Throughout the early Platonic dialogues, Socrates repeatedly tells his interlocutors that if, as they claim, they truly have knowledge concerning some morally significant property, then they should be able to define the nature of that property. Invariably, the interlocutors fail to furnish him with such definitions, leading him to conclude that they, and all humankind, are ignorant of any knowledge about such property. This leads him to encourage his interlocutors, and us, to adopt a sense of intellectual humility and to dedicate their lives to studying these properties in an effort to gain moral insight. Many scholars have cited Socrates' demand for definition as evidence that he accepts a Priority of Definition principle - an epistemological principle asserting that a person must first know the definition of a property before she can know anything else about the property. Many of the scholars who make this ascription also argue, for various reasons, that such a principle is erroneous. If these scholars are correct and Socrates does accept a flawed Priority of Definition principle, then his epistemology, along with his whole philosophy, suffers devastating harm. Students of the early dialogues must consider whether Socrates does, in fact, accept the principle and, if so, whether the principle is incorrect. The thesis will examine the issues that arise from the ascription of a Priority of Definition principle to Socrates. The study will first examine textual evidence supporting the ascription along with texts that bring the ascription into question. It will then outline three general philosophical criticisms of the principle. Finally, this study will examine a number of different understandings of Socrates' conception of knowledge. Hopefully, an understanding can be discovered that preserves his philosophy by effectively showing that either (1) Socrates does not accept the principle, or (2) he does accept the principle but the principle is not philosophically problematic. If such an understanding can be discovered, then Socrates' conception of knowledge is saved from the criticisms raised by scholars. Otherwise, his whole philosophy will be placed in a very troubling light. / Master of Arts

