Diogène de Sinope, principal représentant du cynisme ancien, affirme dans une de ses œuvres qu’« il mettait la liberté au-dessus de tout ». Il n’est pas question ici du sens politique de la liberté, mais plutôt de son acception morale et individuelle, dont les origines remontent au moins au VIe s. av. J.-C. et peut-être à la racine même du mot ἐλεύθερος. Retracer l’histoire de cette notion révèle diverses influences sur le cynisme, que ce soit la figure de l’« esclave libre » chez les tragiques, ou la correspondance entre nature et liberté chez les Sophistes et Démocrite. Pour atteindre l’autarcie et l’apathie, les deux caractéristiques de la liberté cynique, Diogène doit soumettre son corps à un entraînement de nature physique, seul moyen de s’émanciper des chaînes de la civilisation. Socrate, surtout chez Xénophon et dans une certaine mesure chez Platon, avait déjà fait des exercices corporels une condition d’acquisition de la liberté. Toutefois, l’émancipation de l’individu débouche avec Socrate sur l’apprentissage du savoir qu’il juge nécessaire à la vertu. Les Cyniques, quant à eux, rejettent la vertu-connaissance et limitent leur activité philosophique à la pratique d’une ascèse corporelle rigoureuse, de sorte que la liberté mène sans détour à la vertu et au bonheur au point de s’y identifier. Les Cyniques se différencient donc de leurs prédécesseurs socratiques en ne prolongeant pas leur quête philosophique au-delà du moment de la libération et, par le fait même, font de la liberté la véritable marque distinctive de leur philosophie. / Diogenes of Sinope, the main representative of ancient Cynicism, says in one of his works that « he preferred freedom above everything ». He does not mean here freedom in its political sense, but rather in its moral and individual meaning, which dates back at least to the sixth century BC and perhaps to the very root of the word ἐλεύθερος. Tracing the history of this notion reveals diverse influences on Cynicism, whether the figure of the « free slave » of the tragedians, or the correspondence between nature and freedom of the Sophists and Democritus. To reach self-sufficiency and apathy, the two characteristics of Cynic freedom, Diogenes must submit his body to physical training, it being the only way to break free from the chains of civilization. Socrates, especially in Xenophon and to a certain extent in Plato, had already made physical exercises a condition for acquiring freedom. However, with Socrates the emancipation of the individual ends in gaining knowledge that he deems necessary to virtue. Cynics, for their part, reject virtue-knowledge and limit their philosophical activity to the practice of a rigorous physical asceticism, so that freedom leads directly to virtue and happiness to the point of identifying with it. Therefore, Cynics differ from their Socratic predecessors by not extending their philosophical quest beyond the moment of liberation and thereby make freedom the true hallmark of their philosophy.

