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Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Problem statement For utilitarians, human beings have intrinsic moral significance based on only two acquired characteristics: sentience, or the ability to suffer, and psychological personhood. Sentience is the entrance-requirement for moral significance, but does not justify a "right to life" claim; at most a "right" not to suffer. Personhood, described as some sort of self-conscious awareness with a concept of the future, may justify a "right to life" claim. However, since personhood is absent in prenatal beings, and only develops some time after birth, the implication is that such beings have little moral significance and may, for instance, be killed "at will". The moral problem that I address in this dissertation is to investigate, assess and evaluate the utilitarian position on the moral status or value of prenatal life. Methodology and results I firstly, on the basis of an extensive literature study, make a detailed analysis of the utilitarian position with reference to a number of themes that I have identified in their argument. This is followed by a critical philosophical evaluation of the utilitarian position, based on six particular arguments: • Utilitarianism is philosophically incoherent. It over-simplifies the moral argument in claiming that consequences are all that matter morally. Its underlying moral theory is at odds with moral claims contained in contemporary notions of human rights and individual justice. It ignores the moral significance of special obligations to special groups. • Utilitarianism potentially has unacceptable consequences. It IS inherently discriminatory and may lead to legitimate "slippery slope" fears. • Utilitarianism clashes with our fundamental moral intuitions on the value of prenatal life. These intuitions are cherished in most world religions. • Contrary to the utilitarian position, speciesism is inevitable to the human condition, especially argued from a position of existential phenomenology. Self- constitution, simultaneous constitution of the world as we know it, and the very possibility of morality are possible only within a particular notion of speciesism. • The potentiality of pre-persons to develop into persons cannot be as convincingly ignored as is done by the utilitarian. • There is a basic and underlying need and intuition to protect vulnerable human beings, of which pre-persons are exemplars. These notions clash with utilitarian theory. As an alternative, I introduce, set out and evaluate a two-phased position on the moral significance of pre-personal human life, a position of respectfulness of prenatal and pre-personal human life based upon its humanity, potentiality and separation-viability. This leads, firstly, to the conclusion of a graded, sliding scale conception of human prepersonal moral significance in line with the level of development and with the actuation of potentiality. Secondly, it leads to the conclusion that the advent of separationsurvivability (viability) is a morally significant cut-off point beyond which the human fetus may "normally" have a justifiable right to the continuation of its life. In as far as the application of my argument is concerned, I develop a "moderate" position with reference to the abortion debate. Whilst I recognize that all human prenatal beings of which it can be argued that they have a reasonable chance to develop their intrinsic potentiality, i.e., to become full-fledged persons, should have the opportunity to do so, I also recognize that neither this position, nor the complexities of life make it possible to hold "absolute" positions on the justifiability of abortion. I explore this extremely problematic notion in the text. That having been said, the advent of separation-survivability may imply a "moral cut-off point", beyond which termination is only rarely justified. I argue that I find no moral hindrance to wellmotivated research on human pre-embryos and stem cells. