[pt] A presente dissertação tem como objetivo abordar o início da personalidade jurídica da pessoa, defendendo o reconhecimento do nascituro como um ente despersonificado, que não é detentor de personalidade jurídica, mas que o próprio ordenamento jurídico o trata como se fosse. Nesse contexto, o princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana identificado como cláusula geral dos direitos da personalidade embasa o reconhecimento do nascituro como sujeito de direito, pois se trata de princípio que é inerente a qualquer ser humano, e em alguns casos até a seres não humanos. Dessa forma, após compreender o princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana e os direitos da personalidade aplicáveis ao nascituro discute-se as teorias que procuram solucionar o problema da personalidade deste ente. Assim, a partir da identificação da tutela de direitos da personalidade, como o direito à vida, à integridade física, à saúde, à filiação, à adoção, ao dano moral, dentre outros, ao nascituro o próprio ordenamento jurídico, acompanhado da jurisprudência pátria, reconhece capacidade de direito a este ente. Portanto, aplicando hermenêutica civil-constitucional é possível, a partir do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana, o reconhecimento do nascituro como sujeito de direito despersonificado, titular de direitos e deveres. / [en] This thesis aims to address the begining of the legal personality of the person, and it advocates for the recognition of the unborn child as an despersonificated entity, which does not hold legal personality, but that the law itself treats it as if it were. In this context, the principle of human dignity identified as general clause of personal rights underlies the recognition of the unborn child as a subject of rights, because such principle is inherent in every human being, and in some cases, also not human beings. Thus, when understanding the principle of human dignity and personality rights applied to unborn, it discusses the theories that attempt to solve the problem of personality of this entity. Furthermore, by identifying the tutelage of personality rights such as the right to life, physical integrity, health, affiliation, adoption, moral damages, among others of the unborn, the law accompanied by the jurisprudence recognize the legal capacity of this entity. Therefore, when applying civil and constitutional hermeneutics from the principle of human dignity, it is possible to recognize the unborn child as a not personified subject of law that has rights and duties.

[pt] O Supremo Tribunal Federal decidiu, na ADI n. 4815, que a publicação de biografias poderia ocorrer independentemente da autorização das pessoas retratadas, sob a alegação de que o direito à liberdade de expressão teria uma posição preferencial face aos direitos existenciais em risco, tais como a honra, a imagem e a privacidade, mesmo reconhecendo a existência e importância de tais direitos que, para o STF, só poderiam ser reclamados, via responsabilidade civil, depois da publicação. No entanto, como se demonstrará, a cláusula geral de tutela da pessoa humana, que engloba os direitos existenciais mencionados, e se externa a partir do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana, não pode estar em posição inferior ao direito à liberdade de expressão, principalmente em razão de o princípio ter sido considerado, pelo constituinte de 1988, como um dos fundamentos da República. Deste modo, os direitos existenciais devem ser observados em compatibilidade com a relevância que o princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana ocupa na Constituição da República. Em consequência, ao biografado deve ser dada a possibilidade e a oportunidade de preservar seus direitos subjetivos existenciais, em especial as informações de caráter íntimo que, se reveladas, causarão constrangimento e eventual discriminação. Desta forma, o direito à privacidade como autodeterminação informativa permite que o biografado deva ter o controle sobre as informações que estão sendo recolhidas e que serão disponibilizadas aos leitores e esse controle só será possível se biografado for comunicado previamente a publicação da história de sua vida. Assim ele poderá acessar o Poder Judiciário e evitar que uma ameaça de lesão se torne uma efetiva lesão à sua dignidade. / [en] The Brazilian Supreme Court ruled in ADI No. 4815 that the publication of biographies could occur independently of the authorization of the persons portrayed, on the grounds that the right to freedom of expression would have a preferential position vis-à-vis the existential rights at risk, such as honor, image and privacy. Even though the Supreme Federal Court recognized the existence and importance of such rights, it could only be claimed, via civil liability, after the publication of the biography. However, as will be shown, the general clause of protection of the human person, which encompasses the existential rights mentioned, and is extracted from the principle of the human dignity, cannot be in an inferior position when comparing to the right to freedom of speech, especially because the principle was regarded by the 1988 constituent as one of the foundations of the Republic. In this way, existential rights must be observed in compatibility with the relevance that the principle of the human dignity occupies in the Constitution of the Republic. Consequently, to the biography subject must be given the possibility and opportunity to preserve his existential subjective rights, especially related to the publishing of intimate information that, if revealed, will cause embarrassment and eventual discrimination. Thus, the right to privacy as informative self-determination allows the biography subject to have control over the information that is being collected and will be made available to readers and this control will only be possible if the biography subject is communicated before the publication of the story of his life. Thus, he can access the Judiciary and prevent a threat of injury from becoming an effective injury to his dignity.

This study was undertaken to establish whether rights of personality are known in indigenous law. Since indigenous law differs not only between tribes but is also affected by the degree of exposure to Western values, a micro-study has been done in a semi-rural environment in the Kingdom of Swaziland to establish to what extent own value systems have been influenced or altered when Western legal concepts are utilised. The information, obtained by interviewing a panel of experts, was compared with the available literature. During the process of gathering information, the aims of the research were not only to describe how the legal principles function, but also to take note of those socio-cultural processes which function outside of the law. Rights of personality were studied against a background of the culture and way of life of the peoples concerned. The importance of culture has been acknowledged in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, wherein the recognition and application of indigenous law generally rests on a constitutionally protected right to culture. Whilst the identifiable rights of personality may generally be classified according to specialised legal systems, the separation of rights to good name and to dignity may be inappropriate in the indigenous sphere. Dignity in indigenous legal systems is to be viewed as a comprehensive right of personality, into which should be subsumed the right to good name and reputation in the community. It is such dignity, embracing the ubuntu quality of humanness that is protected as a comprehensive indigenous right of personality. Although the indigenous law of personality is showing some signs of adapting to new developments, there is also proof that the established legal principles and human values are being retained. However, these changes are unique and are neither typically traditional nor Western. The indigenous law of personality, operating in a changing social environment, has to retain its flexibility and adaptability in order to remain ”living” law for the peoples concerned. / Jurisprudence / LL.D.

