This dissertation examines the protection given by the Civil Code and the Constitution to the different stages of human life, considering since the embryos produced in vitro until the moment of birth. The problem is analyzed from a fundamental rights perspective, contrasting Bioethics and Biolaw with Constitutional Law, as well as the civil concepts of legal subjects and legal personality. This dissertation considers the embryo and the conceptus as a subject of law, without including them in the juridical concept of person. Thus, the human life still in development receives legal protection, but the law does not specify clearly the limits of this protection, especially if they would be under the legal protection of life. The new Biosafety Act relativized the legal protection of human life in embryonic stage, enabling research with embryos resulting from assisted reproduction. The Criminal Code also relativizes the juridical protection of life, allowing the abortion under certain circumstances. This definition is important so that biojuridical issues receive a just legal protection. Considering the absence of a statutory definition, this dissertation analyzes, from a constitutional hermeneutics perspective, the possibility to ponder the right to life with other fundamental rights, especially the right to health, the right to genetic heritage and reproductive rights. This dissertation suggests it is possible to limit the protection of life of these subjects in contrast with the protection of other human rights guaranteed to the person already born. The principle of the dignity of human life in relation to the principle of human dignity is used as an hermeneutical parameter. With this analysis, this dissertation examines the decisions of the Supreme Court until June 2011, in which the terms “embryo” and “conceptus” are analyzed to consider the attitude adopted by the Ministers facing these statutory omissions. / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente trabalho tem por objeto a análise da proteção civil-constitucional conferida ao ser humano quando ainda em formação gestacional, considerando desde o embrião laboratorial até o momento do nascimento. A problemática é analisada sob a perspectiva dos direitos fundamentais, na interface da Bioética e do Biodireito com o Direito Constitucional, além dos institutos do Direito Civil de sujeito de direito e da personalidade jurídica. Entende-se o embrião e o nascituro enquanto sujeito de direito, sem, contudo, serem considerados pessoas. Com isso, o ser humano ainda em formação recebe proteção jurídica, mas o Direito não especifica claramente qual o limite dessa proteção, principalmente se estariam resguardados pelo direito à vida. A nova Lei da Biossegurança relativizou a proteção à vida humana em formação, possibilitando as pesquisas que se utilizam do embrião humano laboratorial; o Código Penal, em certas circunstâncias, também relativiza a proteção à vida do nascituro, possibilitando o aborto. Essa definição é importante para que as questões biojurídicas recebam uma proteção jurídica adequada. Ante a ausência de uma norma definidora, o trabalho analisa, sob a ótica da hermenêutica constitucional, a possibilidade de ponderar o direito à vida em face de outros direitos fundamentais assegurados, principalmente o direito à saúde, o direito ao patrimônio genético e o direito sexual reprodutivo. Com isso, entende-se ser possível limitar a proteção à vida desses sujeitos em face da proteção de outros direitos assegurados à pessoa humana já nascida. Utiliza-se como parâmetro hermenêutico o princípio da dignidade da vida humana em relação ao princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana. Após essa análise doutrinária acerca do tema proposto, estudam-se os julgados do Supremo Tribunal Federal até junho de 2011, cujos termos “embrião” e “nascituro” surgem como objeto de apreciação para se constatar a postura adotada pelos Ministros diante dessas omissões legais.

Equally discomforting is the PlayStation mentality that surrounds drone killings. Young military personnel raised on a diet of video games now kill real people remotely using joysticks. Far removed from the human consequences of their actions, how will this generation of fighters value the right to life? How will commanders and policy makers keep themselves immune from the deceptively antiseptic nature of drone killings? Will killing be a more attractive option than capture? Will the standards of intelligence gathering justify a killing slip? Will the number of acceptable collateral civilian deaths increase? / Prepared under the supervision of Mr Gus Waschefort at the International criminal court, The Hague, Netherlands / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2011. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / nf2012 / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Through the fetal heartbeat House-Bill-481, Georgia (U.S) has taken a Pro-life stance on the constitutionally enshrined women's reproductive self-determination rights versus the proposed fetus's right to life by banning abortion after six weeks of gestation. The purpose of this research was to analyze how rights are debated in the media, argued in the bill, and presented in the litigation against the bill using a thematic analysis approach guided by the concept of rights. The findings showed that Pro-choice sees the bill as an infringement of women's rights while Pro-life see it as recognizing the proposed fetus's right to life and personhood.

