Scott Shapiro, an exclusive legal positivist, argues that inclusive legal positivism is inconsistent with the view that legal norms must conceptually provide reasons for agents of a legal system to act in specified ways. I defend inclusive legal positivism from Shapiro's charge of inconsistency.

Nusikalstamumas lydi visuomenę tiek laiko, kiek egzistuoja pati visuomenė, todėl nusikalstamumo priežasčių klausimas turbūt niekada nepraras savo aktualumo. Priežasčių, kurios skatina žmones daryti nusikalstamas veikas, yra labai daug, jos tarpusavyje sąveikauja ir jų sąveika yra gana sudėtinga. Atskiras priežastis, taip pat jų grupes, aiškina atskiros kriminologinės teorijos, kurios vadinamos nusikalstamumo priežasčių teorijomis. Nusikalstamumas yra toks socialinis reiškinys, kuris negali būti panaikintas visiškai, nors laikui bėgant jis gali mažėti arba didėti. Būtent todėl visais laikais buvo stengiamasi sumažinti nusikalstamumo rodiklius ir būtent dėl to visada buvo skiriamas ypatingas dėmesys nusikalstamų veikų padarymo priežasčių išsiaiškinimui. Šio magistro baigiamojo darbo objektas yra nusikalstamumo priežasčių teorijos. Nagrinėjant šias teorijas siekiama nustatyti įvairių nusikalstamumo priežasčių teorijų tarpusavio santykį, jų sąveiką. Egzistuoja dešimtys nusikalstamumo priežasčių teorijų ir jų skaičius palaipsniui didėja, tačiau trūksta įvairių teorijų siūlomų nusikalstamumo priežasčių sąsajos klausimo išnagrinėjimo. Nagrinėjant nusikalstamumo priežasčių teorijas susiduriama su tokiomis problemomis, kaip teorijų gausa, kai kurių teorijų tarpusavio prieštaravimas bei teorijų santykinumas. Siekiant nustatyti įvairių nusikalstamumo priežasčių teorijų tarpusavio santykį, šiame darbe šios teorijos yra sugretinamos įvairiais pagrindais. / The crime prevails as long as the society exists, that’s why the question of crime reasons will never loose its relevancy. There is lot of reasons which stimulates people to commit crimes, they interact among each other and their interaction is rather difficult. Separate theories of criminology explore different reasons of criminality or their groups; these theories are called the theories of criminality reasons. Criminality is so kind of social phenomenon, that can’t be absolutely cancelled, although in the course of time it can decrease or increase. For this reason at all times there was made a lot of efforts in order to solve the problem of criminality and to decrease the index of criminality. The object of this work is the theories of criminality reasons. The aim of our research is to define a relation among different theories of criminality reasons. There do exist a lot of theories of criminality reasons and their number is growing, but there is a lack of researches that could clarify the interaction of these theories. Researching the theories of criminality reasons it is confronted with such problems like plenty of theories. Moreover, some theories contradict to each other and a lot of theories are comparative. In this work different theories of criminality reasons are compared in various bases in order to define a relation among them.

<p dir="ltr">This dissertation explores intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts that result from differing axiological stances. A stance is one’s orientation towards a subject and one’s axiological stance is one’s orientation towards what they take to be valuable. An axiological stance also influences how one responds to practical reasons. Stances currently enjoy some attention in epistemology and the philosophy of science, but I provide a novel treatment of stances in the practical domain. Comprised of three chapters, this dissertation explores the psychological and normative contributions of one’s stances in normative ethics, then extends this work to the philosophy of religion. In chapter one, I unpack the psychological contribution of axiological stances. I introduce the concept of an axiological stance in the context of the debate surrounding “hard choices,” arguing that an intrapersonal conflict of axiological stances explains the characteristic difficulty of hard choices. In chapter two, I explore the normative side of axiological stances, drawing from Peter Winch. While Winch has been associated with various forms of relativism, I suggest that he is better understood as defending a moral analog to epistemic permissivism. In this chapter, I suggest that a plausible version of his view is an axiological stance permissivism where an axiological stance can modify the weights of one’s normative reasons. Lastly, in chapter three, I address aspects of God’s practical life that may comprise an axiological stance. The normative import of these aspects, I argue, provide a model of God’s practical life that is not objectionably robotic. On such a model, God has some control over what his weightiest reasons are.</p>

