The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states that all people are entitled to freedom and equality. Providing freedom is an important part of democracy and development yet the process is not always simple and it faces many obstacles. Freedom is identified in many forms but one of the most contentious forms is freedom of religion and conscience; it is currently the subject of heated debate as some prioritise it above all other freedoms whilst others argue that religion is too often the cause of conflict and should not exist at all. Providing freedom of religion means defending a person’s right to practise their religious beliefs, though some can hinder the freedom of others. One of the obstacles facing the provision of various freedoms might be the defence of religious freedom. In order to make more people more free, it may be necessary to limit religious freedom to a certain extent. By employing an abductive approach, this qualitative desk study infers from the observation of occurrences where religious freedom has detrimentally affected or been affected by another form of freedom that an inverse relationship might exist and furthermore that conflict could result. The cases, each one an incident taking place in a highly developed and democratic country, were collected from online newspapers, primarily the BBC, and were analysed using Mill’s Harm Principle as a framework. It was found that, rather than threatening other forms of freedom, defending the religious freedom of one group is more likely to threaten the religious freedom of another group. Small-scale, recurring conflict is a common occurrence, most often resolved judicially and in favour of the majority. It was concluded that freedom in all its forms is not possible for all people simultaneously and that limiting freedom to avoid harming others it also likely to cause harm.

Este trabalho investiga as relações entre a regra da maioria e o princípio do dano de John Stuart Mill. Em suma, seu objetivo é descobrir de que maneira o princípio do dano funciona como um limite à regra da maioria. Diante disso, ao longo desta dissertação, examinam-se as dificuldades enfrentadas por Mill para conciliar utilitarismo e democracia, liberdade e razão. Este trabalho analisa, também, algumas ideias permanentemente presentes na reflexão histórica sobre o liberalismo: os conceitos de liberdade positiva e liberdade negativa; os diversos conceitos de paternalismo; e as muitas críticas dirigidas à regra da maioria / This investigation studies the link between the majority rule and the harm principle by John Stuart Mill. To sum up, the purpose is to find out how the harm principle operates as a limit on majority rule. As a result, throughout this study, we examine the difficulties faced by Mill to reconcile utilitarianism and democracy, liberty and reason. This dissertation analyzes, still, some ideas that were constantly present in historical reflection about liberalism: the concept of the positive liberty and the concept of negative liberty; the various concepts of paternalism; and the many criticisms of the majority rule.

Este trabalho investiga as relações entre a regra da maioria e o princípio do dano de John Stuart Mill. Em suma, seu objetivo é descobrir de que maneira o princípio do dano funciona como um limite à regra da maioria. Diante disso, ao longo desta dissertação, examinam-se as dificuldades enfrentadas por Mill para conciliar utilitarismo e democracia, liberdade e razão. Este trabalho analisa, também, algumas ideias permanentemente presentes na reflexão histórica sobre o liberalismo: os conceitos de liberdade positiva e liberdade negativa; os diversos conceitos de paternalismo; e as muitas críticas dirigidas à regra da maioria / This investigation studies the link between the majority rule and the harm principle by John Stuart Mill. To sum up, the purpose is to find out how the harm principle operates as a limit on majority rule. As a result, throughout this study, we examine the difficulties faced by Mill to reconcile utilitarianism and democracy, liberty and reason. This dissertation analyzes, still, some ideas that were constantly present in historical reflection about liberalism: the concept of the positive liberty and the concept of negative liberty; the various concepts of paternalism; and the many criticisms of the majority rule.

