Théâtre et philosophie présentent au long de leur histoire des modes d’interaction divers. L’approche privilégiée est ici l’analyse de la querelle qui opposa, au Ve siècle av. J.-C. en Grèce, deux de leurs représentants : Aristophane et Platon. Une analyse des œuvres qui véhiculent leurs attaques respectives permet de dégager les enjeux de cet affrontement ainsi que d’en mesurer la portée. Depuis cette perspective, la notion de mimèsis apparaît mise en jeu : terme d’origine théâtrale et portant essentiellement le sens du « jeu » de l’acteur, la mimèsis est utilisée par Platon comme l’argument majeur de sa critique de la poésie, autant que comme point d’articulation entre les deux mondes de son ontologie. La seconde partie de notre entreprise est consacrée à l’étude de l’élaboration platonicienne de ce concept dans la République. Cette synthèse est également opérée sur un plan littéraire par le dialogue en tant que forme d’écriture à la croisée entre philosophie et théâtre, que l’on aborde à travers l’étude des dialogues de Platon de ce double point de vue. On parvient ainsi à montrer, à partir des éléments analysés, qu’au cœur de l’opposition entre philosophie et théâtre s’ancre une liaison profonde, dont la nature contradictoire n’aura cessé de se manifester par la suite à travers le problème philosophique et le paradigme théâtral de la représentation. / Theatre and philosophy present diverse modes of interaction throughout their history. In order to interrogate their relationship, this investigation will focus on the analysis of the quarrel which, in the fifth century B.C. in Greece, opposes two of their representatives, Aristophanes and Plato. An analysis of the works that launch their respective attacks will enable us to reveal the stakes of this confrontation, as well as to evaluate their impact. From this perspective, the notion of mimèsis appears at stake but also « at play » – hence, it is en jeu: term of theatrical origins which essentially contains the meaning of the actor’s « play », mimèsis comprises not only the central argument of Plato’s critique of poetry, but furthermore, the articulation point between the two worlds of his ontology. The second part of our research is dedicated to the study of Plato’s elaboration of this concept in the Republic. This synthesis is also operated on a literal level by the dialogue as a writing form at a crossroads between philosophy and theatre, which we will approach through the examination of Plato’s dialogues from this double point of view. Taken together the different elements of our analysis reveal that, at the heart of their opposition, lies a deep bound whose contradictory nature has not ceased to manifest itself in the philosophical problem and the theatrical paradigm of representation.

“Irony, Finitude and The Good Life,” examines the notion that Socrates, as he is portrayed in the Platonic dialogues, ought to be viewed and interpreted as a teacher. If this assertion is correct, then it is both appropriate and useful to look to the dialogues for instruction on how to live a philosophical life. This thesis will argue that to look at Socrates as a teacher, a figure who imparts knowledge to those around him on how to live a philosophical life, misses the very conception of the good life that Plato sought to personify when he created the character of Socrates. The proceeding discussion draws upon the work of Alexander Nehamas and Drew Hyland, offering an alternate interpretation of the Symposium. This interpretation argues that viewing Socrates as a teacher falsely idealizes the philosophical life, in turn neglecting Plato’s greater legacy for his character—a legacy in which true virtue lies in exposing the creative possibility inherent in living a philosophical life and prompting one’s own expression of a life inspired by the legacy of Socrates.

Carlo Michelstaedter's Persuasion and Rhetoric (1910) is one of best examples of what Massimo Cacciari calls the early twentieth century "metaphysics of youth." Persuasion and Rhetoric is the result of Michelstaedter's academic investigation on the concepts of "persuasion" and "rhetoric" in Plato and Aristotle. Michelstaedter saw in Plato's corpus the gradual abandonment of Parmenidean "being" and Socrates' dialogical philosophy. He reinterpreted the notions of "persuasion" and "rhetoric" terms of a radical dichotomy, using them to represent two opposed ontological modalities, two epistemological attitudes, and two existential alternatives. If "rhetoric" comprehends language, institutional knowledge, and all manifestations of empirical life, then "persuasion" is defined as the unity of the individual with Parmenidean being. Persuasion is an impossible choice: "lifeless life." Being a decisive alternative to rhetoric, persuasion - much like Platonic mania - can neither be articulated nor communicated. Nevertheless, Michelstaedter speaks, aware of his inevitable failure: he will not persuade anyone.