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Probleemstelling Utilitariste huldig sterk omlynde standpunte oor die waarde van lewe. Hulle redeneer dat menslike (inderwaarheid, alle lewende) wesens slegs op grond van twee eienskappe intrinsieke morele waarde kan verwerf: sentiëntisme, d.i. die vermoë om lyding te ervaar, en persoonstatus. Sentiëntisme is 'n bepalende vereiste vir morele status, maar regverdig nie 'n "reg op lewe"-aanspraak nie. Persoonsyn, verstaan as 'n vorm van selfbewustheid tesame met 'n bewuste belang by die voortsetting van eie bestaan, mag wel so 'n aanspraak regverdig. Voorgeboortelike (en "voorpersoonlike") wesens is egter nie persone nie; hulle word eers (aansienlik) ná geboorte volwaardige persone. Die implikasie is dat sulke wesens weinig morele status het, en byvoorbeeld, na willekeur gedood mag word. Die morele probleem wat ek in hierdie dissertasie aanspreek is om die utilitaristiese beskouing ten opsigte van die morale status of waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe krities-filosofies te ondersoek en te evalueer. Metodologie en gevolgtrekkings Eerstens maak ek na aanleiding van 'n gedetaileerde literatuurstudie 'n in-diepte analise van van die utilitaristiese posisie aan die hand van 'n aantal temas wat ek in hul argument geïdentifiseer het. Daarna volg 'n krities-filosofiese evaluasie van die utilitaristiese posisie, aan die hand van ses argumente: • Utilitarisme is filosofies onsamehangend. Dit oorvereenvoudig die morele argument deur voor te gee dat gevolge al is wat moreel saakmaak. Die onderliggende utilitaristiese teorie bots met die morele eise vervat in kontemporêre sienings van menseregte en geregtigheid. Dit negeer die morele belangrikheid van spesiale verpligtinge teenoor spesiale belangegroepe. • Utilitarisme het potensieelonaanvaarbare gevolge. Dit IS inherent diskriminerend en kan lei tot onkeerbare glybaan ("slippery slope")-argumente. Utilitarisme bots met ons fundamentele morele intuïsies betreffende die waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe. Hierdie intuïsies word onder meer ondersteun deur die meeste hoofstroom godsdienste. • Spesiësisme is, in kontras met die utilitaristiese beskouing, onafwendbaar vir ons selfverstaan as mense, soos aangetoon kan word met 'n beroep op die eksistensiële fenomenologie. Self-konstituering, gelyktydige konstituering van die wêreld van die mens, en selfs die moontlikheid van moraliteit is slegs moontlik vanuit' n bepaalde spesiësistiese beskouing. • Die potensialiteit van "pre-persone" om tot volwaardige persone te ontwikkel kan nie, soos die utilitaris doen, sonder meer geïgnoreer word nie. • Daar is 'n basiese en onderliggende morele eis om swak en weerlose menslike wesens te beskerm. Hierdie idees bots lynreg met utilitaristiese teorie. As 'n alternatief tot die utilitaristiese beskouing, ontwikkel ek 'n twee-fase posisie betreffende die morele waarde van voorgeboortelike menslike lewe. Ek noem hierdie posisie agting vir voorgeboortelike en voor-persoonlike menslike lewe gebaseer op die menslikheid, potensialiteit en oorleefbaarheid van prenatale mense. Dit lei, eerstens, tot die gevolgtrekking van 'n gegradeerde glyskaal konsepsie van voor-persoonlike menslike morele waarde, min of meer parallel aan die vlak van ontwikkeling en die ontwikkeling van potensialiteit. Tweedens lei dit tot die gevolgtrekking dat die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid 'n moreel-beduidende afsnypunt is waarna die menslike fetus "normaalweg" aanspraak kan maak op 'n reg dat sy lewe voortgesit moet word. In soverre dit die toepassing van my argument betref, ontwikkel ek 'n "gematigde" posisie vis-á-vis aborsie. Ek redeneer dat alle menslike voorgeboortelike wesens wat 'n redelike kans het dat hul intrinsieke potensialiteit verder sal ontwikkel, die geleentheid daartoe gegun behoort te word. Ek aanvaar ook dat nog hierdie beskouing, nog die kompleksiteit van die menslike bestaan "absolute" posisies moreel regverdig. Die problematiek en inherente spanning tussen hierdie oënskynlik-opponerende posisies word in die teks bespreek. Nogtans beskou ek die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid as 'n moreel insiggewende afsnypunt waarna terminasie net in buitengewone omstandighede moreel regverdigbaar is.

