Le modèle ELIE (pour Equal Labour Income Equalization) est un modèle inédit de redistribution globale des revenus – qui a été proposé par Serge-Christophe Kolm dans Macrojustice (2005). Les enjeux de ce modèle, qui repose notamment sur une réflexion profonde concernant les implications économiques des systèmes de valeurs acceptés dans les sociétés occidentales contemporaines, méritent d’être discutés. Notre thèse est qu’en prenant ses distances avec le paradigme dominant en économie normative, à savoir le welfarisme, Kolm est conduit à modifier la définition de l’économie normative. Pour être plus précis, alors que l’économie normative ne traitait jusque-là que de la question des modalités de la redistribution, laissant celle de la nature de l’assiette de redistribution à la philosophie morale et politique (comme en atteste la controverse « égalité de quoi ? » initiée par Sen), Kolm entend réintroduire cette seconde question dans le champ de l’économie normative. La thèse se compose de trois parties portant sur les implications de ce changement de paradigme et de la redéfinition du champ de l’économie normative. La première partie s’attache aux fondements du modèle ELIE et plus précisément à la justification de la redistribution des revenus et à la détermination de son intensité à travers la question d’un choix social libéral. La deuxième partie aborde les implications théoriques de ce changement de paradigme et traite plus spécifiquement de la relation du modèle avec la théorie mirrleesienne de la fiscalité optimale et avec le welfarisme en général. La troisième partie se tourne vers les conséquences de ce modèle en termes de règles de redistribution. / The ELIE model (for « Equal Labor Income Equalization ») is a new model of global income redistribution – proposed by Serge-Christophe Kolm in Macrojustice (2005). What is at stake in this model, which is based on a Deep Thought concerning economic implications of values systems accepted in contemporary occidental societies, deserves to be discussed. I defend the idea that by distancing himself from the dominant paradigm in normative economics, namely the welfarism, Kolm is led to modify the definition of normative economics. To be more precise, while until then normative economics dealt only with the question of redistribution modality, leaving the question of nature of redistribution to moral and political philosophy (as shown in the « equality of what? » controversy initiated by Sen), Kolm reintroduces this second question in the field of normative economics. The dissertation is composed of three parts relating to implications of this paradigm shift and to Kolm’s redefinition of normative economics field. The first part focuses on fundaments of the ELIE model and, more precisely, on income redistribution justification and on the determination of the intensity of redistribution, through the question of a liberal social choice. The second part is about implications of this paradigm shift and is devoted more specifically to the relation of the ELIE model with the mirrleesian theory of optimal taxation and with welfarism in general. The third part turns toward this model’s consequences in terms of redistribution rules.

The CEPIE working paper series serves to promote scientific discussion in the realm of public and international economics. An initial outlet for current research results, CEPIE working papers are often of a preliminary character.

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The CEPIE working paper series serves to promote scientific discussion in the realm of public and international economics. An initial outlet for current research results, CEPIE working papers are often of a preliminary character.

<div>State and local adoption/repeal of highly polarized policies causes migration responses both out of and into the affected region. Interpreting the responses as revealed policy pref?erences leads to the conclusion that marijuana legalization and abortion waiting periods had been favored nationally, while gay marriage had been opposed. Policy preferences are geographically heterogeneous, which leads to different responses across counties. From 1992- 2017, these policy changes reduced domestic migration by two percent, which is approxi?mately 20% of the total migration decline. The migration changes, via partisan sorting, accounted for a significant share of the increased political polarization from 2012-2016 in western, urban, and swing counties. <br></div><div><br></div><div>In cases where unmarried parents have joint physical custody of their child(ren), there is a wide range of default relocation restrictions that depend on their state of origin. Using IRS county-to-county migration data, demographic data from the ACS, and state relocation restrictions gathered from divorce law websites, I study the impact of these default reloca?tion restrictions on domestic US migration. Results from both regression discontinuity and selection on observables designs, find about 10% - 30% less migration to counties that are outside the allowed relocation range. This migration friction is shown to strengthen from 1992 - 2012, as both joint physical custody and unmarried parents became more common, thereby contributing to the decline in domestic US migration. <br></div><div><br></div><div>In the United States, between 2004 and 2008, 28 states increased their minimum wage; the national minimum wage was increased in 2007. The average migration response to these increases was a 3% change in migration away from a one dollar increase. These effects are not distributed evenly across the population. People from more impacted demographic groups are more likely to move away from minimum wage increases.</div>

