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Alors que la scène du droit semble célébrer le triomphe de l’écriture juridique, on est obligé de se poser la question de l’impact du « tout écrit » sur l’oralité juridique et de rechercher, si besoin était, la place actuelle de cette dernière en droit privé. Il est vrai que l’oralité est source d’insécurité de par ses deux caractéristiques principales : la volatilité et la versatilité. Pour autant, des vecteurs sécurisés de l’oralité existent. On est aujourd’hui en capacité d’assurer une sécurité quant à la parole et de lui conférer un caractère fiable ou pérenne ou de lui assigner un cadre, une structure permettant de développer un habitus institutionnel. L’oralité juridique demeure une notion importante en droit français mais mal définie et à caractère évolutif. Il pour autant est permis de douter que l’écriture constitue, partout et toujours, un progrès. Si l’écriture insiste surtout sur le message qu’elle véhicule et tend à l’anonymat des relations sociales, l’oralité valorise l’individualisation des rapports sociaux. L’oralité présente des caractéristiques principales essentielles telles que la rapidité, la facilité et la simplicité. L’oralité est également nécessaire au soutien des principes généraux d’organisation du procès. Elle présente des qualités indéniables rendant son utilisation indispensable, mais surtout l’oralité a vocation à replacer au centre du rapport d’obligation ou au centre du procès l’individu, source de cette oralité. L’oralité est loin du "déclinisme" qu’on lui prédit et ses apports sont essentiels. C’est la faveur traditionnelle pour l’oralité qui se trouvera ici rappelée / Nowadays the increasing number and complexity of new additional texts congest the Law. As a consequence, we can ask the question of the impact of writing on legal orality. Thus, it is required to look for the current place of orality in private law. It is true that orality is a source of insecurity because of two main features : volatility and versatility. However, there are some secured flows when using orality. Nowadays, we are able to ensure security of speech and to award it a lasting character. Also here, the possibility exists to assign to it a framework, a structure allowing to develop institutional customs. Legal orality remains an important concept in French Law, despite the current lack of structure. Whether in contractual or irrefutable proof or in procedural law, orality does not hold same guarantees as written words and without the transfer into writings, orality remains a source of concern. But we can be skeptical about the writing as a progress. If writing pays particular attention on the message and moves towards the anonymous of social relationships, orality highlights individualization of social relationships. Orality has key characteristics such as speed, ease and simplicity. Orality is also required to support of the general principles of the organization of the trial. It shows undeniable qualities making its use indispensable, but above all, orality has the vocation to put the person in the center of the contract or in the center of the trial. Today, orality is still far from the predicted decline as its contribution remains essential. It is the traditional favor for orality which will be recalled here

L’assurance islamique, ou takaful, qui est apparue dans les années 1970, est un sujet d’actualité, tant en France qu’au Liban. Les sociétés d’assurance islamique voudraient opérer dans ces deux pays dont le droit des contrats, comme celui des entreprises sont dominés par l’idée de laïcité. Peut-on exercer une activité que se veut régie par des principes religieux dans des pays de droit positif laïc ? La police takaful est-elle une police d’assurance à l’instar de la police d’assurance conventionnelle ? Les sociétés takaful sont-elles des sociétés d’assurance au même titre que les sociétés d’assurance conventionnelle ? Certes, les éléments constituant le contrat d’assurance conventionnelle se retrouvent dans la police takaful, à savoir le risque, la prime et la prestation d’assurance. Ces deux contrats d’assurance couvrent les mêmes risques, sous réserve des objets et évènements considérés comme haram et prohibés par l’islam. Quant aux sociétés d’assurance takaful, elles peuvent prendre les mêmes formes que les sociétés d’assurance conventionnelle. Mais leur fonctionnement diffère de celles-ci, en raison de leur structuration en deux fonds distincts et d’un mode opérationnel qui leur est propre. Le contrôle de la conformité à la charia islamique marque les compagnies d’assurance takaful et les distingue fortement des sociétés d’assurance conventionnelle. Il s’agit sans doute du principal obstacle à leur réception par le droit positif. Mais il doit pouvoir être surmonté. / The Islamic insurance, or Takaful, that first appeared in the seventies, is a subject that has an actual importance both in France and Lebanon. The Islamic insurance companies aim at working in these two countries whereas the contracts law as much as the enterprises law is dominated by the idea of secularism. Can we practice an activity mainly ruled by religious principles in countries where the substantive law is secular? Is the Takaful policy an insurance policy like any other conventional policy insurance? And are the Takaful companies insurance companies at the same level of all other conventional insurance companies? Indeed, the elements that are the basics of the conventional insurance contract are found in the Takaful policy, meaning the risk, the premium and the insurance benefit. These two contracts cover the similar risks, except for the objects and events considered as Haram and prohibited by Islam. As for the insurance companies Takaful, they are allowed to have the same form as any other conventional insurance society. Yet, their functioning is different from the abovementioned, due to their structuring into two distinct funds in addition to an operational mode appropriate to their needs. The audit made in conformity with the Islamic sharia imprints the Takaful insurance companies and strongly distinguishes them from the conventional insurance companies. Without any doubt, the idea rotates around how the substantive law accepts them. However, the concept of Takaful should be overcome.

