Le Charmide de Platon s’inscrit légitimement dans ce qu’il est convenu de nommer les « dialogues de jeunesse », et nous y constatons la forte présence de ce qui caractérise traditionnellement l’activité philosophique de Socrate, soit la réfutation. Cependant, tandis que les réfutations effectuées directement sur le jeune Charmide ne produisent aucun effet, celui-ci réagit fortement aux réfutations que Socrate fait subir à son tuteur Critias et auxquelles il assiste passivement. Qu’est-ce qui, dans ce qui s’apparente vraisemblablement à une réfutation indirecte, produit l’ébranlement de Charmide? Nous voulons regarder en quoi la réfutation est ici un traitement purgatif non pas par l’usage d’affirmations propositionnelles contradictoires, mais par une certaine dialectique de l’image, celles de Critias et de Socrate devant Charmide. Cette dialectique de l’image en appelant à une réflexion sur la dimension mimétique du rapport qu’entretient le jeune garçon avec ces deux hommes, nous voulons ainsi regarder en quoi la réfutation indirecte de Charmide nous dresse les contours d’une possible activité poétique de Socrate. Cette poésie résisterait à la critique que celui-ci en fait plus tard dans la République par un usage de l’image qui vise non plus à proposer des modèles fixes de la vertu, mais à montrer le mouvement de la pensée, et donc à « sensibiliser » Charmide à l’élan intellectuel qui l’habite et l’anime lui-même. Ainsi, en nous penchant sur la présence dans le Charmide de ce que nous nommons une « réfutation poétique », ce mémoire explore la possibilité de penser ensemble ce qui semble assoir l’intellectualisme socratique des premiers dialogues et la poésie qui, par son absence de visée intellectuelle, est rejetée par le Socrate de la République à moins qu’elle ne prenne la forme d’un « éloge des hommes bons ». / Plato's Charmides is part of what we refer to as the «early dialogues», and we find in these dialogues a major feature of Socrates's philosophy, mainly refutation. However, while these refutations don't have any effects on the young Charmides, he still reacts to Socrates's refutation of Critias. We wonder how this indirect refutation produces such a reaction on Charmides. We look at how refutation represents here a purgative treatment not by using contradictory propositions, but with the use of a certain dialectic of the image, the ones of Critias and Socrates facing Charmides. Examining this dialectic, which refers to the study of the mimetic dimension that the young boy maintains with the two men, we wish to reflect on how the indirect refutation of Charmides draws the outline of Socrates's possible poetical activity. This poetry resists to the critics made later in the Republic pertaining to the use of images relating to certain models of virtue, by showing the motion of thought, and hence guiding Charmides in his own intellectual motion. By reflecting on the «poetical refutation» we find in Plato's Charmides, this thesis explores the possibility of linking what seems to ground Socrates's intellectualism in the early dialogues to the poetry that is rejected par Socrates in the Republic, besides the one that pertains to the «defense of good men».

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

This study presents a systematic analysis of motifs, literary devices, and language in the Fourth Gospel that resemble similar motifs, literary devices, and language in Socratic tradition. The persistent recurrence of words and patterns of thought in the Fourth Gospel which are common to Platonic philosophy, Socratic progymnasmata, and well-known descriptions of Socrates’ moral heroism and martyr’s death lead me to conclude that the Johannine authors imagined Socrates’ life as a “pagan prophetic theme” which Jesus fulfilled; their use of Socratic tradition in the Fourth Gospel is subtle but obvious, and was used to appeal to a pagan or highly hellenized audience intimately familiar with Socratic tradition as the embodiment and articulation of social and religious values in the Hellenistic period. Much of the study is devoted to literary analysis of the Fourth Gospel, and draws upon the rhetorical criticism models developed by George Kennedy. Through rhetorical criticism the educational background of the Johannine writers becomes clear, as do their evangelical motives in appropriating Socratic tradition for their invention of Jesus’ speeches and martyrdom. / Department of Modern Languages and Classics