<p>Orfičko učenje o bogu Erotu. Bog Erot u starogrčkoj mitologiji i njegovo predstavljanje u Hesiodovoj Teogoniji, Sapfinoj poeziji i Aristofanovoj komediji Ptice. Dokazivanje da je Platonov pojam erosa &ldquo;conditio sine qua non&rdquo; filozofije kao filozofije. Doktorska disertacija prikazuje razvoj pojma Erosa iz mitologije i poezije preko interpretacija Presokratovaca do Platonovog pojma erosa. Ovaj pojam je presudno uticao na hri&scaron;ćanstvo kao i na celokupnu filozofiju Zapada. Ključne reči: Sokratov pojam erosa, Platonov pojam erosa, savremene interpretacije pojma, veza antičkih i savremenih interpretacija.</p> / <p>Orfic teaching about god Eros. God Eros at the Ancient mythology and his representation in Hesiod`s Theogony, Sappho`s poetry and Aristophanes`s comedy The Birds. Proving that Plato`s concept of Eros is &ldquo;conditio sine qua non&rdquo; philosophy like philosophy. Doctor&rsquo;s thesis shows the progress concept of Eros from the mythology and poetry through Presocratic interpretations to the Plato`s concept of Eros. This concept is fundamental for the Christianity and for all forms of philosophy in Western World. Key words: Socrates`s concept of Eros, Plato`s concept of Eros,Contemporary interpretations of Concept, Link between Ancient and Contemporary Interpretations.</p>

À très peu de philosophes l’histoire de la pensée occidentale a accordé une place aussi significative qu’à Socrate : nous apprenons tout naturellement à l’édifier comme héros de la rationalité et à reconnaître en lui la figure même du philosophe critique. À plusieurs égards, cette représentation élogieuse nous paraît justifiée, bien que, d’un autre point de vue, elle puisse nous faire sombrer dans la confusion, dès lors que notre regard porte simultanément, et comme pour produire un contraste, sur l’image d’un Socrate se soumettant au daimonion, son étrange signe divin. Comment pouvons-nous justifier, à partir du corpus platonicien, à la fois l’engagement de Socrate vis-à-vis de la rationalité et sa soumission à un phénomène en apparence irrationnel ? De cette question troublante est née la présente étude qui se consacre donc au problème de l’articulation entre le rapport de Socrate aux dieux et son rapport à la raison critique. Plus précisément, nous avons cherché à déterminer s’il existait, sur le plan épistémologique, une hiérarchie entre le daimonion et la méthode d’investigation rationnelle propre à Socrate, l’elenchos. Une telle étude exégétique nécessitait, dans un premier temps, une analyse systématique et approfondie des quelques passages sur le signe divin. Nous avons ensuite exposé deux solutions paradigmatiques au problème du double engagement contradictoire de Socrate, celle de G. Vlastos ainsi que celle de T.C. Brickhouse et N.D. Smith. Enfin, nous avons augmenté cette seconde partie d’un examen spécifique du Phèdre et du Timée, de même que d’un survol des modes de divination pour satisfaire un triple objectif : situer le signe divin en regard de la mantique traditionnelle, déterminer le rôle attribué par Platon à la raison dans le processus divinatoire, et être ainsi en mesure de trancher notre question principale. / To very few philosophers the history of the Western thought granted a place as significant as to Socrates: we quite naturally learn how to identify him as a hero of rationality and to recognize in him the very figure of the critical philosopher. In several respects, this representation of praise appears justified to us, although, from another point of view, it can make us sink in confusion, since our glance carries simultaneously, and like producing a contrast, on the image of Socrates obeying to the daimonion, his uncanny divine sign. How can we justify, starting from the Platonic corpus, both the engagement of Socrates with respect to rationality and his subordination to a seemingly irrational phenomenon? From this disconcerting question was born the present study which is thus devoted to the problem of the articulation between the relation of Socrates to the gods and his relation to the critical reason. More precisely, we sought to determine if there existed, on the epistemological level, a hierarchy between the daimonion and the method of rational investigation peculiar to Socrates, the elenchos. Such an exegetic study required, initially, a systematic and thorough analysis of the few passages related to the divine sign. We then adduced two paradigmatic solutions, that of G. Vlastos as well as that of T.C. Brickhouse and N.D. Smith. Lastly, we added to this second part besides a specific examination of Phaedrus and Timaeus, also a broad survey of the modes of divination, satisfying a triple aim: to make sense of the divine sign in comparison with the traditional art of mantic, to determine the role allotted by Plato to the reason in the divinatory process, and thus to be able to solve our principal question.

