O objetivo desta dissertação é problematizar o papel exercido pelas ideias da razão da formulação do conhecimento, isto é, mostrar como as ideias contribuem para que seja possível conceber a natureza como uma totalidade sistemática cognoscível, bem como para que seja possível uma experiência sistemática que confira sentido ao ato conceitualizador do entendimento e à atividade científica como um todo, algo que, conforme defendemos, depende inevitavelmente que seja possível pensar o mundo como algo organizável. Na Crítica da Razão Pura Kant afirma que o conhecimento começa com intuições, passa por conceitos e termina com ideias e ainda que toda ciência tem uma ideia por base, de forma que, o que fazemos na primeira parte do texto, é justamente aclarar a natureza mesma das ideias, de forma que não paire dúvida sobre o que são, bem como procuramos enfrentar as objeções de alguns comentadores sobre a necessidade do emprego das ideias para o estabelecimento de conhecimento seguro. Na segunda parte analisamos o primeiro momento do Apêndice, localizando ali a questão aqui travada e mostrando como Kant estabelece os usos adequados para as ideias da razão de forma que os velhos erros da metafísica não sejam ressuscitados e por fim, na terceira e última parte, buscamos mostrar o caráter específico que a ideia de um Deus criador e arquiteto exerce para assegurar a ordem necessária para o estabelecimento do conhecimento, isto é, legando a uma ideia da razão o papel de fiadora da possibilidade de se conceber a natureza de forma ordenada e, por conseguinte, cognoscível. / The aim of this dissertation is to problematize the role played by the ideas of reason in the process of unfolding of knowledge, namely, to show in which manner the ideas of reason contribute into turning possible to conceive nature (or the world) as a knowable systematic totality and also turning possible the sort of systematic experience that gives meaning to the conceptualizer act of the understanding and to the scientific activity as a whole either, something that, as we argue for, inevitably depends on the chance to think the world as something organized. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant asserts that knowledge starts with intuitions, goes through concepts and ends up with ideas, and also that every science has an idea on its basis, given this, what we do in the first part of the text is exactly to clarify the nature of ideas in themselves, in such a way that there is no doubt about what they are; we also seek to face some objections made by commentators about the necessity of the employment of the ideas to the constitution of safe knowledge. In the second part we analyze the first part of the Appendix, finding there the issue investigated here and showing how Kant sets the proper uses of the ideas of reason in a way that the old errors of metaphysics are not restored. At last, in the third part, we aim to show the particular character that the idea of an architect and creator God plays to ensure the necessary order to the settlement of knowledge, i.e., the attribution to an idea of reason the condition of founder of the possibility to conceive nature in an ordered way and, thereafter, knowable.

Nosso trabalho consiste em investigar a relação entre formação do juízo e educação moral no Emílio de Rousseau. Para examinar esta relação, pretendemos, num primeiro momento, analisar, nos três primeiros livros da obra, como Rousseau concebe a preparação da criança, desde o nascimento até a idade da razão, para a formação moral. Trata-se aqui de acompanhar o processo de desenvolvimento da criança, tal como descrito por Rousseau, assinalando os aspectos deste desenvolvimento que irão possibilitar ao discípulo chegar ao momento de sua formação em que ele se torne capaz de formar juízos morais. Em segundo lugar, analisamos a questão mesma da relação entre formação do juízo e educação moral, tal como Rousseau a concebe no livro IV do Emílio. Esta análise exigirá o exame da distinção entre sensação e juízo, que está exposta na Profissão de Fé do vigário de Savóia, no mesmo livro IV / Our job is to investigate the relationship between formation of judgment and moral education in Emile Rousseau. To examine this relationship, we aim, at first, to analyze the first three books of the work, as Rousseau conceives the preparation of the child from birth to the age of reason, to moral education. it is to follow the process of the child as described by Rousseau, signaling aspects of this development that will enable the disciple to reach the moment of its formation in that it becomes capable of forming moral judgments. Secondly, we analyzed the same question of the relationship between formation of judgment and moral education as Rousseau conceives it in Book IV of Emilio. This analysis will require the examination of the distinction between sense and judgment, which is exposed in the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar, in the same book IV

