Esta dissertação tem como tema a guinada pragmática do juiz norte-americano Richard A. Posner e a aplicação de sua teoria da adjudicação pragmática aos casos difíceis. Para identificar o contexto em que se deu esta virada, apresentaremos em breve síntese a origem do pragmatismo nos Estados Unidos da América, suas implicações filosóficas e jurídicas para os paradigmas duais modernos, e sua influência no realismo jurídico. A virada linguística e da pós-modernidade darão forma a um neopragmatismo, cuja tônica será uma espécie de antifundacionalismo e antiteoria que será adotada por juristas a partir do final da década de 1980. Apresentado este cenário, adentrar-se-á ao trabalho de Richard Posner, destacando-se sua ascensão no movimento da Análise Econômica do Direito até que, influenciado por fragmentos das teorias enunciadas no primeiro capítulo e pelas críticas lançadas à redução do direito ao formalismo econômico, proporá uma releitura das possibilidades e dos limites da aplicação da economia ao direito, adotando uma abordagem mais abrangente e interdisciplinar, próxima ao pragmatismo jurídico. O pragmatismo de Posner terá como pilares a rejeição à autonomia do direito e a problemática da objetividade jurídica, fundamentada no consenso e na indeterminação mitigada do direito, que o levará a defender a impossibilidade de respostas certas aos casos difíceis e a incapacidade da filosofia moral auxiliar o direito. Posner oferecerá daí, uma visão própria de pragmatismo e razão prática, que constituirá o pragmatismo cotidiano e à teoria da adjudicação pragmática, sua relação com os métodos de outras áreas do conhecimento, com o formalismo e a concepção de razoabilidade, bem como a sua aplicação a um caso difícil. No terceiro e último capítulo deste trabalho, serão examinadas as dificuldades da proposta pragmática de Posner apontadas na crítica de Ronald Dworkin, sobretudo sobre o papel da objetividade no direito, a importância da filosofia moral na definição dos fins jurídicos e o perigo da transformação do empreendimento jurídico em um consequencialismo de regras. / This work proposes de analysis of the pragmatic turn of the American judge, Richard A. Posner and application of his theory of pragmatic adjudication to difficult cases. To identify the context in which this turn is given, we present in brief outline the origins of pragmatism in the United States of America, its philosophical implications and legal paradigms for modern dualisms, and its influence on legal realism. The linguistic turn and postmodernism will form a neo-pragmatism, whose keynote will be a kind of antifoundationalism and anti-theory that will be adopted by jurists from the late 1980\'s. Presented this scenario, we will enter into the work of Richard Posner, highlighting its emergence as a pioneer of the movement of Economic Analysis of Law until, influenced by fragments of the theories set out in the first chapter and reviews posted by the reduction of the right to economic formalism, propose a review of the possibilities and limits of application of economics, law, adopting a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach, the next legal pragmatism. The pillars of Posner\'s pragmatism will be the rejection of the autonomy of law and legal issues of objectivity, based on consensus and mitigated indeterminacy of law, which will lead to the adoption of the no-right answers thesis to difficult cases and the inability of moral theory to provide a solid basis for legal judgments. Posner then, offer a particular vision of pragmatism and practical reason, which constitute the everyday pragmatism and the theory of pragmatic adjudication, its relation with the methods of other areas of knowledge, with legal formalism and the concept of reasonableness, and its application to a difficult case. In the third and final chapter of this study will examine the difficulties of Posner\'s pragmatic proposal outlined in the critique of Ronald Dworkin, especially on the role of objectivity in the law, the importance of moral philosophy in defining the legal purposes and the danger of transformation of the enterprise legal in a rule-consequentialism.