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The thesis deals with legal aspects of euthanasia with special focus on criminal law context. It is divided into four broad chapters. First chapter defines terms that need to be understood perfectly for further work on the topic. Therefore, it deals with the term "euthanasia" and its division into active and passive euthanasia, direct and indirect, requested and unsolicited. There are also mentioned some related institutes such as dysthanasia, palliative and hospice care and assisted suicide. Last but not least, this chapter presents some arguments for and against euthanasia. Second chapter is devoted to legislation in foreign countries where euthanasia (or assisted suicide) has been legalized. Wider context of foreign legislation is important for realizing the consequences that possible legalization of euthanasia in the Czech Republic would bring. It can be clearly seen on the example of individual foreign states what legalization of euthanasia entails, how stringent the conditions that a request for termination of life has to meet are, and ultimately, we can decide whether we tend to endorse the legalization of euthanasia or go in the opposite course. Third chapter focuses on the merit of the matter, which is the legal regulation of euthanasia in the Czech Republic and the context of...

Submitted by PPG Direito (ppgdir@pucrs.br) on 2018-06-04T13:38:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Andrei_Ferreira_de_Arau?jo_Lima_DIS.pdf: 2336908 bytes, checksum: 566fe92260d6a118f2a36da3cfd3cc73 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Sheila Dias (sheila.dias@pucrs.br) on 2018-06-11T13:15:40Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Andrei_Ferreira_de_Arau?jo_Lima_DIS.pdf: 2336908 bytes, checksum: 566fe92260d6a118f2a36da3cfd3cc73 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-11T13:29:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andrei_Ferreira_de_Arau?jo_Lima_DIS.pdf: 2336908 bytes, checksum: 566fe92260d6a118f2a36da3cfd3cc73 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-27 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / This work is the result of an interdisciplinary study between the Science of Law and Bioethics. It aims to understand the ethical and legal limits of the possible right to die, specifically euthanasia. In order to achieve that goal, we will investigate the conflict and the conformation between the fundamental right to life, to human dignity and the autonomy of the will, taking into account both doctrine and national and international jurisprudence. The main reason for the reincorporation of the subject of euthanasia into the medical and legal debate (both academic and jurisprudential) refers to the fast-moving and efficient evolution of medical science, developing treatments that can prolong the patient?s life, possibly, depending on the sickness, forever. In face of this reality, one can perceive the alteration of certain paradigms of Bioethics, such as the breaking of the paternalistic relationship between doctor and patient, the principle of beneficence according to what would be best for the patient, and the removal of unreasonable obstinacy, based on the autonomy of the will and in human dignity. In this scenario, the patients? rights are increasingly debated and new contour to the state?s duty to protect life are being given, especially when in conflict with the dignity and autonomy of the patient. In this scenario, it?s debated a possible right to die with dignity. This right promotes numerous questions, especially concerning the ethical and legal limits in cases of euthanasia, requiring the establishment of clear criteria, having as a basic principle the maximum protection of the patient?s dignity. It is emphasized that, in spite of the varied forms of assisted death, as well as the recent incorporation of ortotan?sia (term in Portuguese used for terminal patients who decline useless treatments and have their right to die granted) as legal conduct in medical ethics in Brazil, the work seeks to solve questions related to euthanasia. First classifying it, in order to avoid any form of semantic confusion. In the following points it will be discussed as a possible establishment of legal criteria as well as the practical developments, taking into account both the medical deontology and the patient?s fundamental rights. / O presente trabalho de disserta??o ? fruto de um estudo interdisciplinar entre a Ci?ncia do Direito e a Bio?tica, buscando compreender quais s?o os limites ?ticos e jur?dicos relativos a um poss?vel direito ? morte, especificamente ? eutan?sia. Para tanto, se investigar? o conflito e a conforma??o entre os direitos fundamentais ? vida, ? dignidade e ? autonomia, levando em considera??o tanto a doutrina quanto a jurisprud?ncia nacional e internacional. Elucida-se que o principal motivo para a reincopora??o da tem?tica da eutan?sia no debate m?dico e jur?dico (tanto em n?vel acad?mico quanto jurisprudencial), se refere ? r?pida e eficaz evolu??o da ci?ncia m?dica, desenvolvendo tratamentos que possam prolongar a vida de um paciente, por vezes, de modo ad eternum. Frente a essa realidade, se percebe a gradativa altera??o