In view of the fact that the obligational relationship can no longer be perceived as a static legal category and yet, due to the fact that the obligation no longer shows a mere interaction between opposing parties whose willful imperative overrode the righteousness of the negotiation based on general duties of demeanor, there arises the need to assess the Substantial Performance Doctrine in light of an open legal system that is aimed at turning the dictates of the 1988 Constitution into reality when it comes to private dealings, thus resulting in what is commonly referred to as Civil-Constitutional Law. Therefore, one chooses to look into the said doctrine by taking obligation as a proceeding focused on disrupting obligational relationships. Furthermore, an assessment is needed of how the Substantial Performance Doctrine works when it comes to external procedures, how it becomes known, and what its impact on procedural rules that deal with Substantive Law exceptions is. In conclusion, boundaries are drawn that home in on the Theory, allow its historical development in the Superior Court of Justice to be assessed, and work as a foundation for the entire Brazilian legal system. / Tendo em vista que a relação obrigacional já não pode mais ser percebida como uma categoria jurídica estanque e, ainda, devido ao fato da obrigação já não representar uma mera interação entre sujeitos opositores cujo imperativo volitivo subjugava a retidão negocial amparada em deveres gerais de conduta, desperta-se a necessidade de avaliar a Teoria do adimplemento substancial à luz de um sistema jurídico aberto e imbuído do propósito de concretizar os ditames da Constituição de 1988, nas relações entre particulares, resultando no que se convencionou chamar de Direito Civil-constitucional. Para tanto, opta-se por iniciar a investigação da referida Teoria pela obrigação vista como processo com foco na perturbação das relações obrigacionais. Ademais, busca-se a verificação do comportamento da Teoria do adimplemento substancial em caráter processual externo, sua veiculação e impacto nas regras processuais na linha das exceções de direito material. Por fim, propõe-se organizar balizas de reconhecimento da Teoria para analisar seu desenvolvimento histórico no Superior Tribunal de Justiça e que sirvam como base para todo o sistema jurídico brasileiro.