This study was undertaken to establish whether rights of personality are known in indigenous law. Since indigenous law differs not only between tribes but is also affected by the degree of exposure to Western values, a micro-study has been done in a semi-rural environment in the Kingdom of Swaziland to establish to what extent own value systems have been influenced or altered when Western legal concepts are utilised. The information, obtained by interviewing a panel of experts, was compared with the available literature. During the process of gathering information, the aims of the research were not only to describe how the legal principles function, but also to take note of those socio-cultural processes which function outside of the law. Rights of personality were studied against a background of the culture and way of life of the peoples concerned. The importance of culture has been acknowledged in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, wherein the recognition and application of indigenous law generally rests on a constitutionally protected right to culture. Whilst the identifiable rights of personality may generally be classified according to specialised legal systems, the separation of rights to good name and to dignity may be inappropriate in the indigenous sphere. Dignity in indigenous legal systems is to be viewed as a comprehensive right of personality, into which should be subsumed the right to good name and reputation in the community. It is such dignity, embracing the ubuntu quality of humanness that is protected as a comprehensive indigenous right of personality. Although the indigenous law of personality is showing some signs of adapting to new developments, there is also proof that the established legal principles and human values are being retained. However, these changes are unique and are neither typically traditional nor Western. The indigenous law of personality, operating in a changing social environment, has to retain its flexibility and adaptability in order to remain ”living” law for the peoples concerned. / Jurisprudence / LL.D.

[pt] Esta tese pretende contribuir para a melhor compreensão e aplicação do denominado direito ao esquecimento na sociedade contemporânea, notadamente caracterizada pela intensa circulação de informações viabilizada pela permanente evolução tecnológica. Para o desenvolvimento do estudo foi necessário tecer considerações críticas à expressão utilizada no Brasil para identificar o direito em exame, conceituá-lo como uma forma de restrição à ilimitada divulgação de informações individuais pretéritas e desprovidas de interesse público, além de definir sua configuração jurídica de direito fundamental da personalidade decorrente da cláusula geral de tutela da dignidade humana. A partir do reconhecimento de evidentes limites para a aplicação do direito ao esquecimento e considerada a tutela da vida privada em seu viés atual, de controle sobre a circulação de informações relativas aos indivíduos, entende-se não apenas possível como também fundamental a plena tutela do direito tratado na tese. Dada a magnitude do papel atualmente desempenhado pela Internet na comunicação social, defende-se, entre outras possibilidades de aplicação do direito ao esquecimento, o direito de o indivíduo requerer a exclusão de resultados das listas de links apresentadas após uma pesquisa, em provedores de busca, utilizando-se determinadas palavras ou expressões, ainda que tal exclusão não atinja também a fonte onde a informação foi originalmente divulgada. Ademais, o exame da legislação correlata ao tema, a análise de projetos de lei sobre a matéria, bem como a pesquisa da recente jurisprudência brasileira na aplicação do direito ao esquecimento foram métodos utilizados para se chegar à sugestão de critérios que possam ser adotados na ponderação entre os interesses eventualmente conflitantes à liberdade de expressão e à tutela dos direitos da personalidade. Em síntese, informações desatualizadas e irrelevantes sob a perspectiva do interesse público, cuja disseminação possa causar comprovados e injustos danos aos direitos da personalidade, não devem ser irrestritamente divulgadas, sob pena de configuração de notória violação à dignidade humana e, acrescente-se, sem que esta defendida limitação informativa possa ser considerada como prática análoga à tão condenável censura. / [en] This thesis intends to contribute for a better understanding and application of the so-called right to be forgotten in the contemporary society, notably characterized by the intense circulation of information made possible by the ongoing technological progress. In order to develop the study, it was necessary to weave critical considerations to the term used in Brazil to identify the right under review, conceptualize it as a way to restrict the unlimited disclosure of past individual information lacking public interest, as well as define its legal configuration of fundamental right of the personality resulting from the general clause of human dignity protection. From the recognition of clear limits for the application of the right to be forgotten and considering the protection of the private life in its current bias of control over the circulation of information regarding individuals, it is noticeable that it is not only possible but also fundamental to provide for the full protection of the right addressed in the thesis. Due to the magnitude of the role that is currently performed by the Internet in social communication, the right of an individual to require the exclusion of results from the lists of links presented after a search in search providers using certain words or terms, even if such exclusion fails to also reach the source where the information was originally disclosed, is defended, among other possibilities to apply the right to be forgotten. In addition to that, the analysis of the legislation related to the subject, the assessment of draft bills on the subject, as well as the survey of the recent Brazilian jurisprudence in the application of the right to be forgotten were methods used to get to the suggestion of criteria that may be adopted when pondering the possibly conflicting interests with freedom of expression and protection of personality rights. In short, outdated and irrelevant information under the perspective of public interest, whose dissemination may cause proven and unfair damages to the rights of personality, shall not beunrestrictedly disclosed, under the penalty of configuring notorious violation to human dignity and, moreover, not allowing that defended informative limitation to be considered a practice that is similar to the so condemnable censorship.