Submitted by Diego Barros (diegobbarros@ufpa.br) on 2015-02-27T12:48:43Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 22974 bytes, checksum: 99c771d9f0b9c46790009b9874d49253 (MD5) Dissertacao_IgualdadePrevidenciaSocial.pdf: 629601 bytes, checksum: 0476eea309f01018cf795ae71e02d5c5 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Rosa Silva (arosa@ufpa.br) on 2015-03-09T12:30:21Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 22974 bytes, checksum: 99c771d9f0b9c46790009b9874d49253 (MD5) Dissertacao_IgualdadePrevidenciaSocial.pdf: 629601 bytes, checksum: 0476eea309f01018cf795ae71e02d5c5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-09T12:30:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 22974 bytes, checksum: 99c771d9f0b9c46790009b9874d49253 (MD5) Dissertacao_IgualdadePrevidenciaSocial.pdf: 629601 bytes, checksum: 0476eea309f01018cf795ae71e02d5c5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / O trabalho objetiva avaliar a importância do sistema de Previdência Social brasileiro no contexto contemporâneo dos Direitos Humanos a partir de sua análise sob a perspectiva da teoria igualitária de Ronald Dworkin. São expostas de forma sistematizada ideias elementares sobre a igualdade no contexto contemporâneo, com destaque para duas teorias liberais em voga: a igualdade de capacidades de Amartya Sen e a igualdade de recursos de Ronald Dworkin, e são definidas as razões pelas quais se opta pela teoria da igualdade dworkiana. Em seguida são apresentadas as principais características do direito à previdência social, numa perspectiva de enquadramento na teoria dos Direitos Humanos, expondo de forma geral os contornos da Previdência brasileira. Depois, passa-se a analisar alguns pontos centrais do sistema de Previdência, a fim de testar a teoria igualitária em elementos práticos, verificando a sua aplicabilidade ou não diante da realidade concreta da Previdência nacional. / The study evaluates the importance of the Brazilian Social Security system in the contemporary context of human rights from its analysis from the perspective of egalitarian theory of Ronald Dworkin. Are exposed systematic elementary ideas about equality in the contemporary context, with emphasis on two liberal theories in vogue: equal capabilities of Amartya Sen and equal resources of Ronald Dworkin, and sets out the reasons why opt for the theory by Dworkin. Following are the main features of the right to social security framework in the perspective of human rights theory, stating generally the contours of the Brazilian Social Security. After, examine some central points of the Social Security system in order to test the theory in practical elements equal, verifying their applicability or not before the reality of national Social Security.

In British Columbia (BC) foresters registered with the Association of BC Forest Professionals (ABCFP) have been given the exclusive right to practise professional forestry. As with all professions there is an expectation that Registered Professional Foresters (RPFs) conduct their activities in an ethical manner and are therefore obligated to act as an ethical agent on behalf of society regarding forest resources. If a certain level of ethical agency is desired of professionals we need to understand whether or not an RPF possesses the ability (defined as their discretion) to sufficiently fulfil this responsibility. Rule-based and principle-based standards of forest management, an RPF’s scope of practice, and the socio-political framework of public forest management in BC all come together to define an RPF’s discretionary context, which sets the limits to an RPF’s discretion. This context is highly idiosyncratic to a specific situation or decision and this makes the RPF’s discretion similarly idiosyncratic. This suggests that an RPF should not be accountable for a standard of ethical agency that does not reflect the context-dependent level of discretion they possess. Fifteen interviews of RPFs were conducted for this study to discuss their approach to ethical decision making. The analysis of the interviews revealed 12 major themes, several of which appear to be highly idiosyncratic to the situations described by the participants. The way these themes were perceived by the participants revealed the differences in the discretionary context of their situations. Several aspects of ethical deliberation emerged from the data that appear to be particular to broad employer categories, including delegated decision-making (government), economic and forest health considerations (industry), and the tension between personal and professional values (consultants).

In British Columbia (BC) foresters registered with the Association of BC Forest Professionals (ABCFP) have been given the exclusive right to practise professional forestry. As with all professions there is an expectation that Registered Professional Foresters (RPFs) conduct their activities in an ethical manner and are therefore obligated to act as an ethical agent on behalf of society regarding forest resources. If a certain level of ethical agency is desired of professionals we need to understand whether or not an RPF possesses the ability (defined as their discretion) to sufficiently fulfil this responsibility. Rule-based and principle-based standards of forest management, an RPF’s scope of practice, and the socio-political framework of public forest management in BC all come together to define an RPF’s discretionary context, which sets the limits to an RPF’s discretion. This context is highly idiosyncratic to a specific situation or decision and this makes the RPF’s discretion similarly idiosyncratic. This suggests that an RPF should not be accountable for a standard of ethical agency that does not reflect the context-dependent level of discretion they possess. Fifteen interviews of RPFs were conducted for this study to discuss their approach to ethical decision making. The analysis of the interviews revealed 12 major themes, several of which appear to be highly idiosyncratic to the situations described by the participants. The way these themes were perceived by the participants revealed the differences in the discretionary context of their situations. Several aspects of ethical deliberation emerged from the data that appear to be particular to broad employer categories, including delegated decision-making (government), economic and forest health considerations (industry), and the tension between personal and professional values (consultants).

