This research examines the legal issues surrounding killing in defence of property in three selected jurisdictions: South Africa, Cameroon and the United States. The comparative analysis illustrates that although the right to protect one’s property is universal, this defence is interpreted differently in the various jurisdictions. Another issue considered in the study is the constitutional right to life in each jurisdiction and whether or not an unlawful attack against one’s property creates a legal entitlement for the attacked party to take the life of another in defence of his or her property. Private defence of property is available when a person uses force to defend an interest in property, for example; to prevent a would-be thief from taking his own, or another’s property, to prevent someone from damaging his own or another’s property, to prevent an intruder from entering his own or another’s property. When an accused pleads private defence, his claim is that his harm-causing conduct was, in the circumstances, lawful. The reasonable use of force (short of deadly force) in the private defence of property is not disputed. However, the use of deadly force in protection of property is controversial, especially in a constitutional state such as South Africa where life should be prized above property. One should however also consider that there is a close link between the private defence of defending life and of protecting property. In many cases, an assault on property also involves a threat on life. However, there are cases of private defence of property where no threat to bodily integrity exists. These situations will be examined in all three jurisdictions and measured against the various constitutional imperatives. Conclusions and recommendations are made as regards the legal framework on the defence of property in the criminal law of the various jurisdictions. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. M.

M.A. (Philosophy) / Consider a couple planning to have children. There are many reasons one could offer these potential parents for reconsidering bringing new people into existence. One could for instance say to them that they currently lack the finances, or maturity, to adequately take care of any children they produce. If it were almost certain that this couple would pass on a terrible genetic disease to their offspring, one could see it as one’s duty to warn them against reproduction. One could even draw attention to the plight of orphans, and suggest to these (and other) potential parents that a more pressing responsibility lies not in planning to give homes to persons not yet in existence, but in attempting to give homes to those already in existence. However, when deciding whether or not to create children, rarely does one consider, over and above the preceding considerations, whether there might be some fundamental wrongness to the very act of procreation. In other words, rarely does one consider the possibility that creating people might, all things considered, never be permissible. At its extreme, “anti-natalism” implies the view that coming into existence is always a harm that outweighs any of its benefits. This position is defended by David Benatar (Benatar 1997, 2006). However, one need not believe that coming into existence is always an overall harm in order to favour an anti-natal perspective; one need only believe that it is morally problematic to inflict serious, preventable harms upon others without their consent. Such a consent-based anti-natal position can be derived from the argument put forth by Seana Shiffrin (1999). To be clear, according to either of these versions of anti-natalism, creating a new person is considered an impermissible harm. When I refer to “anti-natalism” in this dissertation, I will be referring to this negative judgement regarding procreation. Anti-natalism has a rich philosophical heritage, with its roots stretching back to antiquity. For instance, Ecclesiastes (1:1-18) of the Hebrew Bible bemoans the apparent meaninglessness and futility of existence—a state of affairs with which any number of generations of humans must cope. Not until very recently, however, has the anti-natal position been given due consideration by philosophers. Arthur Schopenhauer (1851), for instance, is perhaps best known for advocating a pessimistic philosophy that is, broadly speaking, anti-natal in its implications. The key figure in this field, however, is Benatar, who defends an unequivocally anti-natal position.

Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda hur rätten till liv har ett samband med tvångsförsvinnande enligt den Inter-Amerikanska Domstolen om Mänskliga Rättigheter. För att uppnå uppsatsens syfte genomförs en rättsutredning kring gällande rätt, där en rättsdogmatisk metod och fallstudie applicerats. Uppsatsen kommer vidare att analyseras mot bakgrund av en rättsvetenskaplig teori, där relevant rättspraxis som den Inter-Amerikanska Domstolen om Mänskliga Rättigheter bemött samt en kortfattad genomgång av kontexters påverkan. Under utredningen av de konventionella källorna finns vissa krav för att uppfylla om en stat kan hållas ansvarig. Utifrån det och med de grova mänskliga rättighets kränkningarna staten utfärdat i åtanke, är bevisbördan och statsansvar av stor relevans för att klargöra sambandet mellan rättigheten och handlingen. Uppsatsen avslutas med att konkludera att det råder brister i hur den Inter-Amerikanska Domstolen om Mänskliga Rättigheter arbetar mot att förvara och skydda Mänskliga Rättigheter i fall som berör tvångsförsvinnande. / The aim of this paper is to evaluate how the right to life has a connection with the forced disappearance of persons, according to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. In order to reach this purpose, a legal dogmatic approach and a case study is used, in the light of a legal theory. The research concerns relevant cases that the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has been confronted with, and, to clarify the contextual importance, a brief explanation on the surroundings is provided. With the grave human rights violations committed by State authorities in mind, the thesis shows that the standard of proof, and principle of state responsibility, becomes of importance, in order to be able to determine whether the right to life is violated in cases of forced disappearance. The essay will conclude that the issue prevails defectiveness in relation to preventing and protecting human rights in cases of forced disappearance of persons.