de determinados conceitos da Bio?tica, como a quebra da rela??o paternalista entre m?dico e paciente, o princ?pio da benefic?ncia de acordo com o que seria melhor para o paciente, e o afastamento da obstina??o irrazo?vel, todos calcados na autonomia da vontade e na dignidade da pessoa humana. Nesse cen?rio, os direitos dos pacientes s?o cada vez mais debatidos e o dever de prote??o da vida por parte do Estado passa a receber novos contornos, impondo-se limites ? dimens?o objetiva do direito fundamental ? vida, podendo prevalecer, em casos espec?ficos, a dimens?o subjetiva desse mesmo direito. Dessa rela??o entre vida, dignidade e autonomia, fala-se em um poss?vel direito ? morte digna. Contudo, restam in?meras quest?es quanto aos limites desse direito, tanto em um sentido ?tico quanto jur?dico, pois por mais que se conclua pela exist?ncia de um direito ? morte, necess?rio ser? o estabelecimento de crit?rios, limitando a autonomia dos pacientes, tendo como norte a prote??o m?xima de sua dignidade. Frisa-se que, em que pesem as mais variadas formas de morte assistida, bem como a recente incorpora??o da ortotan?sia como conduta legal na ?tica m?dica brasileira, o trabalho buscar? resolver quest?es relacionadas ? eutan?sia. Primeiro classificando-a, de modo a evitar qualquer forma de confus?o sem?ntica, para nos pontos seguintes estabelecer os crit?rios jur?dicos, bem como os desdobramentos pr?ticos calcados na deontologia m?dica.

A dissertação trata do debate acerca do início da proteção do direito à vida e as consequências dessa proteção em relação às pesquisas com células-tronco embrionárias humanas, autorizadas no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro pelo artigo 5º, da Lei nº 11.105/2005, julgada constitucional pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal em sede de controle concentrado de constitucionalidade. A abordagem, que se concentrou no estudo da doutrina, legislação e jurisprudência, tem caráter preponderantemente dogmático jurídico, nas dimensões analítica, empírica e normativa. As principais conclusões são as seguintes: o direito à vida garantido pela Constituição Federal, estruturalmente, consiste em um princípio, com âmbito de proteção amplo, ensejando a necessidade de sopesamento com outros valores protegidos pelo ordenamento jurídico para sua aplicação; dentre as possíveis interpretações acerca do que consiste esse direito, ele pode ser considerado como um direito à própria existência, um direito à vida digna e um direito à proteção em face do desenvolvimento da biotecnologia; o início da proteção do direito à vida e as pesquisas e terapias com células-tronco embrionárias são disciplinados no direito brasileiro por dispositivos internacionais e nacionais, tais como a Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos, a Constituição Federal e a Lei nº 11.105/2005; o fato de o Supremo Tribunal Federal ter considerado constitucional o artigo 5º, da Lei nº 11.105/2005, em sede de controle concentrado, não afastou a aplicação da Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos (a qual contém norma que protege o direito à vida, em geral, desde a concepção) e nem impediu um controle estatal e internacional efetivo sobre as pesquisas e terapias com células-tronco embrionárias a fim de resguardar, dentre outros aspectos, o direito à vida em um enfoque transindividual. / The present work deals with the debate about the beginning of the protection of the right to life and the consequences of this protection related to human embryo-based stem cell research, authorized by the Brazilian legal legislation according to the Article 5 of Law no. 11.105/2005, considered constitutional by the Federal Supreme Court in the concentrated model of constitutional control. The approach, centralized in the study of the doctrine, legislation and jurisprudence, is based on a predominantly dogmatic legal nature, in the analytical, empirical and regulatory dimensions. Following are the main conclusions: the right to life grated by the Federal Constitution structurally consists of a principle, with a broad protection scope, that justifies the need of weighting with other values protected by the legal legislation for its application; among the possible interpretations of what this right is consistent of, it can be considered as a right to the existence itself, a right to a decent life and a right to protection facing the development of the biotechnology; the beginning of the protection of the right to human embryo-based stem cell research and therapies are set in the Brazilian Law by national and international precepts, such as the American Convention of Human Rights, the Federal Constitution and the Law nº 11.105/2005; the fact that the Federal Supreme Court considered the Article 5 of Law nº 11.105/2005, in the concentrated model of constitutional control, did not distract the application of the American Convention of Human Rights (which contains the regulations that protects the right to life, in general, from its conception) neither obstructed an actual state or international control on the human embryo-based stem cell research and therapies in order to protect, among other aspects, the right to life in a transindividual approach.