[pt] A presente dissertação trata do conceito de ironia socrático-platônica, com ênfase em excertos nos quais encontram-se registros textuais de eíron e derivados, que possam ser compreendidos como ocorrências irônicas do Sócrates de Platão. O problema é que a palavra (eironeía), no dialeto ático, geralmente, tinha a semântica negativa da dissimulação. Contudo, a origem ambígua do termo também abrangia a ideia de questionamento. Dentre os mais proeminentes autores da antiguidade grega, Platão foi o que mais fez uso de eironeía e congêneres, na maioria das vezes, em contextos nos quais aparece Sócrates, agindo com seu hábito tão peculiar de questionar seus interlocutores. No decurso do tempo, essa correlação entre o termo antigo e o paradoxo filosófico da negação de conhecimento intitulou-se de ironia socrática. As correntes interpretativas dividiram-se, basicamente, entre uma proposta de leitura negativa e a outra positiva para esse evento. Portanto, nesta dissertação, o primeiro e principal objetivo é escrutinar a relevância da eironeía/ironia socrática, a partir da verificação do corpus platonicum. Então, encontram-se os oitos diálogos que contêm instâncias do termo, subdividindo-os entre aqueles em que (1) a eironeía não está diretamente relacionada a Sócrates, a saber, Eutidemo, Crátilo, Sofista e Leis, e os outros nos quais (2) a eironeía está diretamente relacionada ao protagonista platônico, i.e., Apologia, Górgias, Banquete e República. Para tal, organizam-se alguns critérios básicos que auxiliam na delimitação e identificação dos eventos irônicos, a fim de extrair conclusões mais coerentes quanto à natureza e os propósitos da eironeía/ironia socrática. Além disso, esta dissertação tem como segundo objetivo a interpretação da mais pregnante estratégia literária de Platão, a saber, o famoso anonimato, ou ocultação da voz autoral, como uma espécie de dissimulação inerente à eironeía. Então, almeja-se analisar o potencial retórico e epistemológico desse recurso, em seus dois aspectos: o método socrático e a estratégia literária platônica. Contudo, apesar dos desafios hermenêuticos e a polêmica que divide a vasta fortuna crítica a respeito do assunto, o terceiro objetivo desta dissertação é a aproximação de interpretações positivas do termo ou, ao menos, interpretações que o vejam como relevante à prática filosófica. Assim, revisitam-se os clássicos para se pensar a atualidade. Afinal, acredita-se que, quando Platão emprega a eironeía/ironia socrática, o efeito disso é o estímulo à reflexão sobre as virtudes e a verdade dos variados temas encontrados nos diálogos. / [en] This thesis deals with the concept of Socratic-Platonic irony, with emphasis on excerpts in which textual scripts of (eiron) and derivatives are found, which can be understood as ironic occurrences of Plato s Socrates. The problem is that the word (eironeia), in the Attic dialect, generally had the negative semantics of dissembling. However, the ambiguous origin of the term also embraced the idea of questioning. Among the most prominent authors of Greek antiquity, Plato made the most use of eironeia and cognates, most of the time, in contexts where Socrates appears, acting with his very peculiar habit of questioning his interlocutors. Throughout the time, this correlation between the ancient term and the philosophical paradox of the disavowal of knowledge was called Socratic irony. The interpretative currents were divided, basically, between a negative and a positive reading proposal for this event. Therefore, in this thesis, the first and main goal is to scrutinize the relevance of Socratic eironeia/irony, by the verification of the corpus platonicum. Then, we find the eight dialogues that contain instances of the term, subdividing them into those in which (1) the eironeia is not directly related to Socrates, namely, Euthydemus, Cratylus, Sophist and Laws, and others in which (2) the eironeia is directly related to the Platonic protagonist, i.e., Apology, Gorgias, Symposium and Republic. To this end, some basic criteria are organized to help in the delimitation and identification of ironic events, in order to draw more coherent conclusions, regarding the nature and purposes of Socratic eironeia/irony. Furthermore, this thesis has as its second goal the interpretation of Plato s most pregnant literary strategy, namely, the famous anonymity, or concealment of the authorial voice, as a kind of dissimulation, inherent to eironeia. So, we aim to analyze the rhetorical and epistemological potential of this resource, in its two aspects: the Socratic method and the Platonic literary strategy. However, despite the hermeneutical challenges and the controversy that divides the vast critical fortune on the subject, the third goal of this thesis is the approach of positive interpretations or, at least, those which see it as relevant to philosophical practice. Thus, the classics are revisited to think about the present. After all, it is believed that, when Plato employs the Socratic eironeia/irony, the effect of this is the stimulus to reflection on the virtues and on the truth of the various themes found in the dialogues.