In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein explicitly opposes his own method of philosophical investigation to that of Socrates, who will not accept a list of examples even as a preliminary answer to his 'what-is-x' question. Relying on Meno and the Seventh Letter however, I will provide an interpretation of Plato's epistemic priority principle that does away with the assumption that what Socrates seeks is the uniquely correct definition of x. Following the work of Fransisco J. Gonzalez, I will argue that the philosopher seeks knowledge of x itself and that this knowledge is non-propositional. An interesting result is that Plato and Wittgenstein turn out to have extremely similar conceptions of philosophy. In particular, I argue that the distinction between doxa and episteme in Plato should be understood along the lines of Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2006. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 204-208). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Intitulée : «La connaissance de soi, dans la perspective de Socrate», cette thèse a pour but d’étudier les caractéristiques de la démarche de Socrate, en ce qui concerne la connaissance de soi et son importance. La mise en œuvre de la vie humaine, telle qu’elle mérite d’être vécue, au sens socratique, est l’objectif indispensable de cet engagement philosophico-spirituel, qui consiste à rendre à l’homme, l’identité existentielle qui lui est essentiellement propre. C’est donc à la recherche de cette identité concrète, que Socrate a toujours invité ses interlocuteurs, et invite encore les lecteurs, à faire usage de leur intellect, afin de découvrir la partie la plus divine de leur âme. La question de la connaissance de soi, dans la perspective de Socrate relève plus précisément de la connaissance de l’âme, considérée comme le véritable soi, portant en elle l’empreinte divine. Par conséquent, se connaître soi-même vise la contemplation de cette particularité propre à l’homme, laquelle le conduit à son excellence. L’aspect subjectif de cette entreprise rationnelle, garantit totalement l’indépendance de l’individu, à la recherche de lui-même, lui permettant également d’acquérir les connaissances qui résident en lui, selon la théorie de la réminiscence. D’où la nécessité de s’appliquer à cette tâche essentielle de l’existence humaine, afin de lui donner un véritable sens humain. La connaissance de l’intelligible―faisant partie intégrante de sa recherche―, cet éveilleur de l’esprit a mis en œuvre, d’une manière extraordinaire, les outils essentiels de sa philosophie pratique, à savoir : la dialectique, la réfutation et la maïeutique, portées par son Amour, en vue de faire sortir ses semblables de leur caverne d’ignorance, en les invitant à se diriger vers le monde intelligible. Il ne s’agit donc pas de chercher un idéal, dans l’espoir de de s’y conformer, ce qui met en péril la liberté du sujet, mais de s’accomplir le plus concrètement, le plus parfaitement possible, comme un être humain excellemment achevé. C’est dans ce contexte précis, que la connaissance de soi, dans la perspective de Socrate, sera prise comme le modèle par excellence de cet accomplissement. / Entitled “Self-khowledge, from the perspective of Socrates” this thesis intends to examine fundamental characteristics of the Socrates’ authentic approach to self-knowledge, and the utmost importance of it. Implementation of human life, as it deserves to be lived, in the Socratic sense of the word, is the essential purpose of this philosophical and spiritual commitment, which aims at giving back to the human being the ontological identity, of his own by essence. Therefore, Socrates always invited his interlocutors, and still now invites his readers, to search for this concrete identification, and to use their intellect in order to discover the most divine part of their soul. The self-knowledge problem in the Socrates’ perspective is questioned here, for it precisely comes from the soul knowledge, considered as the genuine one-self, bearing in it the heavenly imprint. Therefore, “to know one-self“ aims at contemplating the divine part of our one-self, which leads the man to his excellence, as such he is destined to become. The subjective aspect of this rational enterprise gives a guarantee of total independence to the individual seeking his one-self. It also allows him to acquire the knowledge that lies in him according to the “reminiscence theory, “hence the necessity for him is to take great care of this essential task of a human life, in order to give it a real human significance. To know what is intelligible, being an integral part of his research, “He who awakened the mind“developed in a wonderful manner essential tools of his practical philosophy which are: dialectics, refutation, maieutic, as supported by his Love, intending to let his fellow-men to get out of their “cave“ of ignorance, by inducing them to head for the intelligible world. It does not mean to seek an ideal with the hope to look like it, which unquestionably puts at risk the individual’s freedom, but to find out one’s own fulfilment in the most possible concrete and perfect way as an excellently accomplished human being. In this very context, self-knowledge, such as Socrates meant it, will be considered as the pre-eminent model of this accomplishment.

The present thesis deals with the question of goodness in ethical thinking of Plato and Aristotle. The work aims to answer two research questions: How did Plato and Aristotle perceive the essence of goodness in human life? What are we supposed to do in order to accomplish human well-being? The first chapter contains a brief summary of ethical ideas of both philosophers. In the following chapters their concepts of areté, soul and goodness are analysed and compared. The comparison supports the fact that both Plato and Aristotle basically agreed on the essence of human goodness. They consider it the sole criterion of human well-being, both of them connect it with moral values and argue that it can be only achived through life in accordance with the virtues. On the other hand, Plato and Aristotle differ from each other in the way how can be such human goodness and well-being achieved. Aristotle's views based on the ethical issues, however, can not be perceived as totally different from those of Plato, but rather as a further elaboration and supplement of his ideas and opinions.

