O princípio do dano, assim como elaborado por John Stuart Mill em On Liberty, é tido como elemento fundamental à afirmação do liberalismo a partir do século XIX e seu desenvolvimento rumo ao século XX. Diante das nascentes democracias européias foi afirmado como um princípio absoluto de proteção à liberdade individual contra a imposição da moralidade pela opinião pública e pelo Estado. Mill partilhava o apreço de Tocqueville pela democracia sem deixar de temer a tirania das maiorias. Inicialmente, investiga-se o lugar do princípio do dano na filosofia política milliana e as fragilidades apontadas por seus críticos. Em um segundo momento, analisa-se sua influência na defesa das liberdades civis na Inglaterra da década de 1950, especificamente com a edição do Relatório Wolfenden que defendeu a descriminalização de práticas homossexuais, bem como o debate que se lhe seguiu sobre os limites do Direito protagonizado por H.L.A. Hart. Na última parte, o objeto do estudo é o princípio do dano agora inserido em uma doutrina liberal-perfeccionista, assim como formulada por Joseph Raz em A Moralidade da Liberdade. O objetivo final é revelar a existência de incoerências internas no princípio do dano, tanto em sua versão original como nas que lhe sucederam, de modo a impedir a fixação de uma espaço imune ao Direito e à imposição da moralidade. No entanto, visto da perspectiva adequada, o fracasso na elaboração de tal princípio deve ser relativizado, eis que no seu devir o princípio do dano serviu à reflexão acerca dos limites da coerção legítima, bem como ao aprimoramento de conceitos relevantes à filosofia política como moralismo legal, paternalismo e perfeccionismo jurídicos. / The harm principle, as elaborated by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, is regarded as a key element to the assertion of liberalism from the 19th century and its development into the 20th century. Facing emerging European democracies it was stated as an absolute principle of individual freedom against the enforcement of morality by governments and public opinion. Mill, as well as Tocqueville, appreciate democracy but fear the "tyranny of the majority". Initially, we investigate the place of the Millian harm principle in his political philosophy and its weakness as pointed out by its critics. Then, we analyze harm principles influence on civil rights movement in Englands 1950s, notably in theWolfenden Reports debate between HLA Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin about the limits of the law. In the last section we face the liberal-perfectionism of Joseph Raz Morality of Freedom and his view about the harm principle. We argue as a final statement the existence of harm principles internal inconsistencies, both in its original version and later ones, that disables it to be an adequate liberal response to the legal enforcement of morality. However its failures, harm principle seems to produce a deep and useful debate about the legitimacy of such fundamental concepts of philosophy of law as legal coercion, legal moralism, legal paternalism and perfectionism.

Climate change is the defining challenge of this generation, and transforming our energy systems is the largest part of solving this challenge. Nations have pledged goals in the distant future, but these are insufficient to keep the planet below 2℃ of warming. Citizens have taken legal action against states, and legal action between states seems soon to follow. Both have been studied substantially, though there has yet to be a comparison of different principles under international law and for the question to be contextualised within the energy transition. This gap will be addressed with the research question of this thesis which will seek to find how countries can be held legally responsible using the no-harm principle and human rights principle for not sufficiently undertaking a sustainable energy transition and, if possible, be forced to act more quickly. The question will be answered through a qualitative document analysis of relevant cases and legally binding treaties related to the No-harm principle and human rights approach. The findings demonstrate that the No-harm principle was the better option for pursuing such a case given its expansive authority through theResponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (IWA) treaty, which codifies the No-harm principle into international law and has argued numerous environmental cases successfully. However, the No-harm principle and IWA can only be brought by states, which is challenging due to its implication for international relations. The human rights-based approach does not have this risk as citizens can bring cases forward, though there is a significant gap due to a lack of courts in some parts of the world. The results will suggest an ideal case based on these ideal characteristics: a Small Islands Developing Nation bringing a case against the G20 based on a violation of the No-harm principle and the IWA. Though this case was determined to be the most likely to succeed in inducing high emission countries to take action, the duration of such a case and its final process remains in question.