I aim to provide a satisfying response to radical scepticism, a view according to which our knowledge of the external world is impossible. In the first chapter I investigate into the nature and the source of scepticism. Radical scepticism is motivated both by the closureRK-based and the underdeterminationRK-based sceptical arguments. Because these two sceptical arguments are logically independent, any satisfying anti-sceptical proposal must take both of them into consideration. Also, scepticism is a paradox, albeit a spurious one, so we need to provide a diagnosis as to why we are lead into the paradox and why the alleged paradox misrepresents our epistemic standings. Hence, I advocate an obstacle-dissolving strategy for combating the sceptical problem. In chapter two, I discuss the anti-sceptical import of transcendental arguments. Although ambitious transcendental arguments are vulnerable to Stroud’s dilemma, I argue that modest transcendental arguments are promising. Modest transcendental arguments start from an undoubted psychological fact and then reveal some necessary theoretical commitments that we must make. Regarding these commitments, I submit that we are type II epistemically justified in believing them. Our commitments are type II justified in the sense that making these commitments can promote our epistemic goals, namely, the attainment of true beliefs and the avoidance of false beliefs. After that, in light of Cassam’s objection to transcendental arguments, I contend that a modest transcendental argument should be used as a stepping stone for a diagnostic anti-sceptical proposal. In chapter three, I develop a Davidsonian response to closureRK-based radical scepticism. This form of sceptical argument rests on the idea that there is no limitation on our acquisition of rationally grounded knowledge. I discuss Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation, the principle of charity and triangulation. Crucially, he argues that the content of a knowledge-apt everyday belief is determined by its typical cause and other relevant beliefs. Further, among different propositional attitudes, belief is prior to doubt. What follows is that doubt must be local because it must presume other content-determining beliefs. Also, I explore Davidson’s view on the concept of belief. On his view, in order to have a knowledge-apt belief, we must have the concept of knowledge-apt belief. We can command this concept by having the concept of objective truth. Objective truth requires that we are aware of and are capable of appreciating the possibility of a belief’s being true or false. And this possibility cannot be appreciated unless we have some related contentful beliefs to identify the content of the very belief. However, we are committed to, as opposed to believing, the proposition that the sceptical hypothesis does not obtain. It is impossible to appreciate the possibility of our fundamental commitments being false from our own perspective, because fundamental commitments specify the general cause of our beliefs. A change in this regard would cause a total change of the content of all beliefs, which leaves us no contentful belief at all to make this possibility intelligible. Therefore, the closureRK principle is not applicable to the evaluation of the sceptical hypothesis. Hence, we can retain the closureRK principle while evading the closureRK-based sceptical challenge. Unfortunately, the Davidsonian response cannot deal with the underdeterminationRK-based sceptical challenge, because we are not shown whether our rational support in the good case favours one’s everyday belief over its sceptical counterpart. In chapter four, I examine how epistemological disjunctivism can deal with underdeterminationRK-based radical scepticism. This form of sceptical argument assumes that our rational support provides at best inconclusive support for our beliefs. Therefore, a belief’s being rationally supported, no matter in the good case or in the bad case, is compatible with the belief’s being false. Epistemological disjunctivism claims that in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge, our rational support can be both factive and reflectively accessible. The factive rational support at issue is one’s propositional seeing. I discuss both McDowell’s and Pritchard’s proposals for motivating factive seeing, and I argue for epistemological disjunctivism against three prime facie objections, i.e., the distinguishability problem, the basis problem and the access problem. When epistemological disjunctivism is shown to be a plausible view, I argue that underdeterminationRK-based radical scepticism can be dismissed. In particular, in the optimal case, factive rational support favours our everyday belief over the sceptical hypothesis. However, regarding closureRK-based radical scepticism, epistemological disjunctivism seems to licence a robust answer. The ambitious answer is that, in the good case, we can after all know the denial of the sceptical hypothesis in virtue of possessing factive rational support. And it is the immodesty of this answer that renders this response unpalatable. In the last chapter, I propose a combined treatment of the sceptical problem. Although both the Davidsonian response and the epistemological disjunctivist response can only deal with one aspect of the sceptical problem, their views are in fact mutually supportive. On the one hand, the Davidsonian response, together with a Wittgensteinian insight, shows that why rational support can only be provided in a local manner; on the other hand, epistemological disjunctivism reminds us that rational support can be factive in the good case. Putting these two points together allows us to answer the whole sceptical challenge in a uniform way. This combined proposal has three claims. First, our rational support can be both local and factive, so we can dismiss both sceptical arguments in one go. Second, the sceptical problem is a spurious paradox, so the combined treatment involves a diagnosis. This diagnosis starts from a modest transcendental argument which reveals some necessary commitments that we must make, and then proceeds to expose faulty assumptions in the sceptical paradox. Third, once the dubious assumptions are dislodged, we can evade the sceptical problem once and for all. In the end, we are offered with a satisfying response to radical scepticism.