Partant du postulat selon lequel la principale justification de la répression de formes d’expressions réside dans leur nocivité supposée, nous tentons de répondre à la question suivante : comment définir des limites claires et cohérentes à la liberté d’expression ? L’analyse des controverses relatives à la pornographie, et en particulier de la manière dont les notions de liberté d’expression et de nuisance ont été articulées, contribue à répondre à cette question générale. À travers l’analyse des débats portant sur la restriction des représentations sexuelles, nous tentons de montrer que les parties en présence ne sont pas parvenues à définir la notion de « nuisance » de manière claire et satisfaisante, et ne permettent pas, dès lors, de définir avec précision les limites légitimes de la liberté d’expression. Les deux voies théoriques alternatives que nous avons identifiées, les conceptions instrumentales et déontologiques de la liberté d’expression, ne se révèlent pas plus convaincantes. Nous montrons néanmoins qu’il est possible de préciser le principe de non-nuisance en y intégrant deux éléments auparavant négligés : la subjectivité du récepteur, et les rapports d’autorité qui existent entre le locuteur et le récepteur. Nous défendons ainsi l’idée que le principe de non-nuisance reste l’instrument le plus clair et le plus cohérent pour fonder les limites de la liberté d’expression, à condition de l’amender et de le compléter. / Acknowledging the fact that the main justification to restrict some forms of expression lies in the harm they may cause to others, this thesis aims at answering the following question: how do we define clear and coherent limits of the freedom of expression? The study of the controversies regarding pornography, and particularly the way in which the concepts of freedom of expression and harm are closely linked together, is an important contribution in order to answer this vast subject. Through the analysis of debates with regard to sexual representations, this thesis aims at gaining a deeper understanding on how the authors were unsuccessful in defining the notion of « harm » in a clear and convincing way, and fail at allowing to set precisely the legitimate limits of freedom of expression. The two alternative theoretical approaches that were identified and established - the instrumental and deontological conceptions of freedom of expression – were not proven to be more satisfactory either. However, this research confirms that the harm principle can be clarified if two previously neglected aspects are included in the analysis: the receiver’s subjectivity, and the authority relationship established between the speaker and the viewer. Thus, it is argued that the harm principle, given that it is modified and completed, remains the most effective and adequate tool in order to ground the limits of freedom of expression.

The thesis will examine the harm principle, as originally described by John Stuart Mill. In doing so, it will defend that, though unintended, the harm principle may justify several principles of distributive justice. To augment this analysis, the paper will examine several secondary authors’ interpretations of the harm principle, including potential critiques of the thesis itself.

The present investigations study the John Stuart Mill thinking and his position towards paternalism justification, taking into account the harm principle elaborated in his book “On Liberty”. Two are the objectives of this paper. In first place, the anti - paternalist tesis sustained by this autor will be analyzed to identify deficiencies and limitations. In second place, it is sought to determine to what extent they actually opposed such interventions, to verify the accuracy of that somewhat extended belief that sees Mill a strong opponent of paternalism. It is concluded that the defects of Mill’s theses are explained in good account due to an excess of optimism in the capacities of human beings for self-regulation, a strong skepticism about the capacity of the State to achieve effective paternalistic measures, granting From an excessively strong and unrealistic weight to individual autonomy, among other erroneous considerations. It is also concluded that it is not correct to say that John Stuart Mill has maintained an extremely broad or almost absolute antipaternalistic thesis. Although his famous principle of harm makes it impossible to validate many measures of this nature, a more detailed review of his entire work shows that Mill admitted the validity of many interventions in adults. / La presente investigación estudia el pensamiento de John Stuart Mill y su posición alrededor de la justificación del paternalismo, tomando en consideración el principio de daño elaborado en su obra “Sobre la libertad”. Dos son los objetivos de este trabajo. En primer lugar, se analizarán las tesis anti-paternalistas sostenidas por este autor para identificar sus deficiencias y limitaciones. En segundo lugar, se busca determinar hasta qué punto dichas tesis realmente se opusieron a dichas intervenciones, para verificar la exactitud de aquella creencia algo extendida que considera a Mill como un fuerte opositor del paternalismo. Se concluye que los defectos de las tesis de Mill se explican en buena cuenta debido a un exceso de optimismo en las capacidades de los seres humanos para la auto-regulación, un fuerte escepticismo sobre la capacidad del Estado para lograr medidas paternalistas efectivas, el otorgamiento de un peso excesivamente fuerte e irrealista a la autonomía individual, entre otras consideraciones erróneas. Asimismo se concluye que no es correcto afirmar que John Stuart Mill haya sostenido una tesis anti-paternalista sumamente amplia o casi absoluta. Si bien su famoso principio de daño permite excluir de validez a muchas medidas de dicha naturaleza, una revisión más detallada de toda su obra permite mostrar que Mill admitió la validez de muchas intervenciones en adultos.

