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The specificity of the anglo-saxon and continental understanding of corporate governance The goal of my thesis is to characterise specifics of anglo-saxon and continental corporporate governance with regard to the different historic background, capital markets` development degree, theoretical issues, shareholder structure, methods of investment funding and the organizational structure models in both of these legal cultures. The scope of the research is focused only on comparison of two systems and concepts of the corporate governance rather than overall description and analysis of its every single aspect. Second part of this paper is dedicated to the takeover bids issue, as one of the external aspects of corporate governance. Subchapter 1.1 is introductory and endeavours to define the concept of corporate governance. Subchapter 1.2 examines the history and first ocuurence of the corporate governance issues that is very closely connected to the so called "separation of ownership and control" phenomenon. As far as the relationship between shareholders and management of the company is concerned, subchapter 1.3 deals with the agency problem in relation with its costs. The comparison of shareholder structure and company funding method is the core question of the subchapter 1.4. Following part describes...

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"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M) option droit des affaires" / Les organismes de réglementation des valeurs mobilières doivent veiller à la protection des investisseurs et à l'efficience des marchés financiers. Pour ce faire, ils ont été investis de larges pouvoirs discrétionnaires leur permettant de contrôler les opérations qui, quoique conformes aux prescriptions légales, sont susceptibles de porter atteinte à l'intérêt public. La notion d'intérêt public étant malléable et difficile à circonscrire, la discrétion conférée à ces organismes est étendue. Son exercice pouvant menacer la sécurité juridique des opérations et être associé à l'arbitraire, elle a été décriée par de nombreux observateurs qui ont demandé qu'elle soit limitée aux cas de transgression de la législation sur les valeurs mobilières. Le texte cherche à déterminer si les organismes de réglementation des valeurs mobilières ont fait preuve de l'ingérence appréhendée par certains en recourant à leur discrétion relative à l'intérêt public. Tout en faisant ressortir la portée large et flexible de cette discrétion, il cherche à cerner les types d'opérations susceptibles d'en entraîner l'exercice. Bien qu'il ne propose pas une refonte du cadre juridique actuel, il soulève des points de réflexion et suggère des avenues qui pourraient être envisagées afin de limiter les risques y étant associés. / Securities regulators must ensure the protection ofinvestors and the ejJiciency of capital markets. With this intention, they have been vested with broad discretionary powers enabling them to control the operations that, although in conformity with legal requirements, are likely to undermine public interest. The public interest notion being malleable and difJicult to circumscribe, the discretion conferred to these organizations has a wide scope. As its exercise can threaten the legal safety of operations and be associated to the arbitrary, it has been disparaged by many observers who required that it be limited to cases in which the securities legislation has been breached. The text seeks to determine if securities regulators have shown the interference dreaded by some by resorting to their public interest discretion. White emphasizing the broad andflexible range ofthis discretion, it seeks to determine the types ofoperations likely to lead to its exercise. Although it does not propose a revision ofthe current legal framework, it provides points for reflection and suggests avenues that could be considered in order to limit the risks being associated to it.