Title The legal status of the embryo from the perspective of European human rights protection Abstract The thesis addresses the question regarding the legal status of the human embryo in European law. The aim of the thesis is to evaluate whether the embryo stands in the position of a legal object or legal subject and whether the legal status of embryo is in compliance with natural law. For this purpose the thesis firstly defines the status in the field of natural law, i.e. the moral status of embryo. Afterwards, the thesis examines the legal position of embryo in human rights protection. The thesis answers the question whether the embryo is subject of human rights documents. The legal status of embryo is analyzed in relation to the subjectivity of human rights in general as well as in relation to specific rights. The interpretation of legal terms "human being" and "everyone" contribute to a better understanding of legal status of embryo in general. The analysis of the specific rights, namely the right to life, human dignity, personal integrity and non-discrimination, shows the complexity of the potential legal subjectivity of embryo in the area of human rights. The evaluation of the legal status of human embryo in the area of human rights protection is complemented by an assessment of legal status in other...

This thesis deals with the death penalty. At the beginning are mentioned the general theory of punishment and the function of punishment. The next chapter outlines the historical development of the death penalty to the present. The third chapter is devoted to past and present techniques for the death penalty. The important role enact individual international documents conditioning the right to life and the possibility of the death penalty. Also are mentioned the arguments for and against the dea

A dissertação trata do debate acerca do início da proteção do direito à vida e as consequências dessa proteção em relação às pesquisas com células-tronco embrionárias humanas, autorizadas no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro pelo artigo 5º, da Lei nº 11.105/2005, julgada constitucional pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal em sede de controle concentrado de constitucionalidade. A abordagem, que se concentrou no estudo da doutrina, legislação e jurisprudência, tem caráter preponderantemente dogmático jurídico, nas dimensões analítica, empírica e normativa. As principais conclusões são as seguintes: o direito à vida garantido pela Constituição Federal, estruturalmente, consiste em um princípio, com âmbito de proteção amplo, ensejando a necessidade de sopesamento com outros valores protegidos pelo ordenamento jurídico para sua aplicação; dentre as possíveis interpretações acerca do que consiste esse direito, ele pode ser considerado como um direito à própria existência, um direito à vida digna e um direito à proteção em face do desenvolvimento da biotecnologia; o início da proteção do direito à vida e as pesquisas e terapias com células-tronco embrionárias são disciplinados no direito brasileiro por dispositivos internacionais e nacionais, tais como a Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos, a Constituição Federal e a Lei nº 11.105/2005; o fato de o Supremo Tribunal Federal ter considerado constitucional o artigo 5º, da Lei nº 11.105/2005, em sede de controle concentrado, não afastou a aplicação da Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos (a qual contém norma que protege o direito à vida, em geral, desde a concepção) e nem impediu um controle estatal e internacional efetivo sobre as pesquisas e terapias com células-tronco embrionárias a fim de resguardar, dentre outros aspectos, o direito à vida em um enfoque transindividual. / The present work deals with the debate about the beginning of the protection of the right to life and the consequences of this protection related to human embryo-based stem cell research, authorized by the Brazilian legal legislation according to the Article 5 of Law no. 11.105/2005, considered constitutional by the Federal Supreme Court in the concentrated model of constitutional control. The approach, centralized in the study of the doctrine, legislation and jurisprudence, is based on a predominantly dogmatic legal nature, in the analytical, empirical and regulatory dimensions. Following are the main conclusions: the right to life grated by the Federal Constitution structurally consists of a principle, with a broad protection scope, that justifies the need of weighting with other values protected by the legal legislation for its application; among the possible interpretations of what this right is consistent of, it can be considered as a right to the existence itself, a right to a decent life and a right to protection facing the development of the biotechnology; the beginning of the protection of the right to human embryo-based stem cell research and therapies are set in the Brazilian Law by national and international precepts, such as the American Convention of Human Rights, the Federal Constitution and the Law nº 11.105/2005; the fact that the Federal Supreme Court considered the Article 5 of Law nº 11.105/2005, in the concentrated model of constitutional control, did not distract the application of the American Convention of Human Rights (which contains the regulations that protects the right to life, in general, from its conception) neither obstructed an actual state or international control on the human embryo-based stem cell research and therapies in order to protect, among other aspects, the right to life in a transindividual approach.