O principal objetivo desta pesquisa é analisar alguns das principais idéias envolvidas no labirinto da liberdade, um dos assuntos de grande destaque dentro da filosofia leibniziana. Por um lado, Leibniz sempre defendeu a máxima racionalidade de todos os fatos, o que acaba por indicar que todos estes estão absolutamente predeterminados. Por outro, ele procurou mostrar que todos os seres racionais são moralmente responsáveis pelos seus atos conforme suas vontades. Por meio de um grande esforço conceitual, Leibniz procurou conciliar a idéia de um destino, racionalmente delineável, junto à idéia de liberdade das ações dos seres racionais; ele não quis defender nem a pura necessidade e nem o puro acaso. O principal aliado nessa tarefa foi o Princípio de Razão Suficiente. Este princípio ganhou foi fortalecido a partir do desenvolvimento do conceito das infinitas substâncias completas (entelechia, substância individuais, mônadas), que foi elaborado gradualmente ao longo da sua vida filosófica. Uma reconstrução básica de algumas das principais teses da metafísica leibniziana permite observar como as criaturas (especialmente as racionais) passaram a ser consideras as legítimas responsáveis por suas ações, sem que o mundo representasse uma espécie de caos. / The main goal of this dissertation is to investigate some aspects of the Labyrinth of Freedom, a key subject in the Philosophy of Leibniz. On one hand, Leibniz supported the maximum rationality of all events, meaning that they are all absolutely predetermined. On the other, he tried to show that rational beings are morally responsible for their actions, and that requires free will. Through an act of great intellectual effort Leibniz tried to conciliate an idea of all embracing destiny (rationally understood) and the concept of freedom. He resisted admitting a vision of the world driven either by absolute necessity or lost to pure chance. His main ally in this task was the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This principle gained strength from the development of the concept of infinite substances (entelechia, individual substance, monades) that was gradually forged throughout the philosopher\'s life. A brief reconstruction of some of the main features of Leibniz´s metaphysics allows us to perceive how all creatures (especially rational ones) could be seen to be truly responsible for what they do and the choices they make in a rationally structured world.

Esta Tese estuda o papel da Razão e da Emoção no virtuosismo, como se integram aí sintaxe e semântica. Procuramos entender como a obra de arte é vivida, intuída, tanto no momento da sua concepção quanto no momento da sua execução. Nosso objetivo específico foi o de estudar como as composições de Ludwig van Beethoven encontram resplendor artístico nas mãos do virtuose Fritz Jank. Depois de várias leituras, cursos, estudos sobre a obra musical escolhemos como nosso referencial teórico, a obra de Suzanne Langer por harmonizar-se inteiramente com a linha de pesquisa Razão e Emoção, do Laboratório de Epistemologia Genética do qual participamos. Sua formação néo-kantiana, grandemente influenciada por Ernst Cassirer, permitiu-nos uma compreensão e uma visão da obra de arte e especialmente da música, perfeitamente inseridas na produção científica desse Laboratório. Um virtuose necessita ter o domínio da sintaxe da linguagem musical, ou seja, o domínio do conhecimento musical. Entretanto, quando só há a técnica, aos artistas parece faltar humanidade, paixão, emoção. Procuramos mostrar como, tanto a razão quanto a emoção, estão unidas, quer para a composição, quer para a interpretação musicais. O virtuose, assim, transcende esses aspectos, pois necessita ser um artista com excepcional domínio da técnica, da sintaxe da linguagem musical, além de ter profunda sensibilidade musical. Para fundamentar esta pesquisa realizamos comparações das interpretações pianísticas de Fritz Jank com as de outros grandes mestres do teclado, em execuções de algumas sonatas de Ludwig van Beethoven, por nós selecionadas. Neste trabalho procuramos dar uma idéia da carreira musical de Fritz Jank como professor e virtuose, recolhendo dados dos jornais, entrevistando alguns de seus contemporâneos e até acompanhando cursos sobre a sua obra. Esperamos assim, prestar uma homenagem ao grande mestre, nosso professor, que presenteou seus ouvintes com magníficas interpretações pianísticas e enriqueceu a vida, sobretudo o espírito, de todos aqueles que tiveram o privilégio não só de ouvi-lo, mas também de com ele aprender. / The current Thesis deals with the rule of reason and emotion in virtuosism and the way they integrate themselves in syntax and semantics. We try to understand how one lives and feels the work of art, both at the moment of its creation as well as when its being performed. Our specific aim was studying how Ludwig van Beethovens compositions could