O princípio do dano, assim como elaborado por John Stuart Mill em On Liberty, é tido como elemento fundamental à afirmação do liberalismo a partir do século XIX e seu desenvolvimento rumo ao século XX. Diante das nascentes democracias européias foi afirmado como um princípio absoluto de proteção à liberdade individual contra a imposição da moralidade pela opinião pública e pelo Estado. Mill partilhava o apreço de Tocqueville pela democracia sem deixar de temer a tirania das maiorias. Inicialmente, investiga-se o lugar do princípio do dano na filosofia política milliana e as fragilidades apontadas por seus críticos. Em um segundo momento, analisa-se sua influência na defesa das liberdades civis na Inglaterra da década de 1950, especificamente com a edição do Relatório Wolfenden que defendeu a descriminalização de práticas homossexuais, bem como o debate que se lhe seguiu sobre os limites do Direito protagonizado por H.L.A. Hart. Na última parte, o objeto do estudo é o princípio do dano agora inserido em uma doutrina liberal-perfeccionista, assim como formulada por Joseph Raz em A Moralidade da Liberdade. O objetivo final é revelar a existência de incoerências internas no princípio do dano, tanto em sua versão original como nas que lhe sucederam, de modo a impedir a fixação de uma espaço imune ao Direito e à imposição da moralidade. No entanto, visto da perspectiva adequada, o fracasso na elaboração de tal princípio deve ser relativizado, eis que no seu devir o princípio do dano serviu à reflexão acerca dos limites da coerção legítima, bem como ao aprimoramento de conceitos relevantes à filosofia política como moralismo legal, paternalismo e perfeccionismo jurídicos. / The harm principle, as elaborated by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, is regarded as a key element to the assertion of liberalism from the 19th century and its development into the 20th century. Facing emerging European democracies it was stated as an absolute principle of individual freedom against the enforcement of morality by governments and public opinion. Mill, as well as Tocqueville, appreciate democracy but fear the "tyranny of the majority". Initially, we investigate the place of the Millian harm principle in his political philosophy and its weakness as pointed out by its critics. Then, we analyze harm principles influence on civil rights movement in Englands 1950s, notably in theWolfenden Reports debate between HLA Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin about the limits of the law. In the last section we face the liberal-perfectionism of Joseph Raz Morality of Freedom and his view about the harm principle. We argue as a final statement the existence of harm principles internal inconsistencies, both in its original version and later ones, that disables it to be an adequate liberal response to the legal enforcement of morality. However its failures, harm principle seems to produce a deep and useful debate about the legitimacy of such fundamental concepts of philosophy of law as legal coercion, legal moralism, legal paternalism and perfectionism.

O princípio do dano, assim como elaborado por John Stuart Mill em On Liberty, é tido como elemento fundamental à afirmação do liberalismo a partir do século XIX e seu desenvolvimento rumo ao século XX. Diante das nascentes democracias européias foi afirmado como um princípio absoluto de proteção à liberdade individual contra a imposição da moralidade pela opinião pública e pelo Estado. Mill partilhava o apreço de Tocqueville pela democracia sem deixar de temer a tirania das maiorias. Inicialmente, investiga-se o lugar do princípio do dano na filosofia política milliana e as fragilidades apontadas por seus críticos. Em um segundo momento, analisa-se sua influência na defesa das liberdades civis na Inglaterra da década de 1950, especificamente com a edição do Relatório Wolfenden que defendeu a descriminalização de práticas homossexuais, bem como o debate que se lhe seguiu sobre os limites do Direito protagonizado por H.L.A. Hart. Na última parte, o objeto do estudo é o princípio do dano agora inserido em uma doutrina liberal-perfeccionista, assim como formulada por Joseph Raz em A Moralidade da Liberdade. O objetivo final é revelar a existência de incoerências internas no princípio do dano, tanto em sua versão original como nas que lhe sucederam, de modo a impedir a fixação de uma espaço imune ao Direito e à imposição da moralidade. No entanto, visto da perspectiva adequada, o fracasso na elaboração de tal princípio deve ser relativizado, eis que no seu devir o princípio do dano serviu à reflexão acerca dos limites da coerção legítima, bem como ao aprimoramento de conceitos relevantes à filosofia política como moralismo legal, paternalismo e perfeccionismo jurídicos. / The harm principle, as elaborated by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, is regarded as a key element to the assertion of liberalism from the 19th century and its development into the 20th century. Facing emerging European democracies it was stated as an absolute principle of individual freedom against the enforcement of morality by governments and public opinion. Mill, as well as Tocqueville, appreciate democracy but fear the "tyranny of the majority". Initially, we investigate the place of the Millian harm principle in his political philosophy and its weakness as pointed out by its critics. Then, we analyze harm principles influence on civil rights movement in Englands 1950s, notably in theWolfenden Reports debate between HLA Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin about the limits of the law. In the last section we face the liberal-perfectionism of Joseph Raz Morality of Freedom and his view about the harm principle. We argue as a final statement the existence of harm principles internal inconsistencies, both in its original version and later ones, that disables it to be an adequate liberal response to the legal enforcement of morality. However its failures, harm principle seems to produce a deep and useful debate about the legitimacy of such fundamental concepts of philosophy of law as legal coercion, legal moralism, legal paternalism and perfectionism.

