectives and means through which democracy takes place in school, an institution designed to preserve and transform the natural and social world that constitutes the human being and in which the human being participates.

Studiens syfte var att undersöka och fördjupa kunskapen om elevinflytande i grundskolan ur ett elevperspektiv. Utgångspunkten är Skolinspektionens Skolenkät VT 2015 som visade på äldre elevers låga grad av inflytande och med pragmatismen som teoretiskt perspektiv. Genom intervjuer med tio elever i grundskolans F-3 undersöktes huruvida eleverna anser inflytande som en viktig del i skolan samt vilken form av inflytande eleverna får eller önskar att de skulle ha. Resultaten visade på ett relativt litet inflytande för eleverna och att det inflytande som finns sker i olika grad och i olika miljöer i skolan. Slutsatsen är att elevinflytande är lågt även i grundskolans F-3.