Au cours du dernier siècle, les circonstances de la mort ont changé. La plupart des décès surviennent maintenant à des âges élevés. Ils ont principalement lieu en institution et sont souvent précédés d’une longue maladie chronique accompagnée de souffrances et d’angoisses qui ne peuvent être soulagées. Ces mêmes sentiments se retrouvent aussi chez les personnes accidentées de la vie. C’est pourquoi, désormais, les patients privilégient la qualité de la mort à la prolongation de la vie dans la souffrance. Ainsi, de plus en plus fréquemment, le corps médical est confronté à des demandes d’euthanasie ou de suicide assisté de la part des souffrants. C’est dans ce contexte qu’il est intéressant de s’interroger sur la législation française en matière de fin de vie et sur la place donnée tant aux professionnels de santé, qu’aux patients. Si la loi Leonetti du 22 avril 2005 a constitué une avancée considérable en la matière, elle ne répond malheureusement pas à l’ensemble des situations existantes et demeure actuellement insuffisante face aux requêtes constantes des personnes souffrantes et de la majorité de la population française. En témoigne la récente affaire Vincent Lambert dans laquelle, l’équipe médicale confrontée à des avis discordants au sein de la famille proche du patient et à l’absence de volonté exprimée de celui-ci, a été amenée à prendre une décision collégiale sur la poursuite ou non du traitement délivré à ce patient tétraplégique en état de conscience minimale, qui semble-t-il ne voulait plus survivre. S’en sont suivies plusieurs mêlées judiciaires qui ont permis de relancer le débat sur l’évolution de la législation en matière de fin de vie / During the last century, the circumstances of the death changed. Most of the deaths arise now at high ages even very high. They mainly take place in institution and are often preceded by a long chronic disease accompanied with sufferings and with fears which cannot be relieved. The same feelings also find themselves at the more or less young people, damaged by the life.That is why, from now on, the patients favor the quality of the death to the extra time of the life in the suffering. So, more and more frequently, the medical profession is confronted with requests of euthanasia or suicide assisted on behalf of the suffering.It is in this context that it is interesting to wonder on the French legislation regarding the end of life and on the place given as long to the healthcare professionals, and the patients.If the Leonetti’s law of April 22nd, 2005 constituted a considerable advance on the subject, she does not unfortunately answer all the existing situations and currently not sufficient in front of constant requests of the suffering people and the majority of the French population. The recent affair Vincent Lambert shows it in which, the medical team confronted with clashing notices within the family close to the patient and in the absence of will expressed by this one, was brought to make a collective decision on the pursuit or not of the treatment delivered to this patient tetraplegic in state of minimal consciousness, who it seems did not want to survive any more. Followed itself several judicial scrums which allowed to boost the debate on the evolution of the legislation regarding the end of life