achieve success in the hands of the virtuose Fritz Jank. After a lot of reading, course attending and studies we decided to choose, as our theoretical reference the works of Suzanne Langer as it totally combines with the Reason and Emotion research field of our Genetic Epistemology Laboratory. Suzanne Langer´s neo-kantian upbringing greatly influenced by Ernst Cassirer, gave us a better understanding and feeling of the work of art and music inserted in this laboratorys scientific production. A virtuose needs to master the syntax of musical language, that means, the mastery of musical knowledge. However, when there is only technique it looks as though the artists lack humanity, passion and emotion. Thats why we try to demonstrate how reason and emotion are related to each other both in the creation of composition and musical interpretation. This way, the virtuose is the one who transcends these aspects because he needs to be an artist with outstanding mastery of technique and syntax and, along with that, have deep musical sensitivity. In order to give fundaments to this research we have done comparisons between Fritz Jank´s piano interpretations and other piano masters on some of Ludwig van Beethovens sonatas previously selected by us. In this work we try to give an idea about the musical career of Fritz Jank, as a Professor and virtuose, by collecting data from newspapers, interviewing some of his contemporaries and even taking courses on his works. Through this way we want to pay a tribute to the Great Master, our teacher, who gifted his listeners with magnificent piano interpretations that enriched the lives and above all, the spirits of all those who had the privilege of not only listen to him (his plays) but also of learning from him.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:01:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Este trabalho pretende utilizar a filosofia moral de Kant, em especial o conceito de autonomia, para a melhor compreensão da teoria freudiana do fenômeno moral, ou seja, a teoria do superego. Propõe, com este objetivo, três questões: a) qual a legitimidade de uma instância psíquica moral como conceito de uma teoria que tem como fundamento o determinismo inconsciente? b) qual a pertinência da comparação, por Freud, do superego com o imperativo categórico kantiano? c) qual a utilidade da filosofia moral de Kant para o entendimento da teoria freudiana do superego? O trabalho procura demonstrar a limitação da comparações, por Freud, entre o superego e o imperativo categórico, considerando que tais comparações ocorrem em momentos em que o conceito de superego estava em elaboração. Procura também destacar a raiz comum do pensamento de ambos os autores no conceito iluminista de razão, e as decorrências disto para a teoria freudiana do superego, em especial no sentido de responder à pergunta: é possível um superego a / This work intends to make use of Kant’s moral philosophy, specially the concept of autonomy, in order to get a better unsderstanding of Freud’s moral phenomenon theory, what means the superego theory. Aiming at this purpose, the work proposes three questions: a) what’s the legitimacy of a moral psychic instance as a concept of a theory that has in its basis the unconscious determinism? b) what’s the adequacy of the Freud’s parallel between the superego and Kant’s categorical imperative? c) what’s the use of Kant’s moral philosophy to a better understanding of Freud’s superego theory? The work tries to demonstrate the limitation of Freud’s parallels between the superego and the categorical imperative, considering that this paralles occurs in a moment of elaboration of the superego concept. It also looks to emphasize the shared bases of both Freud and Kant theories in the iluministic concept of reason, and the consequences of this fact for Freud’s superego theory, specially in order to answer the question: is

Habermas’s work since the turn of the millennium is characterized by an increased interest in the role of religion in politics. One of the most significant theses of this so-called “religious turn” is captured by Habermas’s institutional translation proviso, which calls on citizens to participate in translating religious contributions to public dialogue into a secular language purportedly accessible to all. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the translation proviso with a view both to the political inclusion of religious citizens and to the renewal of the normative resources required for democratic self-determination. By way of a critical engagement with the work of Immanuel Kant and Charles Taylor, I argue that, despite being limited as a solution to both problems, Habermas’s institutional translation proviso is nonetheless preferable to available alternatives. To that extent, I maintain that it is an indispensable feature of democratic politics in pluralist societies.

