The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states that all people are entitled to freedom and equality. Providing freedom is an important part of democracy and development yet the process is not always simple and it faces many obstacles. Freedom is identified in many forms but one of the most contentious forms is freedom of religion and conscience; it is currently the subject of heated debate as some prioritise it above all other freedoms whilst others argue that religion is too often the cause of conflict and should not exist at all. Providing freedom of religion means defending a person’s right to practise their religious beliefs, though some can hinder the freedom of others. One of the obstacles facing the provision of various freedoms might be the defence of religious freedom. In order to make more people more free, it may be necessary to limit religious freedom to a certain extent. By employing an abductive approach, this qualitative desk study infers from the observation of occurrences where religious freedom has detrimentally affected or been affected by another form of freedom that an inverse relationship might exist and furthermore that conflict could result. The cases, each one an incident taking place in a highly developed and democratic country, were collected from online newspapers, primarily the BBC, and were analysed using Mill’s Harm Principle as a framework. It was found that, rather than threatening other forms of freedom, defending the religious freedom of one group is more likely to threaten the religious freedom of another group. Small-scale, recurring conflict is a common occurrence, most often resolved judicially and in favour of the majority. It was concluded that freedom in all its forms is not possible for all people simultaneously and that limiting freedom to avoid harming others it also likely to cause harm.

Submitted by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2017-06-06T19:22:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TES_TOMAS_GRINGS_MACHADO_PARCIAL.pdf: 302377 bytes, checksum: bb6c3bff3cf87181cc484c183651699b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-06T19:22:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TES_TOMAS_GRINGS_MACHADO_PARCIAL.pdf: 302377 bytes, checksum: bb6c3bff3cf87181cc484c183651699b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-01-16 / This study presents the basic problematization about the limits that the crime of money laundering presents and, more precisely, where or from which theoretical referential we can indicate the limits of the crime of money laundering. In an attempt to limit criminal law, traditional doctrine recognizes that, at least in the context of continental and brazilian doctrine, a crime is legitimately constituted when the criminalization of behavior represents an offense against a criminal legal good. The thesis presented here is based on the premise that the limit of the money laundering crime can not be rooted in the concept of criminal legal good and any attempt to adapt or even update this concept ends up challenging the very definition of criminal legal good. It discusses the reference of the concept of criminal legal good as a limit to criminal law, opposing it to the framework proposed by the common law context from the referential of harm to other principle. It is observed that the concept of criminal legal good is insufficient to identify the limits of the crime of money laundering, or it appears too broad, and thus does not carry any limitation, or it is too restrictive, and thus does not allow an effective adjustment to the purposes that lead to the criminalization of money laundering. It is verified that the application of harm to other principle presents itself as a more adequate mechanism for an effective limitation as to the dogmatic structure of the crime of money laundering. / Este trabalho desenvolve a problematiza??o b?sica a respeito dos limites que o crime de lavagem de dinheiro apresenta e, mais precisamente, onde ou a partir de que referencial te?rico podemos defini-los. Na tentativa de limitar o direito penal, a doutrina tradicional reconhece que, ao menos no ?mbito da doutrina continental e brasileira, um crime encontra-se legitimamente constitu?do quando a criminaliza??o do comportamento retrata ofensa a um bem jur?dico-penal. A tese que aqui se apresenta parte da premissa de que o limite do crime de lavagem de dinheiro n?o poder? estar radicado no conceito de bem jur?dico-penal e que qualquer tentativa de adapta??o ou mesmo de atualiza??o deste conceito acaba por colocar em xeque sua pr?pria defini??o. Discute-se acerca do referencial do conceito de bem jur?dicopenal como limite ao direito penal, contrapondo-o ao referencial proposto pelo contexto da common law a partir do referencial do harm to other principle. Observase que o conceito de bem jur?dico-penal ? insuficiente para identificar os limites do crime de lavagem de dinheiro, que, ou se apresenta demasiadamente amplo, e assim n?o realiza qualquer limita??o; ou se apresenta excessivamente restrito, e assim n?o permite uma efetiva adequa??o aos prop?sitos que levam a criminaliza??o da lavagem de dinheiro. Verifica-se, com isso, que a aplica??o do harm to other principle apresenta-se como o mecanismo mais adequado para uma efetiva limita??o da estrutura dogm?tica do crime de lavagem de dinheiro.