In 2022 Spain recorded its highest suicide rates in history. Spanish politicians acknowledge the need for solutions but fail to agree on adequate ones that could help decrease the current upward trend in suicides. The study aims to analyse practical argumentations advanced by politicians during the 2022 Parliamentary debate where the issue of suicide was addressed, to explore the place suicide has in the decision-making process, to investigate the reasons for and against concrete ways of acting regarding the issue, and to understand how these arguments align with current political ideologies. This will deepen the understanding of the political response to the suicide crisis. To achieve this aim, the research applies Isabela and Norman Fairclough’s Political Discourse Analysis framework. The findings show that suicide is not addressed as the public health crisis it constitutes, and it is overshadowed by political power dynamics where regional nationalistic ideologies play a big role.

Uppsatsen analyserar om huruvida kärnvapenavskräckning hotar eller skyddar rätten till liv. Genom insamlade pro- och contra-argument skapas en diskussion kring kärnvapenavskräckning där centrala argument identifieras. Argumenten analyseras sedan i en argumentationsanalys samt slutsats utifrån ett rättighetsperspektiv med fokus på rätten till liv. Rätten till liv definieras utifrån General Comment No. 36 (2018) som berör artikel 6 rätten till liv inom den internationella konventionen om de medborgliga och politiska rättigheterna. / The essay analyses whether nuclear deterrence threatens or protects the right to life. By collecting pro- and contra-arguments it has been possible to create a discussion around nuclear deterrence as well as to identify key arguments within the two groups. The central arguments are then analyzed in an argumentation analysis and conclusion from a human rights perspective with a focus on the right to life. The right to life is defined from the General Comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life.

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Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Problem statement For utilitarians, human beings have intrinsic moral significance based on only two acquired characteristics: sentience, or the ability to suffer, and psychological personhood. Sentience is the entrance-requirement for moral significance, but does not justify a "right to life" claim; at most a "right" not to suffer. Personhood, described as some sort of self-conscious awareness with a concept of the future, may justify a "right to life" claim. However, since personhood is absent in prenatal beings, and only develops some time after birth, the implication is that such beings have little moral significance and may, for instance, be killed "at will". The moral problem that I address in this dissertation is to investigate, assess and evaluate the utilitarian position on the moral status or value of prenatal life. Methodology and results I firstly, on the basis of an extensive literature study, make a detailed analysis of the utilitarian position with reference to a number of themes that I have identified in their argument. This is followed by a critical philosophical evaluation of the utilitarian position, based on six particular arguments: • Utilitarianism is philosophically incoherent. It over-simplifies the moral argument in claiming that consequences are all that matter morally. Its underlying moral theory is at odds with moral claims contained in contemporary notions of human rights and individual justice. It ignores the moral significance of special obligations to special groups. • Utilitarianism potentially has unacceptable consequences. It IS inherently discriminatory and may lead to legitimate "slippery slope" fears. • Utilitarianism clashes with our fundamental moral intuitions on the value of prenatal life. These intuitions are cherished in most world religions. • Contrary to the utilitarian position, speciesism is inevitable to the human condition, especially argued from a position of existential phenomenology. Self- constitution, simultaneous constitution of the world as we know it, and the very possibility of morality are possible only within a particular notion of speciesism. • The potentiality of pre-persons to develop into persons cannot be as convincingly ignored as is done by the utilitarian. • There is a basic and underlying need and intuition to protect vulnerable human beings, of which pre-persons are exemplars. These notions clash with utilitarian theory. As an alternative, I introduce, set out and evaluate a two-phased position on the moral significance of pre-personal human life, a position of respectfulness of prenatal and pre-personal human life based upon its humanity, potentiality and separation-viability. This leads, firstly, to the conclusion of a graded, sliding scale conception of human prepersonal moral significance in line with the level of development and with the actuation of potentiality. Secondly, it leads to the conclusion that the advent of separationsurvivability (viability) is a morally significant cut-off point beyond which the human fetus