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1	Why Do Acquirers Manage Earnings Before Stock-for-Stock Acquisitions? Tran, Nam D. 06 1900 (has links) xi, 68 p. : ill. (some col.) / In this dissertation, I examine whether high disclosure costs explain why acquirers manage earnings before stock-for-stock acquisitions. Because stock-for-stock acquirers use their own shares to pay for targets' shares, stock-for-stock acquirers have incentives to manage earnings in order to boost their stock prices. I show that high disclosure costs lead to an equilibrium in which acquirers engage in earnings management in a manner consistent with target firms' expectations. As a result, I hypothesize that stock-for-stock acquirers with high disclosure costs are more likely to manage earnings before the acquisition than stock-for-stock acquirers with low disclosure costs. Using a sample of stock-for-stock acquisitions in the United States during the period from 1988 to 2009, I find a positive association between acquirers' proprietary disclosure costs and pre-acquisition abnormal accruals. In addition, I find a negative association between pre-acquisition abnormal accruals and abnormal stock returns around the acquisition announcement for acquirers with high proprietary disclosure costs but not for acquirers with low proprietary disclosure costs. Assuming that the market is efficient with respect to publicly available information, this evidence is also consistent with acquirers with high proprietary disclosure costs using abnormal accruals to manage earnings. Finally, I do not find a statistically significant association between the extent of acquirers' earnings management and the acquisition premium received by target shareholders. This is consistent with acquirers' earnings management not serving to extract wealth from target shareholders. Overall, the evidence in this dissertation suggests that earnings management by stock-for-stock acquirers is a rational response to targets' expectations when high disclosure costs prevent the acquirers from credibly signaling the absence of earnings management. / Committee in charge: Steven Matsunaga, Chairperson; Angela Davis, Member; David Guenther, Member; Van Kolpin, Outside Member Accounting Disclosure costs Earnings management Stock-for-stock acquisitions Stock-for-stock mergers
2	Earnings Management : En studie om earnings management förekommer vid stock-for-stock-förvärv Öhlund, Wiola, Örnryd, Martin January 2013 (has links) Denna studie undersöker ifall det förekommer earnings management (EM) vid stock-for-stock-förvärv på den svenska marknaden. Tidigare forskning har gett tydliga tecken på att EM sker inför företagsförvärv och det finns starka incitament att använda sig utav det. Detta undersöks genom att studera om det sker en ökning av diskretionära periodiseringar, som mäts genom Modified Jones Model, åren innan förvärvet till skillnad från tidigare år. Studien undersöker även om målföretagets relativa storlek har en påverkan på EM. Undersökningens resultat från första hypotesprövningen indikerar att EM förekommer i svenska bolag redan tre år innan stock-for-stock-förvärv. Resultatet från den andra hypotesprövningen visade ingen signifikant skillnad mellan grupperna Små förvärv och Stora förvärv medan resultatet från den tredje visade att storleksförhållandet mellan företagen har en inverkan på användningen av EM. Detta visades genom att företagen med de tio största förvärven har en signifikant högre summa diskretionära periodiseringar än de med de tio minsta förvärven. Earnings management Förvärv Stock-for-stock Diskretionära periodiseringar Modified Jones Model
3	O instituto da incorporação de ações / Stock for stock exchange transactions Ponczek, Daniel Kalansky 06 April 2011 (has links) O presente trabalho tem por objeto o estudo do instituto da incorporação de ações. Para tanto, será analisado, (i) no primeiro capítulo, o regime legal vigente e sua natureza jurídica, apresentando-se as diferenças em relação à operação de incorporação de sociedade, fazendo inclusive um contraste com o direito norte-americano; (ii) no segundo capítulo, a proteção dos acionistas minoritários em operações de incorporação de controlada e eventual impedimento de voto do acionista controlador, analisando-se os recentes pareceres de orientação emitidos pela CVM; (iii) no terceiro capítulo, o estudo do instituto do tag along e do fechamento de capital e necessidade de realização de oferta pública em operações de incorporação de ações que impliquem transferência de controle ou cancelamento de registro de companhia aberta, à luz das últimas operações realizadas no mercado; (iv) no quarto capítulo, a discussão dos principais precedentes nos quais a CVM decidiu impor restrições ou impedir a realização de operações de incorporação de ações por entender ter havido um tratamento não equitativo entre os acionistas minoritários e controladores, com o objetivo de demonstrar a alteração do comportamento do órgão regulador no decorrer dos anos / The present work aims the study of the stock-for-stock exchange transactions (incorporação de ações). For this purpose, it will be examined (i) in the first part, the current legal regime and legal nature, contemplating differences with the statutory merger (incorporação de sociedade), including a comparison with the US law, (ii) in the second part, the protection of minority shareholders in the context of parent-subsidiary mergers and possible exclusion from voting of the controlling shareholder, taking into account the recent opinions issued by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), (iii) in the third part, the study of the tag along rights and the regulation for delisting companies and the need to conduct a tender offer in stock-for-stock exchange transactions involving transfer of control or delisting of a publicly-held company in light of recent transactions, and (iv) in the fourth part, the discussion of the key precedents on which CVM has decided to impose restrictions or prevent the conduct of stock-for-stock transaction under the understanding that there was inequitable treatment of minority shareholders and controlling shareholders, in order to demonstrate the change of the CVMs understanding over the years. Abuse of law Acionista majoritário Acionista minoritário Appraisal Business judgment rule Business purpose test Comitê de empresas Companys acquisition Controlling shareholder Corporate restructure CVM CVM opinions 34 and 3 Delisting Exchange ratio Fraud to law Indirect business Interest conflict Intrinsic fairness test Legal nature Merger Minority shareholders Parent-subsidiary merger Particular benefit Shares Simulation Sociedade anônima de capital aberto Sociedade comercial Special committee Statutory merger Stock for stock exchange Subsidiary Tag along Tender offer Two-step acquisition Vote impediment Wholly owned subsidiary
4	O instituto da incorporação de ações / Stock for stock exchange transactions Daniel Kalansky Ponczek 06 April 2011 (has links) O presente trabalho tem por objeto o estudo do instituto da incorporação de ações. Para tanto, será analisado, (i) no primeiro capítulo, o regime legal vigente e sua natureza jurídica, apresentando-se as diferenças em relação à operação de incorporação de sociedade, fazendo inclusive um contraste com o direito norte-americano; (ii) no segundo capítulo, a proteção dos acionistas minoritários em operações de incorporação de controlada e eventual impedimento de voto do acionista controlador, analisando-se os recentes pareceres de orientação emitidos pela CVM; (iii) no terceiro capítulo, o estudo do instituto do tag along e do fechamento de capital e necessidade de realização de oferta pública em operações de incorporação de ações que impliquem transferência de controle ou cancelamento de registro de companhia aberta, à luz das últimas operações realizadas no mercado; (iv) no quarto capítulo, a discussão dos principais precedentes nos quais a CVM decidiu impor restrições ou impedir a realização de operações de incorporação de ações por entender ter havido um tratamento não equitativo entre os acionistas minoritários e controladores, com o objetivo de demonstrar a alteração do comportamento do órgão regulador no decorrer dos anos / The present work aims the study of the stock-for-stock exchange transactions (incorporação de ações). For this purpose, it will be examined (i) in the first part, the current legal regime and legal nature, contemplating differences with the statutory merger (incorporação de sociedade), including a comparison with the US law, (ii) in the second part, the protection of minority shareholders in the context of parent-subsidiary mergers and possible exclusion from voting of the controlling shareholder, taking into account the recent opinions issued by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), (iii) in the third part, the study of the tag along rights and the regulation for delisting companies and the need to conduct a tender offer in stock-for-stock exchange transactions involving transfer of control or delisting of a publicly-held company in light of recent transactions, and (iv) in the fourth part, the discussion of the key precedents on which CVM has decided to impose restrictions or prevent the conduct of stock-for-stock transaction under the understanding that there was inequitable treatment of minority shareholders and controlling shareholders, in order to demonstrate the change of the CVMs understanding over the years. Acionista majoritário Acionista minoritário Comitê de empresas Sociedade anônima de capital aberto Sociedade comercial Abuse of law Appraisal Business judgment rule Business purpose test Companys acquisition Controlling shareholder Corporate restructure CVM CVM opinions 34 and 3 Delisting Exchange ratio Fraud to law Indirect business Interest conflict Intrinsic fairness test Legal nature Merger Minority shareholders Parent-subsidiary merger Particular benefit Shares Simulation Special committee Statutory merger Stock for stock exchange Subsidiary Tag along Tender offer Two-step acquisition Vote impediment Wholly owned subsidiary

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