A legitimidade da criminalização de condutas na legislação brasileira de prevenção e combate à lavagem de dinheiro, bem como seu tratamento em âmbito internacional, e a dificuldade encontrada em sua adequada delimitação e aplicação eficaz constituem a problemática central desta tese. A justificação, validade, legitimidade e pertinência desta criminalização são analisadas criticamente em aprofundada discussão dos problemas atinentes ao sistema penal e como este pode, ou não, trabalhar com a atual criminalização da lavagem de dinheiro. São idealizados referenciais básicos, almejando, no mínimo, efeitos menos deletérios em uma tipificação tida como exemplo de quão gravemente os princípios fundamentais do direito penal liberal podem ser agredidos no afã criminalizante. Os resultados alcançados neste trabalho se traduzem na conclusão pela ilegitimidade desta tipificação penal na atual forma e na proposição do estabelecimento de contornos nítidos para a delimitação da responsabilidade criminal neste delito. Para além dos estreitos limites do direito penal, outra abordagem é oferecida, visando propiciar uma solução aos conflitos que surgem na sociedade brasileira em decorrência de condutas de lavagem de dinheiro, ultrapassando-se definitivamente o tecnicismo jurídico em favor de um sistema funcional de direito penal e, sobretudo, condizente com os fundamentos de um Estado Democrático de Direito. / The legitimacy of7 the criminalization of money laundering conducts in the Brazilian legislation and its treatment in the international forum, as well as the difficulties faced in adequately limiting the extent and effective application of that law constitute the main focus of this doctoral thesis. The justification, validity, legitimacy and pertinence of this criminalization are critically analyzed through detailed discussion of the problems posed in view of the penal system and of whether it could possible work with the contemporary criminalization of money laundering. Basic guidelines are developed with the goal of, at least, containing the negative impact of a criminalization that is seen as an example for how gravely elementary criminal law principles can be hurt in through excessive use of the criminal law. The results reached translate into the conclusion of the illegitimacy of the criminalization of money laundering in its current form and in a suggestion for the stipulation of clear limits to the reach of criminal responsibility for this conduct. Beyond the narrow area of criminal law, another approach is offered, aiming at creating a solution for the conflicts which arise in Brazilian society as a consequence to acts of Money laundering, thereby favoring a systemic approach under observation of the fundamental principles of a democratic State founded on the rule of law.

A legitimidade da criminalização de condutas na legislação brasileira de prevenção e combate à lavagem de dinheiro, bem como seu tratamento em âmbito internacional, e a dificuldade encontrada em sua adequada delimitação e aplicação eficaz constituem a problemática central desta tese. A justificação, validade, legitimidade e pertinência desta criminalização são analisadas criticamente em aprofundada discussão dos problemas atinentes ao sistema penal e como este pode, ou não, trabalhar com a atual criminalização da lavagem de dinheiro. São idealizados referenciais básicos, almejando, no mínimo, efeitos menos deletérios em uma tipificação tida como exemplo de quão gravemente os princípios fundamentais do direito penal liberal podem ser agredidos no afã criminalizante. Os resultados alcançados neste trabalho se traduzem na conclusão pela ilegitimidade desta tipificação penal na atual forma e na proposição do estabelecimento de contornos nítidos para a delimitação da responsabilidade criminal neste delito. Para além dos estreitos limites do direito penal, outra abordagem é oferecida, visando propiciar uma solução aos conflitos que surgem na sociedade brasileira em decorrência de condutas de lavagem de dinheiro, ultrapassando-se definitivamente o tecnicismo jurídico em favor de um sistema funcional de direito penal e, sobretudo, condizente com os fundamentos de um Estado Democrático de Direito. / The legitimacy of7 the criminalization of money laundering conducts in the Brazilian legislation and its treatment in the international forum, as well as the difficulties faced in adequately limiting the extent and effective application of that law constitute the main focus of this doctoral thesis. The justification, validity, legitimacy and pertinence of this criminalization are critically analyzed through detailed discussion of the problems posed in view of the penal system and of whether it could possible work with the contemporary criminalization of money laundering. Basic guidelines are developed with the goal of, at least, containing the negative impact of a criminalization that is seen as an example for how gravely elementary criminal law principles can be hurt in through excessive use of the criminal law. The results reached translate into the conclusion of the illegitimacy of the criminalization of money laundering in its current form and in a suggestion for the stipulation of clear limits to the reach of criminal responsibility for this conduct. Beyond the narrow area of criminal law, another approach is offered, aiming at creating a solution for the conflicts which arise in Brazilian society as a consequence to acts of Money laundering, thereby favoring a systemic approach under observation of the fundamental principles of a democratic State founded on the rule of law.

