Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2003. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-116).

Part One defends the thesis, first advanced by Aristotle, that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and argues for its philosophical significance. Opposition to the thesis rests on a contestable way of distinguishing between acts and contents of reasoning and on a picture of normative principles as external to the actions that fall under them. The resulting view forces us to choose between the efficacious, world-changing character of practical thought and its subjection to objective rational standards. This is a false choice. Aristotle's own understanding of the thesis points the way to an alternative conception of practical reason on which it is at once a power to effect changes in the world and to get things right. Practical reasoning endows the action performed on its basis with a principle that is not imposed on it from outside: instead, it makes the action what it is. Properly understood in terms of the relevant acts of a rational subject, the thesis is defensible and philosophically attractive. Furthermore, it helps us understand the continuity and discontinuity that exists between the motions of human beings and those of other animals, as Aristotle showed. / Philosophy

Uppsatsen ska ge en bild av de olika förhållningssätten till gudstjänsten som finns inom Svenska kyrkan som i sitt uppdrag har att föra ut evangeliet. Det är gudstjänstens förhållande till den Augsburgska bekännelsen, här främst inriktat på den IV, V och den VII av de förnämsta trosartiklarna som ska utläggas. Vilka konsekvenser får då de skilda synsätten som råder i gudstjänstens utformning och gestaltning? Några av de modeller som finns kommer att redovisas, från den renodlade högkyrkliga till dagens aktuella former som består av en blandning av tidigare inriktningar tillsammans med nya koncept. Slutligen ställer jag också frågan om Svenska kyrkans uppgift och betydelse för dagens människa och hur hon lever upp till sin önskan och vision att nå ”alla” människor med evangeliet. Sv.kyrkan är en evangelisk-luthersk bekännelsekyrka och min frågeställning i denna uppsats är hur och om Sv.kyrkan lever upp till detta ideal eller inte. Givetvis kan jag inte ge ett rakt och konkret svar på hur Sv.kyrkan på bästa sätt lever upp till sitt uppdrag, men uppsatsen kan väcka tankar över Sv.kyrkans uppgift och betydelse i dagens samhälle. De förnämsta trosartiklarna i den Augsburgska bekännelsen utgör tillsammans med de tre versionerna av trosbekännelsen, den apostoliska, nicaenska och den athanasianska, är kärnpunkten av Sv.kyrkans bekännelseskrifter som varandes evangelisk-luthersk bekännelsekyrka. Gudstjänsten är det centrala i gestaltningen av Sv.kyrkans tro, bekännelse och lära. Den Augsburgska bekännelsen bör betraktas som den gudstjänstfirande församlingens dokument som är nyckeln till evangeliets bruk som har sin grund i gudstjänstens bekännelse som slår vakt om en rätt gudstjänst, alltså är det själva gudstjänsten som gestaltar Sv.kyrkans tro och bekännelse. Luther såg gudstjänstfirandet som det säkra kännetecknet och helgelsemedlet. Sv.kyrkan har den Augsburgska bekännelsen som riktlinje och ledning i sitt arbete och bland de främsta trosartiklarna finner vi den IV som beskriver den tro som leder till en rättfärdighet inför Gud. Därefter följer den V trosartikeln som visar att det är genom det inrättade predikoämbetet som förmedlar Ordet, evangeliet och sakramenten som skänker den heliga Anden och frambringar den rätta tron. Som en motbild beskrivs de som tror att den heliga Anden kan komma till människorna genom deras egna ansträngningar, utan det utvärtes ordets förmedling. Av detta kan man dra slutsatsen att prästämbetet i Sv.kyrkan har ett stort ansvar i sin utövning av sitt ämbete. Detta bekräftar den VII trosartikeln ytterligare där kyrkan beskrivs som de heligas samfund där evangeliet rent förkunnas och sakramenten rätt förvaltas.

Michael Della Rocca has provided an influential interpretation of Spinoza relying heavily on the principle of sufficient reason. In order to challenge this interpretation, I identify three assumptions Della Rocca makes about the PSR and demonstrate that it is not clear Spinoza shares them. First, Della Rocca contends that the PSR is unlimited in scope. I show that the scope of Spinoza’s version of the PSR is ambiguous. While it is clear that substances and modes are included, it is unclear just how widely the scope extends. Second, Della Rocca argues that the PSR demands there are no illegitimate bifurcations. I argue that Della Rocca’s account of illegitimate bifurcations is too strong. I show that Spinoza offers a distinction in explanatory types that should be considered illegitimate and inexplicable according to Della Rocca’s definition of illegitimate bifurcations. Third, Della Rocca argues that explanations which satisfy the demands of the PSR must be in terms of the concepts involved. I show that Spinoza does not use conceptual explanations. Instead, in almost all cases, the explanations Spinoza relies on to satisfy the demands of the PSR are in terms of a thing’s cause. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2014-03-28 11:35:29.035

