Ce mémoire cherche à évaluer la culpabilité de Socrate face à l’échec et à la corruption d’Alcibiade, telle que la question se pose dans le Banquet de Platon. Il comprend quatre chapitres. Le premier démontre que le cadre dramatique lui-même fait occuper une place centrale à la vie et au déclin d’Alcibiade et au problème de la responsabilité de Socrate face aux accusations de corruption de la jeunesse qui ont pesé sur lui. Le deuxième chapitre interprète le discours d’Alcibiade comme une tentative de disculpation qui repose sur une critique acerbe du comportement de Socrate. Il se serait détourné de Socrate et de ses enseignements en raison de son ironie, de son arrogance et de son indifférence – de son hybris. Le troisième chapitre étudie le discours de Socrate sur l’accession à la beauté intelligible. Il expose la nature particulière de son éros, qui repose sur l’ironie et l’inversion des rôles comme moyens d’exhorter à la philosophie. Le quatrième chapitre pose la question de l’efficacité de ce type de pédagogie et de la responsabilité du philosophe vis-à-vis de ses disciples. L’étude conclut que l’amour et l’ironie de Socrate sont essentiellement des moyens d’inviter l’autre à se remettre lui-même en question et à prendre soin de son âme. Socrate n’est donc pas coupable d’avoir corrompu Alcibiade. La faute est entièrement celle du jeune homme. Il s’est montré incapable, par égocentrisme et fierté excessive, de réagir correctement à l’énigme posée par le comportement érotique de Socrate. / This essay on Plato’s Symposium assesses to what extent Socrates could be held guilty for Alcibiades’ failure and corruption. The first of the four chapters shows that Alcibiades’ life and decline and the accusation against Socrates of youth corruption are central to the dramatic structure. The second chapter interprets Alcibiades’ speech as a sharp criticism of Socrates’ behaviour meant to exculpate himself. Alcibiades justifies his walking away from Socrates and his teachings on the basis of the philosopher’s irony, arrogance and indifference – his hybris. The third chapter looks at Socrates’ speech, which sets out the path to the highest form of Beauty. It explores the particular nature of his eros, which relies especially on irony and role inversion to induce philosophical thinking. The fourth chapter asks how effective this kind of pedagogy is, and what is the responsibility of the philosopher to his students. It is concluded that Socratic love and irony are essentially to be conceived of as means of inciting followers to put themselves into question and take greater care of their souls. Socrates is thus not guilty of corrupting the young man. The fault is entirely Alcibiades’. His pride and selfishness are what prevented him from meeting the challenge that Socrates’ erotic behavior put before him.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Ce mémoire a pour but d’élucider l’analyse et l’évaluation nietzschéennes du sens et de la portée de la figure de Socrate dans les cultures antique et moderne. Pour ce faire, nous nous pencherons d’abord sur la question de l’identité de Socrate, ce qui permettra d’introduire une distinction centrale à l’analyse de Nietzsche, soit celle entre la doctrine et la personnalité du célèbre Athénien. En effet, Nietzsche isole la personnalité de Socrate, qu’il circonscrit à partir des notions d’instinct, de pulsion et d’affect, de sa doctrine, qu’il appelle le socratisme et qu’il définit à partir de l’équation socratique raison = vertu = bonheur. Ensuite, nous développerons les trois éléments sur lesquels il s’appuie pour expliquer que Socrate ait pu séduire les Grecs, soit le fait qu’il fut un grand érotique, qu’il introduisit une nouvelle forme de joute à Athènes et qu’il apparut comme étant un médecin pour ses contemporains. Cette question des raisons permettant d’expliquer que Socrate ait pu séduire les Grecs est déterminante pour Nietzsche, puisque c’est de là qu’il est amené à se demander qui est ce Socrate et quel a été son véritable impact sur la culture, soit les deux questions qui sont au cœur de ce qu’il appelle « le problème de Socrate ». Enfin, nous nous pencherons sur le diagnostic que le philosophe allemand pose sur le célèbre Athénien ainsi que sur son évaluation de l’impact du socratisme sur les cultures antique et moderne, après quoi nous présenterons l’inversion des valeurs que Nietzsche tente d’opérer dans sa propre culture. Nous verrons alors qu’il cherche entre autres par cette inversion des valeurs à nous libérer du socratisme, car il est d’avis que cette doctrine dévalorise toute forme d’agir puisant ses motifs dans ce qui relève de l’inconscient et survalorise une morale luttant contre les pulsions dominantes en nous. / The purpose of this thesis is to investigate Nietzsche’s analysis and assessment of the meaning and the impact of Socrates’ character on the classical and modern culture. To that effect, I will emphasize the question of Socrates’ identity, in order to introduce the crucial issue in Nietzsche’s analysis, namely the distinction between Socrates’ doctrine and his character. Nietzsche isolated Socrates’ character – which he defined through the categories of instinct, drive, and affect – from his doctrine, which he labelled socratism and defined through the Socratic equation reason = virtue = happiness. This thesis explores the three core elements Nietzsche used to explain how Socrates was able to seduce the Greeks: not only was Socrates a very erotic figure, he also introduced a new form of debate to Athens, and was considered an eminent physician by his contemporaries. Socrates’ appeal to the Greek is of fundamental importance to Nietzsche, since it prompted him to question Socrates’ inherent character, and his true impact on Athenian culture. It thus forms the crux of what he called “the problem of Socrates.” Nietzsche’s understanding of socratism as well as its impact on classical and modern culture allows him to revaluate all values within his own culture. To that effect, I reveal Nietzsche’s critiques of socratism – in particular, his belief that society needed to be liberated from socratism, since it denies all agency to individuals. Given that it was strongly motivated by the unconscious, socratism, according to Nietzsche, overemphasizes a certain morality in the struggle against our dominant impulses.