The aim of this project is to argue that practical reason governs our normative responsibilities in one voice. There are no genuine conflicts within law, none within morality, and none between law and morality. On the contrary, there are single right answers to questions about what law and morality, considered separately or together, demand. I try to show that this claim, which I refer to as the "Unity Thesis", is both ordinary and deeply valuable. It concerns the correct way to understand, judge, and reason about the normative principles our political, legal, and moral practices establish. The Unity Thesis holds that we ought to, and that we already tacitly do, regard these principles as constituting an integrated, mutually supportive practical system--a unity of principle.

Esta dissertação pretende abordar o artigo Idéia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita a partir de sua inserção no interior do sistema da filosofia kantiana. Tentaremos mostrar que a Idéia de uma história universal pode ser interpretada à luz do sistema da filosofia crítica. No \"Apêndice à dialética transcendental\" da Crítica da razão pura, o princípio racional da unidade sistemática dos conhecimentos do entendimento abre a perspectiva de ordenação da natureza de acordo com leis teleológicas. Segundo entendemos, é de acordo com esta representação teleológica da natureza que a Idéia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita é redigida. Adotando como fio condutor o direito cosmopolita, Kant expõe o conjunto das ações humanas como um progresso contínuo da humanidade em direção à realização de todas as suas disposições naturais racionais, como se a espécie seguisse a um propósito da natureza. / This dissertation intends to examine the article Idea for an universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose considering its insertion into Kant´s philosophical system. The claim is to show that this article can be interpreted according to the system of critical philosophy In the Transcendental Dialectic of Pure Reason´s Appendix, the rational principle of systematic unity of cognitions of the understanding allows the organization of nature by teleological laws. We think that the Idea for an universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose was written according to this teleological representation of nature. Adopting cosmopolitan right as a guide principle, Kant establishes the human actions as a continuous progress of humanity towards the realization of all rational natural dispositions, as if the species followed a principle of nature.

This thesis defends the claim that reason-giving is a discrete type of speech act (of an expressive kind) that has a distinctive value. It further argues that this value is best understood in terms of recognition, rather than justification, and that it is intrinsic to reason-giving. Its main aim is to argue against the commonly-held view that the main, sometimes the only, value to reason-giving lies in its capacity to provide justification (and in the related claim that if reasons cannot justify, then reason-giving has no value). The argument presented is intended to support that recognition (of a certain type) is a value that reason-giving has independently from any other value that it might or might not have – including justification; and hence, that reason-giving has a certain distinctive value that is not predicated upon a capacity for actually achieving justification. In particular, this thesis argues, based on speech act theory and on the concept of recognition, that this value is best understood as consisting in the expression of a particular type of recognition for the other. To establish this claim, in chapter one, it begins by setting out the standard view: that the value of reason-giving lies in its capacity to justify, and analyses some of the moves that have been made in the literature when the connection between reason-giving and justification breaks down. In chapters two to four, it uses speech act theory to analyse the acts of arguing and reason-giving, and to argue that reason-giving is a discrete speech act that has features in common with but is not reducible to arguing. Finally, in chapter five, it defends the claim that reason-giving has an intrinsic value, and that this value is best understood as an expressive value: namely, the expression of recognition for the other as a rational being (which is a valuable feature of the other’s humanity); and that it has this value regardless of whether the reasons in question are “good” from a justificatory standpoint.