may "normally" have a justifiable right to the continuation of its life. In as far as the application of my argument is concerned, I develop a "moderate" position with reference to the abortion debate. Whilst I recognize that all human prenatal beings of which it can be argued that they have a reasonable chance to develop their intrinsic potentiality, i.e., to become full-fledged persons, should have the opportunity to do so, I also recognize that neither this position, nor the complexities of life make it possible to hold "absolute" positions on the justifiability of abortion. I explore this extremely problematic notion in the text. That having been said, the advent of separation-survivability may imply a "moral cut-off point", beyond which termination is only rarely justified. I argue that I find no moral hindrance to wellmotivated research on human pre-embryos and stem cells. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Probleemstelling Utilitariste huldig sterk omlynde standpunte oor die waarde van lewe. Hulle redeneer dat menslike (inderwaarheid, alle lewende) wesens slegs op grond van twee eienskappe intrinsieke morele waarde kan verwerf: sentiëntisme, d.i. die vermoë om lyding te ervaar, en persoonstatus. Sentiëntisme is 'n bepalende vereiste vir morele status, maar regverdig nie 'n "reg op lewe"-aanspraak nie. Persoonsyn, verstaan as 'n vorm van selfbewustheid tesame met 'n bewuste belang by die voortsetting van eie bestaan, mag wel so 'n aanspraak regverdig. Voorgeboortelike (en "voorpersoonlike") wesens is egter nie persone nie; hulle word eers (aansienlik) ná geboorte volwaardige persone. Die implikasie is dat sulke wesens weinig morele status het, en byvoorbeeld, na willekeur gedood mag word. Die morele probleem wat ek in hierdie dissertasie aanspreek is om die utilitaristiese beskouing ten opsigte van die morale status of waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe krities-filosofies te ondersoek en te evalueer. Metodologie en gevolgtrekkings Eerstens maak ek na aanleiding van 'n gedetaileerde literatuurstudie 'n in-diepte analise van van die utilitaristiese posisie aan die hand van 'n aantal temas wat ek in hul argument geïdentifiseer het. Daarna volg 'n krities-filosofiese evaluasie van die utilitaristiese posisie, aan die hand van ses argumente: • Utilitarisme is filosofies onsamehangend. Dit oorvereenvoudig die morele argument deur voor te gee dat gevolge al is wat moreel saakmaak. Die onderliggende utilitaristiese teorie bots met die morele eise vervat in kontemporêre sienings van menseregte en geregtigheid. Dit negeer die morele belangrikheid van spesiale verpligtinge teenoor spesiale belangegroepe. • Utilitarisme het potensieelonaanvaarbare gevolge. Dit IS inherent diskriminerend en kan lei tot onkeerbare glybaan ("slippery slope")-argumente. Utilitarisme bots met ons fundamentele morele intuïsies betreffende die waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe. Hierdie intuïsies word onder meer ondersteun deur die meeste hoofstroom godsdienste. • Spesiësisme is, in kontras met die utilitaristiese beskouing, onafwendbaar vir ons selfverstaan as mense, soos aangetoon kan word met 'n beroep op die eksistensiële fenomenologie. Self-konstituering, gelyktydige konstituering van die wêreld van die mens, en selfs die moontlikheid van moraliteit is slegs moontlik vanuit' n bepaalde spesiësistiese beskouing. • Die potensialiteit van "pre-persone" om tot volwaardige persone te ontwikkel kan nie, soos die utilitaris doen, sonder meer geïgnoreer word nie. • Daar is 'n basiese en onderliggende morele eis om swak en weerlose menslike wesens te beskerm. Hierdie idees bots lynreg met utilitaristiese teorie. As 'n alternatief tot die utilitaristiese beskouing, ontwikkel ek 'n twee-fase posisie betreffende die morele waarde van voorgeboortelike menslike lewe. Ek noem hierdie posisie agting vir voorgeboortelike en voor-persoonlike menslike lewe gebaseer op die menslikheid, potensialiteit en oorleefbaarheid van prenatale mense. Dit lei, eerstens, tot die gevolgtrekking van 'n gegradeerde glyskaal konsepsie van voor-persoonlike menslike morele waarde, min of meer parallel aan die vlak van ontwikkeling en die ontwikkeling van potensialiteit. Tweedens lei dit tot die gevolgtrekking dat die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid 'n moreel-beduidende afsnypunt is waarna die menslike fetus "normaalweg" aanspraak kan maak op 'n reg dat sy lewe voortgesit moet word. In soverre dit die toepassing van my argument betref, ontwikkel ek 'n "gematigde" posisie vis-á-vis aborsie. Ek redeneer dat alle menslike voorgeboortelike wesens wat 'n redelike kans het dat hul intrinsieke potensialiteit verder sal ontwikkel, die geleentheid daartoe gegun behoort te word. Ek aanvaar ook dat nog hierdie beskouing, nog die kompleksiteit van die menslike bestaan "absolute" posisies moreel regverdig. Die problematiek en inherente spanning tussen hierdie oënskynlik-opponerende posisies word in die teks bespreek. Nogtans beskou ek die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid as 'n moreel insiggewende afsnypunt waarna terminasie net in buitengewone omstandighede moreel regverdigbaar is.