Cette thèse a pour but de dresser un panorama complet des croyances de Xénophon en la divination. À l’aide d’une analyse rigoureuse de la totalité des œuvres de cet auteur antique pendant longtemps déprécié, il ressort que le problème de la consultation des dieux, loin d’être abordé de manière anecdotique et spontanée à la façon d’un legs de la tradition que la pensée critique n’a pas touchée, est au contraire un élément essentiel de la formation d’une réflexion profonde sur la piété et plus généralement les rapports qu’entretiennent les hommes avec les dieux. D’autre part, en raison du zèle de Xénophon à avoir rapporté des récits ou des réflexions à propos de la divination, cette analyse offre l’occasion de mieux comprendre les subtilités de cette pratique rituelle logée au cœur de la religion grecque et qui ne saurait être réduite à une forme de superstition. / This thesis aims to provide a complete overview of the beliefs of Xenophon about divination. Using a rigorous analysis of all the works of this ancient author who has long been depreciated, it seems clear that the problem of the consultation of the gods, far from being addressed incidentally and spontaneously like a traditional legacy that critical thinking has not reached, is on the contrary an essential element in the formation of a deep thinking on piety, and more generally of the relationships between men and gods. On the other hand, due to Xenophon’s zeal to have reported stories or thoughts about divination, this analysis provides an opportunity to a better understanding of the intricacies of this ritual lying at the core of Greek religion and that can not be reduced to a form of superstition.

Much modern moral philosophy has conceived of its interpretative and critical aims in relation to an entity it sometimes terms 'common-sense morality'. The term was influentially used in something like its canonical sense by Henry Sidgwick in his classic work The Methods of Ethics (1874). Sidgwick conceived of common-sense morality as a more-or-less determinate body of current moral opinion, and traced his ('doxastic') conception through Kant back to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and the practice of Plato's Socrates before him. The Introduction to this thesis traces the influence of Sidgwick's conception both on subsequent (mis)understandings of Socratic practice as well as on the practice of moral philosophy in the twentieth century. The first essay offers a challenge to Sidgwick's understanding of Socratic practice. I argue that Socrates' questioning of his interlocutors, far from revealing some determinate body of pre-existing beliefs, is in fact a demonstration of the dynamic and partially indeterminate quality of common-sense morality. The value for the interlocutor of engaging in such conversation with Socrates consisted primarily in its forcing him to adopt what I term a deliberative stance with respect to his own practice and dispositions, asking himself not 'what is it that I believe?' but rather, 'what am I to believe?' This understanding of Socratic practice gives us a way of reconciling the often puzzling combination of conservative and radical elements in Plato's dialogues. The second essay is a discussion of the reception of Sidgwick's conception of ethics in twentieth-century Oxford, a hegemonic centre of Anglophone philosophy. This recent tradition consists both of figures who accepted Sidgwick's picture of moral philosophy's aims and those who rejected it. Of the critics, I am centrally concerned with Bernard Williams, whose life's work, I argue, can be fruitfully understood as the elaboration of a heterodox understanding of Socratic practice, opposed to Sidgwick's. Ethics, on this conception, is a project directed at the emancipation of our moral experience from the many distortions to which it is vulnerable. Williams's writings in moral philosophy, disparate and not entirely systematic, are unified by these emancipatory aims, aims they share with strains of psychoanalysis except in that they do not scorn philosophical argument as a tool of emancipation: in this respect among others, I claim, they are fundamentally Socratic.

