Uma revisão das relações Brasil-África nas últimas quatro décadas, desde a independência dos países africanos, mostra que a África subsaariana deteve um baixo perfil nas prioridades externas brasileiras. A isto se deveu a fraca intensidade de relacionamento entre ambas as partes, assim como a descontinuidade de interesses por parte dos diferentes governos brasileiros, tanto no desenho de estratégias de cooperação, assim como na coordenação de ações conjuntas perante aos Estados desenvolvidos. Factores internos, no Brasil, como a percepção dos diferentes governos militares para com a orientação política externa, a correlação de forças no sistema internacional, com efeitos visíveis em países africanos, relações privilegiadas destes com as suas antigas metrópoles, assim com a forma utilizada por alguns países africanos a ascender à independência, actuaram como elementos positivos ou negativos para uma maior ou menor aproximação entre o Brasil e a África em geral. As relações entre Brasil e Moçambique desde 1975, foram mais profundas no âmbito político do que no comercial, pois a ausência de um sector privado e de um modelo de desenvolvimento escolhido por Moçambique, bem como a guerra civil, acabou por se tornar elementos chave para a retração das intenções brasileiras de manter cooperação econômica sólida com a margem do Índico. A situação se reverteu na década 1990 com as mudanças políticas introduzidas em Moçambique, do ponto de vista da introdução do multipartidarismo e a adoção da economia de mercado. A expectativa de Moçambique em relação ao Brasil aumentou a partir de 2003, com a eleição do Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, que enviou um sinal positivo ao colocar o continente africano no centro das atenções da política externa brasileira. Hoje, Moçambique assume-se como um dos maiores parceiros do Brasil na África, o que se consubstancia nos deslocamentos que o presidente brasileiro efectuou. Para Moçambique, a assinatura de diversos protocolos de cooperação não só ajuda o país a se desenvolver, mas também contribui para elevar a sua posição frente aos países vizinhos. / An analysis of Brazil-Africa relations over the last four decades, since the independence of the African countries, reveals the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa has been given low priority in Brazilian foreign interests. Such a position is due to the low intensity of relations between both sides, as well as the discontinuity of interest expressed by different Brazilian governments be at the design of cooperation strategies or the coordination of joint actions before the developed countries. Internal factors in Brazil, such as the military government’s perception about the main lines of the foreign policy, the correlation of forces in the international system, with visible effects on African countries, the privileged relations of the latter with their former colonial powers, as well as the means used by some African countries to achieve independence, have acted at times as positive or negative elements for enhanced or decreased interaction between Brazil and Africa. Brazil’s relations with Mozambique since 1975 have been deeper in the political sphere than in the commercial one, since the absence of a private sector and the development model chosen by Mozambique, as well as the civil war, came to be key elements to the retraction of Brazilian intentions to maintain a solid economic cooperation with a country of the Indian ocean shore. This situation underwent a twist at the beginning of the 1990’s after the political changes that took place in Mozambique when multipartidarism and a market economy were adopted. Mozambican expectations towards Brazil increased from 2003 on, after the election of president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who sent the African continent a positive message by placing it at the center of Brazil’s foreign policy. Today, Mozambique arises as one of Brazil’s biggest partners in Africa, a position made clear through the displacements made by the Brazilian president. On the Mozambican side, the signature of several cooperation protocols not only helps the country develops, but also contributes to enhance its position with regards to neighboring countries.

Magister Legum - LLM / Corruption is among the world's devastating social, economic and political problems. It is enormous to the extent that ''not one single country, anywhere in the world, is corruptionfree''. Its effects on the quality of life of billions of people around the world are widely acknowledged. Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, in his statement on the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), proclaimed that: Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows organised crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish. Corruption takes different forms depending on the time and the social, political and economic circumstances that create avenues for its occurrence. Consequently, scholars construe corruption from different viewpoints. On the one hand, post-colonialists and Marxists perceive corruption as a product of capitalist pursuit of profit and capital accumulation. On the other hand, liberal-rationalists and free-market economists define corruption by looking at its negative effects on development and economic sustainability. The argument is that corruption discourages foreign investment and allows public officials to siphon off resources for their private advantage, thereby defeating the public good. Despite the definitional and ideological differences found in literature, there is an agreement that corruption is a bad thing and should be fought vigorously.