The current forms of representative democracy have come to face various fundamental challenges such as: decrease in political participation, distrust in partisan politics and politicians and perhaps increase of ideological polarization. To take solace in the belief that the current democratic tools are far from perfect yet the finest in modern societies, has not contributed to solution-oriented modifications of its efficacy. In this thesis Lua Nazerian intends to address the inadequacies and inherent limitations in the current form of representative democracy, by analyzing its underlying assumptions through a critical examination of the fundamental challenges in Classical pluralism, Agonist and Deliberative democratic theory. Furthermore, it proposes some modifications drawn from the Socratic idea of the non-pursuit of power, the bottom-up political approach and the learnings from the worldwide Baha’i community. The study is carried out within the field of international relations with a normative approach as well as it incorporates a case study of the Baha’i electoral and decision-making principle. Nevertheless, by using the Socratic idea together with the Baha’i principles in a bottom-up approach shifts then the paradigm from the inherent competitive culture of representative democracy to a more inclusive solution-oriented culture of learning.

Cette thèse doctorale a pour objet l’étude de la réception de l’Histoire Ecclésiastique de Socrate de Constantinople dans trois œuvres tardo-antiques : l’Histoire Tripartite (HT) de Théodore le Lecteur, composée en grec en 518, l’Histoire Tripartite (HT) de Cassiodore composée en latin (1re moitié du VIe s.), et la première version arménienne de Socrate (« Grand Socrate ») (VIe-VIIe s.). Les œuvres de Théodore et de Cassiodore sont traditionnellement considérées comme de simples compilations alors que le Grand Socrate n’est perçu que comme une traduction. Une double question a guidé notre recherche : comment et pourquoi les auteurs tardo-antiques ont-ils exploité l’Histoire Ecclésiastique de Socrate de Constantinople ? Pour répondre à ces questions, nous avons examiné quel rôle jouait l’œuvre de Socrate dans chacun des trois témoins ciblés, en déterminant préalablement la fonction de ces œuvres « réceptrices » à leur propre époque. Dans les trois témoins analysés, malgré les différences apparentes entre « compilation » et « traduction », l’auteur a procédé à une déconstruction de l’Histoire ecclésiastique de Socrate – son matériel historiographique est disséqué en notices ou en morceaux – et a ensuite arrangé ce matériel, l’a reconstruit selon des critères méthodologiques et historiographiques propres. L’œuvre de Socrate est avant tout une source d’informations sur l’histoire de l’Eglise dont se servent les trois « récepteurs » en vue de créer leur propre récit, original, des mêmes événements. L’entérinement de leur récit ne repose pas sur le respect de la signification historiographique de l’œuvre de Socrate mais sur l’autorité qui émane de l’invocation du nom de son auteur. / This Ph.D. thesis examines the reception of the Church History of Socrates of Constantinople in three late-antique historiographical texts: the Tripartite History (TH) of Theodorus Lector, composed in Greek in 518, the Tripartite History (TH) of Cassiodorus, written in Latin in the first half of the sixth century, and the first Armenian version of Socrates (the so-called « Great Socrates », 6th-7th c.). The works of Theodorus and Cassiodorus are traditionally considered to be mere compilations whereas the Great Socrates was considered a mere translation. The core research question of this thesis is a double one: how and why did these late-antique authors use the Church History of Socrates of Constantinople? In order to answer these questions, I examine the role of Socrates’ work in each of the three historiographical texts under examination in view of the function that each of these new texts fulfilled in their own context. Notwithstanding the differences between a “compilation” and a “translation”, or the clear differences between the HT of Cassiodorus and Theodore, each of our three witnesses has deconstructed the Ecclesiastical History of Socrates, divided it up in separate notices and pieces, then re-arranged the material to reconstruct it according to his own methodological and historiographical criteria. Socrates is above all a source of information for church history, used by all three witnesses with the aim of creating their own, original narrative of the same events. The validity of their narrative does not derive from a respect for the historiographical significance of the work of Socrates but on the authority evoked by his very name.