[pt] Esta tese parte de uma provocação enunciada pela personagem Alcibíades em seu discurso no diálogo Banquete de Platão: Nenhum de vocês o conhece bem. Esta frase versa a respeito da ininteligibilidade e consequente incomparabilidade de Sócrates, identificada pelo simposiasta como atopía, um não-lugar. Partindo, então, deste termo, buscamos aqui analisar as pistas que a personagem que discursa sobre o filósofo apresenta acerca dele, correlacionandoas a outras que ocorrem na obra platônica em geral e que consolidam a atopia de Sócrates. Assim, desenvolvemos uma análise de Sócrates enquanto um ser atópico tanto em sua fisionomia, como em seu comportamento e palavras, sendo estas três áreas da vida do filósofo o que chamamos nesta tese de eixos, bases metodológicas segundo as quais desenvolveremos a análise da sua atopia. Como fio condutor principal de todos estes eixos, teremos a presença central das figuras divinas de Eros e Dioniso, ambas apresentadas no Banquete como sendo os principais referenciais a partir dos quais Sócrates viverá a sua atopia. No campo de Eros, analisaremos o fundamento da narrativa de Diotima acerca deste deus, com seu caráter intermediário e daimônico, que será associado a Sócrates de forma evidente na fala da sacerdotisa de Mantineia. Já quanto ao aspecto dionisíaco, ele surgirá permeando todo o diálogo, mas será encontrado, em especial, na figura dos sátiros e silenos, seres mitológicos do círculo dionisíaco que serão associados a Sócrates por Alcibíades. Postulamos, assim, como tese central deste trabalho, que Sócrates é atópos porque a sua filosofia será um exercício integrado de seu corpo, de seus atos e de suas palavras, como partes de seu ser erótico e dionisíaco. / [en] This thesis is part of a provocation enunciated by the character Alcibiades in his speech in Plato s Symposium dialogue: None of you know him well. This phrase concerns the unintelligibility and consequent incomparability of Socrates, identified by the symposiasta as atopy, a non-place. Beginning from this term, we reach to analyze the clues that the character speeches about the philosopher presents about him, correlating them to others, that occurs in the Platonic piece in general and that consolidates the atopy of Socrates. Thus, we developed an analysis of Socrates as an atopic being both in his physiognomy as in his behavior and words, these three areas of the philosopher s life being what we call this thesis of axes, methodological bases according to which we ll develop the analysis of his atopy. As the main thread of all these axes, we will have the central presence of the divine figures of Eros and Dionysus, both presented at the Symposium as the main references from which Socrates will live his atopy. In Eros field, we will analyze the foundation of Diotima s narrative about this god, with his intermediate and daimonic character, which will be associated with Socrates in an evident way in the speech of the priestess of Mantineia. In the matter of the Dionysian aspect, it will appear permeating the whole dialogue, but will be found, in particular, in the figure of the satyrs and silenos, mythological beings of the Dionysian circle that will be associated with Socrates by Alcibiades. We postulate, therefore, as the central thesis of this work, that Socrates is atomic because his philosophy will be an integrated exercise of his body, his acts and his words, as parts of his erotic and Dionysian being.

This thesis examines Nietzsche’s relationship to Socrates through his positive philosophy of education, arguing that the latter is crucial to resolving the apparent contradictions of the former. While there is a good deal of literature dealing with Nietzsche’s criticisms of the educational system of his day, there is relatively little on his own account of what education should be. I point out that the Greek conception of agon (roughly “contest” in English), is central to Nietzsche’s understanding of education, and informs his ideal of the student-mentor relationship. This is the model on which, I contend, Nietzsche’s relation to Socrates needs to be interpreted. Such an interpretation helps to make sense of, and reconcile, the divergent pictures of Socrates Nietzsche presents in his texts, which are sometimes admiring and imitative, sometimes hostile and contemptuous, and have led to conflicting interpretations within the scholarship on this subject. My analysis aims to shed new light on both the figure of Nietzsche’s Socrates, and Nietzsche’s philosophy of education, by relating these to one another.

This thesis examines Nietzsche’s relationship to Socrates through his positive philosophy of education, arguing that the latter is crucial to resolving the apparent contradictions of the former. While there is a good deal of literature dealing with Nietzsche’s criticisms of the educational system of his day, there is relatively little on his own account of what education should be. I point out that the Greek conception of agon (roughly “contest” in English), is central to Nietzsche’s understanding of education, and informs his ideal of the student-mentor relationship. This is the model on which, I contend, Nietzsche’s relation to Socrates needs to be interpreted. Such an interpretation helps to make sense of, and reconcile, the divergent pictures of Socrates Nietzsche presents in his texts, which are sometimes admiring and imitative, sometimes hostile and contemptuous, and have led to conflicting interpretations within the scholarship on this subject. My analysis aims to shed new light on both the figure of Nietzsche’s Socrates, and Nietzsche’s philosophy of education, by relating these to one another.