The aim of this study was to develop a framework that makes explicit some of the core norms and indicators of hydrosolidarity and to assess whether regional and basin-level multilateral water regimes in SADC are able to promote and apply the identified norms and indicators. This is a relevant aim given that water availability and provision is a challenge in this water scarce region. This is further complicated by the reality that transboundary water contains 68 percent of the area of the SADC region; it provides for 74 percent of the region’s people and constitutes 91 percent of the available surface water resources in the region. In a region where fresh water is both fundamentally scarce and shared, it becomes critical to best govern water so as to respond to the needs of water-related ecosystems which transcend political boundaries as well as the complex spectrum of social actors and forces that place demands on the resource. Hydrosolidarity is a concept that aims to respond to this challenge. The concept has not, however, been distilled into a framework for analysing the effectiveness of transboundary water governance. Also, International Relations (IR) has extensive scholarship on the closely related ideas of cooperation, regimes and international organisations. This literature has not, however, been systematically linked to a framework for analysing whether water regimes can deliver on the indicators of hydrosolidarity. This context gives rise to a core research question which focused on the extent to which SADC Water Sector (WS) (a regional water regime) and the Orange-Senqu River Basin 214 Commission (ORASECOM) (a basin level water regime) can foster hydrosolidarity in Southern Africa. The assumption and thesis statement is that water regimes in SADC offer a partial promotion of hydrosolidarity by developing cooperative institutional structures that allow for the development of norms and standards of behaviour, but are not able to create enhanced integration and linkages beyond the water sector or to deal with issues relating to holistic stakeholder participation. This research question is unpacked through four subquestions. The first question considers the extent to which hydrosolidarity contributes to an understanding of an ideal for transboundary water governance. The second analyses whether water regimes can foster hydrosolidarity. The third considers if regional and basinlevel water regimes exist in SADC, and if so, how they manifest. The last considers whether SADC WS and ORASECOM do actually foster hydrosolidarity in practise. The task of developing a theoretical framework for analysing hydrosolidarity in a transboundary context results in a set of norms and indicators being clarified. The norms of hydrosolidarity include cooperation and solidarity, equity, inclusivity, promotion of human well-being and environmental sustainability around transboundary waters. Linked to these norms are a set of indicators that can be used to identify and work towards hydrosolidarity. These include striving for shared knowledge about transboundary rivers, enhanced integration and linkages between relevant actors, issue areas and governance structures, organisational structures for fostering transboundary water governance, stakeholder involvement in transboundary water governance processes, and development of a normative framework for transboundary water governance. These norms and indicators are also systematically linked to the characteristics and functions of multilateral water regimes. When applying this framework to the two case study areas, it emerges that SADC WS and ORASECOM can only partially foster and promote the norms and indicators of hydrosolidarity in SADC. Whilst all the norms and indicators are present in the agreements and practices of the regimes, there are certain limitations to the extent to which the norms and indicators can be entrenched. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, the regimes are confronted with various capacity constraints. Secondly, the regimes have a limited advisory and technical mandate, meaning that they cannot enforce their recommendations or actually implement anything in the domestic jurisdiction of member states without express permission. Thirdly, the regime structure itself is limited by its theoretical assumptions which emphasise the authority of states, the importance of state sovereignty and the importance of a Western-centric, positivist type of scientific knowledge as being the most authoritative statements of truth with which to guide policy. In order to fully achieve hydrosolidarity, a more complex set of actors needs to work in collaboration with these water regimes. These other actors include national governments, pre-existing bilateral arrangements in the basin, non-state actors and civil society. The theoretical contribution of this dissertation from a water perspective is a clarification of the norms and indicators of hydrosolidarity. From an IR perspective, it illustrates how important a multi-theoretical lens is when analysing complex problems, as it helps to elucidate the strengths and weaknesses of a variety of individual theoretical stances. The practical contribution of this dissertation is to provide a clearer understanding of the capacity of water regimes to deliver on the outlined norms and indicators of hydrosolidarity. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / gm2014 / Political Sciences / unrestricted