<p>This dissertation considers the role of the critic in democratic political culture by engaging Socrates. Since Socrates so often stands as an exemplar for many different styles of critical activity, both in political rhetoric and in popular culture, I address the roots of these many figures of Socrates by examining the multiple aspects of Socrates as they appear in Plato's dialogues. Starting from the different metaphors that Socrates uses to describe himself - the stingray, the master of erotics, the midwife, the practitioner of the true political art, and the gadfly - I parse these different strands of Socrates' character and assess their coherence. While each of these descriptions captures a different angle of Socrates' activity vis-à-vis Athenian democracy, I argue that together they also hold one essential aspect in common: Socrates' strange relationship to Athens as both connected and disconnected, immanent in his criticism and yet radically so. As strange both in the context of Athens and in relation to his interpreters, I further advance that the figure of Socrates suggests a kind of political activity committed to disturbance and displacement while also working across, with, and against conventional boundaries and languages. Moreover, I maintain that the Socrates suggests new forms of critical associations that take up his practice of philosophy in democratic culture today.</p> / Dissertation

<p>ABSTRACT</p><p>This essay concerns Christina Rossetti’s poem Goblin Market and its use in a Swedish upper secondary classroom. The purpose of this essay was to analyse the poem through a Marxist perspective and investigate how both the analysis of the poem and the poem itself could be used when teaching English to an upper secondary class.</p><p>This was done in two stages; firstly by analysing the Victorian society’s effect on Rossetti’s poem through a Marxist criticism perspective and secondly by using a specific pedagogic method called the Socratic Dialogue method when analysing the use of the analysis and the poem in the classroom.</p><p>When analysing the poem and how it has been affected by its contemporary society, it becomes clear that the poem provides a critique in several ways towards consumerism and social ideals of Victorian Britain. Concerning the use of the poem and the analysis in the upper secondary English classroom it is evident that the poem and the literary analysis combined provides an interesting view on Victorian Britain for the pupils to discuss while having Socratic seminars.</p>

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Central Florida, 2009. / Adviser: Nancy Stanlick. Includes bibliographical references (p. 54-58).

This dissertation examines Socrates' method of examining interlocutors, referred to as the elenchus, in Plato's definitional dialogues. It contains three parts. The first part lays out various theories of the elenchus. The first chapter examines the seminal view of Richard Robinson. The second sketches the development and aftermath of Vlastos' constructivist view. The third focuses on Socrates' own testimony about the elenchus in the Apology. These pictures of the elenchus form a selection of views against which various definitional dialogues may be compared. The second part, containing six chapters, provides a detailed commentary on the Euthyphro. Various features of that dialogue suggest that neither the prominent forms of constructivism, nor their non-constructivist alternatives presented in the first part adequately capture Socrates' procedure. The third part, consisting of one chapter, presents my view of the Socratic elenchus, which I term “technical destructivism.” I argue that this view provides a straight-forward solution to a number of problems which the alternative treatments leave unsolved. It also helps to explain some otherwise puzzling features of Socrates' procedure in the shorter definitional dialogues, including his use of the technē analogy, and his appeal to the priority of definitional knowledge. / Philosophy / text

Ce mémoire a pour but d’élucider l’analyse et l’évaluation nietzschéennes du sens et de la portée de la figure de Socrate dans les cultures antique et moderne. Pour ce faire, nous nous pencherons d’abord sur la question de l’identité de Socrate, ce qui permettra d’introduire une distinction centrale à l’analyse de Nietzsche, soit celle entre la doctrine et la personnalité du célèbre Athénien. En effet, Nietzsche isole la personnalité de Socrate, qu’il circonscrit à partir des notions d’instinct, de pulsion et d’affect, de sa doctrine, qu’il appelle le socratisme et qu’il définit à partir de l’équation socratique raison = vertu = bonheur. Ensuite, nous développerons les trois éléments sur lesquels il s’appuie pour expliquer que Socrate ait pu séduire les Grecs, soit le fait qu’il fut un grand érotique, qu’il introduisit une nouvelle forme de joute à Athènes et qu’il apparut comme étant un médecin pour ses contemporains. Cette question des raisons permettant d’expliquer que Socrate ait pu séduire les Grecs est déterminante pour Nietzsche, puisque c’est de là qu’il est amené à se demander qui est ce Socrate et quel a été son véritable impact sur la culture, soit les deux questions qui sont au cœur de ce qu’il appelle « le problème de Socrate ». Enfin, nous nous pencherons sur le diagnostic que le philosophe allemand pose sur le célèbre Athénien ainsi que sur son évaluation de l’impact du socratisme sur les cultures antique et moderne, après quoi nous présenterons l’inversion des valeurs que Nietzsche tente d’opérer dans sa propre culture. Nous verrons alors qu’il cherche entre autres par cette inversion des valeurs à nous libérer du socratisme, car il est d’avis que cette doctrine dévalorise toute forme d’agir puisant ses motifs dans ce qui relève de l’inconscient et survalorise une morale luttant contre les pulsions dominantes en nous. / The purpose of this thesis is to investigate Nietzsche’s analysis and assessment of the meaning and the impact of Socrates’ character on the classical and modern culture. To that effect, I will emphasize the question of Socrates’ identity, in order to introduce the crucial issue in Nietzsche’s analysis, namely the distinction between Socrates’ doctrine and his character. Nietzsche isolated Socrates’ character – which he defined through the categories of instinct, drive, and affect – from his doctrine, which he labelled socratism and defined through the Socratic equation reason = virtue = happiness. This thesis explores the three core elements Nietzsche used to explain how Socrates was able to seduce the Greeks: not only was Socrates a very erotic figure, he also introduced a new form of debate to Athens, and was considered an eminent physician by his contemporaries. Socrates’ appeal to the Greek is of fundamental importance to Nietzsche, since it prompted him to question Socrates’ inherent character, and his true impact on Athenian culture. It thus forms the crux of what he called “the problem of Socrates.” Nietzsche’s understanding of socratism as well as its impact on classical and modern culture allows him to revaluate all values within his own culture. To that effect, I reveal Nietzsche’s critiques of socratism – in particular, his belief that society needed to be liberated from socratism, since it denies all agency to individuals. Given that it was strongly motivated by the unconscious, socratism, according to Nietzsche, overemphasizes a certain morality in the struggle against our dominant impulses.