Plato’s Socrates is famous for claiming that “I know one thing: That I know nothing” (see e.g. Ap. 21d and Meno 81d). There is one subject that Socrates repeatedly claims to have expertise in, however: ta erôtika (see e.g. Symp. 198d1). Socrates also refers to this expertise as his erôtikê technê (Phdr. 257a7–8), which may be translated as “erotic expertise”. In this dissertation, I investigate Socrates’ erotic expertise: what kind of expertise is it, what is it constituted by, where is it put into practice, and how is it practiced? I argue that the purposes this expertise serve are, to a significant extent, educational in nature. After first having clarified the dissertation’s topic and aim, as well as my methodological approach, I present an initial account of erôs and Socrates’ erotic expertise. While discussing what constitutes Socrates’ erotic expertise, I account for two erotic educational methods: midwifery and matchmaking. I further argue that these methods tend to be accompanied by two psychological techniques, namely charming and shaming. I argue that these methods and techniques are systematically applied by Socrates when he puts his erotic expertise into practice. In the dissertation, three dialogues where Socrates practices his erotic expertise are scrutinized: Lysis, Charmides, and Alcibiades I. I focus on Socrates’ encounters with the eponymous youths of the dialogues, and each dialogue is devoted a chapter of its own. I show how these dialogues are erotically charged, and also how Socrates in these dialogues demonstrates his erotic expertise. I argue that Socrates’ expertise on erôs plays an essential role in his attempts to engage the three youths in the processes of self-cultivation, learning, and the very practice of philosophy. In the final chapter of the dissertation I turn to some questions that arise in light of my readings, and summarize the results of my investigation.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-23T14:09:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Adolfo Miranda Oleare.pdf: 667088 bytes, checksum: 66aca180a8c81bf9c466cd689d529634 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-06-16 / According to the Nietzsche s statement that metaphysics operates in the moral sense of denaturalization and spiritualization passions, introducing them to the state of evil to be combated by institutions universally shared values and controlling the being and activity - religion, science, philosophy - I will try here to address the exposure of the metaphysics of the passions produced in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. To do so, I take as a base, especially the speech "Of joys and passions," to which others also come to join. Thinking deny the passions in favor of conceptual knowledge-representational - that rationality, consciousness - the deified metaphysical truth, preventing, therefore, research on the value of truth, that is, the elements that, in addition to what could be the nature of truth underlying the relationship themselves as creators of their philosophies, they have the truth. The persecution of passions, then, is the director of metaphysical passion. Symptom of a dominant drive comes from her orders in , unconscious, emotional, passionate. Contrary to the dualist tradition - rationalist and subjectivist - the philosophy of Nietzsche equates life and passion, identifying the engine in the affective dimension of human activity, including thinking there / Seguindo a indicação nietzschiana de que a metafísica opera no sentido moral de desnaturalização e espiritualização das paixões, lançando-as ao reino do mal a ser universalmente combatido pelas instituições formadoras dos valores comuns e controladoras do ser e do agir religião, ciência, filosofia , tratarei de abordar aqui o desmascaramento da metafísica produzido pela tematização das paixões em Assim falou Zaratustra. Para tanto, tomo como base, sobretudo, o discurso Das alegrias e das paixões , ao qual outros também vêm se juntar. Pensando negar as paixões em favor do conhecimento conceitual-representativo referido à racionalidade, à consciência , os metafísicos divinizam a verdade, impedindo-se, assim, a investigação acerca do valor da verdade, isto é, dos elementos que, para além do que poderia ser a natureza da verdade, fundamentam a relação que eles próprios, enquanto criadores de suas filosofias, têm com a verdade. A perseguição às paixões é, pois, a paixão diretora dos metafísicos. Sintoma de uma pulsão dominante provém ela de ordens intransparentes, inconscientes, afetivas, apaixonadas. Contrária à tradição dualista racionalista e subjetivista , a filosofia de Nietzsche equipara vida e paixão, identificando na dimensão afetiva o motor da atividade humana, incluindo-se aí o pensamento

Aerosols contribute the largest uncertainty to estimates of radiative forcing of the Earth’s atmosphere, which are thought to exert a net negative radiative forcing, offsetting a potentially significant but poorly constrained fraction of the positive radiative forcing associated with greenhouse gases. Aerosols perturb the Earth’s radiative balance directly by absorbing and scattering radiation and indirectly by acting as cloud condensation nuclei, altering cloud albedo and potentially cloud lifetime. One of the major factors governing the uncertainty in estimates of aerosol direct radiative forcing is the poorly constrained aerosol single scattering albedo, which is the ratio of the aerosol scattering to extinction. In this thesis, I describe a new instrument for the measurement of aerosol optical properties using photoacoustic and cavity ring-down spectroscopy. Characterisation is performed by assessing the instrument minimum sensitivity and accuracy as well as verifying the accuracy of its calibration procedure. The instrument and calibration accuracies are assessed by comparing modelled to measured optical properties of well-characterised laboratory-generated aerosol. I then examine biases in traditional, filter-based absorption measurements by comparing to photoacoustic spectrometer absorption measurements for a range of aerosol sources at multiple wavelengths. Filter-based measurements consistently overestimate absorption although the bias magnitude is strongly source-dependent. Biases are consistently lowest when an advanced correction scheme is applied, irrespective of wavelength or aerosol source. Lastly, I assess the sensitivity of the direct radiative effect of biomass burning aerosols to aerosol and cloud optical properties over the Southeast Atlantic Ocean using a combination of offline radiative transfer modelling, satellite observations and global climate model simulations. Although the direct radiative effect depends on aerosol and cloud optical properties in a non-linear way, it appears to be only weakly dependent on sub-grid variability.