Esta dissertação tem como tema a guinada pragmática do juiz norte-americano Richard A. Posner e a aplicação de sua teoria da adjudicação pragmática aos casos difíceis. Para identificar o contexto em que se deu esta virada, apresentaremos em breve síntese a origem do pragmatismo nos Estados Unidos da América, suas implicações filosóficas e jurídicas para os paradigmas duais modernos, e sua influência no realismo jurídico. A virada linguística e da pós-modernidade darão forma a um neopragmatismo, cuja tônica será uma espécie de antifundacionalismo e antiteoria que será adotada por juristas a partir do final da década de 1980. Apresentado este cenário, adentrar-se-á ao trabalho de Richard Posner, destacando-se sua ascensão no movimento da Análise Econômica do Direito até que, influenciado por fragmentos das teorias enunciadas no primeiro capítulo e pelas críticas lançadas à redução do direito ao formalismo econômico, proporá uma releitura das possibilidades e dos limites da aplicação da economia ao direito, adotando uma abordagem mais abrangente e interdisciplinar, próxima ao pragmatismo jurídico. O pragmatismo de Posner terá como pilares a rejeição à autonomia do direito e a problemática da objetividade jurídica, fundamentada no consenso e na indeterminação mitigada do direito, que o levará a defender a impossibilidade de respostas certas aos casos difíceis e a incapacidade da filosofia moral auxiliar o direito. Posner oferecerá daí, uma visão própria de pragmatismo e razão prática, que constituirá o pragmatismo cotidiano e à teoria da adjudicação pragmática, sua relação com os métodos de outras áreas do conhecimento, com o formalismo e a concepção de razoabilidade, bem como a sua aplicação a um caso difícil. No terceiro e último capítulo deste trabalho, serão examinadas as dificuldades da proposta pragmática de Posner apontadas na crítica de Ronald Dworkin, sobretudo sobre o papel da objetividade no direito, a importância da filosofia moral na definição dos fins jurídicos e o perigo da transformação do empreendimento jurídico em um consequencialismo de regras. / This work proposes de analysis of the pragmatic turn of the American judge, Richard A. Posner and application of his theory of pragmatic adjudication to difficult cases. To identify the context in which this turn is given, we present in brief outline the origins of pragmatism in the United States of America, its philosophical implications and legal paradigms for modern dualisms, and its influence on legal realism. The linguistic turn and postmodernism will form a neo-pragmatism, whose keynote will be a kind of antifoundationalism and anti-theory that will be adopted by jurists from the late 1980\'s. Presented this scenario, we will enter into the work of Richard Posner, highlighting its emergence as a pioneer of the movement of Economic Analysis of Law until, influenced by fragments of the theories set out in the first chapter and reviews posted by the reduction of the right to economic formalism, propose a review of the possibilities and limits of application of economics, law, adopting a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach, the next legal pragmatism. The pillars of Posner\'s pragmatism will be the rejection of the autonomy of law and legal issues of objectivity, based on consensus and mitigated indeterminacy of law, which will lead to the adoption of the no-right answers thesis to difficult cases and the inability of moral theory to provide a solid basis for legal judgments. Posner then, offer a particular vision of pragmatism and practical reason, which constitute the everyday pragmatism and the theory of pragmatic adjudication, its relation with the methods of other areas of knowledge, with legal formalism and the concept of reasonableness, and its application to a difficult case. In the third and final chapter of this study will examine the difficulties of Posner\'s pragmatic proposal outlined in the critique of Ronald Dworkin, especially on the role of objectivity in the law, the importance of moral philosophy in defining the legal purposes and the danger of transformation of the enterprise legal in a rule-consequentialism.