The objective of the study is to establish how original financial integration could be attained in southern Africa in order to attract more foreign investment and develop a financially robust and stable region in the southern part of Africa; also to deal with the challenges, risks and remedies of prospective future financial crises. Financial markets are rapidly integrating into a single global market. Developing countries of various regions are drawn into the process with little choice, and without having sound financial infrastructure and policies in place. It is against this background that countries and regions of global integration choose policies that would benefit their regional economy and avert potential economic shock. The challenges posed to countries and regions by the progressive global integration of financial markets are becoming more urgent by the day. These challenges need to be addressed more effectively, either nationally or regionally, as demonstrated by the 1998 financial turmoil in Asia. Private capital flows are becoming intra regionally concentrated, particularly in the USA, Europe, Asia and Latin America. Be that as it may, failure in one market is likely to have immediate and large regional repercussions. Globalisation also marginalises Africa and other Least Developed Countries (LDC), leaving them more impoverished and with greater disparities in terms of income, GDP and FDI. Regional financial integration has to be efficient and sound in order to prevent or contain currency and capital market crises in the southern African region. This study identifies macro economic challenges and risks associated with financial integration. Recommendations are made about methodologies of addressing these issues in order to realise the benefits of regional financial integration in southern Africa, which could be a building block in realising the dream of an African Monetary Union. The study contributes greatly to the debate around the most appropriate criteria that are to be met by the SADC countries, before monetary integration can become a reality. A comparison of the benchmark macro economic convergence criteria of the EU and of the African Monetary Union is done and the performance of SADC countries is assessed in terms of both sets of benchmarks. Southern African states are found to not even be at a comparable level with regard to the EU targets of 1997. The thesis is also critical to the impact of the political instability in the SADC region on prospective monetary integration. Most importantly, SADC would be at a permanent disadvantage and face a long-run depreciation of its common currency, should it continue to integrate financially at macro economic benchmark levels inferior to those of its major trading partner, the EU. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Economics / unrestricted

The central question addressed by this thesis is whether and to what extent ASEAN and SADC provide a regional response to security challenges from within and without the region respectively. In the examination of a regional response to security challenges in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, this study investigates each regional organisation’s efforts and methods of how to approach and deal with regional security problems. In examining the processes and patterns of ASEAN and SADC regionalism in terms of the security dimension, the focus is on political security in its regional context. In doing so, the mechanisms of both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms are explored. This study also aims to compare SADC and ASEAN to find similarities and differences in terms of the way in which ‘politico-security regionalism’ as a regional project is used to respond to global challenges, as well as to internal needs. Moreover, this study seeks to explore what can be learnt from the experiences of both ASEAN and SADC with regard to regionalism and regionalisation in response to political security threats. This will, as a result, be conducive to understanding the character, nature and type of contemporary regionalism and regional security in the South, including Southeast Asia and Southern Africa. Furthermore, in discussing the question of whether and how ASEAN and SADC attempt to shape and modify or change the process of globalisation and regionalisation in politico-security terms, this study emphasises a multi-dimensionality of contemporary regionalism – so called ‘new regionalism’ – which would normally be based on constructivism. Therefore, this study argues that the theoretical problem relates to the insufficiency of neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist accounts that call for a much needed attempt to bring ASEAN and SADC into contemporary discussions about the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms within the context of a (social) constructivism of international relations (IR) theory. / Thesis (DPhil (International Relations))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

The study highlights the significance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) economies. The first objective focuses on analysing the SADC investment policies pertaining to FDI. FDI instruments available at the regional and national levels are analysed. The study takes an in-depth look at the various activities by Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) currently existing for SADC member states (MS). The existing policy instruments are key in attracting FDI and the policy architecture will largely determine the extent to which FDI will flow to different countries. The second objective focuses on reconciling the evidence on the determinants and impact of FDI in the SADC region. Through a systematic literature review, various literature reports pertaining to FDI have been analysed. Journal articles were collected from the UNISA library by means of a standard database search criterion through Scopus, Web of Science and EconLit search engines ranging from 1960 to 2019. The database was built based on known published and unpublished empirical papers for FDI in SADC. Out of the 554 journals investigated, 346 were found to be relevant to the study, with 114 journal articles contributing to the qualitative study. Through its quality assessment, descriptive statistics and qualitative synthesis provided a summary of the samples and measures utilized in a study through the measures of central tendency (mean and median) and dispersion - how spread out the data is (standard deviation). The results showed a higher mean value for general case studies reporting 0.53 with a standard deviation of 0.23. The standard deviations of variables indicated less spread or variability in the data collected over the years of the estimation period 1990 to 2019, indicating the results being more reliable. In conclusion, the study highlights the need to address the investment environment by addressing challenges such as political instability and wide differences in tax incentives. / Economics / M.. Com. (Economics)