Syftet med föreliggande studie är att undersöka anledningar till varför ungdomar mellan 16 19 år slutar att idrotta och vilka konsekvenser detta kan medföra. De två modellerna som studien utgår ifrån är Push/pull/anti-push/ anti-pull modellen (Fernandez, Stephan och Forqereau, 2005) och Holistic athletic career model (Wylleman, Reints &amp; De Knop, 2013). Kvalitativa intervjuer med retrospektiva frågor användes på elva ungdomar från ett idrottsgymnasium i sydvästra Sverige. Resultaten visade på att de vanligaste anledningarna till varför ungdomar valde att avsluta sina idrotter var på grund av skador, tidsbrist, sociala problem utanför idrotten, sociala problem inom idrotten och idrottskulturen. Resultatet visade även på att de mest förekommande konsekvenserna av det idrottsliga avhoppet rörde de psykosociala- och idrottsliga sfärerna. Nästintill alla uppgav att de tappat kompisar från idrotten i och med avhoppet, många angav dessutom att de hade förändrat sitt motionerande. Ytterligare en konsekvens var att eleverna uppgav att de efter avhoppet hade mer tid åt skolan och att de var mer fokuserade när de väl var i skolan, vissa påpekade även att detta givit de bättre betyg. / The purpose of present study was to investigate the reasons why adolescents in the age between 16-19 years dropout from sport and what consequences this may entail. Retrospective interviews were made on eleven adolescents from a sportgymnasium in Southwest Sweden. The two models used in the study were Push/pull/anti-push/anti-pull framework (Fernandez, Stephan &amp; Fouquereau, 2006) and the holistic athletic career model (Wylleman, Reints &amp; De Knop, 2013). The results showed that the most common dropout reasons were injuries, lack of time, social problems outside the sport, social problems inside the sport and the sport culture. The results also showed that the most frequent consequences for dropping out from sport were mainly concerning psychosocial- and sports factors. Almost all participants described that they lost friends from the sport as a result of the dropout, many also indicated that they had changed their type of exercise after the dropout. The participants reported that after the dropout they had more time for school and they were more focused once they were in school, some even pointed out that they got better grades.

In my dissertation, I argue that rationality, for real humans, is best understood as a strategy for communication and interacting in a social environment. In particular, I argue that humans are rational to the extent that they are able to understand and be understood by others, to the extent that they can give and accept reasons and explanations. This raises a pair of questions. The first concerns the source of the norms for giving and accepting reasons. The second is why we should accept and follow these norms if they are not guaranteed to preserve truth or optimize outcomes. I address the first question by arguing that these norms function as constraints on our imaginations, on the ways in which we can think about or understand the world. This goes beyond the traditional view that these norms govern acceptable inferences. Rather, I argue, the more significant function of these norms is to govern the structure of our reasoning in the sense of guiding considerations about the relevance and form of our understandings of situations. This suggests an answer to the second question. We ought to accept these norms because they are self-confirming. Following them allows us to communicate and interact with others who follow these same norms. In those endeavors that require interaction and coordination in a social group, being understood is frequently more important than being right. / text

Bakgrund: Eutanasi är lagligt i ett fåtal platser i världen. I länder där det är otillåtet är detta ett outforskat ämne, särskilt ur ett patientperspektiv. Palliativ vård anses vara ett alternativ till eutanasi, trots detta önskar en del personer att avsluta livet med eutanasi. Syfte: Att beskriva anledningar till varför vuxna personer vill påskynda döden med hjälp av eutanasi och att beskriva undersökningsgruppen i utvalda artiklar. Metod: En deskriptiv litteraturstudie byggd på elva kvalitativa vetenskapliga artiklar hämtade ur databaserna Cinahl, PubMed och PsycINFO. Huvudresultat: Resultatet visade att bristande symtomkontroll, i synnerhet smärta, var en vanlig anledning till att önska eutanasi. Funktionsförluster gjorde att deltagare förlorat sig själva och inte längre kunde delta i aktiviteter som tidigare. Rädslor för framtida lidande och förlust av självständighet uttrycktes. De önskade en värdig död genom att återta kontroll över sin kropp och sitt liv. De ville inte vara en börda ochkände sig inte längre behövda. Undersökningsgrupperna innehöll deltagare från länderdär eutanasi är lagligt såväl som olagligt. Deltagare varierade i antal, ålder ochmedicinskt tillstånd. Slutsats: Eutanasi är relativt outforskat ur perspektivet från de som önskar sjukvårdens hjälp med att avsluta livet. Det förekommer att svårt sjuka och äldre utan livshotande sjukdom, vill dö i förtid. En vanlig anledning bland deltagarna, var att återta kontroll över kroppen samt bestämma hur och när livet tar slut. Eftersom individens syn på en värdig död ibland skiljer sig från vad sjukvården tillåter och anser värdigt, förekom rädslor för en smärtsam och utdragen död. / Background: Euthanasia is legal in a few places in the world. This is a subject with limited research made in countries where it is not legal especially from a patientperspective. Palliative care is considered an alternative to euthanasia but requests foreuthanasia still occurs. Aim: Describe the reasons behind a wish to hasten death through euthanasia among dults and to describe the study group of selected items. Methods: A descriptive literature study based on eleven scientific articles with qualitative approach collected from the databases Cinahl, PubMed and PsycINFO. Main results: The result showed that lack of symptom control and pain in particular seemed to be a common motivating factor to wish for euthanasia. Also loss of functions among participants led to feelings of identity loss and being unable to participate inactivities like before. Participants expressed fears of having to endure suffering as well as being dependent on others. They wanted to die with dignity by regaining control of their own bodies and lives with euthanasia. They did not want to be a burden and no longer felt needed. Study groups included participants from countries where euthanasia is legal and illegal. Participants varied in number, age and medical condition. Conclusion: Euthanasia is a relatively unexplored subject from the perspectives of people who wish for medical help to end their lives. It occurs that severely ill people as well as elderly without a terminal disease want help to end their lives prematurely. A common desire among participants was to regain control of their bodies and determine how and when life should end. Fears of suffering a painful and prolonged death occured since the individual’s vision of a dignified death sometimes differs from what healthcare permit and deem worthy.