<div>This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I investigate the effects of complexity in various voting systems on individual behavior in small group electoral competitions. Using a laboratory experiment, I observe individual behavior within one of three voting systems -- plurality, instant runoff voting (IRV), and score then automatic runoff (STAR). I then estimate subjects' behavior in three different models of bounded rationality. The estimated models are a model of Level-K thinking (Nagel, 1995), the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model (Camerer, et al. 2004), and a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). I consistently find that more complex voting systems induce lower levels of strategic thinking. This implies that policy makers desiring more sincere voting behavior could potentially achieve this through voting systems with more complex strategy sets. Of the tested behavioral models, Level-K consistently fits observed data the best, implying subjects make decisions that combine of steps of thinking with random, utility maximizing, errors.</div><div><br></div><div>In the second chapter, I investigate the relationship between the mechanisms used to select leaders and both measures of group performance and leaders' ethical behavior. Using a laboratory experiment, we measure group performance in a group minimum effort task with a leader selected using one of three mechanisms: random, a competition task, and voting. After the group task, leaders must complete a task that asks them to behave honestly or dishonestly in questions related to the groups performance. We find that leaders have a large impact on group performance when compared to those groups without leaders. Evidence for which selection mechanism performs best in terms of group performance seems mixed. On measures of honesty, the strongest evidence seems to indicate that honesty is most positively impacted through a voting selection mechanism, which differences in ethical behavior between the random and competition selection treatments are negligible.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>In the third chapter, I provide an investigation into the factors and conditions that drive "free riding" behavior in dynamic innovation contests. Starting from a dynamic innovation contest model from Halac, et al. (2017), I construct a two period dynamic innovation contest game. From there, I provide a theoretical background and derivation of mixed strategies that can be interpreted as an agent's degree to which they engage in free riding behavior, namely through allowing their opponent to exert effort in order to uncover information about an uncertain state of the world. I show certain conditions must be fulfilled in order to induce free riding in equilibrium, and also analytically show the impact of changing contest prize structures on the degree of free riding. I end this paper with an experimental design to test these various theoretical conclusions in a laboratory setting while also considering the behavioral observations recorded in studies investigating similar contest models and provide a plan to analyze the data collected by this laboratory experiment.</div><div><br></div><div>All data collected for this study consists of individual human subject data collected from laboratory experiments. Project procedures have been conducted in accordance with Purdue's internal review board approval and known consent from all participants was obtained.</div>

Transportation economists apply different labor supply models when studying anti-congestion policy: (i) endogenous working hours; (ii) endogenous workdays but given daily working hours; (iii) labor supply as a residual. We study whether the outcome of anti-congestion policies that change the relative cost of labor supply margins, and, thus, may affect decisions on working hours and working days, is robust against the model applied. In particular, we focus on welfare implications in the presence of other taxes when there is a congestion externality. We find surprisingly strong differences in quantity and sign. Further, we develop a clear recommendation for future research on issues that include decisions on commuting trips. Researchers shall apply both a model of endogenous working hours that provides an upper limit and a model of endogenous workdays that provide a lower limit of results for welfare changes, optimal policies and two optimal tax components (Pigouvian and Ramsey terms).

This thesis is, to my knowledge, the first study utilising data from the Swedish population and housing censuses between 1960 and 1990 merged with other data from the same period in order to estimate extensive margin labour supply responses to changes in municipal tax rate changes. Given that women historically have not faced the same structural labour market preconditions as men, the empirical strategy is designed to allow for an analysis of gender-based heterogeneity in labour supply responses. Using a weighted fixed effects framework, estimates of the average over time between municipal effects of tax rate increases are presented. Using the preferred main model specification, the estimate for the average tax rate elasticity is -0.165 for men and 0.3513 for women. Additionally, an attempt is made to estimate an effect using a difference-in-difference framework, treating the overall largest municipal tax rate changes as a form of quasi-experimental treatment. The results of the main analysis indicate the presence of gender-based heterogeneity in extensive margin labour supply responses during 1960 to 1990 within the administrative region in question.