A dissertação visa expor a tese de Ronald Dworkin que veio a ser conhecida como interpretativismo, segundo a qual o direito é uma prática interpretativa. O objetivo principal é entender a contribuição metodológica que essa tese representa para o entendimento teórico do direito e qual seu argumento contra teorias do direito meramente descritivas. Para localizar a contribuição de Dworkin, são apresentadas, em primeiro lugar, as inovações metodológicas que surgem na obra seminal de Herbert Hart, O Conceito de Direito. A ideia chave que passa a ser discutida a partir dessa obra é a de ponto de vista interno. É considerada uma tese segundo a qual o próprio Hart teria plantado as sementes do interpretativismo. A teoria de Dworkin é então apresentada como uma teoria que, inicialmente, preocupa-se em entender a controvérsia no direito. Para isso, ela se vale de do argumento dos desacordos teóricos e do argumento relacionado do ferrão semântico. Esses argumentos revelam uma característica política da prática jurídica que o positivismo analítico desconsiderou, ao tentar entender essa prática apenas por meio da abordagem da filosofia da linguagem. Ao interpretativismo é contraposto então o desafio proposto por uma teoria positivista contemporânea, a qual, ainda que não discorde do caráter normativo da prática, pretende defender o descritivismo na teoria. Por fim, como resposta a esse desafio, é apresentada a formulação mais recente do interpretativismo, a partir das obras de Dworkin Justiça de Toga e Justice for Hedgehogs. Nessas obras, estão formulados de maneira definitiva dois argumentos que são a chave para o entendimento da teoria interpretativa de Dworkin: o argumento sobre caráter controverso da prática jurídica e a indisponibilidade de explicações criteriais, e o argumento sobre a impossibilidade de realização de teorias arquimedianas (externas). A conclusão do trabalho é apresentada em forma de uma agenda de pesquisas para a teoria do direito e também para a sociologia jurídica, agenda esta que decorre da adoção da teoria interpretativista como a maneira mais adequada de enxergar a prática jurídica. / The dissertation aims to expose the Ronald Dworkins thesis that has come to be known as interpretivism, according to which the law is an \"interpretive practice\". The main objective is to understand the methodological contribution that this thesis represents to the theoretical understanding of the law, and the argument it offers against merely descriptive theories of law. To locate the contribution of Dworkin\'s theory, the dissertation presents, first, the methodological innovations that arise in the seminal work of Herbert Hart, The Concept of Law. The key idea that starts being discussed is that of the internal point of view. It is considered an argument that Hart himself would have \"planted the seeds\" of Dworkins interpretivism. Dworkin\'s theory is then presented as a theory that is initially concerned to understand the controversy in the practice of law. For that, it relies on the argument of theoretical disagreements and on the argument regarding the \"semantic sting\". These arguments reveal the political character of legal practice that was disregarded by analytical positivism due to its commitment to understand this practice only through the approach of the philosophy of language. Interpretivism is then contrasted to the challenge posed by a contemporary positivist theory, which agrees that the legal practice has normative character, but intends to defend descriptivism in theory. Finally, in response to this challenge, it is presented the latest formulation of interpretivism, bearing on recent Dworkin\'s books, Justice in Robes and Justice for Hedgehogs. In these works, two arguments that are key to the understanding of Dworkin\'s interpretive theory receive its final formulation: the argument about the controversial character of legal practice and the unavailability of criterial explanations, and the argument about the impossibility of \"Archimedean\" (external) theories. Following the adoption of interpretive theory as the most appropriate way of looking at legal practice, the study concludes in the form of a research agenda for the theory of law and to legal sociology.

Esta dissertação é dedicada à interpretação do direito à liberdade de expressão disponível na obra do filósofo Ronald Dworkin. No primeiro capítulo, abordo o sentido em que o autor fala de direitos, o significado das liberdades no seu pensamento, e o esforço por ele feito de integrá-las à sua concepção de justiça distributiva, a saber, a igualdade de recursos. O capítulo segundo é dedicado a aspecto importante da teoria do autor: a continuidade entre ética e moral, em especial à sua teoria da dignidade, seja na forma do que chama de modelo do desafio, seja na forma de dois princípios (do respeito-próprio e da autenticidade). Ele também explora consequências da teoria ética de Dworkin às liberdades e a integração entre ela e o valor da igualdade. O terceiro capítulo, então, é dedicado mais diretamente ao direito à liberdade de expressão como Dworkin o concebe: integrado à justiça distributiva e fundamentado no que chama de independência ética e na autenticidade que marca a igualdade de recursos, bem como a uma concepção de democracia, de que fazem parte, a depender da terminologia que adota em diferentes trabalhos, agência, e os princípios ou dimensões da sua concepção de democracia como parceria. Também faz parte do terceiro capítulo discussão de casos concretos, em que a generosidade de Dworkin em relação ao direito objeto da dissertação se evidencia. Discuto por que Dworkin inclui na liberdade de expressão o discurso de ódios e pornografia mas também por que, justamente pelo seu fundamento na dignidade do emissor, não inclui a liberdade de imprensa, a liberdade acadêmica, e os atos de expressão por empresas. A conclusão da dissertação é dedicada às suas ideias