This thesis examines Nietzsche’s relationship to Socrates through his positive philosophy of education, arguing that the latter is crucial to resolving the apparent contradictions of the former. While there is a good deal of literature dealing with Nietzsche’s criticisms of the educational system of his day, there is relatively little on his own account of what education should be. I point out that the Greek conception of agon (roughly “contest” in English), is central to Nietzsche’s understanding of education, and informs his ideal of the student-mentor relationship. This is the model on which, I contend, Nietzsche’s relation to Socrates needs to be interpreted. Such an interpretation helps to make sense of, and reconcile, the divergent pictures of Socrates Nietzsche presents in his texts, which are sometimes admiring and imitative, sometimes hostile and contemptuous, and have led to conflicting interpretations within the scholarship on this subject. My analysis aims to shed new light on both the figure of Nietzsche’s Socrates, and Nietzsche’s philosophy of education, by relating these to one another.

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The definition and function of Socratic irony has been much disputed in contemporary scholarship. This thesis identifies some methodological difficulties in interpreting and defining Socratic irony and attempts to narrow the field of interpretation in order to facilitate the formulation of a new definition of the concept. With reference to the primary texts of Plato, Xenophon and Aristophanes, as well as some fragments, the different types of irony as employed by Socrates are identified as verbal, in the form of self-deprecation and knowledge disavowal, and physical. A review of late 18th, 19th and 20th century philosophical scholarship on the topic is done in order to gain a better understanding of the perceived functions of Socratic irony. On the basis of this, as well as the opinions of prominent classical scholars, it is argued that the function of Socratic irony in its verbal form is primarily heuristic, while the physical form is a political mode of being designed to criticise 5th-century Athenian politics. Socratic irony is then redefined to allow for these forms and functions, which are shown to be much more complex than previously thought. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Daar word baie gedebatteer oor die definisie en funksie van die Sokratiese ironie in die onlangse navorsing. Hierdie tesis identifiseer sommige metodologiese probleme in die interpretasie en die definisie van Sokratiese ironie en poog om die veld van interpretasie te beperk ten einde die formulering van 'n nuwe definisie van die begrip te fasiliteer. Met verwysing na die primêre tekste van Plato, Xenophon en Aristophanes, asook 'n paar fragmente, word die verskillende vorme van ironie soos deur Sokrates gebruik, geïdentifiseer as verbaal, in die vorm van self-afkeuring en ontkenning van kennis, en fisies. ʼn Oorsig van die laat 18de-, 19de- en 20ste-eeuse filosofiese navorsing is gegee ten einde 'n beter begrip te verkry van die waargenome funksies van Sokratiese ironie. Op grond hiervan, asook die menings van vooraanstaande klassici, word aangevoer dat die funksie van die Sokratiese ironie in sy verbale vorm hoofsaaklik heuristies is, terwyl die fisiese vorm 'n politieke bestaanswyse is, met die doel om die 5de-eeuse Atheense politiek te kritiseer. Teen hierdie agtergrond word Sokratiese ironie dan herdefinieer om voorsiening te maak vir bogenoemde vorme en funksies wat blyk baie meer kompleks te wees as wat voorheen gemeen is.

This thesis investigates Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) reception of the writings of Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). I focus on four specific topics. In chapter one I examine Kierkegaard’s early reception of Hamann which I argue provides the basis for Kierkegaard’s conception of his own authorial task. In particular, I examine concepts of humour and systematicity and the centrality of the figure of Socrates. Central to my argument is a contrast between Kierkegaard’s reception of Hamann and that of Hegel’s review. In chapter two I show that Kierkegaard develops an argument against speculative philosophy and its claims to have achieved the absolute beginning. I argue that Kierkegaard appeals to Hamann’s critique of Kant which centres around the possibility of a priori cognition and the dependency of reason on language. I contend that Kierkegaard takes up Hamann’s critique in order to show that the absolute beginning which speculative philosophy claims to have achieved in the form of pure thinking is unachievable because of the dependency of thought on language. Chapter three examines the conception of selfhood in Hamann and Kierkegaard. I address their views of the self as unified and their critique of alternative conceptions of selfhood which undermine this unity. I show that Kierkegaard’s arguments in relation to despair and forgetfulness share important similarities with Hamann. Chapter four explores Kierkegaard’s critique and repair of post-Kantian reflection theory. I demonstrate that Kierkegaard proceeds to provide a minimal view of the self achieved through reflection which finally encounters its own limits in its own self-knowledge. I propose that Kierkegaard presents this as Socratic ignorance and that his model for outlining the limits of self-knowledge stems from Hamann. I develop my argument by arguing that for Hamann and Kierkegaard self-knowledge is only available through divine revelation.

