There is an apparent disagreement between recent commentators who find in Nietzsche both a constructive philosophy and a compatibilist account of freedom, and Brian Leiter’s reading that rejects both. The reason for this disagreement, I argue, is that Leiter’s “illiberal” view is limited in scope to Nietzsche’s critical philosophy, while Nietzsche also has a constructive philosophy aimed at select readers. I read Nietzsche’s critical philosophy as targeting the metaphysical entities that underpin asceticism and herd values, not the mental states and processes with which these entities are associated. The “no such entity” reading preserves the resources needed to read Nietzsche as offering a replacement for the ascetic ideal—and an alternative source for life’s meaning. Although few of his readers will have been born with the drives needed to throw off herd values and enjoy compatibilist freedom, these readers are the intended audience for Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy.

This thesis consists of a series of encounters with textual figures, or conceptual personae, which are strongly associated with freedom in Nietzsche???s oeuvre. The conceptual persona, drawn from the work of Deleuze and Guattari, is an integral part of the process of developing and articulating philosophical concepts. Nietzsche???s texts abound with figures, both anthropomorphic and otherwise. I suggest that regarding these figures as conceptual personae in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense offers a way into some of Nietzsche???s most complex ideas. Freedom surely ranks among Nietzsche???s most multifaceted and teasingly elusive ideations. It has not, however, benefited from the intensive scholarship devoted to signature Nietzschean themes such as will to power, nihilism, or eternal return. This thesis seeks to raise the profile of Nietzsche???s innovations on the subject of freedom by means of close readings of texts featuring three conceptual personae of Nietzschean freedom. These are the free spirit, the sovereign individual, and Zarathustra. These three personae embody freedom as plural and processual. They animate a conception of freedom as something to be striven for, and, indeed, striven for differently by different individuals. Highlighting the infinite variability of embodied freedom, each persona problematises freedom in a distinctly different manner. The free spirit, understood as representing the intersection between freedom and truth, is a primarily epistemological figure. The sovereign individual, who transvaluates bad conscience into good by means of a masterly praxis of promising, instantiates a novel reconstruction of Kantian autonomy as is thus an ethico-political figure. Zarathustra bodies forth an ontology of freedom based on creative willing. A detailed study of the complex interaction of the three conceptual personae of freedom is beyond the scope of this project. I outline the contours of such a study in the concluding chapter, arguing that the reverberations between the three figures offer a further demonstration, if that were still needed, of the rich originality of Nietzsche???s thought of freedom.

Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Esta tese de doutorado é dedicada ao estudo do pensamento de Nietzsche quanto à liberdade e à responsabilidade. Circunscrevendo-se no período que vai de Humano, demasiado Humano até as obras da maturidade produtiva do filósofo, o autor busca identificar os diversos meios que o pensador usou para tentar conceber uma noção de liberdade individual que não incorresse nos pressupostos metafísicos que historicamente determinaram seu conceito, problematizando assim as noções de sujeito, autodeterminação, intencionalidade, vontade, metas, motivos da ação e, particulamente, a noção de responsabilidade. Por meio da análise crítica de determinadas referências teóricas do filósofo, junto de uma leitura cronológica que acompanha as transformações conceituais presentes nas obras publicadas e nas anotações póstumas, esta pesquisa mostra o caminho de experimentação por meio do qual o pensamento de Nietzsche tomou forma e amadureceu ao longo dos anos. O problema que orienta toda a concepção da tese é o questionamento sobre como ser possível a responsabilidade no interior da própria desconstrução do sentido quanto aos critérios de avaliação das ações, de seus motivos e objetivos. Neste sentido, esta pesquisa investiga como Nietzsche busca por outros critérios que possibilitem avaliações e ações com engajamento efetivo e duradouro. Na medida em que sua busca por superação da metafísica envolve o ensaio de pensar num outro modo de relação com a prática de estabilização do devir que não exclua a assunção de sua vigência e as consequências disso, o autor postula a hipótese interpretativa de que o ideal moral de Nietzsche reside na figura do indivíduo soberano apresentado em Para a Genealogia da Moral, no qual se concretizaria a viabilidade de uma forma de comprometimento com projetos e pessoas, reinstaurando-se a liberdade e a responsabilidade como critérios de autorealização que superem, ao mesmo tempo, os seus tradicionais critérios metafísico-niilistas, por meio de uma outra compreensão de subjetividade e de autodeterminação, a partir da prática de experimentos de auto superação que não incorram necessariamente na impossibilidade de engajamentos duradouros. / The study of Nietzsche's thoughts on freedom and responsibility is at the center of this doctorates thesis. The research focused on the period from Human, All Too Human to the productive works of the philosophers maturity. The author aims to identify the various means that the thinker used to try to envisage a notion of individual freedom that is not subjected to the metaphysical assumptions that historically determined its concept. Thus questioning the notions of subject, self-determination, intentionality, will, goals, and actions motives, in particular, the notion of responsibility. Through critical analysis of particular theoretical references of the philosopher, alongside chronological reading of the conceptual transformations present in the published works and posthumous notes, this research shows the path of experimentation through which Nietzsche's thought took shape and matured over the years. The questionof how responsibility could be possible when its meaning is deconstructed in terms of traditionalcriteria for evaluating actions, their motives and goals, guides the thesis. In this sense, this research investigates how Nietzsche searches for other criteria that enable reviews and actions with effective and lasting engagement. Insofar as his quest to supersedemetaphysics involves the practicing of thinking in another way of relating with the practice of stabilization of becoming that does not exclude the assumption of its validity and the consequences of such, the author postulates an interpretive hypothesis. This contends that the moral ideal of Nietzsche lies in the figure of the sovereign individual presented in On the Genealogy of Morals. In this figure, the feasibility of a form of commitment to projects and people would materialize, reintroducing freedom and responsibility as criteria for self-realization that overcome, at the same time, their traditional metaphysical nihilist criteria. This being achieved by means of further understanding of subjectivity and self-determination, from the practice of experiments of self-overcoming, which do not necessarily entail the impossibility of lasting commitments.

Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Esta tese de doutorado é dedicada ao estudo do pensamento de Nietzsche quanto à liberdade e à responsabilidade. Circunscrevendo-se no período que vai de Humano, demasiado Humano até as obras da maturidade produtiva do filósofo, o autor busca identificar os diversos meios que o pensador usou para tentar conceber uma noção de liberdade individual que não incorresse nos pressupostos metafísicos que historicamente determinaram seu conceito, problematizando assim as noções de sujeito, autodeterminação, intencionalidade, vontade, metas, motivos da ação e, particulamente, a noção de responsabilidade. Por meio da análise crítica de determinadas referências teóricas do filósofo, junto de uma leitura cronológica que acompanha as transformações conceituais presentes nas obras publicadas e nas anotações póstumas, esta pesquisa mostra o caminho de experimentação por meio do qual o pensamento de Nietzsche tomou forma e amadureceu ao longo dos anos. O problema que orienta toda a concepção da tese é o questionamento sobre como ser possível a responsabilidade no interior da própria desconstrução do sentido quanto aos critérios de avaliação das ações, de seus motivos e objetivos. Neste sentido, esta pesquisa investiga como Nietzsche busca por outros critérios que possibilitem avaliações e ações com engajamento efetivo e duradouro. Na medida em que sua busca por superação da metafísica envolve o ensaio de pensar num outro modo de relação com a prática de estabilização do devir que não exclua a assunção de sua vigência e as consequências disso, o autor postula a hipótese interpretativa de que o ideal moral de Nietzsche reside na figura do indivíduo soberano apresentado em Para a Genealogia da Moral, no qual se concretizaria a viabilidade de uma forma de comprometimento com projetos e pessoas, reinstaurando-se a liberdade e a responsabilidade como critérios de autorealização que superem, ao mesmo tempo, os seus tradicionais critérios metafísico-niilistas, por meio de uma outra compreensão de subjetividade e de autodeterminação, a partir da prática de experimentos de auto superação que não incorram necessariamente na impossibilidade de engajamentos duradouros. / The study of Nietzsche's thoughts on freedom and responsibility is at the center of this doctorates thesis. The research focused on the period from Human, All Too Human to the productive works of the philosophers maturity. The author aims to identify the various means that the thinker used to try to envisage a notion of individual freedom that is not subjected to the metaphysical assumptions that historically determined its concept. Thus questioning the notions of subject, self-determination, intentionality, will, goals, and actions motives, in particular, the notion of responsibility. Through critical analysis of particular theoretical references of the philosopher, alongside chronological reading of the conceptual transformations present in the published works and posthumous notes, this research shows the path of experimentation through which Nietzsche's thought took shape and matured over the years. The questionof how responsibility could be possible when its meaning is deconstructed in terms of traditionalcriteria for evaluating actions, their motives and goals, guides the thesis. In this sense, this research investigates how Nietzsche searches for other criteria that enable reviews and actions with effective and lasting engagement. Insofar as his quest to supersedemetaphysics involves the practicing of thinking in another way of relating with the practice of stabilization of becoming that does not exclude the assumption of its validity and the consequences of such, the author postulates an interpretive hypothesis. This contends that the moral ideal of Nietzsche lies in the figure of the sovereign individual presented in On the Genealogy of Morals. In this figure, the feasibility of a form of commitment to projects and people would materialize, reintroducing freedom and responsibility as criteria for self-realization that overcome, at the same time, their traditional metaphysical nihilist criteria. This being achieved by means of further understanding of subjectivity and self-determination, from the practice of experiments of self-overcoming, which do not necessarily entail the impossibility of lasting commitments.