Submitted by PPG Ci?ncias Criminais (ppgccrim@pucrs.br) on 2018-04-19T11:57:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 PEDRO HENRIQUE - HARM PRINCIPLE BEM JUR?DICO-PENAL E OFENSIVIDADE SUAS IMPLICA??ES RELATIVAS AO USO DE DROGAS.pdf: 1612667 bytes, checksum: 9e67caffda2db09bb8a625f274f1effb (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2018-05-07T16:33:25Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 PEDRO HENRIQUE - HARM PRINCIPLE BEM JUR?DICO-PENAL E OFENSIVIDADE SUAS IMPLICA??ES RELATIVAS AO USO DE DROGAS.pdf: 1612667 bytes, checksum: 9e67caffda2db09bb8a625f274f1effb (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-07T16:38:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PEDRO HENRIQUE - HARM PRINCIPLE BEM JUR?DICO-PENAL E OFENSIVIDADE SUAS IMPLICA??ES RELATIVAS AO USO DE DROGAS.pdf: 1612667 bytes, checksum: 9e67caffda2db09bb8a625f274f1effb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-11-24 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / This study address with the implications (dogmatic and political-criminal) of Harm Principle, Theory of Legal Good and the Principle of Offensiveness concerning the use of drugs. In order to do this, our first two chapters are based on these principles, emphasizing the analysis and problematization aspects of dogmatic and criminal policy. Moreover, since they are the principles of different matrices, the Harm Principle, Anglo-American, and Theory of Legal Good and Offensiveness, continental Europeans, use the methodology of comparative criminal law to provide as bases approach, and to analyze its practical application in relation to the Canadian and Brazilian jurisprudence related to the use of drugs. Thus, it is impossible for a democratic state ruled by law to find an intrasystemic legitimation to prohibit the use of drugs, erroneously considered as illicit, in the case of this criminalization where there is no legitimate legal good and the possibility of affectation of some legal good, both from the perspective of offensiveness and by the Harm Principle, is inconsistent. / Neste estudo abordam-se as implica??es (dogm?ticas e pol?tico-criminais) do Harm Principle, da Teoria do Bem Jur?dico-Penal e do Princ?pio da Ofensividade referentes ao uso de drogas. Para tanto, aprofunda-se sobre tais princ?pios nos dois primeiros cap?tulos, dando ?nfase ? an?lise e problematiza??o dos aspectos dogm?ticos e pol?tico-criminais. Ainda, por se tratarem de princ?pios de matrizes diferentes - sendo o Harm Principle anglo-americano, e a Teoria do Bem Jur?dico-Penal e o Princ?pio da Ofensividade europeus continentais - utiliza-se da metodologia do direito penal comparado para fornecer as bases necess?rias para tal tipo de aproxima??o, analisando-se a sua aplicabilidade pr?tica em rela??o ? jurisprud?ncia canadense e brasileira relacionada ao uso de drogas. Verifica-se a impossibilidade, em um Estado Democr?tico de Direito, de encontrar legitima??o intrassist?mica para proibi??o do consumo de drogas, tidas erroneamente como il?citas, tratando-se de uma criminaliza??o onde inexiste bem jur?dico-penal leg?timo e a possibilidade de afeta??o de algum bem jur?dico, tanto pela perspectiva da ofensividade como pelo Harm Principle, ? inconsistente.

Este trabalho investiga as relações entre a regra da maioria e o princípio do dano de John Stuart Mill. Em suma, seu objetivo é descobrir de que maneira o princípio do dano funciona como um limite à regra da maioria. Diante disso, ao longo desta dissertação, examinam-se as dificuldades enfrentadas por Mill para conciliar utilitarismo e democracia, liberdade e razão. Este trabalho analisa, também, algumas ideias permanentemente presentes na reflexão histórica sobre o liberalismo: os conceitos de liberdade positiva e liberdade negativa; os diversos conceitos de paternalismo; e as muitas críticas dirigidas à regra da maioria / This investigation studies the link between the majority rule and the harm principle by John Stuart Mill. To sum up, the purpose is to find out how the harm principle operates as a limit on majority rule. As a result, throughout this study, we examine the difficulties faced by Mill to reconcile utilitarianism and democracy, liberty and reason. This dissertation analyzes, still, some ideas that were constantly present in historical reflection about liberalism: the concept of the positive liberty and the concept of negative liberty; the various concepts of paternalism; and the many criticisms of the majority rule.