This is a thesis about anti-paternalism – the liberal doctrine that we may not interfere with a person’s liberty for her own good. Empirical circumstances and moral values may certainly give us reason to avoid benevolent interference. Anti-paternalism as a normative doctrine should, however, be rejected. Essay I concerns the definitions of paternalism and anti-paternalism. It is argued that only a definition of paternalism in terms of compound reason-actions can accommodate its special moral properties. Definitions in terms of actions, common in the literature, cannot. It is argued, furthermore, that in specifying the reason-actions in further detail, the notion of what is self-regarding, as opposed to other-regarding, is irrelevant, contrary to received opinion. Essay II starts out with the definition of paternalism defended in essay I and claims that however this very general definition is specified, anti-paternalism is unreasonable and should be rejected. Anti-paternalism is the position that certain reasons – referring one way or the other to the good of a person, give no valid normative support to certain actions – some kind of interferences with the same person. Since the reasons in question are normally quite legitimate and important reasons for action, a convincing argument for anti-paternalism must explain why they are invalid in cases of interference. A closer look at the reasons and actions in question provides no basis for such an explanation. Essay III considers a concrete case of benevolent interference – the withholding of information concerning uncertain threats to public health in the public’s best interest. Such a policy has been suggested in relation to the European Commission’s proposed new system for the Registration, Evaluation, and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH). Information about uncertain threats to health from chemicals would allegedly spread anxiety and depression and thus do more harm than good. The avoidance of negative health effects is accepted as a legitimate and good reason for withholding of information, thus respecting the conclusion of essay II, that anti-paternalism should be rejected. Other reasons, however, tip the balance in favour of making the information available. These reasons include the net effects on knowledge, psychological effects, effects on private decisions and effects on political decisions. / QC 20101115

My aim with this essay is to investigate if Australia's approach; implementation of lockdown, vaccine passport and restriction of the right of assembly and the impact on public protest is compatible with John Stuart Mill's harm principle. I found a conflict between the individual freedom and harm to others. One the one hand, to implement restrictions intervenes with the autonomy of an individual; of one’s body, freedom to move around freely and with freedom of speech. But on the other hand, not implementing these restrictions could potentially harm others by letting the virus spread in the society. My interpretation of Mill's harm principle is that liberty originates from the individual as a progressive being, hence I claim that allowing people to live their life as they chose -”experiment of living”, will lead to a better and happier society. I argue that the Australian government's approaches during the Covid 19 pandemic was not compatible with the harm principle’s individualistic core as I claim Australia neglected individual freedom. However, I argue that some restrictions might be compatible to the harm principle if they are proportional, time limited and properly scrutinised.

