The problem of induction is most famously discussed by David Hume, though he himself has never resorted to the notion of “induction.” As part of Hume’s overall project of identifying the logical fallacy of causal relations, the problem of induction is identified as the problem of “the unobservable matters of fact.“ Hume argues that, as empirical beings, we can believe in two types of knowledge with confidence: relations of ideas and observable matters of facts. We can be certain about the relations of ideas, since by analyzing the relation itself we can come to necessarily true conclusions about such relations. On the other hand, we do not need to question observable matters of fact, since such are the content of our experience, and empirical matters such as “tables” and “chairs” are not subject to truth or falsity: it would be quite meaningless to argue that “it is true that table.” Though our perceptive experience easily invites another interesting philosophical discussion - most famously discusses by Descartes - that is, the external world scepticism, that is not something that this paper would address. Hume’s point, in the end, is to show that when we infer any unobservable matters of fact - that is, inductive inferences - from observable matters of facts, we are committing to a logical fallacy where the true premises of the inference does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RicardoGAP_DISSERT.pdf: 757603 bytes, checksum: bfeae294ee68b7c0f314886fbbd624fb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-10-02 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / The following work is to interpret and analyze the problem of induction under a vision founded on set theory and probability theory as a basis for solution of its negative philosophical implications related to the systems of inductive logic in general. Due to the importance of the problem and the relatively recent developments in these fields of knowledge (early 20th century), as well as the visible relations between them and the process of inductive inference, it has been opened a field of relatively unexplored and promising possibilities. The key point of the study consists in modeling the information acquisition process using concepts of set theory, followed by a treatment using probability theory. Throughout the study it was identified as a major obstacle to the probabilistic justification, both: the problem of defining the concept of probability and that of rationality, as well as the subtle connection between the two. This finding called for a greater care in choosing the criterion of rationality to be considered in order to facilitate the treatment of the problem through such specific situations, but without losing their original characteristics so that the conclusions can be extended to classic cases such as the question about the continuity of the sunrise / O seguinte trabalho consiste na interpreta??o e an?lise do problema da indu??o sob uma vis?o fundamentada em teoria de conjuntos e teoria de probabilidades como base para a solu??o de suas implica??es filos?ficas negativas relativas aos sistemas de l?gica indutiva de maneira geral. Devido ? import?ncia do problema e aos desenvolvimentos recentes nos referidos campos de conhecimento (in?cio do s?culo 20), bem como ?s rela??es vis?veis entre eles e o processo de infer?ncia indutivo, tem-se aberto um campo de possibilidades relativamente inexplorado e promissor. O ponto-chave para o estudo consiste na modelagem do processo de aquisi??o de informa??o usando conceitos de teoria de conjuntos, seguido por um tratamento usando teoria de probabilidades. Ao longo do estudo foi poss?vel identificar, como obst?culos principais ? justifica??o probabil?stica, tanto o problema da defini??o do conceito de probabilidade quanto do de racionalidade, al?m da sutil conex?o entre ambos. Essa constata??o permitiu um maior cuidado na escolha do crit?rio de racionalidade a ser considerado no intuito de viabilizar o tratamento do problema por meio de situa??es-exemplo espec?ficas, mas sem a perda de suas caracter?sticas originais, de modo que as conclus?es obtidas possam ser estendidas a casos cl?ssicos como o relativo ? d?vida sobre a continuidade do nascer do sol