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-24T18:08:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-rineu-quinalia-filho.pdf: 1281232 bytes, checksum: 567502ac00788106db2f061afa627942 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-24T18:09:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-rineu-quinalia-filho.pdf: 1281232 bytes, checksum: 567502ac00788106db2f061afa627942 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-24T18:09:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-rineu-quinalia-filho.pdf: 1281232 bytes, checksum: 567502ac00788106db2f061afa627942 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-11 / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo oferecer uma leitura do Hípias Maior de Platão pretendendo discutir a respeito da possibilidade de o diálogo apresentar as primeiras discussões sobre o conceito inteligível do Belo. / This paper aims to offer a reading of Plato's Greater Hippias intending to discuss about the possibility of dialogue present the first discussions on the concept of Fine intelligible.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 JorgeSL_TESE.pdf: 1029067 bytes, checksum: ae8e1e06cf2d03b47d093d83cb9179fc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-11-05 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / This thesis endorses the interpretation that in Plato`s Republic the argument made by Thrasymachus in which justice is the convenience of the most powerful one is implicitly accepted by Socrates. Although Thrasymachus? discussion does not show any similarity with the argument of Socrates, it proposes a sarcastic and ironic comment on political life. Socrates accepts this comment to develop a more refined notion of the category of the most powerful ones. While Thrasymachus assumes that the convenience of the most powerful ones includes the power to subordinate all and everything to their individual pleasures, Socrates admits that the most powerful ones are defined only by their characteristic of being able to hold power in perpetuity. In this context, the main theme of The Republic is that the harmony between the functional classes of the city is convenient for perpetual power. For preservation of harmony, the functional class of the most powerful considers the convenience of forsaking a possible monopoly on pleasure towards a redistribution that promotes harmony, which also makes it convenient for the other classes. Thus, we can explicitly say that the most powerful ones believe in a sense of justice as convenience for everyone, but implicitly believe only in the argument that justice is what is convenient for themselves. Since convenience is what promotes harmony between functional classes, it becomes convenient to Socrates to believe that the understanding justice that the most powerful ones have is not publicly disclosed. The notion that all the speculation of the dialogue between the characters cannot be true, but, at best, only plausible and convenient is also part of the central argument in The Republic. Socrates needs to modify the nature of the functional classes through a targeted program of sexual reproduction and a program of ideological indoctrination so that the proposal to promote harmony through the elements of the city, declaring that justice is in favor of the weakest becomes a more plausible and convenient speech. To make the new system more plausible, Socrates develops a metaphysics based on the mathematical notion of harmony, such metaphysics serving the official rhetoric of the political regime presented by Socrates / Essa tese de doutorado defende a interpreta??o de que n A Rep?blica de Plat?o o argumento elaborado por Tras?maco, no qual justi?a ? a conveni?ncia do mais forte, est? implicitamente aceito por S?crates. Apesar da defesa enfatizada por Tras?maco n?o demonstrar nenhuma afinidade com o argumento de S?crates, ela prop?e um coment?rio ir?nico e sarc?stico sobre vida pol?tica. S?crates aceita esse coment?rio para derivar dele uma no??o mais refinada da categoria dos mais poderosos. Enquanto Tras?maco assume que a conveni?ncia dos mais poderosos inclui o poder de submeter todos e tudo a seus prazeres individuais, S?crates admite que os mais poderosos estejam definidos apenas pela sua caracter?stica de ser capaz de manter o poder em perpetuidade. Nesse contexto, o tema principal d A Rep?blica ? que a harmonia entre as classes funcionais da cidade ? conveniente para poder perp?tuo. Para conserva??o dessa harmonia, a classe funcional dos mais poderosos v? como conveniente renunciar um poss?vel monop?lio sobre prazer em prol de uma redistribui??o que promova a harmonia, o que tamb?m se torna conveniente para as demais classes. Assim, pode-se dizer que os mais poderosos divulgam o sentido de justi?a como sendo a conveni?ncia de todos, mas que implicitamente acreditam somente no argumento de que a justi?a ? o que lhes ? conveniente. Uma vez que a conveni?ncia ? o que promove a harmonia entre as classes funcionais, torna-se conveniente para S?crates a cren?a de que a compreens?o de justi?a dos mais poderosos n?o seja divulgada publicamente. Tamb?m faz parte do argumento central d A Rep?blica a no??o de que toda a especula??o presente no di?logo entre seus personagens n?o pode ser verdadeira, mas, na melhor das hip?teses, apenas plaus?vel e conveniente. S?crates precisa modificar a natureza das classes funcionais atrav?s de um programa direcionado de reprodu??o sexual e um programa de doutrina??o ideol?gica para que a proposta de promover a harmonia atrav?s dos elementos da cidade, sob a alega??o de que a justi?a est? a favor do mais fraco, torne-se o discurso mais plaus?vel e conveniente. Para fazer o novo regime mais plaus?vel, S?crates desenvolve uma metaf?sica fundamentada na no??o matem?tica de harmonia, tal metaf?sica a servi?o da ret?rica oficial do regime pol?tico apresentado por S?crates

A partir do referencial paradigmático e exemplar da figura e disciplina (eu zen) de Sócrates na obra de Xenofonte, desenvolvem-se a análise, a reflexão sobre o princípio reintegrador perante a inexorabilidade, o desconhecimento e a incerteza do real, com vistas à reconciliação proporcional, ao desenvolvimento satisfatório da integridade razoável, para que o homem possa adquirir não somente a compreensão filosófica, mas também condições de resistência, de flexibilidade estratégica - enfim, a capacidade suficiente de transformação e relacionamento com os problemas fundamentais da existência. / From the paradigmatic reference and example of socratic discipline (eu zen) in the Xenophons works, the reflections about the re-integrating principle facing the inexhaustible, uncertain and unknown reality can be developed, searching the proportional reconciliation, the satisfactory and reasonable integrity for the human being to acquire not only the philosophical understanding, but also the conditions of resistence, of strategic flexibility the sufficient capacity to deal with and transform the fundamental problems of existence.