Official statistics provide us with some of our most important insights into crime and the criminal justice system. Sociologists, however, have generally not examined the institutions which produce these statistics. "Making Crime Count" addresses this lacuna through a study of the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS), which is Canada's sole source for national criminal justice statistics. To do so it employs a methodological combination of focused interviews, participant observation and documentary analysis. The availability of criminal justice statistics has fostered a distinctive approach to the governance of crime and criminal justice. A form of 'actuarial justice' has emerged whereby crime is increasingly understood as a statistical probability rather than a moral failing. At the same time, criminal justice statistics render criminal justice organizations amenable to governmental strategies that aim to manage the system. To examine the means by which the Centre has been able to produce its statistics, I draw from contemporary work in the sociology of science which emphasizes the role of complex knowledge networks in the production of scientific facts. Within the Centre's 'knowledge network' assorted elements and institutions must be aligned. We document the ways in which the CCJS is in continual negotiation with the police in order to secure data for the 'uniform crime report' survey. The Centre's controversial 1990 proposal to collect race/crime data is also explored as an example of the power and politics of official classifications. Although the Centre must maintain the appearance of being apolitical, they are occasionally engaged in micro- political negotiations in order to produce their statistics. We document the role that different jurisdictions play in shaping the Centre's knowledge production regime. Once their statistics are collected, there can be negotiations over how they should be publicized. The style of presentation employed by the CCJS is ultimately influenced by organizational constraints, audience considerations and epistemic concerns. The overall results of this research underline the importance for authors writing on 'governmentality' to consider the means through which governmental knowledge is produced.

This thesis examines Kantian conceptions of freedom. Beginning with Kant himself, I show how Kant’s response to Hume concerning the rational justification of causal judgements results in his claim that the sensible world is governed a priori by causal principles. Kant’s moral philosophy, however, requires a robust conception of freedom for moral agency to be possible. These two features leave Kant in an apparent contradiction, for it is unclear how we, as members of the physical, causal world, can be truly free if all events are governed by causal laws. I show that Kant’s solution to this contradiction lies in an important aspect of his transcendental idealism: the noumenal/phenomenal distinction. I argue, further, that his solution is problematic due to the fundamentally unknowable quality of the noumenal realm, wherein freedom is located. John McDowell’s Mind and World is introduced as an alternative to the extreme Kantian dualism between noumena and phenomena, while remaining within a broadly Kantian framework. Like Kant, McDowell locates our freedom in our ability to operate through reason, though unlike his predecessor, he situates “the space of reasons” within nature. This becomes possible by extending our conception of nature to include a “second nature”, thus making our initiation into the space of reasons—into the realm of freedom—a natural process. Remaining Kantian in spirit, however, McDowell’s account inherits a problematic Kantian feature. He maintains the distinction between two modes of intelligibility—between naturalistic and rational modes of explanation—thus leaving room for a hard-nosed naturalist to question the autonomy of the latter. I argue that Peter Strawson’s proposal in “Freedom and Resentment” is able to assuage this worry in McDowell’s otherwise plausible model. In it, Strawson provides an account of why the autonomy of rational explanations can never be undermined by purely naturalistic explanations, even in the face of a theoretical conviction in determinism. Strawson argues that our “personal reactive attitudes” (like gratitude and resentment)—attitudes that express our commitment to a moral life and are representative of our functioning within the space of reasons—could never be undermined by the truth of determinism, and this reveals the extent to which our conception of ourselves as rational agents is immune from assault by the determinist. The result is a compelling form of compatibilism that persuasively retains the space of reasons without appeal to Kantian noumenalism. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-14 14:36:23.511

One major trajectory of early 'aql traditions is scrutinized: the Aqbil! Adbir! creation narrative "lamma khalaqa llahu l-'aqla (When god had created the intelligence ...)". In Part I early Sunni and Shii transmission and reception of the varying texts dominates the discussion, with analysis of chief motifs. Then successive transformations are traced, with attention devoted to ideas of 'first creation'. The original context of the Aqbil! reports is convincingly explained within the thought forms of 1st & 2nd century theological ideas of voluntarism or predestination, without recourse to Goldziher's "new-Platonic element". The late neo-Platonising form "awwalu ma khalaqa llahu l-'aqlu, (The first (thing) God created is the intellect ...)", is shown to be not earlier than the mid-3rd/9th century. / In a related class of narratives, 'aql pre-exists in the realm of the divine Throne. The focus is the notion of the divinely provisioned innate trait of 'intelligence' or 'wisdom' as a "light in the heart" inequitably apportioned among humanity. Part II examines the creative manner in which the sixth Shi'iimam Ja'far al-Sadiq (d.148/765) transforms the Aqbil! tradition by integrating this heavenly sapiential 'aql with the 'Adam-Iblis' conflict into a binary listing of the character traits (akhlaq, khisal). His myth of the creation, empowerment, and opposition between 'aql and jahl (intelligence & ignorance, or wisdom & folly) propounds a psycho-ethical scheme for the inner purgative struggle, wherein 'aql operates as chief of the character traits, Ja'far stresses the cognitive function (ma'rifah) in the perfection of 'aql peculiar to the inner circles of humanity (prophets, saints$ $ Imams, the faithful). An assessment is given of the repercussions of al-Sadiq's contribution for continuing Shii and Sufi enrichments of the 'aql creation narratives (eg. with al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi).