A partir do referencial paradigmático e exemplar da figura e disciplina (eu zen) de Sócrates na obra de Xenofonte, desenvolvem-se a análise, a reflexão sobre o princípio reintegrador perante a inexorabilidade, o desconhecimento e a incerteza do real, com vistas à reconciliação proporcional, ao desenvolvimento satisfatório da integridade razoável, para que o homem possa adquirir não somente a compreensão filosófica, mas também condições de resistência, de flexibilidade estratégica - enfim, a capacidade suficiente de transformação e relacionamento com os problemas fundamentais da existência. / From the paradigmatic reference and example of socratic discipline (eu zen) in the Xenophons works, the reflections about the re-integrating principle facing the inexhaustible, uncertain and unknown reality can be developed, searching the proportional reconciliation, the satisfactory and reasonable integrity for the human being to acquire not only the philosophical understanding, but also the conditions of resistence, of strategic flexibility the sufficient capacity to deal with and transform the fundamental problems of existence.

Cette étude a pour but d’analyser l’attitude de Xénophon vis-à-vis d’Athènes et de la démocratie. En retraçant les événements de l’histoire athénienne comme ils sont relatés dans les Helléniques et comme l’auteur les a vécus, le travail vise à démontrer : - que Xénophon ne condamne pas la démocratie comme une forme politique injuste, bien qu’il n’approuve pas ses choix politiques au cours du Ve siècle ; - que, grâce à la leçon tirée de l’expérience de l’échec subi au Ve siècle, Athènes est la seule cité capable, aux yeux de l’auteur, de résoudre le conflit entre Grecs et d’apporter la paix en Grèce au IVe siècle ; - que Xénophon essaie d’améliorer la démocratie sans apporter de réformes structurelles, mais à travers une réforme des mentalités politiques selon le modèle socratique. / The following study aims to analyse Xenophon’s attitude to Athens and democracy. By recounting the events of Athenian history as they are related in Hellenica and as the author experienced them, the work aims to demonstrate: - that Xenophon does not condemn democracy as an unfair form of politics, even though he does not agree with the political decisions made by Athens during the 5th century B.C. - that, due to the lessons it learnt from its defeat in the 5th century B.C., Athens is the only city capable, in the eyes of the author, of resolving the conflict between Greeks and bringing peace to Greece in the 4th century B.C. - that Xenophon would like to improve democracy, not through structural reforms but through a reform of political thinking based on the Socratic model.

Este trabalho pretende discutir alguns elementos presentes nas figuras de Sócrates e Adolf Eichmann tal como descritos por Hannah Arendt. A aparentemente indecorosa aproximação ganha sentido por meio da noção arendtiana de pensamento, que encontra em Sócrates seu modelo e cuja falta caracteriza Eichmann. Para tanto, reconstruímos a crítica arendtiana à modernidade por meio da ideia de alienação do mundo, que acompanha a modernidade desde seu nascimento passando pelo período do imperialismo e culminando na sociedade de massas, da qual Eichmann pode ser tomado como exemplo concreto. Em contraposição, discutimos Sócrates como exemplo de pensador ainda não marcado pela hostilidade que, segundo Arendt, nossa tradição filosófica estabeleceu contra a política. Por fim, discute-se a inacabada teoria arendtiana do juízo, atividade intimamente relacionada ao pensamento e que certamente permitiria a Eichmann uma resposta mais consistente à pergunta: por que não entrar para a SS? / This work intends to discuss some of the elements concerning Socrates and Adolf Eichmann as described by Hannah Arendt. The apparently inappropriate rapprochement reveals its sense through Arendts idea of thinking, to which Socrates provides a model and the lack of which marks Eichmann. In order to let our point clear, we reconstruct Arendts criticism against modernity focusing on the idea of world alienation, present in modernity since its beginning, through the whole period of imperialism and reaching its peak in modern mass societies, of which Eichmann can be seen as a concrete model. On the other hand, we discuss Socrates as an example of thinker whose activity is still free from the hostility that, according to Arendt, our tradition of political philosophy established against politics. At last, we discuss the Arendts unfinished theory of judgment, activity closely related to thinking and that certainly would provide Eichmann a more consistent answer to the question: Why not join the SS?

