Uppsatsen undersöker om kvartalsvisa resultatmönster kan indikera potentiellt användande av resultatmanipulering (eng. earnings management). Företag klassificeras som Negativa-Positiva- (NP), Positiva-Negativa- (PN) respektive kontrollföretag beroende på hur resultatförändringar ter sig över ett helår. Med hjälp av den modifierade Jonesmodellen beräknas därefter företagens godtyckliga periodiseringar för att undersöka om NP- eller PN-företag är mer troliga än andra företag att tillämpa periodiseringsmanipulering. Ytterligare undersökningar genomförs med fokus mot faktisk resultatmanipulering (eng. real activities manipulation) genom test av godtyckliga utgifter, effektiv skattesats och produktionskostnader. Överlag påvisas signifikanta resultat för faktisk resultatmanipulering för NP-företag vilket indikerar att NP-företag är mer troliga än andra företag att manipulera resultatet.

Introduktion och problembakgrund: Finansiell rapportering är en viktig källa för information till externa intressenter. Analytiker spelar en viktig roll som informationsförmedlare, och bidrar således till en minskad informationsassymetri mellan företaget och dess intressenter. Vidare har analytiker även en övervakande roll i bolagsstyrningen. Real activities manipulation är en form av earnings management där företaget manipulerar sitt resultat genom riktiga affärshändelser. Det finns inga tidigare studier i Sverige på sambandet mellan analytikerbevakning och RAM. Således är det av intresse att genomföra en studie på börsnoterade företag i Sverige, vilket leder till forskningsfrågan: Finns det något samband mellan analytikerbevakning och förekomsten av real activities manipulation (RAM) i börsnoterade bolag i Sverige? Syfte: Studiens syfte är att undersöka sambandet mellan analytikerbevakning och förekomsten av real activities manipulation hos företag noterade på stockholmsbörsens small- mid- och large-cap listor. Studiens första delsyfte är att kartlägga analytikerbevakningen inom urvalet. Det andra delsyftet är att skatta RAM. Teoretisk referensram: Den teoretiska referensramen är byggd på tidigare studier inom earnings management, real activities manipulation och analytikerbevakning. Vidare inkluderas även teorier som förklarar relationen analytikerbevakning och earnings management; signalteorin, agent/stewardshipteorin och prospektteorin. Metod och data: Studien är baserad på en longitudinell design med en deduktiv ansats. Studiens urval är företag noterade på Stockholmsbörsens small- mid- och large-cap listor mellan åren 2005-2015 och består efter exkluderingar av 2706 unika årliga företagsobservationer. Den normala nivån av RAM skattas för varje år och bransch och genomförs genom flertalet OLS regressioner. Residualerna från regressionerna hypotestestas sedan mot analytikerbevakning och tre andra relevanta kontrollvariabler för att undersöka sambandet. Resultat: Studiens resultat är att det absoluta värdet av de undersökta RAM metoderna har ett positivt och signifikant samband med analytikerbevakning. Detta betyder att ju fler analytiker som följer ett företag desto mer manipulation genom RAM förekommer. Sambandet är i likhet med tidigare studier. Vidare finner vi även att signed värdet av RAM metoderna har ett signifikant samband med analytikerbevakning. Signed värdena visar på att de olika RAM metoderna tillämpas för att manipulera resultatet i en viss riktning beroende på nivån av analytikerbevakning. Slutsats: I studien har vi kommit fram till att analytikerbevakning har ett signifikant samband med förekomsten av RAM. Tänkbara anledningar till detta är att manipulation genom RAM kan ske på ett effektivt eller opportunistiskt vis. Vidare kan analytikerbevakningen tänkas bidra till en press på företagsledningen att utföra RAM. Detta för att kunna uppnå resultat i linje med analytikernas prognoser.

This paper examines the behaviour and use of accruals management (AM) and real activities manipulation (RAM) under local Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and if it has been altered following IFRS implementation in Sweden, Finland and Norway. The paper takes inspiration from Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012) and use previously developed frameworks for earnings management. It provides empirical results with data from 1997 to 2016, focusing on companies around zero earnings and zero earnings growth. The results are mixed where the use of RAM through production suggests increased earnings manipulation. RAM, through discretionary expenditures, on the other hand are positive, which suggests that companies do not engage in these activities. The results regarding AM suggest downward adjustments. However, neither discretionary expenditures nor AM have a significant change following IFRS implementation. Overall, earnings management behavior in the sample appears to be limited. Although, increased RAM has been found regarding production costs, which suggest adjustments following IFRS adoption. Lastly the paper finds that studying one type of earnings management behavior, as often previously done in research, is insufficient in order to fully estimate earnings management.

