Este trabalho pretende discutir alguns elementos presentes nas figuras de Sócrates e Adolf Eichmann tal como descritos por Hannah Arendt. A aparentemente indecorosa aproximação ganha sentido por meio da noção arendtiana de pensamento, que encontra em Sócrates seu modelo e cuja falta caracteriza Eichmann. Para tanto, reconstruímos a crítica arendtiana à modernidade por meio da ideia de alienação do mundo, que acompanha a modernidade desde seu nascimento passando pelo período do imperialismo e culminando na sociedade de massas, da qual Eichmann pode ser tomado como exemplo concreto. Em contraposição, discutimos Sócrates como exemplo de pensador ainda não marcado pela hostilidade que, segundo Arendt, nossa tradição filosófica estabeleceu contra a política. Por fim, discute-se a inacabada teoria arendtiana do juízo, atividade intimamente relacionada ao pensamento e que certamente permitiria a Eichmann uma resposta mais consistente à pergunta: por que não entrar para a SS? / This work intends to discuss some of the elements concerning Socrates and Adolf Eichmann as described by Hannah Arendt. The apparently inappropriate rapprochement reveals its sense through Arendts idea of thinking, to which Socrates provides a model and the lack of which marks Eichmann. In order to let our point clear, we reconstruct Arendts criticism against modernity focusing on the idea of world alienation, present in modernity since its beginning, through the whole period of imperialism and reaching its peak in modern mass societies, of which Eichmann can be seen as a concrete model. On the other hand, we discuss Socrates as an example of thinker whose activity is still free from the hostility that, according to Arendt, our tradition of political philosophy established against politics. At last, we discuss the Arendts unfinished theory of judgment, activity closely related to thinking and that certainly would provide Eichmann a more consistent answer to the question: Why not join the SS?

Entre as teses do socratismo presentes nos primeiros Diálogos de Platão, é sobre a tese da unidade das virtudes que recaem nossos olhares nesta presente pesquisa e, particularmente, sobre as duas teses exegéticas acerca do estatuto desta unidade, a saber: a tese da bicondicionalidade e a tese da identidade. Encontramos, no desenvolver da pesquisa, insuficiências em ambas as teses. Por meio destas insuficiências chegamos a uma hipótese interpretativa: a tese da unidade das virtudes, nos diálogos socráticos, é iluminada pelo método dialético platônico. Porém, tal afirmação pressupõe uma incompatibilidade com o método socrático presente nestes Diálogos conhecido como método elênctico: ou temos o método elênctico ou o dialético. Logo, para que a pesquisa alcance um final satisfatório, apresentamos duas soluções: 1) as duas teses clássicas da unidade das virtudes fazem parte de uma terceira fundada na dialética, a dialética implica a identidade das virtudes que implica a sua inseparabilidade e a distinção entre as partes; e 2) o método elênctico, enquanto negativo que se encaminha para uma tese positiva, é um dos componentes do método dialético. / Among the Socrates\' theses found in the first Dialogues of Plato, there is one, about the unity of the virtues, which will concern us in our present research. More specifically, we will be interested in examining two ways of explaining the unity of virtues: the bicondicionality thesis and the identity thesis. We have found shortcomings in both theses. To avoid these shortcomings we propose as an interpretative hypothesis: the unity of the virtues thesis, in the Socratic Dialogues, is explained by the dialectical Platonic method. However, this affirmation has to deal with an alleged incompatibility between the Socratic elenctic method and the properly dialectical method, as it is developed in later Dialogues. So, we present two solutions to have a satisfactory final result for this research: 1) the two classic ways of explaining the unity of the virtues are part of a distinct thesis, the one based on dialectic, for dialectic implies the identity of virtues, which implies their inseparability and the difference of their parts; and 2) the elenctic method, a negative thesis, points to a positive one, that is, to the dialectical method.