Les organismes de réglementation des valeurs mobilières doivent veiller à la protection des investisseurs et à l'efficience des marchés financiers. Pour ce faire, ils ont été investis de larges pouvoirs discrétionnaires leur permettant de contrôler les opérations qui, quoique conformes aux prescriptions légales, sont susceptibles de porter atteinte à l'intérêt public. La notion d'intérêt public étant malléable et difficile à circonscrire, la discrétion conférée à ces organismes est étendue. Son exercice pouvant menacer la sécurité juridique des opérations et être associé à l'arbitraire, elle a été décriée par de nombreux observateurs qui ont demandé qu'elle soit limitée aux cas de transgression de la législation sur les valeurs mobilières. Le texte cherche à déterminer si les organismes de réglementation des valeurs mobilières ont fait preuve de l'ingérence appréhendée par certains en recourant à leur discrétion relative à l'intérêt public. Tout en faisant ressortir la portée large et flexible de cette discrétion, il cherche à cerner les types d'opérations susceptibles d'en entraîner l'exercice. Bien qu'il ne propose pas une refonte du cadre juridique actuel, il soulève des points de réflexion et suggère des avenues qui pourraient être envisagées afin de limiter les risques y étant associés. / Securities regulators must ensure the protection ofinvestors and the ejJiciency of capital markets. With this intention, they have been vested with broad discretionary powers enabling them to control the operations that, although in conformity with legal requirements, are likely to undermine public interest. The public interest notion being malleable and difJicult to circumscribe, the discretion conferred to these organizations has a wide scope. As its exercise can threaten the legal safety of operations and be associated to the arbitrary, it has been disparaged by many observers who required that it be limited to cases in which the securities legislation has been breached. The text seeks to determine if securities regulators have shown the interference dreaded by some by resorting to their public interest discretion. White emphasizing the broad andflexible range ofthis discretion, it seeks to determine the types ofoperations likely to lead to its exercise. Although it does not propose a revision ofthe current legal framework, it provides points for reflection and suggests avenues that could be considered in order to limit the risks being associated to it. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M) option droit des affaires"

Offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på den svenska aktiemarknaden sker främst med kontantvederlag, ofta förenat med aktievederlag. Som alternativ till sådant vederlag kan budgivaren erbjuda målbolagets aktieägare ”stub equity” med vilket avses det fall budgivaren erbjuder målbolagets aktieägare en begränsad mängd aktier i ett särskilt onoterat holding- eller budbolag, vilket i sin tur efter det offentliga uppköpserbjudandet innehar samtliga aktier i målbolaget. Syftet med denna uppsats är att utreda hur ett sådant erbjudande måste utformas för att vara förenligt med Takeover-reglerna, då i synnerhet den aktiemarknadsrättsliga likabehandlingsprincipen. Det föreligger inga direkt aktiemarknadsrättsliga hinder för stub equity vid offentliga uppköpserbjudanden, förfarandets förenlighet med regleringen är helt beroende av hur erbjudandet utformas och vilka syften erbjudandet avser uppnå. Möjligheterna att särbehandla målbolagets aktieägare är till följd av likabehandlingsprincipen i regel mycket små. Ett erbjudande med stub equity torde kunna utformas så att mindre aktieägare erbjuds ett kontantvederlag alternativt ett aktievederlag i holding- eller budbolaget medan de större aktieägarna enbart erhåller ett aktievederlag i holding- eller budbolaget, då mot bakgrund av de praktiska skäl som finns till stöd för en sådan utformning. Budgivaren har därutöver vid ett erbjudande med stub equity möjligheten att erbjuda målbolagets aktieägare A-aktier i budbolaget i utbyte mot A-aktier i målbolaget, B-aktier i budbolaget i utbyte mot B-aktier i målbolaget samt en premie för aktier med olika ekonomiska rättigheter. Ett stub equity-erbjudande ställer därutöver krav på erbjudandehandlingens utformning, innefattande att ett värderingsutlåtande avseende värderingen av aktievederlaget bör inhämtas och bifogas samt att målbolagets aktieägare bör informeras om upplägget i erbjudandehandlingen på ett tydligt och lättbegripligt sätt. Vidare torde villkor om viss anslutandegrad för stub equity-delen av vederlaget, villkor om att aktievederlaget med stub equity begränsas samt villkor om att vissa aktieägare ska acceptera erbjudandet vara förenligt med likabehandlingsprincipen. Gällande reglering torde slutligen innebära ett erforderligt skydd för okvalificerade investerare vid erbjudanden om stub equity, detta då möjligheterna att särbehandla aktieägare till följd av likabehandlingsprincipen är mycket begränsade och skyldigheterna att informera okvalificerade investerare om innebörden av ett erbjudande med stub equity betydande. / Public takeover bids on the Swedish stock market are mainly made with cash considerations, frequently combined with share considerations. As an alternative to such public offerings, the bidder may offer the company's shareholders “stub equity”, in which case the bidder offers the target company's shareholders a limited number of shares in a special unlisted holding or bidding company, which in turn after the public takeover bid holds all shares in the target company. This thesis seeks to discuss how such an offer needs to be designed in order to be compatible with the Swedish takeover regulation, in particular the principle of equal treatment of shareholders. There are no direct restrictions to stub equity in public takeover bids in the Swedish takeover regulation, the procedure's compatibility with the regulation is entirely dependent on how the offer is designed and what purposes the offer is intended to achieve. The opportunity to treat the target company's shareholders differently are generally very limited due to the principle of equal treatment. An offer with stub equity ought to be able to be designed so that smaller shareholders are offered a cash consideration or a share consideration in the holding or bidding company, whilst the larger shareholders only receive a share consideration in the holding or bidding company. This in accordance with the exception for practical reasons the Swedish takeover regulation permits in these cases. In addition to this, in an offer with stub equity, the bidder has the opportunity to offer the target company's shareholders A-shares in in the holding- or bid company in exchange for A-shares in the target company, B-shares in the holding- or bid company in exchange for B-shares in the target company as well as a premium for shares with different financial rights. Furthermore, an offer with stub equity places high demands on the design and content of the offer document, including obtaining a valuation statement regarding the valuation of the share consideration and informing the target company's shareholders about the structure of the offer document in a clear and easy to understand manner. Conditions regarding certain degree of accession to the stub equity part of the offer, conditions that the share consideration with stub equity is limited and conditions that certain shareholders must accept the offer ought to also be compatible with the Swedish takeover regulation. Lastly, the existing regulation ought to entail the necessary protection for unqualified investors when offering stub equity, as the opportunity to treat shareholders differently due to the principle of equal treatment is very limited and the obligations to inform unqualified investors about the meaning of an offer with stub equity are significant.