Il y a 150 ans, John Stuart Mill dénonçait l'emprise tyrannique de la morale publique sur la vie des individus et affirmait que le principe du préjudice à autrui constitue l'unique critère en vertu duquel l'État peut légitimement interférer avec la liberté individuelle. Près d'un siècle plus tard, en réaction au rapport Wolfenden, Lord Devlin articulait une version de la thèse du moralisme juridique en faveur du maintien de l'interdiction criminelle des pratiques homosexuelles en privé entre adultes consentants. Cette thèse du moralisme juridique a fait l'objet de nombreuses critiques. Selon deux des plus influents philosophes et théoriciens du droit du XXe siècle, Herbert L.A. Hart et Ronald Dworkin, le rôle légitime des valeurs de la communauté, dans la justification de l'intervention coerctive de l'État dans la vie des individus, doit être déterminé du point de vue de la morale critique. Ces débats philosophiques ont profondément influencé le discours judiciaire au Canada. La jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada depuis l'avènement de la Charte témoigne de deux tendances dans l'interprétation et l'application du principe du préjudice lors de l'examen de la légitimité des objectifs législatifs à la première étape du test Oakes. Selon une première approche, qui légitimise souvent un activisme judiciaire, la justification des mesures attentatoires doit reposer sur la démonstration d'un préjudice aux valeurs officiellement reconnues. Selon une deuxième approche, qui préconise plutôt une attitude de déférence envers les choix moraux du législateur, la démonstration d'un préjudice n'est pas un prérequis : l'existence de considérations morales objectives suffit. / 150 years ago, John Stuart Mill denounced the tyrannical hold of public morality on the life of individuals and asserted that the principle of harm to others constituted the sole criterion under which the State may legitimately interfere with individual liberties. A century later, in response to the Wolfenden report, Lord Devlin developed a version of the legal moralism thesis which supported the criminal prohibition of homosexual practices made in private between consenting adults. This thesis of legal moralism has been widely criticized. According to two of the most influent legal philosophers and theorists of the twentieth century, Herbert L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, the legitimate role of community values in the justification of coercive intervention of the State in the lives of individuals must be determined according to the principles of critical morality. These philosophical debates have profoundly influenced the judicial discourse in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada decisions rendered since the entrenchment of the Charter show two trends in the interpretation and application of the harm principle in the examination of the legitimacy of the legislative objectives at the first stage of the Oakes test. According to the first trend, that often legitimizes judicial activism, the justification of an infringement must rely on the demonstration of a prejudice to values officially recognized. According to the second trend, which favours deference towards the legislator's moral choices, the harm principle is not a requisite: The existence of objective moral considerations suffices.

La tesi si propone l'obiettivo di investigare il ruolo che il diritto penale può avere nel fronteggiare i cosiddetti "problemi della modernità". In particolare, ci si interroga sulle reali capacità che lo strumento penalistico, attraverso i reati di pericolo astratto e delle fattispecie incentrate sul principio di precauzione, può avere nel garantire adeguata tutela ai sistemi ecologici. Il primo capitolo del lavoro è dedicato alla disamina critica delle posizioni dottrinali emerse in ordine alla definizione del pericolo quale elemento costitutivo della fattispecie, mentre il secondo si concentra sull'analisi del principio comunitario di precauzione, con l'obiettivo di segnalare i rischi dell'appiattimento della legislazione penale su tale principio. Nel corso dei successivi capitoli lo studio si concentra sulla complessa realtà della legislazione ambientale e vuole evidenziare, da un lato, come le fattispecie di pericolo astratto presunto mal si prestino a garantire opportuna salvaguardia al sistema complesso costituito dalle matrici ecologiche e, dall'altro, come la recente introduzione dei reati contro il bene ambiente all'interno del codice penale non abbia affatto rimediato ai diversi profili di ineffettività del sistema. In conclusione del lavoro, si propone un nuovo modello di gestione della questione ambientale, fondato su una più marcata valorizzazione dei profili di responsabilità della persona giuridica, unico soggetto realmente in grado di prevenire e contrastare i più gravi fatti di compromissione ambientale. / The thesis aims to investigate the role that criminal law can play in dealing with the so-called "problems of modernity". In particular, the paper investigates the real capabilities that the criminal instrument can have in guaranteeing adequate protection to ecological systems. The first chapter of the work is dedicated to the critical examination of the doctrinal positions in order to define danger as a constitutive element of the crime, while the second focuses on the analysis of the precautionary principle. In the following chapters, the study focuses on the complex reality of environmental legislation and aims to highlight, on one hand, how crimes of abstract danger cannot guarantee adequate protection to the complex system constituted by the ecological matrices and, on the other hand, how the recent introduction of crimes against the environment within the criminal code has not at all remedied the different profiles of ineffectiveness of the system. In conclusion, a new model of managing environmental issue is proposed, based on a more marked enhancement of the profiles of responsibility of the legal person, the only subject really able to prevent and counter the most serious facts of environmental compromise.