ABSTRACT This essay concerns Christina Rossetti’s poem Goblin Market and its use in a Swedish upper secondary classroom. The purpose of this essay was to analyse the poem through a Marxist perspective and investigate how both the analysis of the poem and the poem itself could be used when teaching English to an upper secondary class. This was done in two stages; firstly by analysing the Victorian society’s effect on Rossetti’s poem through a Marxist criticism perspective and secondly by using a specific pedagogic method called the Socratic Dialogue method when analysing the use of the analysis and the poem in the classroom. When analysing the poem and how it has been affected by its contemporary society, it becomes clear that the poem provides a critique in several ways towards consumerism and social ideals of Victorian Britain. Concerning the use of the poem and the analysis in the upper secondary English classroom it is evident that the poem and the literary analysis combined provides an interesting view on Victorian Britain for the pupils to discuss while having Socratic seminars.

The central thesis of the dissertation is that in the Phaedrus philosophy is presented as a kind of madness in a strict sense, that is to say, the claim is not that philosophy is necessarily unappreciated by the many, hence considered by their standards as insane, but that the philosophical soul is in a way not in rational control, but in a state of mind that can fairly be defined as madness, and that the philosophical life is arranged in order to visit or revisit this state of mind. Socrates' account of eros and madness is based on his account of the soul, thus the first chapter shall give a close reading of Socrates' account of the soul. The second chapter, in turn, interprets Socrates' account of eros in light of his account of the soul. The third chapter, again, looks into Socrates' depiction of eros as a certain kind of madness in light of the first two chapters, focusing respectively on the following three characterizations: madness as the opposite of sōphrosunē, madness as the opposite of tekhnē, and madness as the core of the best human life, namely, the philosophical life. This dissertation, hopefully, gives a faithful interpretation of Socrates' account of eros in the Phaedrus on the one hand, on the other hand reveals the rationale behind Socrates' conception of eros and its highest form, philosophy, as a kind of divine madness. By doing so, I wish to contribute to our understanding of Plato's Socrates and his life as a paradigm of philosophy.

De amore: Socrates and Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium”. This articleproposes to study the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades according toPlato’s Symposium. By these means, we seek to relect upon the other kind of lovewhich Socrates also exempliies in the dialogue, with the aim of understandingSocrates’ behavior towards Alcibiades beyond the moral contraposition betweenthe spiritual love of contemplation and the earthly love of Alcibiades. Moreover,we aim to present an approach to this relationship without identifying it with aSocratic conirmation of Diotima’s version. To this end, we will not neglect theimportant homoerotic atmosphere of the dialogue and the epoch. / Este artículo se propone estudiar las relaciones entre Sócrates y Alcibíades según la versión de Platón en el Banquete. Con ello, se busca relexionar acerca del otro tipo de amor del que Sócrates también es protagonista en el diálogo, con el fin de comprender su comportamiento con Alcibíades, más allá de contraponer moralmente el amor espiritual de la contemplación y el amor terrenal de Alcibíades. Más aun, se busca una lectura sobre la relación sin ver en ella necesariamente la confirmación socrática de la versión de Diotima. Para tal fin, no se omite el ambiente homoerótico propio del diálogo ni de la época.

KVAPIL, M.: Arts And Language In The Early Work Of Friedrich Nietzsche. (Master thesis) Charles University In Prague, Faculty Of Humanities, Department Of Europhilosophy. Supervisor: doc. Mgr. Aleš Novák, Ph.D. This work aims to examine the early philosophical and esthetical concept of Friedrich Nietzsche, which is elaborated in his first published work The Birth of Tragedy from the spirit of Music (Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, 1872). This concept, based on a mutual tension between the Apollonian and Dionysian, will be examined mostly from the perspective of a significant "struggle" of Dionysus and Socrates. Its manifestation is first apparent as a contradiction between theoretical and tragical world understanding or a contradiction between optimism of science and pessimism of arts. The work will mostly focus on the origin of the theoretical optimism, which is coming from the human "will to truth". Its archetype is represented in Nietzsche's early philosophy by Socrates. The problem, which comes to light with this struggle of Dionysus and Socrates, will necessarly lead the work to examine Nietzsche's critique of cognition led by the metaphysical understanding of the term "truth". The basis of this critique lies in the metaphorical character of language and human cognition in...