Ce mémoire cherche à évaluer la culpabilité de Socrate face à l’échec et à la corruption d’Alcibiade, telle que la question se pose dans le Banquet de Platon. Il comprend quatre chapitres. Le premier démontre que le cadre dramatique lui-même fait occuper une place centrale à la vie et au déclin d’Alcibiade et au problème de la responsabilité de Socrate face aux accusations de corruption de la jeunesse qui ont pesé sur lui. Le deuxième chapitre interprète le discours d’Alcibiade comme une tentative de disculpation qui repose sur une critique acerbe du comportement de Socrate. Il se serait détourné de Socrate et de ses enseignements en raison de son ironie, de son arrogance et de son indifférence – de son hybris. Le troisième chapitre étudie le discours de Socrate sur l’accession à la beauté intelligible. Il expose la nature particulière de son éros, qui repose sur l’ironie et l’inversion des rôles comme moyens d’exhorter à la philosophie. Le quatrième chapitre pose la question de l’efficacité de ce type de pédagogie et de la responsabilité du philosophe vis-à-vis de ses disciples. L’étude conclut que l’amour et l’ironie de Socrate sont essentiellement des moyens d’inviter l’autre à se remettre lui-même en question et à prendre soin de son âme. Socrate n’est donc pas coupable d’avoir corrompu Alcibiade. La faute est entièrement celle du jeune homme. Il s’est montré incapable, par égocentrisme et fierté excessive, de réagir correctement à l’énigme posée par le comportement érotique de Socrate. / This essay on Plato’s Symposium assesses to what extent Socrates could be held guilty for Alcibiades’ failure and corruption. The first of the four chapters shows that Alcibiades’ life and decline and the accusation against Socrates of youth corruption are central to the dramatic structure. The second chapter interprets Alcibiades’ speech as a sharp criticism of Socrates’ behaviour meant to exculpate himself. Alcibiades justifies his walking away from Socrates and his teachings on the basis of the philosopher’s irony, arrogance and indifference – his hybris. The third chapter looks at Socrates’ speech, which sets out the path to the highest form of Beauty. It explores the particular nature of his eros, which relies especially on irony and role inversion to induce philosophical thinking. The fourth chapter asks how effective this kind of pedagogy is, and what is the responsibility of the philosopher to his students. It is concluded that Socratic love and irony are essentially to be conceived of as means of inciting followers to put themselves into question and take greater care of their souls. Socrates is thus not guilty of corrupting the young man. The fault is entirely Alcibiades’. His pride and selfishness are what prevented him from meeting the challenge that Socrates’ erotic behavior put before him.

In both the Meno and the Protagoras, Plato investigates the unity, acquisition and nature of virtue (ἀρετή). Although these dialogues appear to reach opposing conclusions—the Protagoras that virtue is knowledge and the Meno that virtue is divinely dispensed true opinion—in fact they both articulate the same moral principle. Both dialogues argue that virtue is knowledge of the good. I investigate these two dialogues independently and on their own respective terms, dedicating Chapter 2 to the Protagoras and Chapter 3 to the Meno. Although both dialogues argue that virtue is knowledge of the good, neither offers an account of the good. This is because each dialogue is but a single part of a larger argument which culminates in the Republic, wherein we find a more complete explanation of knowledge of the good in the description of the philosopher-king.