Les règles de conflit de lois n’ont pas toutes la même autorité. Les parties, et même le juge, peuvent être autorisés à passer outre à la désignation opérée par la règle de conflit. Les parties sont parfois libres d’écarter par convention la loi objectivement désignée (règles de conflit supplétives), parfois tenues par la désignation opérée, qui s’impose à elles (règles de conflit impératives). Le juge est tantôt tenu, tantôt libre de relever d’office l’internationalité du litige, et d’en déduire l’application de la règle de conflit. Le choix d’envisager ensemble des questions aussi variées peut étonner, mais c’est celui de la jurisprudence. L’autorité des règles de conflit y est définie de manière conjointe, à l’égard des parties comme du juge, à l’aune de considérations substantielles. Ainsi, parce qu’une demande en recherche de paternité relève, en droit substantiel, d’une matière d’ordre public, et qu’elle intéresse l’état des personnes, réputé indisponible, la règle de conflit qui lui est applicable sera impérative et mise en œuvre, au besoin d’office, par le juge. Inversement, si la prétention relève d’une matière largement supplétive ou vise des droits disponibles, la règle de conflit applicable sera supplétive, et le juge ne sera pas tenu de la relever d’office. Ce sont donc des considérations substantielles qui définissent, en jurisprudence, l’autorité des règles de conflit à l’égard des parties comme du juge.Cependant, ce régime n’est plus celui du droit international privé européen. D’abord, les règlements européens n’ont défini l’autorité des règles de conflit qu’à l’égard des parties, laissant à chaque Etat membre le soin de déterminer leur autorité à l’égard du juge. Ensuite, la définition européenne de l’impérativité des règles de conflit fait abstraction de toute considération substantielle, en retenant une supplétivité de principe pour l’ensemble des règles de conflit unifiées à l’échelle européenne. La jurisprudence a-t-elle raison de définir l’autorité des règles de conflits exclusivement à l’aune de considérations substantielles ? Non, car cela revient à nier que l’effet juridique des règles de conflit est imputé selon des considérations propres à la justice conflictuelle. Pour autant, on ne saurait, à l’instar du législateur européen, exclure toute considération substantielle. Le présupposé des règles de conflit vise des questions de droit substantiel. Les règles de conflit sont donc construites en contemplation de considérations substantielles. Dès lors, si ces dernières ne sauraient dicter à elles seules l’autorité des règles de conflit, on ne saurait, non plus, en faire totalement abstraction. / Choice-of-law rules do not all have the same authority. The parties, and even the judge, may be allowed to override the designation made by the conflict rule. The parties are sometimes free to depart, by convention, from the designated law (suppletory choice-of-law rules), sometimes bound by the designation made (imperative choice-of-law rules). The judge is sometimes obliged, sometimes free to raise ex officio the internationality of the dispute, and to deduce from it the application of the choice-of-law rule. Considering together such varied questions may be surprising, but it is the approach adopted by French case law. The authority of choice-of-law rules is defined jointly, according to substantive considerations. As a matter of example, an affiliation proceeding is, in French substantive law, a matter of public policy regarding someone’s family status, and deemed to concern an unwaivable right. Therefore, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be imperative and applied ex officio by the judge. Conversely, if the claim falls within a largely suppletory subject matter or relates to waivable rights, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be suppletory, and the judge will not be required to apply it ex officio. Therefore, the authority of choice-of-law rules is defined, with respect to both the parties and the judge, according to substantive considerations.However, this regime is no longer that of European private international law. Firstly, the European regulations have only defined the authority of their choice-of-law rules with respect to the parties, leaving it up to each Member State to determine their authority over the judge. Secondly, the European definition of their authority over the parties disregards any substantive consideration, and retains a whole set of suppletory choice-of-law rules, regardless of the subject-matter. Is case law justified in defining the authority of choice-of-law rules solely on the basis of substantive considerations ? No, because choice-of-law rules designate the applicable law according to choice-of-law considerations. However, one cannot, like the European legislator, exclude any substantive consideration. The supposition of choice-of-law rules concerns substantive law issues. Choice-of-law rules are, thus, devised according to substantive considerations. Therefore, if these alone cannot define the authority of choice-of-law rules, they cannot be totally ignored either.

Diploma thesis concerns about legal regulations of real estate by new civil codex with reflection to the previous and international legal regulation.The aim of the thesis is to assess the functionality of new civil code and its benefits in the real estate investment transactions in Czech Republic. This analysis is supported with overview of transfrontier real estate acquisitions made by foreign investors in Czech Republic and additionally also real estate investments of Czech investors abroad. This thesis therefore tries to provide answers to multiple questions ranging from analysis of new civil codex regulation, its impacts, risks and functionality then secondly its similarities in comparison to foreign law regulation (of Germany, Austria, Great Britain, Italy and France). From the perspective of transfrontier real estate acquisitions this thesis concerns about law acknowledgement for foreigner parties in real estate transactions in Czech Republic and counterbalance of the similar rights on the side of Czech residents in reciprocal acquisition process. The analysis is supported by the debate of accuracy of either liberal or protectionist attitude to foreign real estate investors' regulation with a reflection to current international political, sociological and economical course of events.