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The thesis deals with legal aspects of euthanasia with special focus on criminal law context. It is divided into four broad chapters. First chapter defines terms that need to be understood perfectly for further work on the topic. Therefore, it deals with the term "euthanasia" and its division into active and passive euthanasia, direct and indirect, requested and unsolicited. There are also mentioned some related institutes such as dysthanasia, palliative and hospice care and assisted suicide. Last but not least, this chapter presents some arguments for and against euthanasia. Second chapter is devoted to legislation in foreign countries where euthanasia (or assisted suicide) has been legalized. Wider context of foreign legislation is important for realizing the consequences that possible legalization of euthanasia in the Czech Republic would bring. It can be clearly seen on the example of individual foreign states what legalization of euthanasia entails, how stringent the conditions that a request for termination of life has to meet are, and ultimately, we can decide whether we tend to endorse the legalization of euthanasia or go in the opposite course. Third chapter focuses on the merit of the matter, which is the legal regulation of euthanasia in the Czech Republic and the context of...

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In order to achieve that goal, we will investigate the conflict and the conformation between the fundamental right to life, to human dignity and the autonomy of the will, taking into account both doctrine and national and international jurisprudence. The main reason for the reincorporation of the subject of euthanasia into the medical and legal debate (both academic and jurisprudential) refers to the fast-moving and efficient evolution of medical science, developing treatments that can prolong the patient?s life, possibly, depending on the sickness, forever. In face of this reality, one can perceive the alteration of certain paradigms of Bioethics, such as the breaking of the paternalistic relationship between doctor and patient, the principle of beneficence according to what would be best for the patient, and the removal of unreasonable obstinacy, based on the autonomy of the will and in human dignity. In this scenario, the patients? rights are increasingly debated and new contour to the state?s duty to protect life are being given, especially when in conflict with the dignity and autonomy of the patient. In this scenario, it?s debated a possible right to die with dignity. This right promotes numerous questions, especially concerning the ethical and legal limits in cases of euthanasia, requiring the establishment of clear criteria, having as a basic principle the maximum protection of the patient?s dignity. It is emphasized that, in spite of the varied forms of assisted death, as well as the recent incorporation of ortotan?sia (term in Portuguese used for terminal patients who decline useless treatments and have their right to die granted) as legal conduct in medical ethics in Brazil, the work seeks to solve questions related to euthanasia. First classifying it, in order to avoid any form of semantic confusion. In the following points it will be discussed as a possible establishment of legal criteria as well as the practical developments, taking into account both the medical deontology and the patient?s fundamental rights. / O presente trabalho de disserta??o ? fruto de um estudo interdisciplinar entre a Ci?ncia do Direito e a Bio?tica, buscando compreender quais s?o os limites ?ticos e jur?dicos relativos a um poss?vel direito ? morte, especificamente ? eutan?sia. Para tanto, se investigar? o conflito e a conforma??o entre os direitos fundamentais ? vida, ? dignidade e ? autonomia, levando em considera??o tanto a doutrina quanto a jurisprud?ncia nacional e internacional. Elucida-se que o principal motivo para a reincopora??o da tem?tica da eutan?sia no debate m?dico e jur?dico (tanto em n?vel acad?mico quanto jurisprudencial), se refere ? r?pida e eficaz evolu??o da ci?ncia m?dica, desenvolvendo tratamentos que possam prolongar a vida de um paciente, por vezes, de modo ad eternum. Frente a essa realidade, se percebe a gradativa altera??o de determinados conceitos da Bio?tica, como a quebra da rela??o paternalista entre m?dico e paciente, o princ?pio da benefic?ncia de acordo com o que seria melhor para o paciente, e o afastamento da obstina??o irrazo?vel, todos calcados na autonomia da vontade e na dignidade da pessoa humana. Nesse cen?rio, os direitos dos pacientes s?o cada vez mais debatidos e o dever de prote??o da vida por parte do Estado passa a receber novos contornos, impondo-se limites ? dimens?o objetiva do direito fundamental ? vida, podendo prevalecer, em casos espec?ficos, a dimens?o subjetiva desse mesmo direito. Dessa rela??o entre vida, dignidade e autonomia, fala-se em um poss?vel direito ? morte digna. Contudo, restam in?meras quest?es quanto aos limites desse direito, tanto em um sentido ?tico quanto jur?dico, pois por mais que se conclua pela exist?ncia de um direito ? morte, necess?rio ser? o estabelecimento de crit?rios, limitando a autonomia dos pacientes, tendo como norte a prote??o m?xima de sua dignidade. Frisa-se que, em que pesem as mais variadas formas de morte assistida, bem como a recente incorpora??o da ortotan?sia como conduta legal na ?tica m?dica brasileira, o trabalho buscar? resolver quest?es relacionadas ? eutan?sia. Primeiro classificando-a, de modo a evitar qualquer forma de confus?o sem?ntica, para nos pontos seguintes estabelecer os crit?rios jur?dicos, bem como os desdobramentos pr?ticos calcados na deontologia m?dica.