To many people love is special, sacred even. Love plays a countless number of roles for a countless number of people. Contemporary ideas about love, however, are more in alignment with the philosophies of Aristotle, and not of Plato. Aristotle held that love could exist as many people see it today – wishing well for others purely for their own sake. But Plato disagreed. Plato claimed that love was a way by which one could better themselves and become wiser. In this thesis, I explain Plato’s theory of love put forth in the Symposium. I also explore the textual evidence for the selfish nature of Plato’s love.

Le Charmide de Platon s’inscrit légitimement dans ce qu’il est convenu de nommer les « dialogues de jeunesse », et nous y constatons la forte présence de ce qui caractérise traditionnellement l’activité philosophique de Socrate, soit la réfutation. Cependant, tandis que les réfutations effectuées directement sur le jeune Charmide ne produisent aucun effet, celui-ci réagit fortement aux réfutations que Socrate fait subir à son tuteur Critias et auxquelles il assiste passivement. Qu’est-ce qui, dans ce qui s’apparente vraisemblablement à une réfutation indirecte, produit l’ébranlement de Charmide? Nous voulons regarder en quoi la réfutation est ici un traitement purgatif non pas par l’usage d’affirmations propositionnelles contradictoires, mais par une certaine dialectique de l’image, celles de Critias et de Socrate devant Charmide. Cette dialectique de l’image en appelant à une réflexion sur la dimension mimétique du rapport qu’entretient le jeune garçon avec ces deux hommes, nous voulons ainsi regarder en quoi la réfutation indirecte de Charmide nous dresse les contours d’une possible activité poétique de Socrate. Cette poésie résisterait à la critique que celui-ci en fait plus tard dans la République par un usage de l’image qui vise non plus à proposer des modèles fixes de la vertu, mais à montrer le mouvement de la pensée, et donc à « sensibiliser » Charmide à l’élan intellectuel qui l’habite et l’anime lui-même. Ainsi, en nous penchant sur la présence dans le Charmide de ce que nous nommons une « réfutation poétique », ce mémoire explore la possibilité de penser ensemble ce qui semble assoir l’intellectualisme socratique des premiers dialogues et la poésie qui, par son absence de visée intellectuelle, est rejetée par le Socrate de la République à moins qu’elle ne prenne la forme d’un « éloge des hommes bons ». / Plato's Charmides is part of what we refer to as the «early dialogues», and we find in these dialogues a major feature of Socrates's philosophy, mainly refutation. However, while these refutations don't have any effects on the young Charmides, he still reacts to Socrates's refutation of Critias. We wonder how this indirect refutation produces such a reaction on Charmides. We look at how refutation represents here a purgative treatment not by using contradictory propositions, but with the use of a certain dialectic of the image, the ones of Critias and Socrates facing Charmides. Examining this dialectic, which refers to the study of the mimetic dimension that the young boy maintains with the two men, we wish to reflect on how the indirect refutation of Charmides draws the outline of Socrates's possible poetical activity. This poetry resists to the critics made later in the Republic pertaining to the use of images relating to certain models of virtue, by showing the motion of thought, and hence guiding Charmides in his own intellectual motion. By reflecting on the «poetical refutation» we find in Plato's Charmides, this thesis explores the possibility of linking what seems to ground Socrates's intellectualism in the early dialogues to the poetry that is rejected par Socrates in the Republic, besides the one that pertains to the «defense of good men».