This research set out to develop a deeper theoretical component to the emerging discipline of hydropolitics by studying the political aspects of institutional developments in the water sector. The focal point was the four international river basins that are shared between South Africa and six of its neighbouring states. The study found that while there is a lot of evidence for the securitization of water resource management in South Africa’s international river basins, there are also a number of examples of regimes. The creation of these regimes was driven primarily by threat perceptions relating to state security, mostly during the period of apartheid and the Cold War. These regimes were mostly robust and served as a valuable instrument for the de-escalation of conflict, which was primarily of a high politics nature. Examples of both plus-sum and zero-sum outcomes have been isolated. Plus-sum outcomes arose when the non-hegemonic state chose to view the offer of a regime in terms of national self-interest with four examples of this condition. In all four cases the non-hegemonic state benefited from cooperation with South Africa. Zero-sum outcomes arose when the non-hegemonic state chose to view the offer of a regime in terms of ideology with two examples of this condition. In both cases the non-hegemonic state did not benefit and was sidelined to the extent that they became marginalized and worse off than before. In all cases the hegemonic state benefited from the regime. The research consequently showed that a hydropolitical complex is emerging in Southern Africa, clustered around two international river basins, the Orange and Limpopo, which have been defined as pivotal basins. Both of these basins have reached the limit of their readily available water resources and future development is not possible on any great scale. Four of the most economically developed states in Southern Africa (Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa) are riparians on these two international river basins, and have been defined as pivotal states. Other less developed countries that share any international river basin with a pivotal state have been defined as an impacted state, because their own development aspirations have been capped through this association. Any international river basin that has at least one of the pivotal states in it has been defined an impacted basin. Finally, this research showed that regimes create a plus-sum outcome in closed international river basins because they reduce the levels of uncertainty and institutionalize the conflict potential. As such regimes are a useful instrument with which to regulate inter-state behavior, leading over time to the development of institutions consisting of rules and procedures. / Thesis (DPhil (International Politics))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

This study explores the role of a foreign ministry within the context of diplomacy and regional cooperation, focusing on the delivery of regional public goods. Diplomacy is described as a state of mind, an approach to the conduct and/or management of international relations that emphasises the timeous and pacific application of intelligence and tact in the making and implementation of foreign policy. As the custodian of diplomacy and diplomatic practice within a national government, the foreign ministry constitutes the primary grouping of expertise on international matters, responsible for the execution of foreign policy but also involved in the process of foreign policy making. Regional cooperation is defined as an issue-focused arrangement, in terms of which participating states may cooperate for a joint development project and facilitation of exchange of information or best practices. Within the context of regional cooperation, regional public goods are defined as any goods, commodities, services, system of rules or policy regimes that are public in nature, that generate shared benefits for the participating states and whose production is a result of collective action by the participating states. Arguably, the provision of regional public goods is considered the most effective way for regional economic communities to reduce poverty and to develop economies of scale. As an assumption, this study contends that, because of the need for regional public goods agenda-setting and policy prioritising, and based on the utility of diplomacy, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) plays a central and catalytic role within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This assumption is described and analysed at the regional strategic level, specifically related to the responsibility of SADC foreign ministries in terms of the management of regionalisation in Southern Africa; and at the national operational level, emphasising the role of DIRCO vis-à-vis the delivery of regional public goods. At the regional strategic level, it was found that diplomacy serves as an institution of regional relations; as an instrument of regional foreign policy; as an administrative function in SADC, specifically related to the responsibilities of foreign ministries; as an instrument in the formulation of regional foreign policy; and as a dialogue between regional actors. At the national operational level, it is evident that diplomacy serves as an institution in DIRCO‟s management of regional public goods delivery; as an instrument within DIRCO‟s participation in the execution of policies towards regional public goods delivery; as an administrative function within DIRCO; as an instrument in terms of DIRCO‟s role towards the formulation of policies towards regional public goods delivery; and as a dialogue between DIRCO and key regional actors in terms of regional public goods delivery. Due to the urgency and priority accorded to the delivery of regional public goods, DIRCO must consider the establishment of a core capability specialising in the technical competencies related to specific programmes within the delivery of regional public goods. / Dissertation (MDiplomatic Studies)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