Este trabalho investiga as relações entre a regra da maioria e o princípio do dano de John Stuart Mill. Em suma, seu objetivo é descobrir de que maneira o princípio do dano funciona como um limite à regra da maioria. Diante disso, ao longo desta dissertação, examinam-se as dificuldades enfrentadas por Mill para conciliar utilitarismo e democracia, liberdade e razão. Este trabalho analisa, também, algumas ideias permanentemente presentes na reflexão histórica sobre o liberalismo: os conceitos de liberdade positiva e liberdade negativa; os diversos conceitos de paternalismo; e as muitas críticas dirigidas à regra da maioria / This investigation studies the link between the majority rule and the harm principle by John Stuart Mill. To sum up, the purpose is to find out how the harm principle operates as a limit on majority rule. As a result, throughout this study, we examine the difficulties faced by Mill to reconcile utilitarianism and democracy, liberty and reason. This dissertation analyzes, still, some ideas that were constantly present in historical reflection about liberalism: the concept of the positive liberty and the concept of negative liberty; the various concepts of paternalism; and the many criticisms of the majority rule.

Partant du postulat selon lequel la principale justification de la répression de formes d’expressions réside dans leur nocivité supposée, nous tentons de répondre à la question suivante : comment définir des limites claires et cohérentes à la liberté d’expression ? L’analyse des controverses relatives à la pornographie, et en particulier de la manière dont les notions de liberté d’expression et de nuisance ont été articulées, contribue à répondre à cette question générale. À travers l’analyse des débats portant sur la restriction des représentations sexuelles, nous tentons de montrer que les parties en présence ne sont pas parvenues à définir la notion de « nuisance » de manière claire et satisfaisante, et ne permettent pas, dès lors, de définir avec précision les limites légitimes de la liberté d’expression. Les deux voies théoriques alternatives que nous avons identifiées, les conceptions instrumentales et déontologiques de la liberté d’expression, ne se révèlent pas plus convaincantes. Nous montrons néanmoins qu’il est possible de préciser le principe de non-nuisance en y intégrant deux éléments auparavant négligés : la subjectivité du récepteur, et les rapports d’autorité qui existent entre le locuteur et le récepteur. Nous défendons ainsi l’idée que le principe de non-nuisance reste l’instrument le plus clair et le plus cohérent pour fonder les limites de la liberté d’expression, à condition de l’amender et de le compléter. / Acknowledging the fact that the main justification to restrict some forms of expression lies in the harm they may cause to others, this thesis aims at answering the following question: how do we define clear and coherent limits of the freedom of expression? The study of the controversies regarding pornography, and particularly the way in which the concepts of freedom of expression and harm are closely linked together, is an important contribution in order to answer this vast subject. Through the analysis of debates with regard to sexual representations, this thesis aims at gaining a deeper understanding on how the authors were unsuccessful in defining the notion of « harm » in a clear and convincing way, and fail at allowing to set precisely the legitimate limits of freedom of expression. The two alternative theoretical approaches that were identified and established - the instrumental and deontological conceptions of freedom of expression – were not proven to be more satisfactory either. However, this research confirms that the harm principle can be clarified if two previously neglected aspects are included in the analysis: the receiver’s subjectivity, and the authority relationship established between the speaker and the viewer. Thus, it is argued that the harm principle, given that it is modified and completed, remains the most effective and adequate tool in order to ground the limits of freedom of expression.

The thesis will examine the harm principle, as originally described by John Stuart Mill. In doing so, it will defend that, though unintended, the harm principle may justify several principles of distributive justice. To augment this analysis, the paper will examine several secondary authors’ interpretations of the harm principle, including potential critiques of the thesis itself.