"Nietzsche and aristocratic ranking" tries to address and interpret relatively incoherent topic of the higher man and, specifically, aristocratic ranking. Basic concepts of Nietzsche's thoughts are shown through the thesis, specifically from Genealogy of Morality, The Dawn or The Gay Science. Some of those concepts are listed as follows: morality of custom, gradation, individual, autonomous individual, noble or blond beast and these concepts are then intertwined with aristocratic ranking. By that not only those basic concepts are clarified, but especially aristocratic ranking as such. Thesis aims to interconnect each of these motives and take interpretation to some important motives of Will to Power, which then helps the reader to understand broader context. Aristocratic ranking is shown as integral part of Nietzsche's thoughs and is then implied as inherent part of all basic motives that Nietzsche's work imply.

In the first chapter of my doctoral thesis, entitled The Political Implications of Nietzsche's Perspectivism, I argue that due to conflicting passages present throughout his oeuvre, Nietzsche is best understood as a twofold metaphysical sceptic. That is, a sceptic about the existence of the external world, and consequently, as a sceptic about such a world's correspondence to our perspectives. Nietzsche presents a threefold conceptualization of 'nihilism' and a twofold one of the 'will to power.' Neutral nihilism is humanity's inescapable condition of having no non-humanly created meanings and values. This state can be interpreted positively as an opportunity to create one's own meanings and values, or negatively as a terrifying incentive to return to dogmatism. The will to power is life before and as it becomes life, the unqualified will to power, and all the realities in it, the qualifiable will to power. The combination of these ontological concepts brings me to my second chapter and to the determination of Nietzsche's general epistemology: perspectivism. Perspectivism is an admittedly created, ontologically derived interpretation of knowledge, which both entails and goes beyond relativism. Nietzsche's perspectivism is constructed to support any norm that allows for univocal evaluations, not just Nietzsche's. Moreover, it can be derived from any ontology that conceptualizes life as a unit of growth and decay and human beings as creators of all their perspectives. These two elastic concepts allow me to propose, in my third chapter, that, although his texts disavow an all-inclusive democracy in favour of a new spiritual aristocracy, on the one hand, the proper political implications of perspectivism allow for democracy, while on the other hand, Nietzsche can be read as disapproving of an all inclusive or representative democracy, yet as approving of the direct democracy that arises naturally among elite peers.