Das übergeordnete Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, ökonomische Gesichtspunkte konsequent in die Diskussion zu den Verhaltenspflichten des Vorstands während öffentlichen Übernahmeverfahren zu integrieren. Aus wohlfahrtstheoretischer Perspektive müssen hierbei die ökonomischen Funktionen des Markts für Unternehmenskontrolle umfassend Berücksichtigung finden. Das Instrumentarium der Ökonomischen Theorie des Rechts dient im Rahmen der Untersuchungen zum einen der positiven Analyse der diskutierten Ansätze zur Regelung der Verhaltenspflichten sowie der bestehenden Regelungen nach der EU-Übernahmerichtlinie (ÜRL) und dem WpÜG. Der normativen Variante der Ökonomischen Theorie des Rechts kommt insbesondere bei der Entwicklung von Regelungsalternativen zu den bestehenden Vorschriften bezüglich der Verhaltenspflichten nach dem WpÜG Bedeutung zu. Vor dem Hintergrund dieses übergeordneten Ziels verfolgt die Arbeit nach der umfassenden Darstellung der, mit der Regulierung des Verhaltens des Vorstands während des Übernahmeverfahrens verbundenen Regelungsprobleme aus juristischer und ökonomischer Perspektive zwei konkrete Ziele: die positive Wirkungsanalyse der bestehenden Regelungen nach der ÜRL und dem WpÜG sowie die Entwicklung einer Regelungsalternative auf nationaler Ebene. / The primary objective of the dissertation is to systematically integrate economic considerations into the discussion about the code of conduct for the board of directors during public takeovers. From a welfare theoretic perspective, the economic functions of the market for corporate control have to be taken into account in their entire scope. In this context the instruments of Law and Economics are used for a positive analysis of different approaches to regulate the code of conduct as well as the existing regulations of the EU Directive on Takeover Bids and the WpÜG. The normative approach of Law and Economics is particularly useful for developing regulatory alternatives to the existing code of conduct under the WpÜG. Based on a survey of the regulatory problems of public takeovers from an economic and legal perspective, the dissertation is perusing two objectives: a positive effect analysis of the impact of the existing rules of the EU Directive on Takeover Bids and the WpÜG as well as the formulation of an alternative concept for the code of conduct on the national level.

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