In der ersten Abhandlung untersuche ich die Auswirkungen von Informationsfriktionen und Aufwandskosten auf die Effektivität von Steuervergünstigungen bei der Förderung von Spenden für wohltätige Zwecke. Mittels eines groß angelegten Umfrageexperiments und einem Feldexperiment prüfe ich empirisch, ob die Verringerung von Informationsfriktionen durch Hervorhebung von Steuervergünstigungen und Bereitstellung von Informationen über die Höhe von Steuervergünstigungen Spendenentscheidungen verändert. Meine Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Spenden steigen, wenn Steuervergünstigungen hervorgehoben und Informationen bereitgestellt werden. Ich lege dar, dass der Hauptverhaltensmechanismus, der Informationsfriktionen zugrunde liegt, Unaufmerksamkeit ist. Die zweite Abhandlung ist eine gemeinsame Arbeit mit Steffen Altmann, Armin Falk, Paul Heidhues und Rajshri Jayaraman. In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir die Auswirkungen von voreingestellten Beträgen auf Spenden für wohltätige Zwecke in einem groß angelegten Feldversuch auf einer Online-Spendenplattform. Wir beobachten eine starke Auswirkung von voreingestellten Beträgen auf das individuelle Verhalten, stellen jedoch fest, dass die Gesamtspende nicht von voreingestellten Beträgen beeinflusst wird. Mit einem Strukturmodell wird untersucht ob die Personalisierung von voreingestellten Beträgen die Spendeneinnahmen erhöhen kann. In der dritten Abhandlung, die in Zusammenarbeit mit Rajshri Jayaraman und Michael Kaiser verfasst wurde, untersuchen wir gemeinnützige Spenden für Naturkatastrophen auf einer großen Online-Plattform. Wir beobachten, dass der Großteil der Spenden für wohltätige Zwecke an einen winzigen Teil der Naturkatastrophen geht, bei denen es sich in der Regel um besonders schwere Katastrophen handelt, über die in den Medien berichtet wird. Unter Verwendung eines Ereignisstudiendesigns finden wir Hinweise, die mit zwei Erscheinungsformen der Spenderermüdung übereinstimmen, jedoch nicht mit einer dritten. / In the first essay, I study the implications of information frictions and hassle costs for the effectiveness of tax incentives in encouraging charitable giving. Empirically, I test whether mitigating information frictions by making tax incentives more salient and by providing information on the magnitude of tax incentives alters donation decisions by conducting a large-scale survey experiment, representative of the German adult population and I complement this with a large-scale field experiment on an online donation platform. My findings indicate that when tax incentives are made salient, and when information is provided, donations increase. I find that the main behavioral mechanism underlying information frictions is inattention. Analyzing who responds more to salience and information provision shows that it is predominantly individuals that face lower hassle costs and have high incomes. The second essay is joint work with Steffen Altmann, Armin Falk, Paul Heidhues, and Rajshri Jayaraman. In this paper, we study the effects of defaults on charitable giving in a large-scale field experiment on an online fundraising platform. We document a strong effect of defaults on individual behavior but nevertheless find that aggregate donation levels are unaffected by defaults. In contrast, co-donations increase in the default amount. We complement our experimental results with a structural model that investigates whether personalizing defaults based on individuals’ donation histories can increase donation revenues. In the third essay, which is joint work with Rajshri Jayaraman and Michael Kaiser, we investigate charitable donations to natural disasters on a large online platform. We document that the bulk of charitable donations go to a tiny fraction of natural disasters, which tend to be severe disasters that receive media coverage. Using an event study design, we find evidence consistent with temporal fatigue and donor fatigue, but not with crowding out.

<p>This thesis comprises three essays that empirically investigate important issues in two areas of health economics: physician labour supply and health insurance policy interventions.</p> <p>In the first essay, gendered associations between family status and physician labour supply are explored in the Canadian labour market, where physicians are paid according to a common fee schedule and have substantial discretion in setting their hours of work. Data from 1991 to 2006 show no gender difference in physician labour supply after controlling for family status. Male and female physicians have statistically indistinguishable hours of work when never married and without children. Married male physicians, however, have higher market hours than unmarried male physicians and parenthood either increases their hours or leaves them unchanged. In contrast, married female physicians have lower market hours than unmarried physicians and parenthood substantially lowers market hours. Little change over time in these patterns is observed for males, but for females two offsetting trends are observed: the magnitude of the marriage-hours effect declined, whereas that for motherhood increased. Preferences and/or social norms induce substantially different labour market outcome across the sexes. In terms of work at home, the presence of children is associated with higher hours for male physicians, but for females the hours increase is at least twice as large. A male physician’s spouse is much less likely to be employed in the presence of children, and if employed, has lower market hours in the presence of children. In contrast, a female physician’s spouse is more likely to be employed in the presence of children, and if employed, has slightly lower market hours in the presence of children. Both male and female physicians have lower hours of work when married to another physician.</p> <p>This second essay examines the impacts of a mandatory, universal prescription drug insurance program on health care utilization and health outcomes in a public health care system with free physician and hospital services. Beginning in 1997, all residents of the province of Quebec, Canada, were required by law to have drug insurance coverage. Under this program, all persons under age 65 who are eligible for a private plan are required to join that plan, while the public prescription drug insurance plan covers all Quebecers who are not eligible for a private plan. Using the National Population Health Survey from 1994 to 2003, we find that the mandatory program substantially increased drug coverage among the general population. The program also increased medication use and general practitioner visits but had little effect on specialist visits and hospitalization. Findings from quantile regressions suggest that there was a large improvement in the health status of less healthy individuals. Further analysis by pre-policy drug insurance status and the presence of chronic conditions reveals a marked increase in the probability of taking medication and visiting a general practitioner among the previously uninsured and those with a chronic condition. We also find evidence of positive health gains among the chronically ill.</p> <p>The third essay examines the impact of delisting routine eye exam services on patient eye care utilization and on providers’ labour market outcomes in a public health care system. Beginning in the early 1990s, provincial governments in Canada started to de-insure routine eye examinations from the basket of publicly funded health care services. We exploit delisting policy changes across Canadian provinces to estimate the impact of delisting from the supply- and demand-sides. Demand side analysis using the National Population Health Survey and Canadian Community Health Survey data suggests that the delisting of eye exams for the working age population decreased the probability of using eye care among this population group. However, the number of visits among those who continued to use eye care services was not affected. We also find suggestive evidence that the delisting policies targeted at the working age population were associated with increased eye care utilization among the elderly patients. Using the optometrist sample from the Canadian census data we find that the delisting of eye exams decreased optometrists’ weekly work hours while raised their annual work weeks. There was no statistically significant effect on optometrists’ income.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)