Prior literature suggests two competing theories regarding the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in their portfolio companies. The VC monitoring hypothesis argues that VCs effectively resolve the managerial agency problem through close monitoring and restraining managers' earnings management behavior. The VC moral hazard hypothesis argues that VCs aggravate the private benefits agency problem by exerting influence over managers to artificially inflate exit stock price through earnings management. Using a sample of IPO firms between 1987 and 2002, after controlling for the magnitude of accruals manipulation (AM), I compare the magnitude of real activities manipulation (RM) between venture-backed and non-venture-backed companies. I find that relative to non-venture-backed companies, venture-backed companies show significantly less RM in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The results are robust after controlling for the VC selection endogeneity. The finding supports the VC monitoring hypothesis that VCs restrain managers' RM behavior. Furthermore, I document that venture-backed companies exhibit a significant difference from non-venture-backed companies only in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The difference between the two groups in either the IPO year or the second post-IPO fiscal year is not significant, or at best, is weak. This finding is consistent with the argument that VCs tighten their control during the lockup expiration period when insiders such as managers or founders have strong incentives to inflate earnings. By the end of the second post-IPO fiscal year when VCs exit the portfolio companies, their impact on portfolio companies' RM decreases dramatically which makes the difference between the two groups less significant. In addition, using a sample of venture-backed IPOs from 1987 to 2002, I find that companies backed by high-reputation VCs show significantly less RM than those backed by low-reputation VCs in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The results are robust to alternative VC reputation proxies. This finding is consistent with the argument that high-reputation VCs have more incentives to preserve reputation and better ability to monitor managers than low-reputation VCs.

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In the first essay, I examine the association between auditor industry specialization and earnings management choices. Prior research suggests that industry specialist auditors constrain accounting-based earnings management. But such actions may cause client companies to seek alternative means to manage earnings. Specifically, companies that hire industry specialist auditors may alter operating decisions to meet earnings targets, referred to as real activities manipulation. This essay investigates whether clients of industry specialist auditors that have an incentive to manage earnings are constrained from managing earnings through accruals manipulation and, therefore, are more likely to engage in real activities manipulation. Further, I examine whether operating performance declines for firms suspected of real activities manipulation. My findings indicate that clients of industry specialist auditors with incentives to manage earnings have lower absolute value of accruals relative to firms with incentives to manage earnings that do not hire industry specialist auditors. These clients of industry specialist auditors are also more likely to engage in real activities manipulation, suggesting this is a possible unintended consequence of hiring an industry specialist auditor. I also document evidence that firms suspected of real activities manipulation have lower future operating performance relative to firms not suspected of real activities manipulation. In the second essay, I examine the association between the tightness of accounting standards and earnings management choices. Prior studies suggest that managers switch from accounting-based earnings management to real activities manipulation in response to tightening accounting standards. My study investigates this line of reasoning. I develop an analytical model and conduct an experimental examination of the effect of flexibility of accounting standards under different institutional environments. I find that managers switch from accounting-based earnings management to real activities manipulation with tightening accounting standards only when the institutional investors have a short-term investment horizon. In contrast, when managers are monitored by institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon, they do not engage in such behavior.

管理當局與利害關係人(stakeholders)之間，透過會計資訊的提供，可降低代理問題及資訊不對稱。惟會計資訊的提供，依管理當局介入的程度不同，會有層次上的差別。 本文即從層次開始，界定了盈餘管理(Earnings Management)與盈餘操縱(Earnings Manipulation)的不同，而透過營運政策中的營業活動(operational activities)來影響盈餘的方式地處兩者之間的灰色地帶，目前至今尚少討論。Roychowdhury(2006)則以美國市場為對象，首開先例發展了如何偵測公司透過營業活動的實質盈餘管理行為。 本文同樣選定避免報導損失為盈餘門檻，考量台灣市場的特性後，偵測台灣企業是否有真實營業活動的盈餘管行為。實證結果顯示，無論是透過銷貨操縱、降低裁決性支出還是過量生產以降低銷貨成本的實質交易操作，都得到顯著地支持。進一步分析那些特性的企業，較容易透過真實營業相關的活動來從事盈餘管理行為時發現，債務契約壓力高、成長性機會高及利害關係人緊密度高者符合預期，而製造業性質則與預期相反，盈餘管理彈性則未得到支持。另外在機構投資人持股方面，則發現高機構投資人持股可降低過量生產實質交易操作的可能，但未能有效防止降低裁決性支出的操作。 / Through providing accounting information for stakeholders , management could somewhat reduce agency problem and information asymmetry.But accounting information quality could be different depending on how management intervene in . This article begins from distinguishing between Earnings Management and Earnings Manipulation.To intervene in business policy through real operational activities is not only one way that is hard to categorize in Earnings Management or Earnings Manipulation but also receives little attention to date. Roychowdhury(2006), taking American market as observation values,was the first one who developed how to detect real operational activities earnings management. Following Roychowdhury(2006),I define avoiding reporting loss as earnings threshold to detect whether real operational activities earnings management exists in Taiwan business.There is obvious evidence suggesting sales manipulation、reduction of discretionary expenditures and overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold to improve reported margins.To go a step further,I test observation values of what characters are inclined to manipulate earnings through real operational activities. I find supporting evidence in observation values with higher debt stress、higher growth opportunity、higher connection with stakeholders and samples on non manufacturing industry.But I find no evidence in observation values with higer earnings management elasticity.In addition,I find observation values with higher instutional holding shares could abate the possibilities of overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold,but fail to avoid the manipulation of reduction of discretionary expenditures.