Entre as teses do socratismo presentes nos primeiros Diálogos de Platão, é sobre a tese da unidade das virtudes que recaem nossos olhares nesta presente pesquisa e, particularmente, sobre as duas teses exegéticas acerca do estatuto desta unidade, a saber: a tese da bicondicionalidade e a tese da identidade. Encontramos, no desenvolver da pesquisa, insuficiências em ambas as teses. Por meio destas insuficiências chegamos a uma hipótese interpretativa: a tese da unidade das virtudes, nos diálogos socráticos, é iluminada pelo método dialético platônico. Porém, tal afirmação pressupõe uma incompatibilidade com o método socrático presente nestes Diálogos conhecido como método elênctico: ou temos o método elênctico ou o dialético. Logo, para que a pesquisa alcance um final satisfatório, apresentamos duas soluções: 1) as duas teses clássicas da unidade das virtudes fazem parte de uma terceira fundada na dialética, a dialética implica a identidade das virtudes que implica a sua inseparabilidade e a distinção entre as partes; e 2) o método elênctico, enquanto negativo que se encaminha para uma tese positiva, é um dos componentes do método dialético. / Among the Socrates\' theses found in the first Dialogues of Plato, there is one, about the unity of the virtues, which will concern us in our present research. More specifically, we will be interested in examining two ways of explaining the unity of virtues: the bicondicionality thesis and the identity thesis. We have found shortcomings in both theses. To avoid these shortcomings we propose as an interpretative hypothesis: the unity of the virtues thesis, in the Socratic Dialogues, is explained by the dialectical Platonic method. However, this affirmation has to deal with an alleged incompatibility between the Socratic elenctic method and the properly dialectical method, as it is developed in later Dialogues. So, we present two solutions to have a satisfactory final result for this research: 1) the two classic ways of explaining the unity of the virtues are part of a distinct thesis, the one based on dialectic, for dialectic implies the identity of virtues, which implies their inseparability and the difference of their parts; and 2) the elenctic method, a negative thesis, points to a positive one, that is, to the dialectical method.

La theía moîra dans la philosophie de Platon demeure étonnamment peu étudiée au point même de souffrir d’un silence exégétique préjudiciable malgré des tentatives chez les commentateurs germaniques (Zeller), français (Souilhé, Des Places) ou encore anglo-saxons (Berry, Greene). S’illustrant tout au long de son œuvre, la theía moîra n’est ni assignable à une signification définitive, ni réductible à une traduction unique, ni associable à un champ thématique déterminé. Cette disparité s’avérant problématique et propre à susciter l’étonnement, notre travail propose un modèle interprétatif pour la theía moîra articulé autour d’une double exigence. En premier lieu, notre travail montre les insuffisances des analyses existantes de la theía moîra en insistant particulièrement sur les tendances réductrices inhérentes à ces études (approche sceptique, ironique, taxinomique, génétique ou encore anachronique). En second lieu, notre travail établit une méthode d’étude de la theía moîra centrée autour de pôles de significations (sophistiques, socratiques, extatiques, techniques, épistémologiques et politiques) dans le but de comprendre la complexité de la theía moîra. Plus précisément, notre travail montre que ces pôles de significations suivent le plus souvent un triple mouvement de formulation, de mise à l’écart et de réactivation au sein du corpus platonicien et que ce triple mouvement entend répondre à la variété des problèmes et des difficultés qui parcourent l’œuvre de Platon. / Surprisingly, scholars have always paid a relatively limited attention to Plato’s theía moîra - an academic silence which proved damaging to its exegetical analysis. Notwithstanding the contributions of German (Zeller), French (Souihlé, Des Places) or British and American (Berry, Greene) specialists, who all tried to interpret the theía moîra, these attempts failed to offer a satisfactory analysis of Plato’s θεία μοῖρα. Though Plato refers to the theía moîra many times in his work, it is extremely difficult to either precisely define or to supply a definitive translation of the theía moîra. Nor can one easily make it fit into any preconceived thematic field.This disparity, as surprising as it may seem, nevertheless poses a certain number of problems. Our work aims to provide an interpretative framework for the theía moîra revolving around two main axes. First, we will demonstrate the limits of the existing body of scholarly work by pointing out the over-simplification of the theía moîra inherent to those studies (particularly the skeptical, ironic, taxonomic, genetic and anachronistic approaches). Second, so as to understand the complexity of the meaning of the theía moîra, our work intends to establish a methodology built upon pivotal aspects and meanings (sophistic, Socratic, ecstatic, technical, epistemological and political). More precisely, the ambition of this work is to show that these pivotal aspects and meanings are very often guided by a triple principle of formulation, neglect and rediscovery and that this triple principle serves to provide an answer to the multiplicity of questions and difficulties which readers are accustomed to meet in Plato’s work.