de cultura de liberdade e de cultura de independência. / This dissertation is dedicated to the interpretation of the right to free speech available in the work of philosopher Ronald Dworkin. In the first chapter, I dwell with the sense in which the author speaks of rights, with the meaning of liberties in his thought, and his effort to integrate them to his conception of distributive justice, namely, equality of resources. The second chapter is dedicated to an important aspect of the authors theory: the continuity between ethics and morals, especially his theory of dignity, either in the form o what he calls the model of challenge or in the form of two principles (of self-respect and authenticity). It also explores the consequences of Dworkins ethical theory to the liberties and integration between it and the value of equality. Then, the third chapter is dedicated more directly to the right of free speech as Dworkin conceives it: integrated to distributive justice and founded in what he calls ethical independence and in the authenticity that marks equality of resources, as well as in a conception of democracy, formed, depending on the terminology he adopts at different works, agency and the principles or dimensions of his partnership conception of democracy. It is also part of the third chapter discussion of concrete cases, where Dworkins generosity towards the right which is the object of the dissertation makes itself evident. I discuss why Dworkin includes in free speech hate speech and pornography but also why, precisely because of its foundation in the dignity of the speaker, does not include freedom of the press, academic freedom and expressive acts by companies. The conclusion of the dissertation is dedicated to his ideas of culture of liberty and culture of independence.

In British Columbia (BC) foresters registered with the Association of BC Forest Professionals (ABCFP) have been given the exclusive right to practise professional forestry. As with all professions there is an expectation that Registered Professional Foresters (RPFs) conduct their activities in an ethical manner and are therefore obligated to act as an ethical agent on behalf of society regarding forest resources. If a certain level of ethical agency is desired of professionals we need to understand whether or not an RPF possesses the ability (defined as their discretion) to sufficiently fulfil this responsibility. Rule-based and principle-based standards of forest management, an RPF’s scope of practice, and the socio-political framework of public forest management in BC all come together to define an RPF’s discretionary context, which sets the limits to an RPF’s discretion. This context is highly idiosyncratic to a specific situation or decision and this makes the RPF’s discretion similarly idiosyncratic. This suggests that an RPF should not be accountable for a standard of ethical agency that does not reflect the context-dependent level of discretion they possess. Fifteen interviews of RPFs were conducted for this study to discuss their approach to ethical decision making. The analysis of the interviews revealed 12 major themes, several of which appear to be highly idiosyncratic to the situations described by the participants. The way these themes were perceived by the participants revealed the differences in the discretionary context of their situations. Several aspects of ethical deliberation emerged from the data that appear to be particular to broad employer categories, including delegated decision-making (government), economic and forest health considerations (industry), and the tension between personal and professional values (consultants). / Forestry, Faculty of / Graduate

This thesis challenges some of the current limits to the grounds for judicial review of legislation accepted by most Canadian jurists. More specifically, it makes a common law-based argument in favour of the priority over legislation of principles which are implied from the Imperial Constitution Acts 1867-1982 and which originally derive from the English constitution – namely implied constitutional principles. The argument faces two main interrelated legal objections: Parliamentary sovereignty and the Framers’ intentions. The first objection is rebutted by arguing that Parliamentary sovereignty possesses an ability to change in a way that can incorporate substantive legal limitations. The most prevalent common law-based theories of change to Parliamentary sovereignty suggest that the courts can authoritatively determine if implied constitutional principles can check legislation. The second objection is rebutted by reference to the notion of progressive interpretation as conceived under Hartian and Dworkinian theories of law and adjudication. Under these theories, progressive interpretation is an aspect of the courts’ best overall interpretation of the constitution, which includes implied constitutional principles. Such progressive interpretation can result in these principles constraining legislative authority. Justification of the progressive interpretation of implied constitutional principles can be based on the rule of law from which derive a number of these principles. One plausible conception of the Canadian rule of law is that it rejects the view that implied constitutional principles can prevail when in conflict with legislation. However, the better conception is that, as an attempt to adapt implied constitutional principles to relevant changes in society and to protect their underlying values, the judiciary should interpret these principles as capable of checking legislation to the extent that they form part of the core content of the rule of law. Such a conception and an operation of implied constitutional principles can properly be explained by Hartian or Dworkinian common law-based progressive interpretation of these principles and by their relationship with legislative authority.