Submitted by Pedro Bravo de Souza (pedrobravodesouza@hotmail.com) on 2018-09-26T10:57:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Versão Final (Pedro Bravo de Souza).pdf: 935527 bytes, checksum: e4f29872ce25a2664c0c9b47e9a3c459 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Satie Tagara (satie@marilia.unesp.br) on 2018-09-26T14:07:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 souza_pb_me_mar.pdf: 935527 bytes, checksum: e4f29872ce25a2664c0c9b47e9a3c459 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-09-26T14:07:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 souza_pb_me_mar.pdf: 935527 bytes, checksum: e4f29872ce25a2664c0c9b47e9a3c459 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-09-18 / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / Objetivamos avaliar a razoabilidade da abordagem bayesiana de Colin Howson ao problema da indução, tal como formulado por David Hume. Propomos que uma abordagem ao problema da indução será razoável se nossa compreensão da indução não regride em relação àquela fornecida por Hume. Por sua vez, o bayesianismo é uma corrente teórica derivada da adoção das teses conhecidas como gradualismo, probabilismo e revisão pela condicionalização; seu mérito é fornecer um modelo para representar e atualizar graus de crença. Em seu turno, o problema da indução configura-se como a busca para justificar racionalmente argumentos indutivos, tendo em vista a tese humeana segundo a qual é impossível fazê-lo, seja mediante argumentos demonstrativos, seja mediante argumentos prováveis. Para satisfazer a nosso objetivo, esta Dissertação divide-se em quatro capítulos. No primeiro capítulo, expomos o problema da indução e como Howson o interpreta. No segundo capítulo, comentamos propostas de solução ao problema da indução analisadas por ele. No terceiro capítulo, introduzimos conceitos e teses de probabilidade e bayesianismo. No quarto capítulo, apresentamos, em primeiro lugar, as teses específicas de Howson em relação ao problema da indução; em segundo lugar, criticamos sua interpretação de Hume, suas objeções a outras abordagens e sua própria proposta; finalmente, averiguamos a sua razoabilidade. Finalizamos o trabalho sintetizando as considerações realizadas. / We aim to evaluate the reasonability of Colin Howson’s bayesian approach to the problem of induction, as elaborated by David Hume. We propose that an approach to the problem of induction will be reasonable if our induction understanding does not regress in relation to that provided by Hume. In turn, bayesianism is a theoretical position derived from the adoption of gradualism, probabilism and conditionalization theses; its merit is to provide a model for representing and updating degrees of belief. The problem of induction is the search to rationally justify inductive arguments, due to the humean thesis according to which it is impossible to do so, neither through demonstrative arguments, nor through probable arguments. To achieve our goal, this Dissertation is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, we expose the problem of induction and how Howson interprets it. In the second chapter, we discuss solutions to the problem of induction analyzed by him. In the third chapter, we introduce probability and bayesianism concepts and theses. In the fourth chapter, we present, first, Howson’s specific theses regarding the problem of induction; second, we criticize his interpretation of Hume, his objections to other approaches, and his own proposal; finally, we examine whether it is reasonable or not. We finish this master’s degree dissertation summarizing ours considerations. / FAPESP: 16/03251-2 e 16/25125-9

The demarcation problem aims to articulate the boundary between science and pseudoscience. Solutions to the problem have been notably raised by the logical positivists (verificationism), Karl Popper (falsificationism), and Imre Lakatos (methodology of research programmes). Due, largely, to the conclusions drawn by Larry Laudan, in a pivotal 1981 paper which dismissed the problem of demarcation as a “pseudo-problem”, the issue was brushed aside for years. Recently, however, there has been a revival of attempts to reexamine the demarcation problem and synthesize new solutions. My aim is to survey two of the contemporary attempts and to assess these approaches over and against the broader historical trajectory of the demarcation problem. These are the efforts of Nicholas Maxwell (aim-oriented empiricism), and Paul Hoyningen-Huene (systematicity). I suggest that the main virtue of the new attempts is that they promote a self-reflexive character within the sciences. A modern demarcation criterion should be sensitive towards the dynamic character of the sciences. Using, as an example, a case study of Traditional Chinese Medicine, I also suggest that the potential for conflict between demarcation conclusions and the empirical success of a pseudoscientific discipline is problematic. I question whether it is sensible to reject, as pseudoscientific, a discipline which seems to display empirical success in cases where the rival paradigm, contemporary western medicine, is not successful. Ultimately, I argue that there are both good theoretical and good pragmatic grounds to support further investigation into a demarcation criterion and that Laudan’s dismissal of the problem was premature. / Graduate / 0422 / 0402

The demarcation problem aims to articulate the boundary between science and pseudoscience. Solutions to the problem have been notably raised by the logical positivists (verificationism), Karl Popper (falsificationism), and Imre Lakatos (methodology of research programmes). Due, largely, to the conclusions drawn by Larry Laudan, in a pivotal 1981 paper which dismissed the problem of demarcation as a “pseudo-problem”, the issue was brushed aside for years. Recently, however, there has been a revival of attempts to reexamine the demarcation problem and synthesize new solutions. My aim is to survey two of the contemporary attempts and to assess these approaches over and against the broader historical trajectory of the demarcation problem. These are the efforts of Nicholas Maxwell (aim-oriented empiricism), and Paul Hoyningen-Huene (systematicity). I suggest that the main virtue of the new attempts is that they promote a self-reflexive character within the sciences. A modern demarcation criterion should be sensitive towards the dynamic character of the sciences. Using, as an example, a case study of Traditional Chinese Medicine, I also suggest that the potential for conflict between demarcation conclusions and the empirical success of a pseudoscientific discipline is problematic. I question whether it is sensible to reject, as pseudoscientific, a discipline which seems to display empirical success in cases where the rival paradigm, contemporary western medicine, is not successful. Ultimately, I argue that there are both good theoretical and good pragmatic grounds to support further investigation into a demarcation criterion and that Laudan’s dismissal of the problem was premature. / Graduate / 0422 / 0402

No description available.

Induction machine; outer rotor; water pump; thermal network; thermal analysis; optimization; electromagnetic model; finite element method; thermal insulation class