Corporal punishment is an accepted and widely used form of discipline in the United Stated. Frequent use of corporal punishment has been correlated with many maladaptive outcomes and depressive symptoms in adulthood. The Reasons for Living Inventory - Survival and Coping Beliefs subscale identifies those with coping strategies that enable them to deal effectively with negative feelings. The present study seeks to identify whether adaptive characteristics, particularly survival and coping beliefs, are present in individuals who received little or no corporal punishment. Participants were administered a brief demographic inventory, a corporal punishment history questionnaire and the Reasons for Living Inventory - Survival and Coping Beliefs subscale. Results revealed no significant differences between those who received little or no corporal punishment and those who received high levels of corporal punishment. The results were contradictory to past research and indicate the need for further investigation regarding outcomes of corporal punishment use.

Victimization from bullying has become a more serious issue as available avenues for bullying have increased and as the media has been alerted to the devastating effects of the phenomenon. Victimization has been linked to increased externalizing and internalizing disorders including depression, anxiety, stress, and at its worst suicide. Research has been focused on the negative outcomes following victimization, with some authors only recently examining the buffering or exacerbating effects of coping mechanisms. Participants (n=642) from a moderately sized southeastern university completed a survey to examine problem-focused and emotion-focused coping as potential moderators and maladaptive coping as a potential mediator between retrospective reports of victimization and depression, anxiety, and stress, and reasons for living. The hypothesis concerning maladaptive coping as a mediator was supported. Implications and limitations are also discussed. Results suggest that maladaptive coping may be a key mechanism explaining the impact of bullying on outcomes years after victimization.

There’s a widespread conviction in the norms of assertion literature that an agent’s asserting something false merits criticism. As Williamson puts it, asserting something false is likened to cheating at the game of assertion. Most writers on the topic have consequently proposed factive norms of assertion – ones on which truth is a necessary condition for the proper performance of an assertion. However, I argue that this view is mistaken. I suggest that we can illuminate the error by introducing a theoretical distinction between the norm of a practice and its goal. In light of this distinction, we can see that proponents of factive norms tend to mistake the goal of a practice for the norm. In making my case, I present an analogy between the norms and goals of placing wagers and the norms and goals of assertion. One may place a bet and lose without being subject to criticism, while one may win and be worthy of criticism. Whether one wins or loses is irrelevant to the normative evaluation of a bet. What is relevant is whether the bet maximizes the bettor's expected value, which is a function of what might be lost, what might be gained, and how likely those prospects are, given the bettor's evidence. Similarly, I argue, whether one's assertion is true or false is not strictly relevant to the normative evaluation of an assertion. What is relevant is whether the speaker has adequate supporting reasons for the assertion, and that the necessary conventional and pragmatic features are present. However, context will determine what count as supportive reasons for a given proposition, what counts as relevant, and what count as conventional and pragmatic elements possessing that relevance. My proposed norm, the Supportive Reasons Norm, is thus sensitive to the context of assertion and shifts from context to context.

I consider Derek Parfit's claim that our partial and impartial reasons are only roughly commensurable. Parfit's philosophy draws heavily on Henry Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason, and I examine how well Parfit's arguments in Reasons and Persons and On What Matters handle the difficulties that come with Sidgwick's dualism. I also defend Parfit's conclusions against Allen Wood's accusation that he relies on intuitions about cases that lack morally relevant information. This charge overlooks the more fundamental differences in their two moral theories. I conclude that if we accept Parfit's conception of what reasons we have, we ought to accept his further claim that our fundamental reasons cannot be weighed against one another. If this is the case, we will always have sufficient reason to be both moral and self-interested in most situations.