MAIR / Department of Development Studies / See the attached abstract below

The Southern African Development Community Tribunal (the Tribunal) is the only judicial organ of the Southern African Development Community (the SADC). Its mandate includes ensuring “adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of the Southern African Development Community Treaty” (the Treaty). The decisions of the Tribunal are final and binding in the territories of member states party to a dispute before it. The responsibility to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced lies with the Southern African Development Community Summit (the Summit). The Summit is the supreme policy-making body of the SADC. It comprises the Heads of State or Government of all SADC member states. The decisions of the Summit are binding on all member states and, upon referral from the Tribunal, it has the power to take appropriate action against a member state who refuses to honour a decision of the Tribunal. The Tribunal was established primarily to deal with disputes emanating from the SADC’s economic and political units and not with human rights. A dispute concerning allegations of human rights violations in Zimbabwe was brought before the Tribunal by farmers affected by the country’s land-reform policy. The Tribunal, through reliance on the doctrine of implied powers, and the principles and objectives of the SADC as contained in the Treaty, extended its jurisdiction. In particular, the Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction to hear cases involving human rights violations and that there had indeed been human rights violations in the case before it. It consequently ruled against Zimbabwe. This decision has been welcomed by many within the SADC region as showing the Tribunal’s commitment to interpreting the Treaty in a way that does not run counter the rights of SADC citizens. However, the Tribunal’s decision has met with resistance from Zimbabwe and has not been implemented on the ground, inter alia, that the Tribunal acted beyond its mandate. The Tribunal has on several occasions referred cases of non-compliance to the Summit for appropriate action against Zimbabwe. The Summit, however, has done nothing concrete to ensure that the Tribunal’s decisions are enforced in Zimbabwe. Instead, in an unexpected move that sent shockwaves through the SADC region and beyond, the Summit suspended the Tribunal and resolved that it should neither receive nor adjudicate any cases. During the SADC summit in August 2014, a Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community was adopted and signed (the 2014 Protocol). In terms of this Protocol the iii jurisdiction of the (new) Tribunal will be limited to inter-state disputes. Unfortunately, it also does not provide any transitional measures to address issues such as the manner to deal with pending cases and the enforcement of judgments. When it comes to the execution and enforcement of judgments, it can be argued that the 2014 Protocol is largely a replica of the original 2000 Tribunal Protocol. The reason for this is that the envisaged mechanisms to enforce the decisions of the new Tribunal is to a large extent similar to the previous one. Unsatisfied over the non-compliance with the decision by Zimbabwe, the litigants approached the South African courts to enforce the Tribunal’s decision in South Africa.1 The South African courts found that South Africa is obliged under the SADC Treaty to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced, and ruled against Zimbabwe. However, the decision is yet to be enforced. The non-compliance with the judgments and a lack of mechanisms to enforce the decisions of the Tribunal, are crucial issues as they undermine the authority of the Tribunal. This thesis explores whether the Tribunal acted within its mandate in receiving and hearing a human rights case. It further considers whether, in the absence of a human rights mandate, the Tribunal enjoys implied powers under international law to invoke the powers necessary for the fulfilment of the objectives set out in the Treaty. It also reviews the concept of state sovereignty and the extent to which it has been affected by human rights norms post-World War II; regionalism; and globalisation. An important aspect examined, is the relationship between SADC Community law and the national law of member states. The relationship between national courts and the Tribunal also receives attention. Ultimately, the discourse addresses compliance and enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions in the context of international law. To the extent relevant, I draw on other regional (the European Court of Justice) and sub-regional (the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, and the East African Court of Justice) courts to establish how they have dealt with human rights jurisdiction and the enforcement of their judgments. / Jurisprudence / LL. D.