Sammanfattning Examensarbete, Civilekonomprogrammet Titel: Accounting Hocus-Pocus - En studie över de oberoende styrelseledamöternas påverkan på resultatmanipulering. Bakgrund: De principbaserade regelverk som börsnoterade företag tvingas följa, skapar utrymme för ledningen att manipulera redovisningen. Utöver dessa möjligheter kan ledningen dessutom genom manipulation av kassaflödet, justera företagets resultat. När dessa resultatmanipulationer används med fel avsikt riskerar de att minska informationsvärdet av företagets redovisning. Vi ställer oss frågande till hur styrelsens oberoende kan förklara resultatmanipulering. Syfte: Studien avser att förklara i vilken utsträckning resultatmanipulering i svenska företag påverkas av styrelsens oberoende. Metod: Genom användning av tvärsnittsstudie med en deduktiv ansats har studien granskat huruvida resultatmanipulering påverkas av styrelseledamöternas oberoende, samt av olika attribut som anses förstärka ledamöternas övervakande effekt. Studiens hypoteser formulerades med hjälp av teorier som PAT, Agentteorin och Stewardshipteorin som sedan testades mot data insamlad från företag på Stockholmsbörsen för år 2017. Slutsatser: Studien finner avvikelser mellan resultaten för redovisningsmanipulation och kassaflödesmanipulation. Resultatet visar att oberoende styrelseledamöter i svenska styrelser har en negativ relation till kassaflödesmanipulering, medan relationen till redovisningsmanipulation är positiv. / Abstract Master Thesis in Business Administration Titel: Accounting Hocus-Pocus - A study of the independent directors effect on earnings management Background: The principle-based regulation that listed companies are obliged to follow gives the management opportunities to manipulate the accounting with discretionary accruals, and thereby changing the reported earnings of the company.  The management could also manipulate the earnings through real activities manipulation. When these acts of earnings management are used with the wrong intentions it could reduce the information value of the company’s financial reports. We are questioning how different board dependence and -independence could explain earnings management. Purpose: The study aims to explain to what extent earnings management in Swedish companies is affected by board independence. Method: By using a cross-sectional study with a deductive approach our study has researched how earnings management is affected by board independence, and how different attributes is to enhance the independent board members monitoring. Hypotheses were formed through theories such as PAT, Agency theory and Stewardship theory which later was tested with data gathered from companies of the Stockholm stock exchange of the year 2017. Conclusions: Our study finds a difference between the results of manipulation through the discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation. The result show that independent directors have a negative effect on cash flow manipulation while they have a positive effect on accounting manipulation.

公司名稱不僅僅是識別的代號，還具有深切的意義存在，且更名還需花費很大的成本、面對原有客戶流失的風險，故企業更名背後的真正涵義是值得深入探討的。 本研究旨在探討在CRSP有更名紀錄之美國上市公司，是否會透過實質交易或裁決性應計之方式進行盈餘管理。除了比較更名前後盈餘管理程度之差異，同時也以更名公司為實驗組，並選取未更名公司作為對照組，檢測在更名後，更名公司與未更名公司之盈餘管理程度是否有顯著差異。另外，為額外分析不同類型的更名原因，是否會採取不同的盈餘管理方式，依不同標準選取以下二類之更名公司：第一類為因業務範圍改變而更名；第二類為無原因之更名。 實證結果發現，更名公司在更名後，比起更名前及未更名公司，可能有以操縱銷貨來壓低現金流量、透過過量生產以降低銷貨成本的實質交易行為，進行裁決性應計項目之盈餘管理也較為嚴重。額外分析不同原因的更名公司之實證結果則發現，無原因之更名公司在更名後，進行實質交易之情形較業務範圍改變之更名公司嚴重。 / This study investigates the impact of corporate name changes on earnings management. We examine earnings management behavior in the period leading to the passage of name change effective year and in the period following the passage of name change effective year, focusing on both real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management. To make further investigations, we conduct analysis of firms that change name because of broader or narrower focus the firm’s scope of business versus firms that change name with no reason. The empirical results show that name change firms use more accruals and real earnings management after name changes when compared to similar firms. Furthermore, we also find that firms change name with no reason tend to adopt real earnings management when compared to the firms that change name because of broader or narrow focus.