La question du règne des philosophes ne se comprend qu’au prix d’un détour par les marges de la politique classique. D’abord nous avons montré que ces marges sont définies historiquement par un discours qui articule le règne, le savoir et le salut (chapitre I). Puis nous avons montré que la notion de règne, dès lors qu’elle est attribuée à des philosophes, s’établit dans les marges de la notion classique de basilein, en en subvertissant le sens classique (chapitre II). Ensuite nous avons montré que le discours sur le règne des philosophes est une tentative venant des marges de la politique pour subvertir en en faisant usage, c’est-à-dire pour destituer, la liaison classique entre le muthos et l’unification politique (chapitre III), ce qui a impliqué de comprendre comment le philosophe peut être aux marges de la politique tout en en étant le fondement (chapitre IV). Cela nous a conduit à voir que le philosophe est en marge par rapport à l’exigence d’être utile à la cité (chapitre V) et par rapport à l’exigence d’un savoir fondé sur l’expérience (chapitre VI). Enfin, nous avons essayé de montrer que le règne des philosophes s’inscrit dans la recherche du salut de la cité, thème marginal dans les études sur Platon (chapitre VII). / The question of the philosophers’ reign can only be understood at the cost of a detour through the margins of classical politics. First of all, I have shown that these margins have historically been defined by a discourse focusing on the relationship between kingdom, knowledge and salvation (chapter 1). I have then shown that the notion of kingdom itself, when it is attributed to philosophers, positions itself in the margins of the notion of basilein, while actively subverting its classical meaning (chapter 2). The discourse about the philosophers’ reign must therefore be understood as an attempt coming from the margins of politics to use the traditional relation between the muthos and political unification, in order to subvert it, namely, to depose it. This required me to explore the way in which the philosopher can simultaneously be in the margins of politics and at the very foundation of politics (chapter 4). The philosopher’s position in the city is doubly marginal: first, he is not subject to the imperative to be useful to the city (chapter 5), and secondly, he is not subject to the imperative to ground knowledge in experience (chapter 6). Finally, I have set out to show that the philosophers’ reign inscribes itself within a quest for the city’s salvation, a theme that is itself marginal in Plato studies, and deserves more attention than it has hitherto received (chapter 7).

Plato's 'Crito' depicts Socrates in prison awaiting his execution and arguing that despite the injustice of his sentence, he is morally obligated to remain there so that it can be carried out. The early Socratic dialogues were concerned with the nature of the virtues which formed the foundation of Athenian morals. This "primacy of virtue" has developed into the modern theory of virtue ethics. In this thesis, I argue that in the 'Crito', Socrates sets aside his typical virtue ethics approach, and instead utilizes a deontological framework for his arguments. I apply the deontological theories of Immanuel Kant and W. D. Ross to the 'Crito' in an attempt to demonstrate that it has a distinctly duty-based focus that is consistent with the work of Kant and Ross. Finally, I raise the question of whether Ross' theory can be viewed as a bridge between virtue ethics and deontological ethics.

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The objective of this thesis is not only to design a building or investigate an idea, but also to explore and learn to appreciate what is truly important and, hope- fully, to discover that part of truth which may lead us to a serenity in our souls. My entire struggle is basically to try to achieve a comprehension of the order of nature. At some point in my life as an architect, if I have to build an artifact, that artifact should remind people of the everlasting merits of the invisible world and awaken the imagination of others in the pursuit of truth. This book recounts the attempt to articulate an idea, one which I believe to be a part of the order of nature, into the design environment. / Master of Architecture