Climate change is the defining challenge of this generation, and transforming our energy systems is the largest part of solving this challenge. Nations have pledged goals in the distant future, but these are insufficient to keep the planet below 2℃ of warming. Citizens have taken legal action against states, and legal action between states seems soon to follow. Both have been studied substantially, though there has yet to be a comparison of different principles under international law and for the question to be contextualised within the energy transition. This gap will be addressed with the research question of this thesis which will seek to find how countries can be held legally responsible using the no-harm principle and human rights principle for not sufficiently undertaking a sustainable energy transition and, if possible, be forced to act more quickly. The question will be answered through a qualitative document analysis of relevant cases and legally binding treaties related to the No-harm principle and human rights approach. The findings demonstrate that the No-harm principle was the better option for pursuing such a case given its expansive authority through theResponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (IWA) treaty, which codifies the No-harm principle into international law and has argued numerous environmental cases successfully. However, the No-harm principle and IWA can only be brought by states, which is challenging due to its implication for international relations. The human rights-based approach does not have this risk as citizens can bring cases forward, though there is a significant gap due to a lack of courts in some parts of the world. The results will suggest an ideal case based on these ideal characteristics: a Small Islands Developing Nation bringing a case against the G20 based on a violation of the No-harm principle and the IWA. Though this case was determined to be the most likely to succeed in inducing high emission countries to take action, the duration of such a case and its final process remains in question.

A legitimidade da criminalização de condutas na legislação brasileira de prevenção e combate à lavagem de dinheiro, bem como seu tratamento em âmbito internacional, e a dificuldade encontrada em sua adequada delimitação e aplicação eficaz constituem a problemática central desta tese. A justificação, validade, legitimidade e pertinência desta criminalização são analisadas criticamente em aprofundada discussão dos problemas atinentes ao sistema penal e como este pode, ou não, trabalhar com a atual criminalização da lavagem de dinheiro. São idealizados referenciais básicos, almejando, no mínimo, efeitos menos deletérios em uma tipificação tida como exemplo de quão gravemente os princípios fundamentais do direito penal liberal podem ser agredidos no afã criminalizante. Os resultados alcançados neste trabalho se traduzem na conclusão pela ilegitimidade desta tipificação penal na atual forma e na proposição do estabelecimento de contornos nítidos para a delimitação da responsabilidade criminal neste delito. Para além dos estreitos limites do direito penal, outra abordagem é oferecida, visando propiciar uma solução aos conflitos que surgem na sociedade brasileira em decorrência de condutas de lavagem de dinheiro, ultrapassando-se definitivamente o tecnicismo jurídico em favor de um sistema funcional de direito penal e, sobretudo, condizente com os fundamentos de um Estado Democrático de Direito. / The legitimacy of7 the criminalization of money laundering conducts in the Brazilian legislation and its treatment in the international forum, as well as the difficulties faced in adequately limiting the extent and effective application of that law constitute the main focus of this doctoral thesis. The justification, validity, legitimacy and pertinence of this criminalization are critically analyzed through detailed discussion of the problems posed in view of the penal system and of whether it could possible work with the contemporary criminalization of money laundering. Basic guidelines are developed with the goal of, at least, containing the negative impact of a criminalization that is seen as an example for how gravely elementary criminal law principles can be hurt in through excessive use of the criminal law. The results reached translate into the conclusion of the illegitimacy of the criminalization of money laundering in its current form and in a suggestion for the stipulation of clear limits to the reach of criminal responsibility for this conduct. Beyond the narrow area of criminal law, another approach is offered, aiming at creating a solution for the conflicts which arise in Brazilian society as a consequence to acts of Money laundering, thereby favoring a systemic approach under observation of the fundamental principles of a democratic State founded on the rule of law.