This thesis deals with the topic of the Socratic question as a basis of the care for one's soul in Patocka's texts within the period from 30th to 50th years of the 20th century. This topic is here divided into three larger coherent units. The first part deals with the Patocka's understanding of Socratic care for one's soul as a historical moral self-creation of man having a character of negatively oriented transcension, which is not determined by ideas, but associated in its way of distance from objectivity with motive of knowing unknowing about the last good. The second part of this thesis deals with Patocka's comprehending of Plato as a creator of metaphysical thinking, in which core stands this negatively oriented experience of Socratic moral reversal. Plato, however, this experience of originally unobjectivated horizon according to Patocka's interpretation objectivates as the world of eternal ideas. Patocka as a central interpretative motive of this experience inserts in his own interpretation of Plato the term of Being inspired by Heidegger, which is very close to Plato's Idea of Good laying beyond all divides of essence (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας). The last part of this thesis concerns with Patocka's own attempt to understand Plato's Idea by unobjective means. Although thus interpreted Idea is relieved of...

Cette étude porte sur la réfutation (elenchos) dans la République de Platon, et montre que la présence de cette méthode au livre I ne saurait être un signe de la rédaction antérieure de ce livre, ni de la volonté de Platon de critiquer cette forme de la dialectique. Les deux premiers chapitres traitent de l'aspect épistémologique de la question : le premier montre que l'exposition de la dialectique au livre VII inclut l'elenchos, et le second que la défaillance des arguments du livre I doit être interprétée par des motifs pédagogiques, et non par une intention satirique de l'auteur. Les deux derniers chapitres se penchent sur la dimension morale de l'elenchos. Ainsi, le troisième chapitre affirme que Platon nous présente, au livre I, l'elenchos comme un outil efficace d'éducation morale, tandis que le quatrième chapitre cherche à expliquer la critique morale de l'elenchos du livre VII par la différence entre l'éducation dans une cité parfaite et celle dans une société corrompue. La conclusion de l'ouvrage explique le délaissement de la méthode élenctique dans les neuf derniers livres de la République par des raisons autres que par la perte de confiance de Platon en les capacités de cette méthode. / This study is about refutation (elenchus) in Plato's Republic. I claim that Socrates' use of this method in Book I cannot be considered evidence that the text belongs to an earlier draft of this book, nor of an implicit critique of the elenctic method by Plato. My first chapter shows that the dialectic described in Book VII actually includes the elenchus. The second chapter studies the arguments of Book I and shows that their many flaws should be interpreted in term of Plato's pedagogical motives, and do not suggest that he intended to write a satire. Chapter three shows that, far from criticizing Socrates' method on moral grounds, Book I actually presents the elenchus as a successful tool for moral education. Chapter four explains the moral criticism of the elenchus in Book VII by contrasting education in a perfect city with Socrates' education of already-corrupted men. I conclude by explaining why the Republic's main books do not make use of refutation.