Since humans have existed on Earth, the environment has been one of the primary resources contributing to humans' ability to live life adequately. Pollution has not only destroyed natural life, but it has also diminished humans' right to life. The United Nations 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees "every human being has the inherent right to life," but how can one exercise this right in an environment that is degrading through pollution? This is the basis of which this thesis is surrounded; the issue of environmental pollution hindering humans' right to life. Thus, this thesis aims to show how legal action can be taken under the substantive right to life when environmental pollution occurs and negatively impacts humans and their surroundings. Specifically, this thesis shows how the right to life has been used in courts around the world through three primary approaches – State Constitution approach, Regional Treaty approach, and Blended approach – when environmental pollution has occurred. The different approaches will show different ways a court can come to the conclusion that there has been a violation of the right to life in the occurrence of environmental pollution. Through a comparative-analysis of the different approaches, this thesis presents yet another way to protect not only the environment, but also the rights of humans who have been negatively affected by environmental pollution.

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El objetivo de esta investigación fue precisar el verdadero sentido de la dignidad humana en el sistema jurídico peruano desde un aspecto ius-filosófico. En la actualidad se evidencia una divergente concepción de la dignidad humana originada por el desarrollo de corrientes filosóficas equivocadas que ponen en riesgo a la persona humana, ocasionando excepciones en la aplicación normativa, como en el caso Ana Estrada, a quien se declaró la inaplicación del homicidio piadoso para que pueda morir dignamente con el apoyo del sistema sanitario, el cual, será eximido de responsabilidad penal si interviene en el procedimiento para ayudarla a “morir con dignidad”; pese a que, la dignidad humana es reconocida en el sistema jurídico peruano como un principio-derecho que se aplica como parámetro normativo de toda disposición legal e interpretación jurídica, ya que, consiste en un valor intrínseco del ser humano, quien lo posee más allá de las situaciones externas o internas. Esta investigación demuestra que, frente al antecedente jurisprudencial de Ana Estrada, es necesario precisar el verdadero sentido de la dignidad humana acogido en el sistema jurídico peruano, desde un aspecto iusfilosófico, según el cual se concibe a la dignidad humana como un principio ético-jurídico que responde a una dignidad ontológica, lo cual a su vez evitará evidenciar un “derecho la muerte digna”. / The objective of this research was to specify the true meaning of human dignity in the Peruvian Legal System from a legal-philosophical aspect. Currently, a divergent conception of human dignity is evident, caused by the development of erroneous philosophical currents that put the human person at risk, causing exceptions in the normative application, as in the case of Ana Estrada, to whom the non-application of the mercy killing so that she can die with dignity with the support of the health system, which will be exempt from criminal responsibility if it intervenes in the procedure to help her “die with dignity”; Although human dignity is recognized in the Peruvian Legal System as a law-principle that is applied as a normative parameter of all legal provisions and legal interpretation, since it consists of an intrinsic value of the human being, who possesses it beyond of external or internal situations. This research will demonstrate that, given the jurisprudential background of Ana Estrada, it is necessary to specify the true meaning of human dignity accepted in the Peruvian Legal System, from a legal-philosophical aspect, according to which human dignity is conceived as an ethical principle. -legal that responds to an ontological dignity, which in turn will avoid evidencing a “right to a dignified death.”

"Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline. / À la suite d'attaques terroristes massives est apparue une motivation féroce qui risque d'être manipulée pour justifier des excès de force. Voulant prévenir des attaques armées contre leurs intérêts, certains États ont adopté des politiques de « tuerie ciblée » pour éliminer de façon permanente des terroristes en sol étranger qui menacent leur sécurité. II est pourtant illégal de tuer des individus en l'absence de conflits armes sans égard au droit à la vie. La présente recherche tient à déterminer si, en vertu du droit international, des États peuvent neutraliser par force des individus dangereux ou bien venir au secours d' otages en sol etranger. En étudiant l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies, un certain nombre de conclusions sont apparues, notamment que des opérations pour « arrêter ou neutraliser » ne peuvent avoir lieu que dans des États qui supportent des terroristes ou qui restent indifférents face à leur présence, et que I'expression « guerre contre Ie terrorisme » ne peut permettre des «tueries ciblées » sans avoir à considérer les droits à la vie et à la légitime défense. Puisque toute division entre les membres de la communauté internationale peut venir limiter la prévention d'attaques, le fait que la coopération entre les États ayant abolis la peine de mort et ceux ayant recours aux « tueries ciblées » puissent en souffiir fait l'objet de cet ouvrage. Ladite recherche conclue que l'utilisation de « tueries ciblées » en dehors du contexte de conflits armés ne peut être permis qu'en dernière mesure lorsque réellement nécessaire pour prévenir des attaques armées et protéger la vie. / From the ashes of devastating acts of terrorism has arIsen a resolve so powerful that measures of counterterrorism risk being manipulated by states to justify excess. In an attempt to prevent armed attacks against their interests, a number of states have adopted policies of targeted killing to permanently incapacitate terrorists on foreign soil. The intentional killing of suspected offenders, however, cannot be lawfully carried-out by states in the absence of armed conflict without regard for the right to life. The following research attempts to determine whether it is permissible for nations to use force on foreign soil to . incapacitate dangerous individuals or rescue hostages under international law. By studying article 51 selfdefense of the United Nations charter, a number of conclusions are asserted, namely that operations to "arrest or neutralise" can only be carried-out in states that support terrorists or are complacent to their presence, and that declaring "war on terrorism" cannot allow governments to kill suspected terrorists in countries where there is no war, except in a manner that is reconcilable with the rights to life and selfdefense. Since division among members of the international community may ultimately diminish their ability to collectively suppress international terrorism, the potential for hindered cooperation between abolitionist states and those that carry-out targeted killings is also addressed. The current research concludes that targeted killings can only be justified outside the context of armed conflict when they are truly necessary as a last resort to prevent armed attacks and save lives.

The aim of this thesis is to define, what is the position of right to life in the system of protection of human rights and whether is the death penalty a justifiable institute in international human rights law. The thesis focuses on the death penalty and its history in connection with the right to life as an inherent human right. It explores the conventions, protocols and resolutions that are related to the matter. The thesis is divided into seven chapters, whereas first of them is introduction, where the author asks questions about vindicability of the capital punishment. That is followed by a brief history of the death penalty and explanation of the purpose of the punishment. Following chapter looks into a view of international society on the death penalty, summing up views of international governmental organizations, as well as non- governmental. Fundamental part of the thesis is a chapter disserting on the right to life, its history, where we can find right to life in international law, interpretation of right to life and case law. Last chapter deals with an issue of a crime as an act of forfeiting the right to life. The analysis consists of criticizing the conclusions made in the course of the thesis and propositions of further possibilities.

The diploma thesis deals with the selected aspects of the dilemma of the basic human right according to Declaration of Basic Rights, paragraph 6. It focuses mainly on controversial themes such as euthanasia, abortion and death penalty. It provides readers with the definition of the conflict of these three perspectives with breaking the right to life. It shows historical development of the enactment in the Czech Republic and also in the international context. Last but not least, it describes the attitude of selected states (namely Germany, USA and China) to the solution of conflict relations within this area. The attitude of other states is foreshadowed in terms of euthanasia and abortion.

Title: The right to life guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Author: Simona Divoká Department: Department of international law Supervisor: prof. JUDr. Pavel Šturma, DrSc. Abstract: The thesis is mainly focused on the interpretation of the article 2 of the Convention which guarantees one of the most important human rights, the right to life. In the first part of the thesis I deal with the European Convention on Human Rights, especially its aplication to be clear when the violation of the Convention is possible. Then I concentrate on the functioning of European Court of Human Rights which was constituted for the purpose to execute the control of compliance with rights and liberties guaranteed by the Convention and Additional Protocols to the Convention which contracting states obligate to fulfill. Then I handle the interpretation of the article 2 of the Convention and I try to describe with the help of judicature of the Court which obligations must be fulfilled by the contracting states and how the contracting states must behave to comply with the Convention. Substantive and procedural obligations give rise to contracting states. These obligations can be divided into positive and negative obligations. I continuously describe these...