Normal human limitations mean that when people decide how to act, they often have to base their decisions on flawed information or reasoning. Even when agents reason to the best of their ability, and form intentions consistent with that reasoning, they sometimes get things wrong. Dominant theories about reasons for action argue that all good, or ‘normative’, reasons for acting are objective normative reasons. But objective normative reasons for action are derived from facts about the world that ignore certain facts about human agents. On these accounts of reasons, real human agents can be unable to learn what they have normative reason to do. A common response to this problem is to say that in such situations people act in a praiseworthy way, but their actions are based on false beliefs, and false beliefs cannot be good reasons. I argue that when agents reason to the best of their ability and form intentions consistent with that reasoning, agents act appropriately in response to states of the world that are normative reasons for action. To support my claim, I develop an account of what I call ‘justifiable reasons’, normative reasons for action that human agents can always use as a basis for action, and the form of reason that underpins rationality. I discuss the similarities and differences between my account of justifiable reasons and several approaches to reasons that resemble my account. I show that, in spite of objections, justifiable reasons are normative reasons, not motivating reasons. Accounts of subjective normative reasons are based on examples that look similar to mine. So, I explain why justifiable reasons are not subjective normative reasons. Some features of internal reasons also resemble features of justifiable reasons. But, I show that there is nothing about justifiable reasons that entails that they must be internal or external reasons. I take it that justifiable and objective normative reasons serve different purposes, so I explain these different purposes. Finally, I argue in support of my claim that to be rational, agents must act appropriately in response to justifiable reasons.

Syfte: Syftet med studien är att beskriva och analysera vad företag inom den privata sektorn har för uttalade motiv till att hållbarhetsredovisa. Metod: I denna studie har den kvalitativa forskningsmetoden tillämpats. Vidare genomfördes semistrukturerade intervjuer med olika företag verkande inom olika branscher. Intervjuerna hade alla en intervjumall som utgångspunkt vid intervjun. Empirin har kommit oss tillhanda från intervjuer med elva företag. Fem telefonintervjuer genomförda med Hemtex, KappAhl, IKEA, NilsonGroup och Fritidsresor. Även sex intervjuer genomförda på plats, dessa företag var Handelsbanken, Bring, EY, Folksam, JM och Fabege. Empiri: Resultatet visade att de främsta motiven till att privata företag valde att hållbarhetsredovisa var för att visa transparens gentemot dess intressenter, långsiktigheten vad gäller framtida generationer och företagets affärsnytta, samt att det för vissa upplevdes som ett krav. Slutsats: Beroende på hållbarhetsredovisningens omfattning och frekvens i företagen drog vi slutsatsen att det fanns ett klart samband mellan dessa och företagets motivation. De företag som etablerat arbetet mer i affärsverksamheten visade tendens till att se arbetet som långsiktigt, medan företag med ett mindre strukturerat arbete mer upplevde det som ett krav. Att visa transparent till intressenterna var även det ett viktigt motiv för företagen att hållbarhetsredovisa. / Purpose: The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze what companies in the private sector has stated for reasons for sustainability reporting. Methods: In this study we have applied a qualitative research method and used semi-structured interviews with different companies, operating in various industries. All the interviews used an interview guide for the interview. The empirical research has been collected by interviews with eleven companies. Five interviews conducted by phone with Hemtex, KappAhl, IKEA, NilsonGroup and Fritidsresor. Six interviews were conducted at each companies headquarter. These companies were Handelsbanken, Bring, EY, Folksam, JM and Fabege. Empirics: The result shows that the primary motivations for private companies to do sustainability reporting were to show transparency towards their stakeholders, look in a long-term perspective in terms of future generations and business benefit and that some felt that they were forced. Conclusion: Depending on the extent on sustainability reporting and its frequency in the companies there was a clear correlation between these and their motivation. The companies that had establish the work more in the business tended to see the work as a long-term, while companies with a less structured work saw it as a forced work. To show transparent to stakeholders was also an important reason for companies to work with a sustainability report.

This project is primarily exegetical in nature and aims to provide a rational reconstruction of the concept of moral responsibility in the work of Immanuel Kant, specifically in his Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GR), and Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR). It consists of three chapters – the first chapter interprets the concept of freedom that follows from the resolution to the Third Antinomy in the CPR. It argues that Kant is best understood here to be providing an unusual but cogent, compatibilist account of freedom that the author terms meta-compatibilism. The second chapter examines the GR and CPrR to interpret the theory of practical reason and moral agency that Kant develops in these works. This chapter concludes by evaluating what has been established about Kant’s ideas of freedom and moral agency at that point in the project, identifying some problems and objections in addition to providing some suggestions for how Kantian ethics might be adapted within a consequentialist framework. The third chapter argues that, for Kant, there are two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (in addition to a compatibilist definition of freedom) that must obtain for an individual to qualify as responsible for her actions.