This thesis is an attempt to constructively interpret and critically evaluate the liberal doctrine that we may not limit a person’s liberty for her own good, and to discuss its implications and alternatives in some concrete areas of public health policy. The thesis starts theoretical and goes ever more practical. The first paper is devoted to positive interpretation of anti-paternalism with special focus on the reason component – personal good. A novel generic definition of paternalism is proposed, intended to capture, in a generous fashion, the object of traditional liberal resistance to paternalism – the invocation of personal good reasons for limiting of or interfering with a person’s liberty. In the second paper, the normative aspect of this resistance is given a somewhat technical interpretation in terms of invalidation of reasons – the blocking of reasons from influencing the moral status of actions according to their strength. It is then argued that normative anti-paternalism so understood is unreasonable, on three grounds: 1) Since the doctrine only applies to sufficiently voluntary action, voluntariness determines validity of reasons, which is unwarranted and leads to wrong answers to moral questions. 2) Since voluntariness comes in degrees, a threshold must be set where personal good reasons are invalidated, leading to peculiar jumps in the justifiability of actions. 3) Anti-paternalism imposes an untenable and unhelpful distinction between the value of respecting choices that are sufficiently voluntary and choices that are not. The third paper adds to this critique the fourth argument that none of the action types typically proposed to specify the action component of paternalism is such that performing an action of that type out of benevolence is essentially morally problematic. The fourth paper ignores the critique in the second and third papers and proposes, in an anti-paternalistic spirit, a series of rules for the justification of option-restricting policies aimed at groups where some members consent to the policy and some do not. Such policies present the liberal with a dilemma where the value of not restricting people’s options without their consent conflicts with the value of allowing people to shape their lives according to their own wishes. The fifth paper applies the understanding of anti-paternalism developed in the earlier papers to product safety regulation, as an example of a public health policy area. The sixth paper explores in more detail a specific public health policy, namely that of mandatory alcohol interlocks in all cars, proposed by the former Swedish government and supported by the Swedish National Road Administration. The policy is evaluated for cost-effectiveness, for possible diffusion of individual responsibility, and for paternalistic treatment of drivers. The seventh paper argues for a liberal policy in the area of dissemination of information about uncertain threats to public health. The argument against paternalism is based on common sense consequentialist considerations, avoiding any appeal to the normative anti-paternalism rejected earlier in the thesis. / QC 20100714

<p>This is a thesis about anti-paternalism – the liberal doctrine that we may not interfere with a person’s liberty for her own good. Empirical circumstances and moral values may certainly give us reason to avoid benevolent interference. Anti-paternalism as a normative doctrine should, however, be rejected.</p><p><em>Essay I</em> concerns the definitions of paternalism and anti-paternalism. It is argued that only a definition of paternalism in terms of compound reason-actions can accommodate its special moral properties. Definitions in terms of actions, common in the literature, cannot. It is argued, furthermore, that in specifying the reason-actions in further detail, the notion of what is self-regarding, as opposed to other-regarding, is irrelevant, contrary to received opinion.</p><p><em>Essay II </em>starts out with the definition of paternalism defended in essay I and claims that however this very general definition is specified, anti-paternalism is unreasonable and should be rejected. Anti-paternalism is the position that certain reasons – referring one way or the other to the good of a person, give no valid normative support to certain actions – some kind of interferences with the same person. Since the reasons in question are normally quite legitimate and important reasons for action, a convincing argument for anti-paternalism must explain why they are invalid in cases of interference. A closer look at the reasons and actions in question provides no basis for such an explanation.</p><p><em>Essay III</em> considers a concrete case of benevolent interference – the withholding of information concerning uncertain threats to public health in the public’s best interest. Such a policy has been suggested in relation to the European Commission’s proposed new system for the<em> R</em>egistration, <em>E</em>valuation, and <em>A</em>uthorisation of <em>Ch</em>emicals (REACH). Information about uncertain threats to health from chemicals would allegedly spread anxiety and depression and thus do more harm than good. The avoidance of negative health effects is accepted as a legitimate and good reason for withholding of information, thus respecting the conclusion of essay II, that anti-paternalism should be rejected. Other reasons, however, tip the balance in favour of making the information available. These reasons include the net effects on knowledge, psychological effects, effects on private decisions and effects on political decisions.</p>