The present investigations study the John Stuart Mill thinking and his position towards paternalism justification, taking into account the harm principle elaborated in his book “On Liberty”. Two are the objectives of this paper. In first place, the anti - paternalist tesis sustained by this autor will be analyzed to identify deficiencies and limitations. In second place, it is sought to determine to what extent they actually opposed such interventions, to verify the accuracy of that somewhat extended belief that sees Mill a strong opponent of paternalism. It is concluded that the defects of Mill’s theses are explained in good account due to an excess of optimism in the capacities of human beings for self-regulation, a strong skepticism about the capacity of the State to achieve effective paternalistic measures, granting From an excessively strong and unrealistic weight to individual autonomy, among other erroneous considerations. It is also concluded that it is not correct to say that John Stuart Mill has maintained an extremely broad or almost absolute antipaternalistic thesis. Although his famous principle of harm makes it impossible to validate many measures of this nature, a more detailed review of his entire work shows that Mill admitted the validity of many interventions in adults. / La presente investigación estudia el pensamiento de John Stuart Mill y su posición alrededor de la justificación del paternalismo, tomando en consideración el principio de daño elaborado en su obra “Sobre la libertad”. Dos son los objetivos de este trabajo. En primer lugar, se analizarán las tesis anti-paternalistas sostenidas por este autor para identificar sus deficiencias y limitaciones. En segundo lugar, se busca determinar hasta qué punto dichas tesis realmente se opusieron a dichas intervenciones, para verificar la exactitud de aquella creencia algo extendida que considera a Mill como un fuerte opositor del paternalismo. Se concluye que los defectos de las tesis de Mill se explican en buena cuenta debido a un exceso de optimismo en las capacidades de los seres humanos para la auto-regulación, un fuerte escepticismo sobre la capacidad del Estado para lograr medidas paternalistas efectivas, el otorgamiento de un peso excesivamente fuerte e irrealista a la autonomía individual, entre otras consideraciones erróneas. Asimismo se concluye que no es correcto afirmar que John Stuart Mill haya sostenido una tesis anti-paternalista sumamente amplia o casi absoluta. Si bien su famoso principio de daño permite excluir de validez a muchas medidas de dicha naturaleza, una revisión más detallada de toda su obra permite mostrar que Mill admitió la validez de muchas intervenciones en adultos.

This thesis analyzes the beliefs of population theorist Julian L. Simon through the creation of a harm principle. It specifically analyzes his argument that we value our freedom to choose how many children we want above all other values in the context of overpopulation and environmental destruction. The developed harm principle is meant to give us a method to decide how to balance our personal freedom with our security-survival. I begin with an overview of Simon’s work, as well as an exposition of other prominent population theorists. I then propose a principle that is a utilitarian alternative to John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle. I apply the principle to the situation wherein overpopulation causes such great environmental damage that we must choose between upholding procreative rights and our continued survival. I conclude that in most cases we will accept limitations on our procreative freedom in order to maintain our planet and ensure our security-survival.

O princípio do dano, assim como elaborado por John Stuart Mill em On Liberty, é tido como elemento fundamental à afirmação do liberalismo a partir do século XIX e seu desenvolvimento rumo ao século XX. Diante das nascentes democracias européias foi afirmado como um princípio absoluto de proteção à liberdade individual contra a imposição da moralidade pela opinião pública e pelo Estado. Mill partilhava o apreço de Tocqueville pela democracia sem deixar de temer a tirania das maiorias. Inicialmente, investiga-se o lugar do princípio do dano na filosofia política milliana e as fragilidades apontadas por seus críticos. Em um segundo momento, analisa-se sua influência na defesa das liberdades civis na Inglaterra da década de 1950, especificamente com a edição do Relatório Wolfenden que defendeu a descriminalização de práticas homossexuais, bem como o debate que se lhe seguiu sobre os limites do Direito protagonizado por H.L.A. Hart. Na última parte, o objeto do estudo é o princípio do dano agora inserido em uma doutrina liberal-perfeccionista, assim como formulada por Joseph Raz em A Moralidade da Liberdade. O objetivo final é revelar a existência de incoerências internas no princípio do dano, tanto em sua versão original como nas que lhe sucederam, de modo a impedir a fixação de uma espaço imune ao Direito e à imposição da moralidade. No entanto, visto da perspectiva adequada, o fracasso na elaboração de tal princípio deve ser relativizado, eis que no seu devir o princípio do dano serviu à reflexão acerca dos limites da coerção legítima, bem como ao aprimoramento de conceitos relevantes à filosofia política como moralismo legal, paternalismo e perfeccionismo jurídicos. / The harm principle, as elaborated by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, is regarded as a key element to the assertion of liberalism from the 19th century and its development into the 20th century. Facing emerging European democracies it was stated as an absolute principle of individual freedom against the enforcement of morality by governments and public opinion. Mill, as well as Tocqueville, appreciate democracy but fear the "tyranny of the majority". Initially, we investigate the place of the Millian harm principle in his political philosophy and its weakness as pointed out by its critics. Then, we analyze harm principles influence on civil rights movement in Englands 1950s, notably in theWolfenden Reports debate between HLA Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin about the limits of the law. In the last section we face the liberal-perfectionism of Joseph Raz Morality of Freedom and his view about the harm principle. We argue as a final statement the existence of harm principles internal inconsistencies, both in its original version and later ones, that disables it to be an adequate liberal response to the legal enforcement of morality. However its failures, harm principle seems to produce a deep and useful debate about the legitimacy of such fundamental concepts of philosophy of law as legal coercion, legal moralism, legal paternalism and perfectionism.