Submitted by Yarui Dun (yarui0422@gmail.com) on 2017-05-17T19:30:55Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation Yarui Dun.pdf: 3370034 bytes, checksum: 0971a3c099bb023b78027e1514037a71 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2017-05-18T14:29:11Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation Yarui Dun.pdf: 3370034 bytes, checksum: 0971a3c099bb023b78027e1514037a71 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-30T17:36:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation Yarui Dun.pdf: 3370034 bytes, checksum: 0971a3c099bb023b78027e1514037a71 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-02 / State capitalism, the statist planning in certain economic sectors, has generated several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that represent a significant share of activity in the global market. Despite decades of liberalization and privatization in many countries, state ownership and state-led business activity remain widespread; yet new varieties of state capitalism have also emerged. Among these new varieties, state-controlled oil and natural gas entities, also known as nation oil companies (NOCs), represent a type of hybrid organization that specifically deserves scholars’ attention as they dominate the world’s oil & gas industry; yet many of the cases prove to be problematic. The emerging markets possess some of the most important NOC players, yet scant examination has been made to question their appropriateness. This paper presents a contextualized comparison between two NOCs that root in Brazil and China to illustrate how similar and different they are in terms of their ownership style, corporate governance characteristics, and the interactions they have with the host government. We analyzed the findings by matching them with the past theories that offer explanations on NOC performance variation. We concluded that first, regime type is not a dependable factor to indicate the actual state incentives to maintain NOCs, and the goals of state serve only as an equivocate factor in explaining the variation in NOC performances. Secondly, we speculated that due to the absence of a cohesive institutional logic and consistency, Brazil has a fragmented governance system that implies in inappropriateness of state capitalism. Thirdly, we discovered that the unique dynamics between informal and formal institutions in China may justify the better fitness of state capitalism when compared with Brazil. Certain limits to the research method and expectations on further inquiries are also developed.

This dissertation deals with the nature of the Chinese economic system. The first chapter focuses on the global economy and seeks to define the main economic systems prevailing in it, ie. Anglo-Saxon, Continental and Asian-developmental. Compared to these systems defined as market economies, the dissertation consequently analyses and defines a system of state capitalism and the main elements of it. The following part of the dissertation is focused on the historical Chinese approaches to economic governance of the country and attempts to identify those historical approaches that are still relevant and influential in modern Chinese economy. The third chapter analyses the Chinese economic system and the role of the state in it; it also examines the government's approach to the ownership of state enterprises and the overall extent of state ownership in the Chinese economy. The final chapter examines the different types of state subsidies to domestic, often state, enterprises in China. As an example of the various subsidies a case study on the automotive industry is used.

Entre histoire du capitalisme, sociologie des élites et sociologie de l’État, cette thèse prend pour objet le rôle de la direction du Trésor – direction phare du ministère des Finances – dans la fabrique de « mondes » à la fois hybrides et intégrés d’institutions, de réseaux et d’acteurs, aux sommets du pouvoir et au croisement entre État et affaires, administration et économie, public et privé. A partir d’une enquête mêlant entretiens biographiques, base prosopographique et fonds d’archives publics et privés, elle explore les mécanismes concrets par lesquels la direction du Trésor produit du flou, du flux et de la hiérarchie au sein de ses mondes, dans une configuration historique précise (milieu des années 1960- milieu des années 1990). La thèse est organisée selon trois niveaux d’analyse des relations entre le Trésor et ses mondes. Au niveau écologique – celui des alliances – elle montre la transformation des coalitions de soutien du Trésor pour peser dans l’État, du Plan à la « place », organisant les modalités du ralliement de la direction aux réformes libérales à partir des années 1960. Au niveau institutionnel, elle analyse les échanges qui forgent la porosité entre le Trésor et ses mondes, et les contraintes institutionnelles qui leur donnent sens et forme, et montre que la direction du Trésor fonctionne alors comme une entreprise de placement. Au niveau individuel, elle analyse la construction des carrières dominantes (de la « grandeur ») au sein des mondes du Trésor, et les liens d’obligation, de cooptation et de parrainage sur lesquelles elles s’appuient. La thèse contribue, ainsi, à documenter les formes d’indifférenciation des activités qui caractérisent les sommets de l’État. / Between history of capitalism, sociology of elites and public administration, this PhD thesis explores how the French Treasury Department brings together gravitating financial institutions, networks and actors into integrated and hybrid "worlds", situated at the "heights of power" and between administration and business, public and private interests. Drawing on biographical interviews, prosopographical data and public and private archival collections, it focuses on the concrete mechanisms through which the Treasury both blurs boundaries inside its worlds, and re-create hierarchies between the agents who circulate within them. The thesis analyzes the relationships between the Treasury and its worlds at three distinct levels. At the ecological level — that of the Treasury alliances in policy-making — it highlights the Treasury’ changing coalitions of support, from the Great planning coalition of the 1950s to the "place financière" of the 1970s, and shows how this transformation helps us account for the Treasury’ embrace of financial reforms in the 1970s. At the institutional level, it analyzes how various organizational constraints at the Treasury shape exchanges between the Department and its worlds. Finally, at the individual level, it looks at the construction of dominant careers ("grandeur") inside the worlds of the Treasury, and at the interpersonal ties and decentralized logics of co-optation, patronage and moral indebtedness they draw on.

上世紀80年代中國產生了許多的變化，在經濟上採取較為開放的態度。汽車產業也在這樣的趨勢下與國外的跨國汽車企業合作，發展自己的汽車製造工業，至今中國已經成為最大的汽車製造國。為了發展汽車產業，中國透過國有企業與跨國企業合作成立許多合資公司，本文所取用的東風汽車集團與廣汽集團旗下都存在許多這樣的子公司。國家透過國有企業作為帶動產業發展的火車頭，但國有企業複雜的所有權問題牽涉中央與地方關係的運作，影響著汽車產業的發展。運用國有企業作為中介制度的同時，中央與地方關係也同時在運作，在長時間的發展下因國企所有權差異而產生的不同發展模型也逐漸變化，最終中國的汽車發展模式趨於類似。在這過程中，國家的影響實際上分做中央與地方同時進行，短期而言似乎看不到到中央的影響力，但就長期而言中央確實引導了中國汽車產業並助其發展。在理論方面，筆者以為中國汽車產業的成長長久以都是在國家資本主義的途徑上進行的，而非是發展型國家或管理型國家的模式。因為中國雖然引進市場經濟相當長的一段時間，但是實際上不管是中央還是地方的手都不曾離開過這個領域，即便是現在中國最主要的汽車生產與銷售仍舊以國有企業為主。 / China had has series transitions since 1980s years, and it had adopted open attitude at economical work. In this trend, state owner enterprises cooperated (SOEs) with foreign cross-national enterprises (CNEs) to develop self’s automotive industry. Now, China had become biggest country of automotive produce. For developing automotive industry, it established many companies by Chinese SOEs and foreign CNEs, for example Dongfeng motor group, Guangzhou automobile group. SOE like locomotive that it brings development, but it has problem of property that affect working of central-local relationship. While state utilizes SOE to be intermediary institution, central and local is continually interaction. In long time, ownership led to differently developmental model that was changed that trend to similar model. In fact, national affection is divide two parts: central and local. In short term, we difficultly observe central affection but, in long term, central affection is remake. In theoretically, I argue that Chinese automotive industrial development below to approach of state capitalism and it is not developmental state and regulatory state. China had work market economy but government, central and local, still intervenes domestic market, instead of major firm of Chinese produce and selling is SOEs.